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THE GROWTH OF THE *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, 1926–1949

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I

It is a traditional practice for individuals and institutions to celebrate anniversaries, particularly such landmarks as the half century and centennial years. Perhaps more significant in the case of professional journals are the periods ending distinguished editorships. This article deals with the growth of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW under the editorship of Frederick A. Ogg covering the period 1926–1949.

The Ogg editorship of the REVIEW is perhaps not the longest to be found in the annals of American academic journals, but, extending as it did over a period of twenty-four years, it is nevertheless impressive from the standpoint of any measuring stick based on time. As far as the REVIEW itself is concerned, the Ogg editorship easily establishes a record. W. W. Willoughby, the first editor, served approximately ten years and John A. Fairlie, his successor in the editor's chair, completed nine years of service.

But while the duration of an editorship is not without significance, other aspects are perhaps even more important. If a few editors of journals in other professional fields may have equalled or even exceeded the Ogg editorship in point of time, it is to be doubted whether any has made more of an impact, or has devoted himself more generously to his work. Professor Ogg used his editorial pencil vigorously in connection with the articles both long and short; in addition, he prepared the news and notes, assigned the book reviews, read the printer's proof, and solicited advertisements from various publishers. Aside from the preparation of the "Recent Publications of Political Interest," "Government Publications," and the "Index," all of the heavy burden of getting out the REVIEW fell on his shoulders. The American Political Science Association has, of course, provided a few hundred dollars each year

for a part-time secretary, but the work itself, both that of formulating editorial policies and of performing the drudgery, was done in very large measure by the editor himself. For this service the American Political Science Association paid a modest honorarium which did not exceed $1000 per year.

To this writer the most remarkable aspect of the Ogg editorship was the wholehearted devotion to the task to be performed. Professor Ogg's contribution to the University of Wisconsin as professor of political science and as chairman of its Department of Political Science over many years is attested by the volume prepared by former students bearing the title *The Study of Comparative Government*[1] and by the dinner given in his honor by the University upon his retirement in 1948. His contribution to the literature in the field is too well known to require detailed attention—the mere mention of *Introduction to the Study of American Government*, *Essentials of American Government*, *European Governments and Politics*, *English Government and Politics*, and *Modern Foreign Governments* suffices. But if one had to select the part of his career which was nearest to his heart, it would, in this author's judgment, be the editorship of the REVIEW. To give undivided attention to the demands of the REVIEW, Ogg resigned from social organizations; to his associates in the book-writing field, he sometimes sent word that there would be a delay because of work in connection with the REVIEW. If one can designate a professional journal as an editor's "brainchild," one would have to go far to find a better example than the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW under the editorship of Professor Ogg.

II

In the succeeding paragraphs attention will be given to some of the details of the growth of the REVIEW under Editor Ogg.

Though the American Political Science Association dates back almost to the beginning of the century, it did not launch the REVIEW until 1906, contenting itself with an annual volume of *Proceedings* in 1904 and 1905.[2] During the first year of publication, 1906–1907, the four numbers of the REVIEW totaled 721 pages. Three years later, in 1909–1910, the number of pages had fallen back to 653. When W. W. Willoughby surrendered the editorship in 1916, the four numbers ran to 831 pages and a supplement of 62 pages brought the total to 893. Instead of increasing in size during the early years of John A. Fairlie's able

[1] (New York, 1949).

[2] The last volume of *Proceedings*, which continued publication for several years after the REVIEW was started, appeared in 1913.

editorship, the REVIEW actually was forced to curtail because of the high prices of paper and printing—from 827 pages in 1917, it dropped to 772 in 1918, 734 in 1919, and 656 in 1921. Then it started to increase in length again, but it was not until 1924 that it reached the point noted in 1916. When Professor Fairlie surrendered the editorship at the end of 1925, the total number of pages ran to 909.

Under the Ogg editorship the REVIEW started with four numbers aggregating 944 pages in 1926. By 1930 there were still four numbers per year, but the total pages had increased to 1,136. In 1932 the REVIEW became a bimonthly and a change in the type increased the contents of each page by 16 to 18 per cent. In 1935 the number of pages ran to 1,130; in 1940 to 1,264; in 1945 to 1,256. The final year of the Ogg editorship saw 1,243 pages exclusive of some 100 pages of advertising. An increase in the amount of printed matter on each page in mid-1949 added appreciably to the content of the 1949 volume. The latter years of the Ogg editorship saw the REVIEW facing even higher paper and printing costs than during the period following World War I, but this time it was possible to forge ahead despite such difficulties in contrast to the sharp curtailment at the earlier period.[3]

When the Ogg editorship began in 1926, the REVIEW had a circulation of 1,586, including exchanges, and 1,900 copies were printed. The growth in circulation during the first years was modest—by 1930 one notes an increase of 200 in the number of copies printed. By 1935 there was still a circulation of only 1,854, with 2,000 copies printed. Actually the problem during much of this time was to keep the circulation from a sharp decline because of the depression. By 1940 the tide had turned noticeably and 2,857 copies were being distributed *exclusive* of exchanges.[4] This year saw from 2,800 to 3,200 copies printed. By 1945 there had been a further gain to 3,466 circulation exclusive of exchanges, with 3,600 to 3,800 copies printed. The largest increase has been registered during the years 1945–1949. In 1949, 5,140 copies of the REVIEW exclusive of exchanges were mailed to subscribers and a total of 5,300 to 5,500 copies were printed. Inasmuch as the system of reporting changed somewhat during the years 1926–1949, it is difficult to make exact comparisons, but under any method of computation it is readily apparent that there was more than a three-fold increase.

[3] The statistical material included in the remainder of this article comes from three sources. On the years down to 1926 it is exclusively drawn from the report of John A. Fairlie, as he surrendered the editorship, published in the REVIEW, Vol. 20, pp. 181–184 (1926). On the years from 1926–1949 the material has been taken from the reports of the Editor and the Secretary-Treasurer of the Association.

[4] The reports originally included the exchange copies, but since 1940 circulation figures have been exclusive of exchange copies.

But mere circulation figures, as important as they are, do not tell the whole story. Although no lists are available showing the exact subscribers to the REVIEW during the early days, it is known that the copies went almost exclusively to members of the profession and to libraries in the United States. From the position in 1926 when foreign distribution was confined to a few copies going to Canada and Great Britain, it can now be reported that 50 countries are entered on the mailing lists of the REVIEW and that more than five hundred copies are sent to libraries and individuals in these countries. Canada leads the list with 67 copies and Great Britain follows with 46 copies; China is down for 43, Germany for 35, Japan and the Pacific islands for 35, France for 29, India for 28, Italy for 23, and Brazil for 20 copies. Iron curtain or not, the Soviet Union receives seven copies of the REVIEW, Poland nine, Hungary six, Czechoslovakia six, and even Bulgaria and Roumania apparently accept four and three copies respectively. In the case of foreign circulation, the great majority of copies go to libraries, universities, and institutions where a number of persons may be expected to see the REVIEW. Out of slightly over 540 copies sent abroad, approximately 400 are accounted for by such subscriptions. It is appropriate to recognize the contribution of the Social Science Research Council which furnishes the funds for 150 of these subscriptions to libraries. At the end of the Ogg editorship the REVIEW had thus become encouragingly international in circulation, though one might wish that there were even more foreign libraries and universities receiving copies.

It may be of some interest to report the cost of printing the REVIEW during the period. In 1926 the total amount was given as $4,297.64. This had increased to $5,162.55, exclusive of reprints, in 1930. By 1935 the cost had fallen to $4,441.04, exclusive of reprints. The year 1940 saw higher prices again and the printing bill ran to $6,320, exclusive of reprints. By 1945 there had been a moderate increase in costs to $7,881.69, but the big rise occurred during the period 1945–49. In 1949 the bill ran to $17,794.55. While a part of this increased cost may be attributed to the nearly fifty per cent increase in circulation between 1940 and 1949, a larger proportion is chargeable to the printing rates which more than doubled during the same period.

III

Though Professor Fairlie had noted in his final report as editor that "nearly all of the papers which have come to the editor have been published, as well as articles from other sources,"[5] Professor Ogg soon found

[5] AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 20, p. 182 (1926).

that one of his main problems was that of selecting the material that space permitted from the volume of contributions which were submitted. At times he noted in his reports that the quality was not all that one might wish and, as the new journals in public administration and the international field began publication, he expressed concern lest they would attract most of the first-class manuscripts in those particular fields. But there was rarely a time during his entire editorship when space was not at a premium and some deserving material did not have to look elsewhere for publication.

While the distribution of space does not reflect the developments in the whole field of political science without distortion, it is nevertheless quite illuminating. Some features have appeared in every number or at least in every volume; others have come and gone. In certain instances the relative importance has remained more or less constant; in others there has been rather spectacular growth or falling away.

Doubtless most readers of the REVIEW would rank the leading articles as the most important single feature, though they may turn first to the "News and Notes." Inasmuch as the REVIEW is the official journal of the American Political Science Association and consequently must find space for a considerable amount of service material, the proportion of space devoted to leading articles has always been less than in certain other academic periodicals which either serve functional or regional associations. Generally speaking, the proportionate space assigned to leading articles has not been increased to the same extent as has that of certain other features. Indeed one might conclude that leading articles actually bulked larger during the very early days of the REVIEW than has been the case during more recent years.

In the first volume of the REVIEW, for example, leading articles accounted for 306 pages out of 721, or more than 40 per cent of the total. Ten years later, in 1916, leading articles ran to 393 pages out of 831, or almost 50 per cent. However, by 1925, the year before the Ogg editorship started, they received only 232 pages out of 909, or less than 30 per cent. In 1930 they accounted for 211 pages out of 1,122 pages, less than 20 per cent. The relative space increased somewhat in 1935 and 1940, with 241 and 263 pages respectively out of 1,130 and 1,264 pages, but in 1945 there was a drop to 175 pages out of a total of 1,256. The last year of the Ogg editorship saw 230 pages of leading articles and 107 pages of symposia which might well be included in the general category, or a total of 337 pages out of 1,243. These figures represent a marked increase over 1945 and some increase over 1940 and 1935.

The early years of the REVIEW saw considerable attention paid to

legislative matters. The first volume in 1906 started with 114 pages of such subject matter and ten years later there were 99 pages. In 1925 the space had shrunk to 71 pages and by 1930 it had further decreased to 58 pages. In 1935 only 15 pages were given to legislative notes. Later reports of the editor do not show that any space was devoted to such a feature, though without doubt a certain amount of attention was given in general notes and articles on "American Government and Politics."

Strangely enough, the early volumes of the REVIEW seem to have more or less ignored the field of court decisions and constitutional law. The first volume apparently included only four pages on such a topic and in 1911 no space is reported in this category. Beginning with 1916 greater interest appears with 34 pages and in 1920 the editor's report shows 69 pages here. This was cut to 35 pages in 1925, but during the Ogg editorship the record is more consistent. In 1930 judicial decisions, including federal and state constitutional law, filled 58 pages; in 1935, 45 pages; in 1940, 54 pages; in 1945, 51 pages; and in 1949, 65 pages. The volumes of 1930 and 1935 reported 27 and 19 pages respectively devoted to "Judicial Organization and Procedure" which perhaps should be added.

Notes relating to international affairs seem to display greater variation than almost any other REVIEW feature, perhaps because of the special journals in that field. Starting out with 11 pages in the first volume, the reports for 1911 and 1916 show a blank after "International Affairs." In 1920, 30 pages were given over to such reports and in 1925, 18 pages. The years of the Ogg editorship show approximately as sharp variation, with 23 pages in 1930, 40 in 1935, 76 in 1940, 123 in 1945, and a steep decline to 17 in 1949.

The space set aside for items relating to foreign governments has varied from time to time, though perhaps not as sharply as for those in international affairs. Reports for 1906, 1911, and 1916 show blanks after this category, but in 1920 these items covered 27 pages and in 1925, 80 pages. Under the Ogg editorship "Foreign Governments and Politics" made a good showing in 1930 with 69 pages, but in 1935 there was a drop to 32 pages. In 1940 an increase to 49 pages was reported and in 1945 a still further increase to 75 pages, but in 1949, with 25 pages, there was a drop to the lowest position since 1916.

The early reports seem to indicate that no space was devoted to items in the American government field, as such, but this must be the result of the classification used. After blanks for 1906, 1911, and 1916 this category appears in 1920 for the first time with 32 pages; by 1925 it had fallen back to only 12 pages. During the Ogg editorship no special sub-

ject-matter field has fared as well as "American Government and Politics." Starting out with 112 pages in 1930 there has been a consistent rise every five years, except for 1949. In 1935 this feature came in for 133 pages; in 1940, for 149 pages; and in 1945, a highwater mark of 179 pages was reached. The year 1949 showed a generous amount of space but a drop back to 152 pages.

As one examines the reports of the editors at five-year intervals, it is apparent that some features have come and gone. "Colonial Government," for example, appears only once in the first report, with two pages. "Municipal Affairs" started out with 11 pages in 1906, increased to 47 pages in 1911, dropped out entirely in 1916, reappeared in 1920 with 22 pages, fell to 13 pages in 1925, accounted for 24 pages in both 1930 and 1935, dropped back to six pages in 1940, and disappeared entirely in 1945 and 1949. "Public Administration" does not appear as a category prior to the Ogg editorship. In 1930 it received 19 pages of space; in 1935, 47 pages; in 1940, 54 pages; in 1945, 26 pages; and in 1949, it drew a blank. As in the case of "Municipal Affairs", one should expect some coverage under "American Government and Politics." "Rural Local Government," like "Public Administration," attracted comparatively little attention until the middle years of the REVIEW. First appearing in 1930, it accounted for ten pages, only to fall back to zero in 1935. In 1940, 1945, and 1949, 22, 12, and 20 pages respectively were given over to rural local governmental items.

From the very beginning the REVIEW has recognized the importance of furnishing book reviews and notes to its readers. The first volume contained 136 pages of such material and this figure remained fairly constant during the first two decades, with 116 pages in 1911, 127 pages in 1916, 125 pages in 1920, and 153 pages in 1925. Under the Ogg editorship there has been a substantial increase in the amount of space covered by book reviews and notes. Starting out in 1930 with 217 pages, the year 1935 saw 274 pages here; 1940 an all-time high of 325 pages; 1945, 286 pages; and 1949, 295 pages.

Since its founding the REVIEW has devoted space to listing publications of interest to political scientists which for one reason or another could not be reviewed. The first volume in 1906 saw 63 pages given over to this feature and five years later 65 pages were assigned to this purpose. The space had increased to 85 pages in 1916 and went up rather sharply to 100 and 147 pages in 1920 and 1925 respectively. During the Ogg editorship, the record has remained fairly consistent, with 180 pages in 1930, 161 in 1935, 175 in 1940, 156 in 1945, and 162 in 1949.

Though the Association had only a small number of members during

its early years, it apparently provided a vigorous demand for news and notes. The first volume printed 65 pages of such items and in 1911 and 1916 the reports indicate 72 pages and 73 allocated to "News and Notes." In 1920, perhaps as a result of the War, there was a sharp drop to 38 pages and five years later the former ground had not been regained with 56 pages. Under the Ogg editorship there was a falling back in the beginning. In 1930 "News and Notes" covered 49 pages; five years later they ran to 48 pages. During more recent years they have equalled or even slightly surpassed the early years, with 69 pages in 1940, 81 in 1945, and 91 in 1949. Considering the greatly enlarged membership and more elaborate activities, the news and notes were kept well in hand, despite an impression in some quarters that the REVIEW was devoting an undue proportion of its space to such a feature.

During the first years of the REVIEW doctoral dissertation topics were not reported as a service to members. In 1930, when such a feature is encountered in the quinquennial report, one finds that 13 pages were involved. There was very little variation for many years—1935 saw 14 pages, 1940 17 pages, and 1945 13 pages given to this feature. However the postwar increase in candidates for higher degrees in political science is reflected by the 25 pages devoted to this list of topics in 1949.

IV

The annual reports of the editor attempt no classification of contributors. However, the lists of contributors to the annual volumes since 1925 justify a few general comments. First of all, the contributors represent a large cross-section of the American Political Science Association. While such names as those of Charles A. Beard, Charles E. Merriam, E. S. Corwin, and Robert E. Cushman appear a number of times, the pages of the REVIEW have certainly not been monopolized by any particular group. The names of younger members stand alongside those of older members; contributions have been made by scholars attached to large privately-endowed universities, state universities, and small colleges; the various geographical sections of the United States are all represented. The titles of numerous articles which have appeared in the REVIEW at an earlier date are reminders of the titles of books which political scientists have published at a later date. Among the contributors of such articles would be included Arthur W. Macmahon, Alpheus T. Mason, James K. Pollock, Carl B. Swisher, D. F. Fleming, James W. Fesler, J. R. Pennock, Francis G. Wilson, Harold D. Lasswell, Walter R. Sharp and E. Pendleton Herring.

While the REVIEW has always been and doubtless will remain pri-

marily the official journal of political scientists in the United States, it has by no means excluded colleagues in other countries. A cursory examination of the REVIEW under the Ogg editorship reveals articles by such foreign political scientists as Harold J. Laski, W. E. Rappard, Count Sforza, William A. Robson, Roberto Michels, Viscount Gladstone, R. H. Soltau, and S. H. Bailey. In addition, a fair number of contributions have appeared under the names of well known public officials. Though by no means an exhaustive list, the following names may be mentioned: Frank O. Lowden, Francis B. Sayre, Henry A. Wallace, Robert Luce, Byron Price, and Senator Elbert D. Thomas. If one includes academicians who have temporarily entered such a field, the names of Manley O. Hudson, J. Ralston Hayden, Marshall E. Dimock, Leonard D. White, and others could be added.

In conclusion, it may be noted that Professor Ogg's contributions to the American Political Science Association have not been terminated. He remains a member of the Board of Editors of the REVIEW and has assumed the important but difficult post of chairman of the Committee on Awards for 1950.

CONTROLS AND TENSIONS IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM*

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Scholarly analysis of contemporary Soviet realities has faced increasing difficulties in recent years. Direct access to the Soviet Union is denied to all except a handful of diplomats, journalists, and business men on special missions, and even the very few who gain access find themselves largely cut off from all except carefully controlled official contacts. There is still a substantial quantitative flow of books and periodicals from the Soviet Union,[1] but compared with the rich and revealing documentation of the first decade of the Soviet period, the current output appears arid, formalistic, and deliberately designed to confine the circulation of data and ideas to the bare minimum required by the regime's internal communication needs. Given skill, insight, and background, there is still much to be learned from official publications and the samo-kritika (self-criticism) which they contain, but the obstacles are formidable, and the search for meaningful patterns of fact and motivation is at the best an elusive and tantalizing adventure.

There remains one relatively untapped source which promises to be of paramount importance in supplementing and enriching our understanding of Soviet realities. That is the new Soviet emigration.[2] It consists of about a quarter of a million former Soviet citizens who are now chiefly concentrated in western Germany and Austria, but who are beginning to scatter all over the non-Soviet world—the United States, Canada, Australia, North Africa, South America, etc. They include in their number representatives of every stratum of Soviet society—except the top ruling group. The great bulk of these "living witnesses" consists of former Soviet citizens who refused to return to their homeland at the end of the War. Some are more recent defectors from the Soviet Occupation Armies and Military Governments in Germany and Austria. They have been arriving, and are still arriving, in the western zones in not inconsiderable numbers. They provide a living reservoir of fresh data on the Soviet Union and its problems for which there is no parallel in the world today.

This article is a record of an effort to draw on a small segment of the new Soviet emigration as a source of supplementary information about the Soviet system. During the summer of 1949, the author interviewed approximately 100

* The author wishes to acknowledge the very generous assistance provided by the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, in making this study possible.

[1] For a record of the current inflow, see *Monthly List of Russian Accessions*, published by the Library of Congress, Washington, and distributed by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

[2] For a succinct account, see George Fischer, "The New Soviet Emigration," *Russian Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 6–19 (January, 1949). The life stories of some typical representatives of the new Soviet emigration are contained in Louis Fischer (ed.), *Thirteen Who Fled* (New York, 1949). Many life histories and reminiscences have also appeared in Russian in the press and magazines of the new Soviet emigration. Among the more important journals are *Posev*, *Ekho*, and *Borba*, all published in Germany.

former Soviet citizens who were then living in western Germany and Austria, and obtained fairly extensive life histories from 64. Of these 64, seven had been factory workers in the Soviet Union, four office workers, six collective farmers, one a collective farm office worker, one a skilled worker on a MTS (motor-tractor) station, two advanced graduate students, five school teachers, one a university professor, ten engineers, three economist-planners, three scientists, two doctors, one a lawyer, four actors and directors in the entertainment field, one a journalist, one a low-level government administrator, two high-level administrators, seven cadre (professional) officers, two former NKVD employees (one a former sergeant and the other a lieutenant in the NKVD), and one who had spent practically the whole of his adult life in a forced labor camp.[3]

In conducting the interviews,[4] answers were sought to three basic questions:

[3] The median age of the group was between 41 and 42. Fifty of the 64 were under 50. Of the 64, 59 were men and five women. Fifty-one of the 64 were Great Russians, seven were Ukrainians, three Don Cossacks, and one each was from White Russia, the Kalmyk Republic, and Daghestan. Of the 64, 38 had had some form of higher education—technical institute or university. Their family backgrounds were diverse. Three of the 64 did not supply this information. The rest broke down as follows: two were of worker parentage, two of worker-peasant background, sixteen came from peasant families, six were from land-owner families, four came from the professional intelligentsia, ten from the scientific-technical intelligentsia, six from civil servant and salaried manager background, eight belonged to Czarist officer families, five were children of merchants and industrialists, and the fathers of two were Orthodox priests. In terms of their own status in the Soviet system, at least half of the 64 could be described as non-party intelligentsia. Six of the 64 acknowledged former party membership. Of these, two were army officers, one an engineer, one a high-level bureaucrat, and two were former NKVD employees. Eleven of the 64 were former members of the Komsomol. The bulk of the 64 had departed from the Soviet Union during the War. Of the 64, 34 had had some form of military service. Of these, fourteen were former privates, two non-commissioned officers, one an army doctor, seven lieutenants, three captains, three lieutenant-colonels, and four full colonels. Of the 64, 24 had been in Soviet prisons or had served terms of forced labor, another eighteen had not been arrested but had close relatives who had been apprehended; still another seventeen, although not arrested, had had their troubles with the Soviet authorities and lost jobs or status as a result. Only fifteen out of the group reported that both they and their relatives had escaped arrest or any form of disciplinary penalty.

The composition of the group may raise serious questions as to the representative significance of their testimony. It was certainly not a group which could be described as a cross section of the population of the USSR. In terms of family background, it was overweighted with carry-overs from the old regime; in terms of education and occupation, it was overweighted in the direction of the intelligentsia; and the probabilities are that it was also overweighted with those who had suffered some form of repression under the Soviet regime. But it is also worth noting that about nine per cent acknowledged former membership in the Communist party. This is at least double the percentage of party members in the Soviet Union itself. Seventeen per cent had been members of the Komsomol. And it is not without significance that the group contained a substantial number of collective farmers and workers as well as intellectuals, and that at least eight of the 64 had fled within the last year and a half from the Soviet Army of Occupation and Military Government in Germany and Austria.

[4] The interviews varied in length from some that lasted only an hour to others that extended over a period of two days. No formal schedule of questions was used. The person

(1) What were the motivations which inspired the Soviet non-returners not to return and the defectors from the Soviet Army and Military Government to flee? What factors deterred efforts to escape? (2) What were the sources of tension and dissatisfaction in the Soviet system and how were these distributed in different groups in Soviet society? (3) What was the basic pattern of controls in the Soviet system?

Each of these questions will be discussed in turn.

I. MOTIVATIONS OF NON-RETURNERS AND DEFECTORS— FACTORS DETERRING ESCAPE

A discriminating analysis of the motivations which led the new Soviet emigration to sever its ties with the Soviet Union must differentiate the non-returners (those who left the Soviet Union during the War) from the defectors who have been escaping since.

To put the problem of the non-returners in some perspective, it needs to be remembered that the great majority of the approximately five million Soviet citizens who found themselves in Germany and Austria at the end of the War returned home. How many returned voluntarily and how many under compulsion are questions which cannot be satisfactorily answered on the basis of the evidence now available. Soviet citizens who found themselves in areas occupied by the Soviet army, of course, had no alternative except to return. Until 1947 the western allies felt bound by the Yalta agreement to collaborate with the Soviet authorities in a forced repatriation program in the western zones. Undoubtedly some Russians in the western zones returned home willingly. It is also clear that many returned unwillingly despite Soviet statements designed to reassure them about the future. The suicides, camp disorders, and wholesale flights which attended forced repatriation make it difficult to accept the Soviet legend of a homesick Soviet citizenry held in bondage by the western allies.

The non-returners who managed to escape repatriation were a heterogeneous group. Some were ex-Soviet prisoners-of-war; some were former *Ostarbeiter*, Soviet citizens who were sent to Germany on forced labor; some were collaborators who had worked with the Nazis in military government or in other capacities; still others were Soviet citizens living in areas occupied by the Germans, who retreated with the Germans in order to escape from Soviet rule.

The motives which inspired their decision not to return varied. Some obvi-

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interviewed was invited to relate his life story, and the questions that followed centered on his own experiences and opportunities for direct observation. Every effort was made to cross-check information supplied against official sources and the testimony of other informants similarly situated in the Soviet system. The interviewer was strongly impressed by the high degree of compartmentalization of information in the Soviet system. When informants discussed matters well beyond their own jobs, their immediate responsibilities, and their direct observation, what they had to say had to be treated with more than a shade of reserve. When they focused on their own personal experiences, their responses could, on the whole, be relied upon.

ously had a first priority position on Soviet lists of proscribed persons. This was true both of the former collaborators and those who had enrolled in the so-called "Russian Liberation Army" which was organized with German permission by the former Soviet General Vlasov to fight the Red Army.[5] For this group, return to the Soviet Union was a form of quick suicide. For others, the motivations were equally direct. Many had been victims of repression in the Soviet Union and had served terms in forced labor camps or Soviet prisons. Still others had families and relatives who had been imprisoned or killed by the Soviet authorities. They were filled with hatred of the Soviet regime. For them, the German invasion was the equivalent of a jail break. There were also many among the non-returners who belonged to or were descended from social groups which had been persecuted by the Soviet authorities—gentry, merchants, priests, White Guard or Czarist officers, and Kulaks. Some, even though not arrested, had suffered various indignities or disciplinary measures in the Soviet Union, had lost jobs or status or had been denied opportunities to advance as the result of what they regarded as arbitrary action by the regime. Many of these preferred to take their chances in the West rather than re-enter what they described as the stifling, fear-saturated atmosphere of the Soviet system. There were also many ordinary workers and peasants among the non-returners who had not been victims of repression in the Soviet Union, but who still preferred not to return. As Ostarbeiter or prisoners-of-war they had had a view of the West, and they wanted to enjoy bourgeois comforts in preference to Soviet-planned austerity. Their faith in Soviet propaganda had been eroded by contact with the West. Uncertainty about the fate which might await them on their return to the Soviet Union and the lure of western luxuries combined to produce the decision not to return.

The motivations of recent defectors have perhaps greater current and continuing significance. Ten case studies of escape since 1945 may serve to throw some light on the reasons for flight.

Number 1 was a 25 year old private of peasant background with no history of repression in the family. He had been an Ostarbeiter in Germany between 1942 and 1945 and was inducted into the Red Army in 1945. He served as a private until 1948. Why did he flee? First, he reported that he was impressed by the contrast in living conditions between the Soviet Union and the West. He had had a taste of the West and liked it. Second, he said that the MGB (secret police) had kept him in confinement for two days until he agreed to spy on his army comrades. He found this distasteful and decided to try to escape from the MGB clutches. Third, one of his friends managed to escape, and this gave him the courage to make a similar attempt.

[5] For an account of General Vlasov and his activities, see George Fischer, "General Vlasov's Official Biography," *Russian Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 284–301 (October, 1949); also B. I. Nicolaevsky, "Porazhenchestvo 1941–49 Godov i Gen. A. A. Vlasov, Materyaly dlya Istorii" [The Defeatist Movement in 1941–1949 and General Vlasov, Material Toward a History], *Novy Zhurnal* (New York), Vol. 18, pp. 209–234, Vol. 19, pp. 211–247 (1948).

Number 2 was a 22 year old private, also of peasant stock, who worked on a kolkhoz and in a factory near his kolkhoz in the Soviet Union. Neither he nor his family had ever been repressed. He was called up for military service in 1949 and sent to Germany. As reasons for his flight, he stressed that life had been grim and unpleasant in the Soviet Union ever since he could remember, first on the kolkhoz, then in the factory, and later in the army. He rebelled against the harsh discipline and regimentation which prevailed in the army and at home and he wanted to enjoy a better life. Life was so bad in Russia, he insisted, that it could not be worse anywhere else.

Number 3 was a 24 year old private, also of peasant family. Although there was no history of family repression, Number 3 had himself served a year in a Soviet prison as punishment for a youthful hooligan prank. Between 1942 and 1945 he had been an Ostarbeiter in Germany. He was inducted into the Red Army in 1945. As reasons for his flight, he reported that he liked what he saw of the West both as an Ostarbeiter and as a soldier in Germany. As a repatriated Soviet citizen, he was regarded with suspicion and made to work for the MGB. Life in the Soviet army, he said, was like living in a concentration camp. The news from his family in Russia indicated that life was very hard there too, and he had no desire to return.

Number 4 was a 24 year old top sergeant. His father had been a worker-Communist who was purged and disappeared after he protested the excesses of collectivization in 1933. Number 4 himself had never been arrested. After being inducted in the Soviet army, he was captured by the Germans, was a prisoner-of-war until 1945, and was then reinducted into the Red Army. He supplied the following reasons for his flight: the way the Soviet regime had treated his father, fears as to what would happen to him when he returned to the Soviet Union as an ex-prisoner-of-war in Germany, the bad news from home, and his conviction that life in the West promised to be much more attractive.

Number 5 was a 36 year old former lieutenant-colonel in the army who left in 1945. His father had been a carpenter. There was no history of family repression. Number 5 was brought up as a loyal Soviet citizen. He joined the Komsomol and was a party member. He became an engineer and later a journalist. He served with the Red Army from 1941 to 1945 and was promoted from junior officer to lieutenant-colonel. He fled in the confusion of the VE Day celebration in 1945. He reported that he had become disillusioned with Communism in the course of his work as an engineer, that many of his friends and associates had been arrested during the 1936–1938 purge (the Yezhovschina), and that, although he was passed over, he lived in constant fear that he too would be apprehended. The dominating reason for his flight, he reported, was his desire be to free of the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which surrounded him in the Soviet Union.

Number 6 was a 27 year old engineer on occupation duty in Germany. He left late in 1948. His father had been a famous professor with contacts abroad. The son was brought up to be apolitical and had difficulty entering the institute of his choice because of his refusal to join the Komsomols. He cited as

reasons for his flight the fact that he was impressed by the high standard of living in Germany compared with the Soviet Union, that he liked the free and easy way of Americans as he had observed them in Berlin, and that he was in love with a young German girl whom he would have to abandon if he returned to the Soviet Union.

Number 7 was a 34 year old lieutenant-colonel on occupation duty in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. His father had been a Czarist officer. Number 7 was arrested during the Yeshovschina as a Polish spy because his father had Polish connections. He was sentenced to ten years of forced labor, but escaped during the War, hid out, and finally, with the help of false papers which concealed his identity, obtained a job as an electro-technician. He was sent to Germany in 1945 to work on a reparations assignment and escaped in 1947. He reported that he lived in constant fear that the MGB would discover his true identity. He would have fled earlier but was not sure until 1947 that the Americans would give him a friendly reception.

Number 8 was a 33 year old captain, a former employee of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. He escaped in early 1949. His father had been a small tradesman who was arrested at the end of the NEP and sentenced to ten years of forced labor. Number 8 had lived with false papers which concealed this fact. He was not personally repressed until early in the War when his unit was cut off by the Germans. On his return, he was treated as a potential spy, beaten and jailed for 30 days. After prolonged interrogations, he was finally released. He explained his determination to flee as due to his family background, his false papers, his experience when he was arrested early in the War, and the fact that he fell in love with a German girl. He did not want to leave her and they escaped together.

Number 9 was a 43 year old former middle-level administrator in the Soviet Military Administration, who had been a lieutenant-colonel in the supply services during the War. Number 9 had had a very successful career as an administrator in the Soviet Union and had never been arrested. Nevertheless, he reported that he had been dreaming about escape for a long time. He hated the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust which always surrounded him. The MGB checked everything he did. In the Soviet Military Administration, MGB agents were everywhere. He spoke of the girl stenographers in his office—the foxes, he called them—who were used not only as spies in the office but as provocateurs at evening drinking parties to bring out any latent anti-Soviet sentiment among those present. He was disgusted with the whole business. When he visited home in 1948, he talked the matter over with his wife. She advised him to make a break for freedom if a good opportunity presented itself. He left his wife and two children behind in Moscow and, when interviewed, he was still wondering whether he had a right to flee.

Number 10 was a 41 year old former cadre officer, a captain who was on temporary duty with the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. He fled in 1948, also leaving a wife and two children behind. He was terribly worried about them. He said that the decision to escape was a painfully hard

one for him because of his family. He had no personal material reason for fleeing. He lived reasonably well. But he always felt that he was living in a prison. Every movement had to be accounted for, every gesture watched, every intonation controlled. Life had become so unendurably disciplined that he decided that he had to break away. He preferred to take his chances as an ordinary laborer in Germany.

He described his life as without incentive and without perspective. He recalled the year 1937 when many of his comrades were arrested and shot in the wake of the Tukhachevsky affair. He himself lived with the constant fear of arrest and sat night after night waiting for the knock on the door. Most of his comrades were arrested without reason, and he feared that he too would be taken on the same basis. He was not arrested, but he felt no sense of stability or security in the Soviet Union. One might have an important job today and be in a forced labor camp tomorrow. He decided that he simply had to try to escape while there was still an opportunity.

These ten cases constitute a tiny fraction of a much larger number of recent escapes. But even this small sample suggests the range of motivation which inspires flight: the superior material attractions of the West, the grimness of life in the Soviet Union, and the desire to escape the discipline, the regimentation, and the oppressive atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and secret police. For the ordinary peasant soldier, contact with the West and its "decadent" capitalist luxuries operates as a particularly powerful distintegrating factor. For the intellectuals, the officers, and the bureaucrats, the oppressiveness of totalitarian controls would seem to be of transcendent importance.

If the reports of the defectors are to be believed, they represent a small segment of a much larger disaffected group in the Soviet Army of Occupation and Military Administration. They claim that disaffection reaches back quite deeply into the Soviet population itself. They also assert that a substantial percentage of those who make the break for freedom are caught before they reach safety.

Recent escapees report that there has been a tremendous tightening in the Soviet control machinery since 1947. The personnel of the MGB has been greatly expanded in occupied areas, and there is much more careful surveillance than earlier. The Soviet Occupation Army leads what amounts to a concentration camp existence. When soldiers are not on duty, they are confined to barracks and clubs. Absence without leave is subject to the most severe penalties. Arms are issued only when essential for assigned duty. At the first sign of disaffection, the soldier is arrested and sent home. New recruits are a carefully screened and thoroughly propagandized group. They are not ordinarily sent on occupation duty if there is a record of repression in the family or any indication of anti-Soviet attitudes. Screening obviously does not work perfectly (witness the continuing escapes), but it is much more careful than earlier.

Another powerful factor in discouraging defection is the fear of retribution against family and relatives. The hostage system presently in vogue in the

Soviet Union operates with considerable effectiveness to prevent many who contemplate escape from making the attempt.

II. TENSIONS AND DISSATISFACTIONS IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

The new Soviet emigration provides a particularly rich source for an analysis of the elements of tension and dissatisfaction in the Soviet system. The size and diversity of the emigration open up possibilities for a careful analysis of the grievances of particular groups—peasants, factory workers, members of the armed forces, bureaucrats, intellectuals and scientists, nationality groups, youth, and party members. What is offered here is a preliminary effort at such an analysis based on a very small sample. It does not purport to present generalizations valid for the whole of Soviet society. It is a record of how some former Soviet citizens in diverse walks of life reacted to and appraised their environment.

In summarizing the reports of peasants or collective farmers, the complaints of former kulaks whose property was expropriated and who were consigned to forced labor will be passed over. Their bitter enmity to the regime can be taken for granted. More significant were the reactions of the collective farmers who were not kulaks. There seemed to be general agreement among the former kolkhozniks that the kolkhoz was a device by which the regime exploited the peasants for its own interests. They said that the party made fine promises of how much better life would be after collectivization, but that the promises were not kept. The kolkhozes, they asserted, were run chiefly by outsiders, chairmen sent in from the raikom, or district committee of the party. The party members on the kolkhoz monopolized the best administrative jobs; they credited themselves with work days to which they were not entitled; and they had first call on all new supplies arriving in the village stores. The former kolkhozniks complained that organization of work in the kolkhoz broke up family life, that husband and wife rarely had the same free days. They were loud in their denunciations of the NKVD or MGB informers who made it impossible for anyone to speak his mind. Since the end of the War, the complaints centered on the slowness of reconstruction—the shortage of tractors and draft animals. Except for a few returned war invalids, the villages have been emptied of manpower in the prime of life. Women have to do the heavy work. There are many illegitimate children because of the shortage of males. Life is grim and hard.

The workers interviewed complained generally of inadequate pay, food shortages, and bad housing conditions. There was grumbling about the number of compulsory deductions from pay—the obligatory state loans, trade union dues, the special subscriptions to this organization or that. There was resentment expressed against the inflation of administrative staffs in the factories, the supernumeraries who held down soft office jobs. Complaints were reiterated about the Stakhanovite movement. It was described as a form of speed-up, a device for raising norms and extracting extra work for the same pay. Workers, it was said, had no real freedom to express their grievances. MGB informers

were everywhere. The trade unions, which should have expressed the interests of the workers, were the creatures of the party and the factory managements. They did not help the worker to improve his position. There were complaints about discipline and the excessively severe penalties for tardiness and absence from work. Those interviewed asserted that they were practically chained to their job. It was almost impossible to shift or transfer.

Among the ordinary rank and file soldiers, the chief grievances focused on poor food, and (in the case of the occupation army) on the enforced isolation from the local population, on stringent discipline, and on the special privileges of the officer group. With the officers, complaints took a different turn. Among the cadre, or professional officers (particularly the non-party ones), there were repeated expressions of resentment against the encroachment of the Zampolit, or Assistant Commander for Political Affairs (the former political commissar), on command responsibilities. The officers complained that they were constantly subject to the surveillance of the NKVD (now MGB), that they were not trusted, and that they had to function in a milieu of constant insecurity and fear.

Insecurity and fear were also the chief grievances of the bureaucrats. They asserted that they dared not exercise any initiative; the penalties of failure were too drastic. Like the army officers, they felt themselves under constant surveillance, and even more than the army officers, they reflected a feeling that the privileges of today might evaporate into the deprivations of a forced labor camp tomorrow.

The same sense of insecurity and fear was also strongly expressed by the intellectuals and scientists. It was less strongly marked among the doctors and engineers than among the school teachers, college professors, journalists, and those engaged in artistic and cultural pursuits. But in greater or lesser degree, it was present everywhere. One of the younger scientists spoke with great poignancy about what he called the "inner migration" among the young intellectuals—the effort to transfer one's activity from more politically dangerous to less politically dangerous fields. He himself had abandoned literary interests for microbiology. But, as he ruefully observed, with the Lysenko controversy, even microbiology became politically infected. There was no escape from the long arm of totalitarian ideological control. It is with the intellectuals especially that one senses the tensions generated by enforced conformity and the stifling of the desire for self-expression.

The nationality representatives interviewed displayed an interesting ambivalence in their attitude toward the Soviet Union. On the positive side, they pointed to very real achievements in the direction of racial equality and increased educational opportunities. To that extent they gave support to those students of the Soviet system who contend that the Soviet nationality policy constitutes one of the great strengths of the regime. But they also emphasized a darker side of Soviet nationality policy which has been less frequently commented on abroad. One of the most serious points of tension in Soviet nationality policy involves the position of the new Soviet-trained native intelligentsia.

Once they have been educated for administrative and other responsibilities, they aspire to real as well as formal authority, and they become increasingly restive under the rigid external control to which they are exposed from Moscow. When they express their restiveness, they are charged with nationalist or bourgeois deviations, removed from office, and subject to the most drastic punishment. The decimation of the native intelligentsia in the Great Purge of 1936–1938 was explained by some of the interviewees in these terms. This phenomenon of internal Titoism has been little noted, yet it would appear to be of considerable significance, and it constitutes an interesting counterpart to the problems encountered by western colonial powers dealing with the native intelligentsia in their colonies.

Testimony as to tensions among Soviet youth was particularly challenging. There is a widespread assumption in the non-Soviet world that, since the Soviet regime controls all the instruments of indoctrination which shape the minds of youth, its hold on their loyalty is practically complete. Conversations with young ex-Soviet citizens, school teachers, and others who have had extensive contact with young people in Russia cast some doubt on that assumption. One school teacher who had taught for nearly 25 years in Soviet schools said that the attraction of Communist ideology for Soviet youth is greatly exaggerated in the West. She pointed out that there was a great difference between a revolutionary ideology which appealed to youth's idealistic and utopian instincts, and an official ideology which insisted on conformity. Communism in its present state had become such an official ideology. It was dinned into the children day after day. But, she asserted, a number, instead of becoming imbued with it, became bored with it, and turned with relief and enjoyment toward literary, cultural, sport, and technical interests where they could find some relief. Another very intelligent escapee, himself a former Komsomol who had worked professionally with youth groups for many years, insisted that it would be a mistake to assume that all Soviet children came off the Pioneer and Komsomol assembly lines as unthinking and unquestioning tools of the regime. He added that even very young children began to pose embarrassing questions which raised doubts about the official propaganda. Crowded conditions at home, food shortages, low living standards, the arrests of friends and relatives, the difficulty of obtaining a higher education when no stipends were available, compulsory labor service—these and other elements of life in the Soviet Union planted doubts which this informant said proved embarrassingly difficult to handle when youngsters in their early teens came to him to discuss their problems.

This informant also pointed out that it was important to distinguish between the attitudes of two different generations of Soviet youth: (1) those who came of age in the period of the first Five Year Plan and collectivization, and (2) those who came of age in the middle and late thirties. In the first group, he stated, the imagination of many was caught by the grandiose sweep of the Five Year Plan and the Agricultural Revolution. The Komsomols of that generation started with a vision of a vast constructive effort, and genuine

idealistic motivation could not be discounted. The youth crusade to build Komsomolsk was an example of their fervor. But the fervor abated. The agony of collectivization lost the support of many rural young people whose families suffered and starved in the famine of 1932–1933. The drop in the standard of living was strongly felt in industrial centers, and many young workers dropped by the wayside. The purges of the thirties deeply affected the Komsomol organization itself, and the enforced conformity which came afterwards alienated many of the more independent-minded young. To be sure, many of them made their careers on the heels of industrialization, collectivization, and the purges, but much of the initial enthusiasm and ideological momentum was lost in the process.

The new generation which came of age in the mid- and late thirties, according to this informant, never really captured the crusading spirit and idealistic vision of the earlier group. For them, the Komsomol and the party organization were much more of a bread-and-butter affair. They were disciplined to repeat the fashionable party slogans of the moment, but they repeated them as gestures of conformity rather than out of any inner conviction. The more independent-minded of them resented the regimentation, but they had no opportunity to make their resentment effective. The less well-situated rebelled against the growing evidences of inequality in the Soviet Union, but they too were in no position to register any effective protest. Their low state of morale was revealed by the mass surrenders to the Nazis in the early days of the War. It was only when the Nazis resorted to mass slaughter of prisoners and other atrocities that patriotic fervor was aroused and resistance stiffened. Even so, this informant claimed, the bulk of Soviet youth fought for their country and against Hitler—and not out of any deep loyalty or devotion to Communism as such.

The interviews verified the common assumption that the party organization is one of the strongholds of the regime. But, within the party, distinctions must be made between the Party Apparat, or apparatus—the full-time party functionaries and leadership group who constitute the inner core of the party—and the party rank and file whose regular major occupations are elsewhere. The Party Apparat, of course, is peculiarly bound up with and dependent upon the regime; in a sense, it is the regime. It too has its anxieties and worries, not the least of which is the fear that one may be toppled from the heights to the depths with dizzying swiftness. This came out strikingly in an interview with a functionary in a high party school which was attended by regional party secretaries and other party officials of similar rank. This informant remarked that the party secretaries who had been ordered to the school were perpetually worried about what was happening back home in their regions; they were afraid that their authority would be undermined in their absence. They spent much of their spare time telephoning back and forth to their offices to keep a firm hand on local developments.

So far as the party rank and file were concerned, there seemed to be general agreement among those interviewed that many joined the party, not out of

deep inner conviction, but primarily for careerist reasons—because party membership opened the door to a job which they coveted, because it accelerated the rate of promotion, and because it was the gateway to the perquisites of privilege and high position. But even these careerist Communists had their problems. They found themselves surrounded by the same aura of fear and insecurity which enveloped the non-party intelligentsia. Enlarged responsibilities brought privileges and perquisites—but they also brought burdens and hazards with swift retribution for the first misstep. The interviews with former party members emphasized that the tensions generated by these hazards were a gnawing maggot from which there was no escape.

What conclusions can be drawn from the materials gathered in these interviews? If accepted as an index of conditions generally prevalent in the Soviet Union, they seem to give a picture of the Soviet people as a seething mass of anxieties, frustrations, and discontent. But before concluding that this is an accurate portrait of Soviet society in all its diversity, it is important to strike a note of caution and to re-emphasize that the people interviewed constituted a relatively small and select group. While a wide diversity of occupational interests was represented among them, on the whole they were a group who suffered particularly severely under the Soviet regime, and their testimony could be expected to emphasize all the darker sides of Soviet life. This does not mean, however, that their evidence is only of marginal significance for an understanding of Soviet realities. While their testimony did not emphasize and probably did not do justice to such positive sources of support as the Communist regime may still have among the Soviet populace, it did point to the existence of considerable dissatisfactions, frustrations, and tensions which extend through important strata of Soviet society.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that most of the persons interviewed discounted the possibility or probability of any organized or spontaneous effort to unseat the Communist regime in the near future. There seemed to be general agreement among them that the power of the secret police was too all-pervasive, and that the opportunity for an effective organization of a revolutionary movement inside the Soviet Union at the present time was *de minimis*. Nor did most of them think that the death of Stalin would make any substantial difference. They were prepared to concede the possibility of a bitter intra-party struggle for the succession, but they did not think that that struggle would go deep enough to open the way to a revolutionary movement which would dislodge the Communist regime itself.

III. THE PATTERN OF CONTROLS

Given the existence of considerable disaffection, what is it that holds the system together? What is the pattern of controls by which the regime maintains its power?

The Soviet regime, like other dictatorships before it, exists in a state of permanent crisis and emergency. Circumstances as well as doctrine have contributed to perpetuate this sense of crisis over the whole life of the regime, and,

given the continuation of present trends, they promise to project it into the indefinite future. Within this framework of crisis, the regime naturally seeks to stabilize its own position. In doing so, it relies both on repression and indoctrination. It uses force and intimidation to deal with its opponents; it installs its supporters in key positions of control; and it depends on indoctrination to widen its basis of mass support.

In its first phase of development, while its control mechanisms still remained to be developed and consolidated, the Communist regime drew heavily on the utopian aspects of its ideology to broaden its mass appeal. It presented the less attractive features of the dictatorship of the proletariat as transitory phenomena; it emphasized mass welfare objectives and egalitarian and leveling notions as the basis of the organization of Soviet society; it stressed mass participation and intra-party democracy in appealing for popular support. It even sought to placate peasant hostility by the turn to the NEP. There is little doubt that it won considerable popular support in the process.

As the regime turned in its search for stability toward building up its power through an intense program of heavy industry expansion and the collectivization of agriculture, the utopian aspects of Communist ideology were subjected to severe strain. Mass welfare objectives had to be subordinated to the demands of a program of heavy capital investment. The unrest which developed had to be chastened and disciplined and diverted away from the regime. The disciplinary process reflected itself in a growth in the repressive machinery of the regime—the NKVD, the purges, and the forced labor camps, in the emergence of the monolithic party, the liquidation of the opposition, the apotheosis of Stalin, and the concentration of authority in the hands of the leader and his henchmen. The diversionary operation involved finding both domestic and external scapegoats upon which the masses could be induced to pour out their anger for the sacrifices which they were being required to endure. At the same time, every effort was made to assure the masses that their sacrifices were temporary, that they would eventually reap a rich reward in a greatly improved standard of living. But the better life to come—too long delayed—invited disillusionment. Ideological slogans offered as substitutes wore thin with reiteration.

One of the strongest impressions derived from the interviews is of a decline in the ideological élan of Communism inside the Soviet Union—a growth in rank and file apathy and indifference, and a loss of faith in Communist professions as such. This appears to be even partly true of the party itself. Within the party, the proportion of time servers and careerists is larger than before; the zealous devotees are less in evidence.

The testimony of the non-returners and defectors suggests that the heroic age of Soviet Communism is over, that long-postponed economic improvements have eroded belief, that a series of events such as forced collectivization, the Great Hunger of 1932–1933, the Purge of 1936–1938, and the continuing austerities of the postwar period have left a trail of disillusionment behind them.

This does not mean that the regime is without ideological resources. National-

ism is still a powerful cementing factor. To the extent that the regime leans on it, as it did during the War, it evokes its strongest support. The vigorous attempts since the end of the War to identify Communism with nationalism through the new hybrid of Soviet patriotism demonstrate a realization on the part of the regime of the continuing importance of the nationalist appeal, even though strenuous attempts have been made to give it a Soviet content.

The tremendous revival of indoctrination since the end of the War represents an effort to neutralize and overcome apathy and to stir up positive belief. But the effectiveness of the effort is open to serious question. The young recent escapees from the Red Army were unanimously of the view, for example, that the anti-American propaganda campaign was encountering great resistance among the veteran rank and file of the occupation army. This, however, was less true of the fresh recruits who had just begun their exposure to the West.

The weakness of the ideological appeal of Communism within the Soviet Union and the tensions and dissatisfactions generated by Soviet realities make it all the more necessary for the regime to turn for its basic supports and controls in non-ideological directions. This effort takes three main forms:

(1) The regime leans heavily on the support of what might be called the administrative and managerial élite—those who occupy the key managerial and administrative positions—the higher level bureaucrats, the plant directors, managers, engineers, and technicians, the collective farm chairmen, and the worker aristocracy of foremen, brigadiers, and Stakhanovite workers. In order to consolidate the support of these groups, who play key roles in the administrative structure, the party seeks to incorporate them in its hierarchical structure of privileges and rewards. It treats them as a privileged category and pays them well. It seeks to draw them into the party itself and to identify them actively with the party leadership.

(2) A second basic institutional support of the regime is, of course, the party organization itself, and, more especially, the hard inner core of the party—the Apparat, or party functionaries for whom party work is a full-time job. The party operates as an instrument of indoctrination, of leadership, and of control.

(3) The third support of the regime is its repressive element, the Secret Police—the MGB and its supporting formations in the MVD, whose authority extends into every corner of Soviet society and for whom terror itself becomes a system of power.

It is through these three main channels of authority—the administrative-technical, the party, and the secret police—that the regime has worked out its basic pattern of control. The operation of this system of control can best be illustrated by taking three examples: (1) a collective farm, (2) a factory, and (3) the armed forces.

Each collective farm has its chairman (almost always a party member). Formally, he is elected by the members of the kolkhoz. In fact, the kolkhoz merely approves a designee who has been selected in advance by the raikom, or district committee of the party. In most cases, this designee is not even a

member of the kolkhoz, but is sent in by the raikom from some other area as its agent. The actual administration of the kolkhoz is in the hands of the chairman, his deputy or deputies, the brigadiers, who lead the work in the field, and the office staff of bookkeepers, accountants, cashiers, etc. It is this group that usually constitutes the core of the party and Komsomol organization in the kolkhoz and through which the party projects its control over the kolkhoz. In every rayon, or district, there is also an office of the MGB with its own independent lines of authority. It is the job of this office to direct a network of spies, or informers, who penetrate every kolkhoz in the area. Through the reports and denunciations of these informers, the MGB office keeps informed about disaffection in the kolkhoz and takes the necessary action to stamp it out.

The pattern of control in the factory is, in its essential lines, not very different. In administrative-technical charge of the factory there is a director, now invariably a party man, and usually technically trained for his job. He operates in the ministerial or administrative chain of command, though, if the factory is important, his appointment must be approved not only by the Cadres Section of his ministry, but also by the Cadres Section of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party. The party organization in the factory is presided over by a secretary. If the factory is of any size, the secretary is a full-time official ordinarily designated either by the raikom or district committee, or the obkom, or regional committee of the party. The job of the party secretary is not only to direct propaganda and educational work in the factory, but to detect deficiencies in its work, to report on them through his separate channel of command, and to help to correct them. Each factory of any size also has its so-called Special Section, a branch of the MGB, again with its own independent channel of command. The MGB Special Section controls both party and non-party personnel in the factory; it maintains a dossier on every employee, and has its network of informers scattered through the factory. Its major task is to discover and root out disaffection wherever it finds it.

Control in the armed forces conforms to the same basic pattern, although there are differences of detail. Corresponding to the administrative-technical line of control is the regular military command, with the usual hierarchy of officers found in all armies. The higher one ascends in the officer bureaucracy, the greater the percentage of party membership. The party has a particularly strong representation in the officer cadres in the newer services such as aviation and tanks.

In the armed forces, it is necessary to distinguish between the work of the party organizers who concentrate on party personnel and the organization of political work in the broader sense of including both party and non-party personnel. Each small unit of the army has its party and Komsomol organizations, each one led by a partorg or Komsorg (party or Komsomol organizer or secretary). Up to the regiment, the partorg or party secretary is not a full-time official. He performs his party duties in addition to his regular military duties. In the regiment and higher, the party secretary has a full-time job. He is part

of the party apparatus and assigned to his duties by higher party authorities. He directs the work of the party organization in his unit, has responsibility for party education, for party meetings, for executing the party lines in the army, and for enforcing party discipline in his political unit.

The political education of the armed forces as a whole (non-party as well as party) is the responsibility of the Political Administration—so-called—which has its special representatives in every unit down to and through the battalion. This representative is called the Zampolit, or Assistant Commander for Political Affairs. He was formerly called the Political Commissar. He has responsibility for the political education and political health of the army as a whole. The kinos, the army clubs, the educational circles, the army libraries, the army newspapers, and all varieties of propaganda directed to the army rank and file come under his jurisdiction. He also has responsibility for reporting on the political mood and morale of each unit in the army, officers as well as men. The problem of demarcating his responsibilities from the command responsibilities of the officers in military charge of units presents a particularly troublesome issue in Soviet army organization. The difficulty is that the Zampolit and the commander have separate chains of command—the one leading up in the military hierarchy and the other in the party hierarchy.

In addition, there is still another chain of command independent of the other two, that exercised by the MGB, or Secret Police in the army. Divisions, corps, and armies—each has its Special Section representing the MGB; below the level of the division down to the regiment and even occasionally the battalion, there is a specially empowered emissary of the Special Section. As is usual, this emissary has his dossier on everyone in the unit, and the regular network of informers to keep him posted on what is happening in the unit.

This triple-lined system of control—administrative, party, and secret police—is reproduced in essentials in every Soviet institution of any consequence. Among the people interviewed, there seemed to be general agreement that the MGB was not only the most feared, but that it appeared to operate with the greatest degree of independence at the local level, and that its power seemed to be on the increase.

This is the pattern of controls as it has crystallized in the Soviet system. Is there any immediate prospect that it will be modified in the direction of providing greater freedom and a higher level of welfare for the Soviet populace? The prospects do not appear too bright. For the postwar period, the vista held out to the Soviet citizenry is one of primary emphasis on heavy industry construction with only secondary attention to improvements in the standard of living. While there have been undoubted improvements in living standards compared with the war low points, the major energies of reconstruction have been concentrated on capital replacement and expansion, and welfare objectives have necessarily had to be sacrificed in the process. The justification for these sacrifices still runs, as it has run in the past, in terms of the dangers of capitalist encirclement and the necessity of strengthening the fortress of Communism against the threat of attack from the imperialist aggressors.

But continuing sacrifices breed continuing dissatisfactions. The existence of widespread dissatisfactions drives the regime in the direction of strengthening its repressive machinery. The secret police follows its own laws of growth—increasing in importance and power by the amount of distrust it sows and the discord it discovers or invents. The top leadership, to some extent at least, becomes a prisoner of the Frankenstein's monster which it has created—of the intelligence which it provides and of the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which it generates. The products are such measures as the efforts to seal off the Soviet population from all contact with the West, to mute dissatisfactions by arousing the most primal instincts of obscurantist nationalism, while at the same time invoking the apocalyptic vision of the inevitable triumph of world Communism to rally the party faithful. These measures in turn invite their own response, a hardening in the attitude of the non-Soviet world toward the Soviet Union. The vicious circle is completed as the Soviet regime finds in such developments both the occasion and the justification for putting even greater emphasis on its program of capital expansion and for tightening the controls to deal with the dissatisfactions which a high rate of capital investment generates.

It is difficult to see how the Soviet regime can break out of this circle, even assuming some desire to do so. It is possible to envisage a theoretical escape in the collapse of the western world, either through disintegration within or military defeat in which Soviet arms win a cheap and easy victory. But this contingency appears highly remote, given continuing economic and military strength in the West. It is also theoretically conceivable that the circle can be broken by a broad settlement of differences between East and West. The existing state of international tension and the long-term doctrinal outlook of Communism do not promise a hopeful prospect for such an agreement. The vista ahead is an uneasy truce, neither peace nor war, a shadowy no man's land in which danger lurks on all sides.

Given this setting, the Soviet regime seems doomed to continue to feed on crisis and emergency, to emphasize the industrial development which builds up its military potential, to sacrifice mass welfare objectives in the interest of power, and to rely on its bureaucratic apparatus and its totalitarian controls to keep popular discontent in check. This is the moving equilibrium in which the Soviet leadership seeks to stabilize its position. It rests on the premise that while the regime cannot trust substantial segments of its own population, it can still control them. It is a premise for which history has still to provide an ultimate test.

THE VALUE OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORTS TO THE EDUCATOR*

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The Hoover Commission Reports were not written for the educator and his students. The audience was broader and the objective was immediate reform. Nevertheless, the educator must pause at this milepost and take stock. The reports are thrust upon him as inescapable materials for analysis in class and seminar rooms; they record in considerable measure the state of achievement in the development of administrative science; they challenge an examination now of the directions and scope of educational motive forces in the next phase of university education in public administration.

Most teachers of public administration probably found the reports of the President's Committee on Administrative Management and of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure to be very valuable aids in teaching. The publication of the *Report with Special Studies* and the *Final Report*[1] provided a considerable body of material in convenient form for teacher and student use, and the over-all summary of the Committee on Administrative Management even provided material which could be used in introductory courses in American government. Also, these earlier reports dealt with problems at the growing points in the study of public administration and offered basic points of view around which discussion could be centered. Moreover, much of the content of these earlier reports has gone into the broadening stream of literature on public administration and hence has had an enduring effect upon study in the field.

What can be said about the possible value for educational purposes of the reports of the Hoover Commission, including those of the task forces?

I. GENERAL COMMENTS

Several elements of substantial value in the reports are readily apparent. First, they focus attention on problems and on the need for understanding and improving public management. In this way they will further vitalize the teaching of public administration. They will help the teacher relate his teaching to issues which have current significance to the students. Moreover, the public discussion of the reports will probably stimulate interest among a larger number of students in the problems of public management and thus enlarge the student audience in public administration.

* This article is an elaboration of the comments of the author on a similar topic at a round table at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, December, 1949.

[1] President's Committee on Administrative Management, *Report with Special Studies* (Washington, 1937); *Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure* (Washington, 1941).

Second, the reports point up many of the older working assumptions in administration and show some of the ways in which these can be implemented. Thus, the organizational concepts of integration, staff assistance, and organization according to function are proclaimed and illustrated in a way which will give the student a clear grasp of their significance in governmental practice. The reports will serve as a link between theoretical materials on organization and descriptive data on governmental structure and operations.

Third, the reports put a new emphasis on some needs and will thereby affect the literature of public administration, the practice of government, and the content of university courses. Examples are the great emphasis on the need for departmental unity and cohesion, for the performance budget, and for decentralization of management functions. Undoubtedly, the teaching of public administration will be enriched by the studies of the Hoover Commission, and the further studies stimulated by it, in a number of such problem areas.

In brief, then, the reports can be used to give practical significance to instruction, to show how basic assumptions can be implemented, and to concentrate attention on vital needs in management trends in the future. Particular teachers will find other and varying ways in which they can be used.

There are, nevertheless, a number of inadequacies in the reports which indicate that they will not, for long at least, occupy a major place in the teaching and study of public administration. These may be summarized under five headings. The first two state surface generalizations and can be passed over briefly; the last three raise fundamental questions about the depth and breadth of the so-called "science" of administration and require as much amplification as space permits.

First, the material is scattered and often not very helpful unless the task force reports are studied with the reports of the Commission.

Second, the presentations are sketchy. This is true particularly of the Commission reports but also of some of the task force reports. The value of the reporting technique in the Commission reports so far as the education of Congress and the public is concerned would appear to be very great, but the value for student use is diminished to the extent that supporting analysis is sacrificed for simplicity and brevity in presentation.

II. INADEQUATE BASES FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

More significant is the fact that there is all too frequently an unfortunate combination of inadequacy of analysis and positiveness in recommendation. The form of reporting, with brief and positive statement of recommendations, almost always without qualification, gives a tone of certainty and an impression of conclusiveness to recommendations. Behind this there is sometimes an absence of sufficient analysis of basic assumptions, of the various facets of problems, and of the alternative approaches in their solution.

In some cases a corrective is provided in the remarks of dissenting commissioners. Thus, when the majority of the Commission recommended that certain

regulatory functions "relating to food products be transferred to the Department of Agriculture and that those relating to other products be placed under a reorganized Drug Bureau administered by the public health agency," Commissioners Pollock and Rowe pointed out that, although the task force groups had differed on the proper location of the functions of the Food and Drug Administration, the "compromise position of the Commission had not been advocated by any of our Task Forces. . . . "[2] At another place they denied the factual basis for such a change:

> No substantial evidence has been presented and no convincing case has been made . . . . No evidence has been presented . . . .
> As individual Commissioners, with insufficient staff at our disposal, we are unable to point the way to improvement. But until that way is carefully and thoroughly documented, we feel it wiser to leave things as they are.[3]

Again, when the task force on Federal Medical Services submitted a two-page supplementary statement setting forth "advantages of an independent" medical agency,[4] and when the Commission report—without analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of independence versus integration with educational and social security functions—concluded that "Only the creation of a new United Medical Administration" could remedy existing weaknesses and give the needed "leadership, direction and planning,"[5] three commissioners presented another side of the issue;[6] and after arguing that only "extraordinary circumstances" could justify "creation of another independent agency" they concluded, "Nor have the majority stated such reasons."[7] Commissioner Pollock felt constrained to state his own reasons for an independent united medical agency.[8] These and other conflicts gave the Commission's volume on medical services the appearance of a personal opinion display counter.[9]

In one broad and significant area where positive recommendations were summarily offered, the dissents challenged both the adequacy and the objectivity of the supporting analyses. Of the Commission report on Federal Business Enterprises Commissioners Acheson, Pollock and Rowe said:

> Our task force studies of the organizational problems have thus been too narrowly confined for this Commission to make a real contribution to this comparatively new and complex sphere of Federal business enterprises.[10]

This and other over-all comments were followed by criticism of the Commission and the task forces on particular types of activities. On housing agencies:

> We wish here to underscore two factors which the Commission treats inadequately . . . .

[2] *Department of Agriculture*, p. 23.
[3] *Social Security and Education; Indian Affairs*, pp. 49–51.
[4] *Federal Medical Services*, Supplement to Appendix O.
[5] *Medical Activities*, p. 15.
[6] Acheson, Aiken and Rowe, *Medical Activities*, pp. 41–46.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 42. [8] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–51.
[9] There were four separate statements for eight commissioners. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–52.
[10] *Federal Business Enterprises*, p. 92. The full statement is carried at pp. 91–112.

We feel the Commission report is defective in following the lead of our task force report by considering an important "major purpose" group of programs such as housing in this context of "lending, guaranteeing, and insurance . . . . " The Commission report does not go into the vital matter of the internal structure . . . except in recommending the vesting of authority in the top Housing Administrator.[11]

On government lending and "mutualization" these criticisms of the Commission appear:

. . . the Commission report gives no consideration to. . . .
. . . we have seen no evidence whatever . . . to justify the blanket assertion . . . .
. . . the Commission attempts summarily. . . .
. . . sufficient evidence has not been submitted to us.
The Commission report overlooks the fundamental factor that. . . . [12]

As to the Farmers Home Administration, the "task force statistics prove, we think, the opposite of what the task force appears to think they prove . . . . "[13] As to certain task force reports touching on electrical power and irrigation enterprises, the dissenters said "accountants have run riot," parts of the analyses "do not appear objective," and "We feel these reports are 'special pleading' and not impartial opinion."[14]

Such dissents neutralize the impact of the conclusions of task forces and majority commissioners and reveal the vast distance yet to be traversed even in the study of problems of administrative structure. More serious are those cases where oversimplification in analysis and certainty of tone tend to put the imprimatur of finality and certainty on some things on which many will think there is need for more complete study and a questioning attitude.

One example is the status of the regulatory commissions. The issue of the "independence" of regulatory agencies is of tremendous importance, and any fixation of concepts on the basis of inadequate analysis is unfortunate and dangerous. Yet the concept of independence is confirmed by the reports of the Commission and its task force on the independent regulatory commissions, and this on the basis of partial analysis.

Several of the omissions in analysis of this problem are notably apparent. First, the problem of coordination is considered with a limited perspective. The task force concluded that "on the whole, co-ordination is needed in more limited areas than might be supposed a priori, and has been achieved in most of the major fields through interdepartmental committees or more informal techniques";[15] the Commission concluded that "Coordination between these commissions and the general program of the executive departments is often loose and casual and sometimes nonexistent";[16] a careful reading of the nine unpublished reports on special commissions has led the author to the conclusion that there were real problem areas as regards coordination and that there

[11] Pp. 95–99. [12] Pp. 99–102. [13] P. 103.

[14] Pp. 103–112. Compare the statement of Commissioner Aiken, pp. 113–119, of Commissioner Forrestal, pp. 121–124, and Commissioner Manasco, pp. 125–127.

[15] *Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions* (Appendix N), pp. 27–28.

[16] *Regulatory Commissions*, p. 4.

were also other areas of activity in which the problem was not now serious.[17] But the big weakness in the task force analysis is consideration of the problem primarily in terms of what has been rather than in terms of what may be. Macmahon has pointed out that the need for connection of the commissions with the departmental system "is likely to depend largely upon the degree to which our society will desire to conduct economic regulation as something more than deliberately insulated bits of compulsory arbitration applied to points of especial strain among conflicting groups."[18] Though he cannot give the answers on future contingencies and policies, the organization expert should raise questions about the adequacy of machinery for possible eventualities. In the area of regulation, this would seem to require that the issue of non-removable boards should be considered with some reference to the appropriateness of this organizational device if (1) broad planning in such areas as fuel supply, transportation facilities, or decentralization of industry were attempted, (2) a coordinated attack on an internal economic situation were needed, or (3) the requirements of national defense, international policy, or war necessitated quick adaptation of internal economic policies. The proper perspective for consideration of the problem must be the world which follows 1929, Hiroshima, and the Employment Act of 1946.

A second omission is the failure to analyze comparable departmental experience. The task force listed expertness as one of the four advantages of the commission system.[19] Yet the separate reports on the commissions show that there has been much turnover of commissioners on some commissions, that expertness has not been a consistent presidential test in appointment, and that expertness often lay in the staff rather than in the commissioners. These facts would seem to indicate the wisdom of analyzing the expertness of departmental staffs, including bureau chiefs, and of ascertaining whether expertness is not an institutional process arising out of staff collaboration. Further analysis of departmental experience is needed to show whether other advantages claimed for the commission system—impartiality, continuity, deliberation[20]—are attainable in proper measure in a properly organized departmental hierarchy.

Third, wartime experience was not examined. Is there any relevance in the experience of coordinators? Gulick has said that these coordinators "developed the 'directive' into what is almost a new tool of coordination."[21] Does this de-

[17] Unfortunately for the educator, the systematic and detailed studies on the regulatory commissions, prepared for the task force, have not been published.

[18] Arthur W. Macmahon, "The Future Organizational Pattern of the Executive Branch," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 38, pp. 1179–1191, at p. 1189 (1944).

[19] *Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions*, p. 22.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 19–24. Group deliberation was the specific advantage claimed in the task force report, but even in single-headed agencies the process of decision involves group collaboration.

[21] Luther Gulick, "War Organization of the Federal Government," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 38, pp. 1166–1179, at p. 1174 (1944).

vice offer any clues for the solution of our regulatory problem in the future?[22]

Fourth, the whole matter of the relationship of organization to clientele influences on government was not given a searching analysis.[23] This is a tough task but it has been a necessary part of the agenda of research since Herring unfolded the problem in 1936.[24]

Finally, the Hoover Commission's recommendations were based upon assumptions which demand careful study. Cushman's recommendation for the separation of judicial from other functions has been questioned by those who wish to maintain the unity of the regulatory process.[25] The Hoover Commission reports present the issue of whether another form of bifurcation can be made without weakening government, namely, the separation of planning and promotion, and of "executive" work from "regulatory" work. Moreover, it is assumed that regulatory work is a distinct and separable type of government activity. One result is a wide divergence in thought: for most of government not even a federated structure is permissible but only full centralization at the top; for regulatory agencies, also, no federated structure is permissible, but only full independence, not even mitigated by presidential designation of the chairmen of all commissions as was suggested by the task force. May it not be that a much wider study of the nature of government and the relationships of men is needed? Perhaps administration is myriad complexities—not neat contrasts; perhaps its only unifying characteristic is that it is a channel through which an effort is made to carry the process of government from centers of political power to the fingertips of action, and that the real research which is needed is on the relationships of men at various levels in a hierarchy and particularly on the relationships between political and permanent officials. This, it may be added, is not a criticism of the recommendation of the Commission that authority be concentrated legally in department heads; rather, it is a protest against a pattern of thought which assumes that the problem of administrative organization and operation is solved by complete integration or complete independence; it is a suggestion that, after all, the problem of regulatory work may be no different from that of other work but that in both cases there is a proper area for political motivation and push and also a proper area for independence, impartiality, and resistance to overhead command.

Other examples of Commission recommendations which tend to fix organiza-

[22] See Robert E. Cushman, *The Independent Regulatory Commissions* (New York, 1941), p. 643, for comments on a proposal by William A. Robson for ministerial influence through the "open letter of instruction."

[23] There was, it should be said, some analysis of this sort in the nine unpublished volumes on the separate commissions.

[24] E. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (NewYork, 1936).

[25] See particularly James M. Landis, *The Administrative Process* (New Haven, 1938); Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, *Final Report*, pp. 55–60; Frederick F. Blachly and Miriam E. Oatman, *Federal Regulatory Action and Control* (Washington, 1940), pp. 177–182. For the proposal for separation of functions, see Robert E. Cushman, "The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions," in President's Committee on Administrative Management, *Report with Special Studies*, pp. 207–243.

tional trends in areas where many will think further inquiry is needed may be cited. One is the combination of an "administrative" chairman and a deliberative commission of which the chairman is one member. Commissioner Pollock prefixed his statement of specific objections to this kind of arrangement for the Civil Service Commission with the following statement:

> While this compromise might prove to be workable in administrations when both strong leadership is displayed by the chairman and a considerable degree of restraint and cooperation is exercised by the other commissioners, in my opinion, this form of organization has little to recommend it as a permanent institutional arrangement.[26]

The same kind of arrangement was recommended by the Commission for the regulatory commissions.[27] There are certain practical advantages in the concentration of responsibility for "administrative" duties, and already the system recommended by the Commission has been adopted for the Civil Service Commission and the Maritime Commission.[28] It may be, however, that this arrangement merely provides an answer for the minor part of the problem of commission performance and overlooks the broader problem of effective organization for the whole task of an agency.

Another example is the support given to the idea that staff aids to the president, and interdepartmental and cabinet committees can be a full answer to the problem of coordination at the upper level. Two comments may be made. First, the teacher who wants a searching analysis of the problem of staff aids in the president's office will not find it in the publications of the Commission but in earlier published materials.[29] Second, the place of the cabinet and its members needs to be exhaustively examined with reference to the problems of coordination and leadership within the executive branch.

The Hoover Commission did not establish a position for a cabinet which would represent a structurally integrated organization. It did not, as has been seen in discussion of the recommendations concerning the regulatory commissions, provide for full structural integration. A number of other units of organization outside the departmental structure were retained or recommended. As for the cabinet, it concluded: "The cabinet as a body, however, is not an effective council of advisors to the President and it does not have a collective responsibility for Administration policies."[30]

The Commission did not discuss the individual position of the cabinet mem-

[26] *Personnel Management*, p. 54. [27] *Regulatory Commissions*, pp. 5–6.

[28] Reorganization Plans Nos. 5 and 6 of 1949.

[29] As in articles in this REVIEW, including Don K. Price, "Staffing the Presidency," Vol. 40, pp. 1154–1168 (1946); Wayne Coy, "Basic Problems," Vol. 40, pp. 1124–1137 (1946); John J. Corson, "Organizing Government Staff Services for Full Employment," Vol. 39, pp. 1157–1169 (1945); Edwin G. Nourse and Bertram M. Gross, "The Role of the Council of Economic Advisers," Vol. 42, pp. 283–295 (1948); Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formation for National Security," Vol. 43, pp. 534–543 (1949); Ralph J. Watkins, "Economic Mobilization," Vol. 43, pp. 555–563 (1949); Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its Evolution and Present Role," Vol. 39, pp. 653–684, 869–898 (1945). See also John D. Millett, *The Process and Organization of Government Planning* (New York, 1947).

[30] *General Management of the Executive Branch*, pp. 17–18.

ber—as in part a semi-captive of his department and in part an independent personal chieftain—nor whether it was imperative that cabinet members be anchored more closely to the presidency through greater participation in the policy-making process.

The Commission declared, however, that there must be "unity of purpose" in the executive branch.[31] A question remains: can unity of purpose be achieved without more sharing of purpose and more achievement of decision in a council of men responsible for translating such decisions into administrative practice? If unity of purpose is the objective, is there not a gap in the Hoover Commission's recommendations which look on the one hand toward integration within the departments and on the other toward an adequately staffed presidency but which leave in the middle a loosely coordinated group of department heads representing only a portion of the executive branch?

It may be assumed that personal responsibility of the president, rather than collective responsibility of the cabinet, was the foundation on which the Hoover Commission had to build.[31a] Even so, basic questions remain. Is it necessary to reduce the strain on the coordinative and planning machinery in the president's office by a larger measure of structural integration than was recommended by the Hoover Commission? Is it possible, also, that the president could obtain more continuing unity in his administration if he made extensive use of the heads of a structurally integrated mechanism and perhaps certain staff aides in an advisory council? Would the nation be safer for the hard tests of the future (with the inevitable uncertainties concerning competence and motivations of presidents) if a custom of deliberating with such a council before decision was reached on major questions were firmly fixed? The viewpoint of a former president and experienced administrator on the lack of utility of a deliberative council as an aid to a responsible chief commands attention, but it may yet be true that unity for the executive branch and safety for the nation can be provided in sufficient measure only by a balanced combination of personal leadership (and under our system, personal responsibility), staff aids, and a deliberative council of cooperative men. Many administrators find it difficult to use a deliberative council, but it may be true, nevertheless, that the size and significance of the presidential task require a broadening of the counsel on which the political decisions affecting the work of the executive branch are based. And it may be that the incorporation of the cabinet into the deliberative process would help counteract the separatistic influences at the departmental level and facilitate the flow of purpose from the political chiefs to the working groups below.

Our point here is merely that these problems are too important to be dismissed summarily in a study of government organization, and that the teacher of government must continue his search for a fuller view of them and, it may be added, of the connected problems of executive-legislative relations.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

[31a] Contrast the view of Herman Finer, "The Hoover Commission Reports," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 64, pp. 579–595, 405–419 (1949).

In another area limitation of point of view in analysis does not lead to finality and certainty, but does delay the full shift in thought which many will think is long overdue. The Commission's report on personnel fails to reach beyond organization and procedure to the deeper and richer challenges in personnel administration. In this instance, dissent keeps alive hope for the future. Commissioner Pollock appealed boldly and eloquently for a new way of thinking about personnel administration which was not confined to "legalistic, procedural, paper-processing techniques"; which recognized that the problem is one of "human relations, requiring an understanding of human motivation"; which allowed "triumph of purpose over technique" and "more concern with people than with procedures."[32]

III. GAPS IN COMMISSION STUDY

The foregoing comments point up the incompleteness in the analysis of problems which were tackled by the Commission; in addition, there were vast problem areas which were either not considered or were given scant attention. These gaps constitute a further inadequacy of the Commission studies for instructional purposes.

It appears that some of the omitted problem areas were not proper subjects for full analysis under the limited statutory directive to the Commission.[33] It is still true, nevertheless, that their omission seriously limits the utility of the Commission's reports, either for the educator or for the legislator.

One gap is that of Congressional relations. Here and there through the Commission's and the task forces' reports there are references to such relations, but nowhere is there an analysis of problems arising from present relationships between Congress and the administrative agencies and of the possibilities for devising institutional safeguards to protect each in the proper performance of its legitimate functions.[34] The problem has complementary faces: the multiple contacts between the separate parts of Congress and the administrative structure, and the difficulty of raising significant issues of program and administrative method to responsible centers of deliberation and decision. The problem is in part one of Congressional operations, but it also has its administrative

[32] *Personnel Management*, pp. 47–59.

[33] Legislation creating the Commission (61 Stat. at L. 246) declared it "to be the policy of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of the public business in the departments, bureaus, agencies, boards, commissions, offices, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the Government by—

(1) limiting expenditures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient performance of essential services, activities, and functions;

(2) eliminating duplication and overlapping of services, activities, and functions;

(3) consolidating services, activities, and functions of a similar nature;

(4) abolishing services, activities, and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of government; and

(5) defining and limiting executive functions, services and activities."

[34] See Leonard D. White, "Congressional Control of the Public Service," American Political Science Review, Vol. 39, pp. 1–11 (1945).

aspects. The Hoover Commission may have been reaching toward the heart of the problem when it proposed departmental integration, performance budgeting, and further use of staff aides in upper levels of the executive branch. But the implications and the sufficiency of these arrangements with respect to Congressional relations were not analyzed. In part the gap is one in structural analysis: what is the relation of executive integration to Congressional supervision and direction? Is the former the prerequisite to the latter? But the gap in analysis is deeper: what is the nature of the responsibility of the executive branch and what in turn are the responsibilities of the Congress?

A connected omission is the failure to analyze the implications of administrative development of the program of government. Some aspects of this problem, it will be recalled, were analyzed by James Hart for the Brownlow Committee.[35] In a variety of ways political scientists, particularly in the postwar period, have shown an increasing consciousness of the centrality of the problem of policy formation in administration.[36] Here and there the work of the Hoover Commission and its task forces reflects an appreciation of the significance of program development and program analysis.[37] But the failure to recognize the centrality of these aspects of the work of the executive branch had unfortunate results. First, it left gaps in recommendations. Thus, in the list of aids for the departmental secretary there is a glaring omission of any policy aids.[38] Queries: are aids on managerial aspects of administration sufficient for the attainment of the departmental unity desired by the Commission? Can bureauitis be checked, departmental cohesion be achieved, and integrated development of correlated programs be expected if program planning organs are not established in departmental offices? Again, does the Commission implement the presidency as fully for study of the various types of policy problems as it does for managerial leadership? A more significant consequence, however, is the failure to provide an integrated analysis of the methodology and the significance in a democratic government of policy development in the executive branch of the government.

Accompanying this omission and that of Congressional relations is the further omission of searching inquiry into the effects of external factors upon the unity, force, and position of administrative agencies. One critical analysis of the Commission's work has pointed out that the Commission confined itself to the "architect-carpenter job" without "obtaining first any fresh awareness of the ways in which majority rule is squeezed between the millstones of pressure groups, Congressional appropriation committees and vested able-bodied

[35] James Hart, "The Exercise of Rule-Making Power," in *Report with Special Studies*, pp. 313–355.

[36] See particularly Paul H. Appleby, *Policy and Administration* (University, Alabama, 1949); C. J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in C. J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason (eds.), *Public Policy* (Cambridge, 1940), Ch. 1.

[37] As in the task force report on *Departmental Management* (Appendix E), especially at pp. 16, 51–54.

[38] Commission report on *General Management of the Executive Branch*, p. 38.

bureaucratic interests."[39] The Commission did not analyze the relationship of administration to the power forces in society. Its reports do not show a consciousness of the fact that administrative effectiveness is dependent upon a heavy balance of supports over resistances in the power context of society.[40] Without this consciousness integration tends to become a mechanician's toy or a budgeteer's weapon rather than a tool of democratic purpose; without it the search for efficiency must be in terms of man-hours and man-yields rather than according to degree of attainment of social purpose.

These omissions on Congressional relations, policy formation, and power exertions clarify amazing contradictions in Commission declarations. On the one hand, the Commission could state: "There is perhaps no time in history when it has been more important to evaluate the effectiveness of the executive branch of the Government in carrying out the will of the Congress and the people."[41] On the other, it could conclude: "Thus, in the early stages of planning, our attention was directed upon the largest spending activities of the Government with the expectation that these functions would provide the most fruitful ground for economy and savings."[42] The cat is out of the bag: cost of performance, not results of performance, was the primary objective of study. There is merit in the objective, but it is a partial objective nevertheless.

Some other significant gaps in the Commission's study should be noted. One is the failure to study the place of public relations in development and effectuation of policy. In part, this is related to the omissions discussed above, for public relations is a part of both defensive and aggressive administrative politics, a part of the effort of administrative agencies to create or maintain a sufficient area of consensus and power support for continuance or expansion of program in line with the trends set by agency traditions and current motivations.[43] But it has other aspects, one of which is the problem of public distrust of bureaucracy and the correlative lack of prestige of public employment. The Hoover Commission did not join in the criticism of the public employee, but it made no positive effort to discover the roots of public sentiments concerning bureaucracy and bureaucrats or to determine if these sentiments had a real effect upon the effectiveness of the executive branch and, if so, whether the Commission might be the first instrument for re-education of the public.

Another gap is the lack of a broad and inclusive study of the problem of decentralization.[44] The task force study on federal-state relations has now been published,[45] and the Commission made a brief report on the subject.[46] The

[39] Public Affairs Institute, *The Hoover Report—Half a Loaf* (Washington, 1949), p. 7.

[40] See Norton E. Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 9, pp. 257–264 (1949).

[41] *Concluding Report*, p. 3. [42] *Ibid.*, p. 45. [43] See Long, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

[44] The Commission noted in its *Concluding Report*, p. 46, that "There still may be much needed work to be done . . . in such fields as public relations and executive-legislative relationships; and the reorganization problems of the field services are still practically untapped."

[45] Council of State Governments, *Federal-State Relations* (Report prepared for the Hoover Commission), S. Doc. No. 81, 81st Cong., 1st Ses., 1949.

Commission also arranged for a study of federal field services, but it did not publish the study and included only a three-page statement on the problem in one of its final reports.[47] But the time has come, the need is urgent, for a really comprehensive study of all aspects of the problem of carrying the services of government from Washington to the communities of the nation. Among other things such a study should include analysis of the scope of the need for decentralization, the potentialities for devolution of administrative operations, the factors affecting choice between cooperative federalism and federal field administration, the managerial and political problems in each system, the place and forms of regional organization, the methods of coordinating related programs at area office levels,[48] the proper use of lay cooperation and community participation, the possibilities for providing community information centers, the ways of sharing information and purpose with field personnel, and the place of community public relations activities in bridging the gap between Washington agencies and the grassroots. It is lamentable that another study should have been completed without attention to these vital problems of democratic government and efficient administration.

IV. THE NATURE, PURPOSE, AND PLACE OF ADMINISTRATION

The foregoing comments point toward the conclusion that the problems of the executive branch are part of a wider web of relationships and that even the central features of structure and managerial process need to be studied in a broad, varied, and baffling context. This is no novel idea for political scientists, who have come to realize the necessity for a restatement of the problems of the executive branch in terms broader than those which have characterized the study of management in the past. But the Hoover Commission, working within the confines of a narrowly framed statute, provided no fresh view, no deeper insight, no clearer exposition, than we have had in the past on the basic complexities. And this is the fundamental deficiency of the Commission's reports for educational purposes. They give no picture of the nature, purpose and position of administration and the executive branch in today's government and today's society.

Admittedly, some steps for reform can be justified without such a picture. Conversely, however, there is danger that Congress and the public will be misled into a false sense of security by surface management studies, and the educator carries an obligation to provide his students with the grasp of fundamental factors which must have attention in the long-run search for effective government.

The need for broader and deeper study in educational centers than that made by the Hoover Commission may be illustrated by brief reference to four types

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[46] *Overseas Administration, Federal-State Relations, Federal Research*, pp. 25–37.

[47] *General Management of the Executive Branch*, pp. 42–45.

[48] See the author's *Field Administration of Wartime Rationing* (Washington, 1947), *passim*, and the literature cited therein.

of factors which, in the author's opinion, need more attention in the future. In part some of these have been adverted to already, but they need restatement as part of the context of modern government.

First, study of the executive branch must be grounded in ecology. For one thing, it must look at the "logic of events." As Gaus has said, "the study of public administration must begin with some explanation of why people burden themselves with something which many of them, at least, resent."[49] It must take account of the "changes which coerce us into the use of government."[50] Analysis of these changes should enable men to project their vision toward the future and see the probable demands upon the executive branch of the government. They may then be better equipped to constitute arrangements which will be sufficient for things which are to come. In addition, it must take account of environmental attitudes concerning bureaucrats and politicians.[51] To realize the content and significance of these is a condition requisite to pursuit of means of modifying traditional notions or adjusting administrative practice and public relations to their imperatives. Also, it must take account of the position of Mr. Citizen in city or town X who is faced with the complexities and unknowables of the government around him. Students of the executive branch should face up to the question as to whether there are any other answers to this problem besides providing a salary for an assistant Congressman. Finally, it must take account of the complex of forces in a richly diversified social and economic society and a highly disintegrated political situation, and of the challenges arising therefrom to the fashioner of governmental mechanism and procedure.

Second, there appears to be need for centering attention on program operations. One beginning here might be a penetrating analysis of types of program functions. It would be helpful if this could be done without too much restriction from concepts developed in other contexts, such as those which developed with the evolution of judicial and legislative organs, and hence with opportunity to see the distinctive elements in administrative functions. Perhaps there has been too much effort to rationalize as "quasi" and too little effort to study functions for what they are *per se*.

The future analysis of functions may be made from various approaches. Thus, the rich possibilities may be illustrated by suggestion that functions may be studied vertically with the purpose of determining the points of division in a hierarchy between discretionary and automatic functions; horizontally to see the variations of questions of organization, procedure, and responsibility with types of functions; and as a whole to see the peculiar problems in carrying out different types of programs, e.g., the differences between service and control functions, or between moderating strains in the economy or stabilizing elements in the economy. It may be that a more vigorous entry

[49] John Merriman Gaus, *Reflections on Public Administration* (University, Alabama, 1947), pp. 2–3.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 5. [51] See Gaus' comments, *ibid.*, p. 14.

of the student of political science into these areas would do much to reintegrate the study of public administration, which has been distributed in its various aspects to the management experts, the lawyers, and the program specialists.

Whatever merit or lack of merit there may be in these suggestions concerning possible areas of study, there can be no doubt that vast new problem areas would be opened for consideration if the student of government gave the same attention to the unfolding of the program of government in the process of its administration which he has given to structure and managerial process. One result would be to enlarge the consciousness that the executive branch of the government has a significant part in determining the policies under which men live. The idea that administration was separate from politics developed in a period when men thought that "legislative" power could not be delegated. With the breadth and generality of modern delegations it is far too late for students of political science to study administration as management only rather than as a channel for the conversion of policy directives into definite lines of program action or, it should be added, of inaction. Once it is firmly grasped that in the process of administration program can be expanded, contracted, created, or vetoed, the setting is provided for analysis of many problems of personnel, organization, and political responsibility.

The implications also of policy recommendation to the Congress need further study.[52] This, however, needs to be based upon an exhaustive study of what the significance has been, and may be expected to be, of presidential leadership and of agency recommendation in general program areas where responsibility has previously been delegated to the executive branch. How creative have agencies been? From whence does the new view come? Must politics freshen the bureaus or commissions from above if they are to be originative? Do any present organizational and procedural techniques serve to crystallize the short and the narrow view? Is presidential planning the sole resource for the large and the fresh view? Or is a further search for institutional arrangement downward and outward needed?

Once it is fully understood that the essence of government, including administration, is program action, the significance of a third element in study is emphasized. This is the search for internal factors which make for the success of institutional operations. In various ways a richer view of institutional operation has developed in recent years. First, the writings of Barnard and others have shown the importance of the communication of purpose in obtaining

[52] Political scientists have recognized the importance of this aspect of government rather lately. When Edwin E. Witte wrote his article on "Administrative Agencies and Statute Lawmaking" in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 2, pp. 116–125 (1942), he noted that he had found only one article on the subject, namely, O. Douglas Weeks, "Initiation of Legislation by Administrative Agencies," *Brooklyn Law Review*, Vol. 9, pp. 117–131 (1939–1940). But Carl McFarland in *Judicial Control of the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1920–1930* (Cambridge, 1933), Ch. 5, had drawn some interesting conclusions on administrative recommendations to Congress.

the cooperation of men in institutional effort.[53] Second, attention to human motivation has led students of administration to see the importance of the "triumph of purpose over technique" in all matters affecting the competence and morale of workers in an organization. Third, the study of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure has indicated the extent to which public decision and action is the result of the collaboration of men of complementary competencies in an institutional fabric. Communication, motivation, collaboration, are words which convey the nature of the process of attaining purpose in organization.

Fourth, the sense of the importance of values, recently examined in this journal, needs to pervade the study of administration.[54] The prime reason for this is the two-way participation of the administrative agencies in program development—as aid to Congress and as amplifier of programs under their directives. The ends-means dichotomy breaks down in that vast middle area of the governmental hierarchy where men are unbound, or loosely bound, by prescriptives of policy and where the content of program takes form in the discretion and vigor of men.[55] Likewise, as objective analysis of the expert breaks into this area where men "are left at large" under their directives but subjected to manifold special influences, objectivity loses its virility if guided by no principle of integrity.

Invariably men seeking this principle return to one or the other of two themes, and too often without seeing the possible conflicts between them. One is the theme of political responsibility which carries with it the implications that administration is a subordinate function and that in a democracy it must be responsive to the channels for proper expression of the dominant will of the community. The other is the theme of the public interest, which assumes that there are areas of generality of interest larger than various particular interests and that this generality of interest should be objectified in administration. The conflict between the two as guides to administration arises whenever a political directive seems to the administrator to carry some concept of purpose which contradicts or falls short of his view of the general interests of society.

Perhaps it is the task of science to search for ways in which these two ethical imperatives may be accommodated, as best they can be, in the practice of government. The overriding supremacy of the political will, as expressed in a proper directive, seems inescapable as the first canon of administrative ethics. But directives in the modern day generally leave the top hierarchy of the executive branch with a vast area in which it may give its own content to government, and often the political directives in such cases are framed

[53] Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, 1938); Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1948). "Management," says Donald C. Stone, "cannot secure its aims on a command basis." In Joseph E. McLean (ed.), *The Public Service and University Education* (Princeton, 1949), p. 59.

[54] Fritz Morstein Marx, "Administrative Ethics and the Rule of Law," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 1119–1144 (1949).

[55] Compare Simon, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3.

in words which seem only to transfer the search for the public interest to the administrator. Moreover, the administrative hierarchy may recommend to the political superiors a new standard of decision and action which accords with its concept of the public interest.

The search for ways of embodying these two standards of ethics in the practice of the executive branch is the dominating need in the study of administration and one of the dominating needs in the study of politics. The two together, properly accommodated, may form a standard of social efficiency. To state the implications of such a standard and to find ways of implementing it in the discharge of government functions is the difficult but essential requirement in organization, procedure, and human motivation.

V. CONCLUSION

The educator played a significant role in carving out the initial sphere of study in public administration and in defining the standards of the efficiency and economy movement. The confinement of interest and the confidence in proposed solutions simplified the task of reform and have given an impression of progress toward better public administration. In the hands of a later generation of scholars the study of public administration has become more diversified, more inquisitive and less dogmatic, more sophisticated and less affected with certainty of distinctive mission. It may be anticipated that the study in the future will be more richly grounded in ecology, program analysis, institutional behavior, and ethical foundations. As a result the reach for materials of study will extend beyond the management center to the peripheries of psychology, politics, economics, and ethics. The requirements on management analysis will themselves be more complex. Whether in the end new lines of reform toward a broader goal of social efficiency can be charted, or old lines substantiated from a more fertile base, is a part of the challenge to the educator to give his students both the wide and the penetrating view and some guiding tests of principle.

NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE

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I. INTRODUCTION

The trend towards public ownership or control of certain basic industries and services, particularly those relating to fuel, power, transport and banking, is a secular movement of world-wide dimensions. Traces of it can be found, in greater or less degree, in almost every country which is economically developed, and in many backward ones as well.

The political scientist who studies this subject in his own country is almost certain to feel strongly tempted to consider developments elsewhere. There is a deep fascination in comparing and contrasting the manner in which this great movement manifests itself in different countries. The pattern of development will inevitably be influenced by history, and by variations in the political, economic, legal, psychological and sociological characteristics of the several nations. These divergences, however, serve to heighten the interest by enabling us to distinguish the fundamental elements of general significance from the incidental aspects of local significance due to national idiosyncrasies.

In attempting a brief comparison of the administration of nationalised industries in England and France, I am fully aware of the pitfalls which lie in the path, and I would not claim to have avoided them all. A difficulty encountered in the present instance is that most of the serious French documentary material is legalistic and conceptual in character. The inductive method, based on painstaking factual observation, has made little headway in France in the social sciences. Furthermore press comment, in France as in England, is for the most part tendentious and politically biased.

II. THE PRE-WAR SITUATION

We are concerned here primarily with the post-war or post-liberation programmes of nationalisation in the two countries. It is helpful, however, to consider briefly the pre-war situation. In France there is a long tradition of public enterprise, derived originally from Colbert, which finds expression in the national ownership of such famous institutions as the Gobelins, Beauvais and Sèvres factories. During the 19th century the State acquired a monopoly for the manufacture and sale of matches and tobacco products. In 1924 the State entered the field of nitrogen production, and of potash extraction in Alsace.[1]

The State played an important part in the construction of the French railway system from 1842, when a law prescribed the creation of nine principal lines radiating from Paris, which were to be exploited by companies enjoying concessions. An increasing share of the prime costs of construction were assumed by the State, and under successive agreements it became customary for operating deficits to be met out of national funds. This produced "La crise

[1] For an account of these and other early developments see Marcel Ventenat, *L'Expérience des Nationalisations* (Paris, 1947), Ch. 4.

de la concession" which led to the purchase by the State of the western system in 1908. In 1918, with the return to France of Alsace-Lorraine, the State took over the railways in those provinces.

In order to secure co-ordination a Directing Committee was set up to supervise the entire railway system. It was assisted by a higher Railway Council. At the same time an approach towards financial unity was made by the establishment of a common fund. Despite these measures, the burden falling on the French Treasury continued to grow incessantly, and in 1937 the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (S.N.C.F.) was formed. This body is a mixed economic enterprise (*société anonyme d'économie mixte*) of the type frequently found on the continent of Europe, in which both public and private interests participate.[2] In this instance the State has a majority holding of 51 per cent of the stock. The existing companies were not eliminated either as regards their capital interest or functions of management, so that this measure can only be regarded as a limited and partial form of nationalisation. The organs of the S.N.C.F. consist of the stockholders' meeting, which is attended by the representatives of the Government and the concessionaire companies, the Governing Board, and the General Direction. The Governing Board contains ten members representing the State, five representing the companies and five representing the railway employees. The chairman of the Board is selected from the first-named group and he is given a casting vote in case of need.

The General Direction is the chief executive organ. It consists of a director-general, two deputy directors-general and a secretary-general, all nominated by the chairman, on the recommendation of the governing board and with the approval of the Minister of Public Works and Transport. Thus on all the organs of the S.N.C.F. the State has a preponderant voice which can insist on the railways being run as a public service.[3]

The electricity supply industry in France before the War presented certain not entirely dissimilar features. Government intervention was called for in the first instance in order to permit transmission equipment to be placed on the highways. The utility undertakings were compelled to apply for permission to the local authorities, who were empowered by Acts passed in 1906, 1925 and 1935 to impose increasingly strict conditions on them in exchange for the concession.[4]

The electricity generating plants were at first required only to comply with the regulations applicable to dangerous, inconvenient or unhealthy industries, but after the First World War the State was authorised to enter the field where private enterprise was lacking or where very large hydro-electric undertakings

[2] "Les Nationalisations en France et en Grande-Bretagne," *La Documentation Française*, August 27, 1948, *Notes Documentaires et Études*, No. 983, p. 15.

[3] "La Reconstruction de la S.N.C.F. et Ses Perspectives d'Avenir," *La Documentation Française*, April 28, 1948. *Notes Documentaires et Études*, No. 890, p. 10.

[4] Jean-Marie Auby, "La Nationalisation du Gaz et de l'Électricité" in L. Julliot de la Morandière and Maurice Byé (eds.), *Les Nationalisations en France* (Paris, 1948), pp. 111–112.

were projected involving many different interests. The Government thus came to form mixed enterprises, such as the Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (1921) and the Energie Électrique de la Moyenne Dordogne (1928). Coal burning generating plants were brought under public control in 1935 and a complete administrative service was set up for this purpose in the Ministry of Public Works.[5]

An event of a different type was the law passed in 1936 authorising the nationalisation of the armament industry. This measure arose from the moral revolt against the "merchants of death," as the armament manufacturers were called. The statute empowered the Government to expropriate, wholly or partially, undertakings engaged in manufacturing or trading in munitions of war. The power so conferred had to be exercised before the end of March, 1937. Apart from this limited power of acquisition, undertakings engaged in the production or sale of war material were henceforth to function only with the authorisation of the State and under its control. This control extended to intermediaries and even publicity agents. Very slight use was made of these far-reaching powers by the Ministers for War and the Navy. The French Admiralty took over only two small factories making torpedoes; the War Department acquired only highly specialised establishments in need of development. They amounted to no more than ten undertakings employing a total of 10,000 workpeople.

On the other hand, the Air Ministry, then under the direction of M. Pierre Cot, made extensive use of these powers. Six great corporations were formed (subsequently reduced to four by amalgamation) to take over commercial firms making military aircraft. They were based on territorial groupings, there being a Société Nationale de Constructions Aéronautiques du Nord, and others for the Centre, the South-West and the South-East of France respectively. These corporations were in form mixed economic enterprises but almost the whole of their capital—and therefore the management—is in the hands of the State.[6]

Britain did not have a strongly marked tradition of public enterprise going back for centuries, such as existed in France. Moreover, the philosophy of *laissez faire* formulated by Adam Smith and the other classical economists, and Herbert Spencer, was much more fully accepted during the 19th century in England than in France. But during the twenty or thirty years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War there were numerous examples of public enterprise in several industries and services.

An early example was the Port of London Authority, set up in 1908 on the initiative of Mr. Lloyd George to take over and operate the vast complex of river works, quays, docks, warehouses, bridges, etc. which make up the great

[5] The headquarters organisation was known as La Direction de l'Électricité de l'État. Below it were nine provincial organs, each directed by an engineer-in-chief of the *Pont et Chaussées*, and a control service over the distribution of electricity in each *département*. "Les Nationalisations en France et en Grande-Bretagne," *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[6] Ventenat, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–96.

port of London.[7] This is in no sense a Government-managed undertaking. It was an isolated instance of public ownership, forced on a Liberal Government by the bankrupt condition of the commercial dock companies and the urgent need to modernise Britain's chief port.

As regards the gas industry, about 35 per cent of the output was produced by undertakings owned and operated by the larger city councils, the remainder being in the hands of commercial companies. Both types of operator were stringently regulated by public utility legislation and administrative orders in respect of prices, profits, obligation to supply, quality of gas, non-discrimination between consumers, and cognate matters.

A similar situation existed in the electricity supply industry, but here the relative proportions held by private and public ownership were reversed. About two-thirds of the industry was in the hands of the great municipalities, while a third was owned by commercial companies. Between the Wars, however, government action became of great importance in initiating, designing, constructing and operating a "national grid", that is, an interconnected transmission system operating on a standard voltage which links up the principal generating stations. Generating stations poured their output into the grid; from there it was supplied in bulk to statutory undertakers for distribution to consumers.[8] The national grid and the great regional schemes which fitted into it were designed by the Electricity Commission, a public authority appointed by the Minister of Transport and exercising planning and judicial functions. The task of adopting, executing, financing and operating the schemes was the responsibility of the Central Electricity Board, a public corporation set up in 1926. The object was to improve, increase and cheapen the generation of electricity. Distribution was left in the hands of the municipal and commercial operators who were subject to public utility control of the familiar type.

Public enterprise played little or no part in building up the British railway system. There was, of course, a long established system of regulating railway rates and charges. There were administrative tribunals to fix or approve passenger fares and freight rates, to prevent undue preferences between one trader and another, and to remedy the absence of reasonable facilities;[9] but none of this type of intervention even remotely resembled nationalisation. In 1930, independent regulatory commissions were set up to regulate motorbus and motorcoach services, and in 1933, the motor haulage industry was brought

[7] Lincoln Gordon, "The Port of London Authority" in W. A. Robson (ed.), *Public Enterprise* (London, 1937), pp. 14–57. See also Lincoln Gordon, *The Public Corporation in Great Britain* (London, 1938), pp. 18–83; W. A. Robson, *The Government and Misgovernment of London* (2d ed., London, 1948), pp. 131–139.

[8] See G. Haldane, "The Central Electricity Board and Other Electricity Authorities" in *Public Enterprise, op. cit.*

[9] See W. A. Robson, *Justice and Administrative Law* (2d ed., London, 1947), Ch. 3, for an account.

under similar control. The object was, partly at least, to reduce competition with the railways.[10]

The outstanding example of nationalisation in Britain before the War was broadcasting. Here we find a service used by almost every household taken over at a very early stage of its history by a public corporation, which owns and operates it as a national monopoly in the public interest, and is solely responsible for planning and development.

The nationalisation of armament manufacture was considered by a Royal Commission[11] in 1935–36, but rejected on grounds of expediency.

Two important differences may be noted in the attitude of the two nations towards private enterprise. One is the dislike in Britain of the mixed economic enterprise, which has been so widely adopted in France. Almost the only example to be found in Britain is the Manchester Ship Canal. The other is in regard to subsidies. On the English side of the Channel there is nothing comparable to the prolonged willingness of the French Treasury to make up the operating deficits of the French railways. It is true that Parliament voted a substantial subsidy, over a period of years, to Imperial Airways and other overseas air lines; but it was the traditional British dislike of prolonged subsidies of this kind which led to British Overseas Airways Corporation's being set up as a public corporation in 1939 to take over the whole of the British overseas scheduled services.[12] This was an authentic example of nationalisation; but the activities of the Corporation were diverted to war purposes until 1945. It can therefore conveniently be dealt with as part of the post-war development.

Apart from these two important points, the position in Britain and in France between the two World Wars was similar in essentials despite superficial differences. In neither country had any substantial degree of nationalisation taken place, nor did there appear to be much prospect of its occurring in the near future. In each country there were isolated examples of nationalisation which seemed to result from spasmodic impulses aroused by the circumstances of particular industries, rather than from any general movement in that direction. There was, however, a strong current of opinion in the political parties of the Left flowing towards the public ownership and operation of certain basic industries. In due course this current was to exert a powerful influence on the tide of events.

III. THE SCOPE OF NATIONALISATION

War is the midwife of change. But the changes which war brings to birth are those whose seeds have for long been germinating in the womb of time.

[10] D. N. Chester, *Public Control of Road Passenger Transport* (Manchester, 1936), *passim*.

[11] Report of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms, Cmd. 5292/1936.

[12] The heavy subsidies paid to the sugar industry for many years was one of the principal reasons which led the Labour Party to include nationalisation of that industry in its programme for the recent General Election.

Indeed, war seems usually to have the effect of speeding events rather than of determining their course. Hence, while it is true that in the post-liberation and post-war period we encounter a different climate of opinion, the economic and political historian will undoubtedly find an unbroken thread of continuity between the ideas and tendencies which were evolving between the two World Wars and the tidal wave of nationalisation which has broken on the shores of England and France during the last four or five years.

The main programme of nationalisation in France was drawn up by the Council of National Resistance in the winter of 1944, with the agreement of all parties and movements in the resistance. General de Gaulle fully accepted the idea that the State should organise and direct the economy in order to increase production and reduce social antagonisms. He contemplated a large sphere of freedom for private enterprise; but he insisted that the State should possess the essential instruments of control. "Tomorrow," he said, "it will be the rôle of the State itself to ensure the development of the great sources of energy, coal, electricity, and petrol, and also of the principal means of transport by rail, sea, or air, and of the financial media on which all the rest depends. It is the rôle of the State to raise metallurgical production to the necessary level. It is the rôle of the State to make use of the country's credits, to direct the national savings towards the vast investments which such developments demand, and to prevent groupings of private interests from running counter to the general interest."[13]

The coalfields in the north of France and in the Pas de Calais were nationalised by decree on December 13, 1944, and October 12, 1945. These mines employ over 200,000 men and produce two-thirds of the French coal output. A law passed on April 26, 1946, nationalised the entire coal mining industry except for a few very small collieries.

In the same month another statute[14] nationalised all undertakings engaged in the production and distribution of gas and electricity in France, Algiers and the French Colonies. Small undertakings were again excluded: in the case of gas, those producing less than six million cubic metres, and in the case of electricity, those producing less than twelve million kilowatts.

In December, 1945, the Bank of France and several other great banks were nationalised.[15] The Bank of France had been brought under control in 1936, when the Council of Regents was eliminated and the right of appointing the Council given to the Government, which had from the foundation of the Bank possessed the power of nominating the Governor and Deputy Governor. In 1945, however, the shares of the Bank passed into public ownership.

The other banks were divided into 3 classes: (a) deposit banks; (b) business banks; (c) long-term and medium credit banks.[16] The four principal deposit

[13] "Nationalisation in France," *The World Today*, Vol. 2, p. 365 (August, 1946).

[14] Law of April 8, 1946.

[15] Law of December 2, 1945, as amended by the law of May 17, 1946.

[16] Deposit banks are those which accept deposits for not more than two years or withdrawable on demand. They may not hold more than ten per cent of the capital of any

banks were nationalised—the Crédit Lyonnais, the Société Générale, the Comptoir d'Escompte, and the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie. All the others were placed under a supervisory Commission empowered to see that they are properly conducted. This Commission can examine balance sheets, inspect premises and demand information. It can warn, censure, prohibit specified operations, suspend responsible officers and ultimately delete them from the list of members.

Banks are required to choose in which category they will operate. Every business bank (*banque d'affaires*) whose outside liabilities and balance sheet total are in excess of 500 million francs is subject to special control by a Government Commissioner, who must attend meetings of the board of directors, committees and shareholders' meetings. He can veto any decision contrary to the national interest and present to the board of directors any measures which he considers necessary in the general interest and, in particular, called for by the policies of the National Credit Council. The Commissioner is assisted by a Supervisory Committee of three persons, representing respectively public or semi-public financial organs, trade unions, and industrial or commercial organs.[17] They are appointed by the relevant Ministers on the proposal of the appropriate bodies.

At the same time a National Credit Council was established as the central organ of the new financial system. The chairman is a Minister, appointed by the Government, and would presumably be the Minister of Finance. He may delegate his powers to the Governor of the Bank of France, who is *ex officio* vice-chairman. The Council consists of 38 members, of whom ten are nominated by various industries and interests such as agriculture, consumers' co-operation, the Chambers of Commerce and so forth; seven by the trade unions (including four to represent the bank employees); seven members representing various Ministries; seven persons drawn from different sections of the financial world and possessing financial or banking competence; and seven representatives of public or semi-public financial institutions.

The purpose of the Council is to relate the problems of financial policy to the banking organisation and the task of financing economic reconstruction. It recommends to the Minister measures to increase bank deposits, to diminish hoarding, and to develop the use of cheques, and proposes the rates to be allowed by privately-owned or nationalised banks. It advises on Government policy in such matters as subsidies, tax reductions and the acquisition of shares. It is consulted by the Minister of National Economy on general credit policy

enterprise except banks, finance houses, or mortgage companies necessary to their operation. Business banks are those whose principal activity is to acquire stock and participate in the management of firms. They can invest their own funds or deposits made with them for not less than two years. Long term and medium credit banks are those whose main business is to open credits for not less than two years. They may not accept deposits for shorter periods without authorisation.

[17] "Nationalisation of Banks and Industries in France," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 54, pp. 206–207 (Sept.-Oct., 1946).

with a view to financing plans for national reconstruction, the modernisation of plant and equipment, imports and exports. It exercises general control, through the Bank of France, on all occupations connected with credit and the money market. It assists in drafting proposals aimed at securing a greater concentration of banking and its improved efficiency. It proposes the basic operating rules for all banks, whether privately-owned or nationalised. It can hear appeals from any decision of a Government Commissioner who is supervising a particular bank.

France has also nationalised a great part of her insurance industry.[18] The 35 principal insurance companies, whose premium income amounts to 65 per cent of the total, were transferred to public ownership as working units by the expropriation of their shareholders. A Central Re-insurance Fund was set up under the control of the Ministry of Finance, to which the other companies must contribute a proportion of their premium income not exceeding ten per cent.[19] A National Insurance Council with advisory powers has also been established. The nationalised concerns do not include French companies operating abroad or foreign companies carrying on business in France.

In the summer of 1945 the State acquired the stock of the civil air lines and merged them into a single company.[20] Three years later, the Compagnie Nationale Air France was given its present constitution by statute.[21] It took over all the assets, rights and obligations of the former Air-France, Air-Bleu, and Air-France-Transatlantique, together with material and equipment provided by the State. Its stock may be ceded to public authorities in France or in the French Union; or, to the extent of not more than 15 per cent, to French citizens or juridical persons.[22]

In addition to the basic industries of coal, gas, electricity, banking and insurance, where a policy of nationalisation was applied on grounds of principle, a number of individual concerns in other industries were acquired for public ownership for reasons of a more adventitious kind. Thus, the Société Anonyme des Moteurs Gnôme-Rhône, the largest producer of aircraft engines in France, was taken over by the State because of the unpatriotic attitude of the directors

[18] Law of April 25, 1946.

[19] "A central fund will be responsible for reinsurance operations; this is, as the finance Committee stated (*Journal officiel*, 18 May, 1946, p. 45) one of the corner stones of the scheme. First of all, the Reinsurance Fund is a supervisory and statistical body; its situation reports will reproduce, on a reduced scale, the operations being conducted at a given moment, by insurance establishments in France as a whole. The Fund also has commercial functions: it will insure French insuring agencies, specially encourage types of insurance operations which are in the social and economic interest of the country, and promote the covering of certain special risks. The Fund will be administered by a board similar to those of the nationalised undertakings, and a Director-General." "Nationalisation of Banks and Industries in France," *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[20] Decree of June 26, 1945. David H. Pinkney, "Nationalization of Key Industries and Credit in France after the Liberation," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 62, p. 374 (Sept., 1947).

[21] Law of June 16, 1948. See "Le Statut d'Air France," *La Documentation Française*, July 17, 1948. *Notes Documentaires et Études*, No. 954.

[22] *Ibid.*, Article 4.

during the occupation.[23] Their alleged conduct in supplying the German air force on a vast scale was regarded as so contrary to the public interest and morally reprehensible that it justified nationalising the company as a punitive measure.[24] Similar action for a similar reason was taken in the case of the Renault motor company, the largest motor manufacturing concern in France.[25] There were other reasons in the case of the Renault Company; but Louis Renault's personal behaviour during the German occupation, and his subsequent arrest and death in prison, provided the occasion if not the only cause for the nationalisation of his huge concern. Several other individual companies fall into this category, such as the Berliet factory and numerous printing works now managed by the Société Nationale des Entreprises de Presse.[26]

This concludes our brief survey of the scope of French nationalisation. It indicates the chief measures which have been taken since the liberation, but it is far from complete. The participation of the State in mixed enterprises is very widespread. It extends to more than 40 companies engaged in such diverse activities as mining for ore, motion picture production, broadcasting, news agency, petroleum production and distribution, chemical manufacture, the merchant marine, industrial research and river navigation.[27] They include large concerns such as the S.N.C.F., or the Société Francolor, as well as quite small undertakings such as the Société du Sanatorium des Neiges at Briançon, whose capital is slightly over two million francs. The participation of the State ranges from 99 per cent in the South American Cable Company to four per cent in the Société d'Exploitation des Matériels Hispano-Suiza or less than three per cent in the Société Française des Nouvelles-Hebrides.

In England the scope of nationalisation has been wider in some respects and narrower in others than in France. As in France, coal mining, electricity supply, gas supply, scheduled air services and the central bank have passed into collective ownership. The Labour Government made no attempt to take over any of the great joint stock banks[28] but was content to confer on the nationalised Bank of England power to request information from, and make

[23] Decree of May 29, 1945.

[24] Ventenat, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–202. The name of the company was changed on August 28, 1945 to Société Nationale d'Étude et de la Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation.

[25] For a list of the branches and subsidiaries of this vast undertaking, see Bernard Wilmet and Maurice Faber, "De la Société Anonyme à la Régie Nationale des Usines Renault," *Économie et Humanisme*, No. 33, p. 496 (Sept.-Oct., 1947).

[26] Law of May 11, 1945.

[27] The French Ministry of Finance has published a complete list of the public corporations and the mixed economic enterprises; see "Liste des Établissements Public à Caractère Industriel et Commercial et des Sociétés d'Économie Mixte" in *Inventaire de la Situation Financière de la France.* Ventenat, *op. cit.*, Annexe II.

[28] The need to nationalise the great deposit banks in France was justified by M. Pleven as Minister of Finance on the ground that only by so doing could the Government secure acceptance of its monetary and credit policies by the leading banks. He contrasted this with the situation in England where, he said, one word uttered by the Governor of the Bank of England was sufficient to obtain compliance by the joint stock banks. M. Einaudi, "Nationalization in France and Italy," *Social Research*, Vol. 15, pp. 22–43 (March, 1948).

recommendations to, bankers; and, with Treasury authority, to give directions to any banker to secure compliance with any such request or recommendation.[29] The insurance industry has so far been left in private ownership in England; but the "mutualisation" of industrial insurance (that is, small policies on which the premiums are payable by weekly instalments) formed part of the Labour Party's programme for the recent General Election.[30] No British armament or aircraft manufacturing firms have been nationalised except Short Brothers, which was taken over by the Ministry of Aircraft Production during the War under Defence of the Realm Regulations owing to its inefficiency under private management. It has been retained in order to give the Government a yardstick by which to measure the prices demanded by commercial firms for military aircraft.

In Britain, the biggest single nationalisation measure was the Transport Act, 1947. This transferred the railways, the long distance road haulage industry (forty miles or upward from the operating center), the entire London passenger transport system in all its complexity, and a string of hotels and restaurants owned by the railways. Motor transport systems engaged in passenger services, and trade harbours can also be taken over under powers conferred by the Act.

Cables and Wireless, Ltd., which had a monopoly of the overseas tele-communications services, has been nationalised and placed under the control of the Post Office.

The Cotton (Centralised Buying) Act set up the Raw Cotton Commission and gave it exclusive power to import and dispose of raw cotton. The Overseas Resources Development Act, 1948, created the Colonial Development Corporation, which is authorised to carry out major works of capital development in the colonial empire; and the Overseas Food Corporation, to undertake large food producing schemes such as growing ground nuts in Tanganyika.

Iron and steel production has also been nationalised in Britain, though the coming into operation of the Act was postponed to enable the verdict of the recent General Election to determine its fate.

So in these major fields of inland transport, iron and steel, raw cotton and colonial economic development, Britain has gone further than France. Mention should also be made of the national health service, which involves the nationalisation of the hospitals; the public acquisition of development rights in land, which was effected by the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947; and the appointment of several Development Corporations to build new towns under the New Towns Act, 1946. These, however, may be thought to fall under the heading of social services rather than industries.

British nationalisation policy is easier to grasp than that of France because it is not complicated by (1) the inclusion of particular firms whose directors or

[29] Bank of England Act, 1946, s. 4 (3).

[30] The original proposal was to nationalise the industrial assurance companies. Owing to opposition by the Consumers' Cooperative movement, which is heavily involved in this business, the proposal was changed to mutualisation—that is, ownership of the undertaking by the policy holders.

proprietors behaved badly during the War, or (2) the participation of the State in a wide variety of mixed economic enterprises.

British legislation tends to be more monopolistic than French. There is nothing so far in England corresponding to the partial nationalisation of banking and insurance in France. We must distinguish for this purpose the extent of the ground covered by nationalisation from the proportion of an activity which is nationalised. For example, the English air line corporations only enjoy a monopoly of scheduled air services. The Civil Aviation Act, 1946, leaves commercial companies or private individuals a wide field of aerial work in which to operate freely, such as air surveying, flying clubs, charter flying, herring spotting, air taxis, sky-writing, training schools, private commercial fleets, etc. Hence, while only part of the sphere of civil aviation is nationalised, the whole of that part is under public ownership and operation.

IV. MOTIVES AND AIMS

How far were the socialisation programmes in the two countries based on similar motives and aims? This is a difficult question to answer. A full analysis of public opinion on the subject would occupy a substantial volume. Here we can deal with it in only a cursory manner.

There has been a doctrinal urge towards the public ownership of the basic industries throughout the Socialist movement in Europe since the first World War or even earlier. The organised labour movements in both France and England had for long declared themselves in favour of nationalisation of coal, for example. In both countries it was recognised to be necessary in order to secure a greater willingness to work on the part of the miners, although there were other important reasons.

The British coalmining industry had become technically backward under private ownership. Its technical shortcomings were impressively exposed in the Reid Report.[31] Large capital expenditure, estimated at £150 millions at the least, was required over a period of about five years in order to modernise the pits; and the colliery companies were unable or unwilling to provide the necessary funds. Furthermore, it was widely believed that unification could itself produce technical and financial advantages.

Opinions may differ on whether the French coalfields were in a better technical condition than the English ones. On the whole, their colliery engineering was probably better. The French economy was, however, in a disastrous condition at the end of the War and it was generally agreed that State action was required if coal production, on which the whole industrial recovery of France depended, was to be rapidly improved. Only the State could impose the unity of action necessary for technical modernisation and provide the necessary funds. On the social plane nationalisation was expected to safeguard to the maximum extent the health and well-being of the workers, to improve industrial relations, to fulfil the workers' just demands and to enable them to take part in the management of the undertakings. Here, too, the moral status of the employers had in some cases been weakened by their readiness to col-

[31] Report of the Technical Advisory Committee, Cmd. 6610/1944.

laborate with the Germans.[32] So on both sides of the Channel we find political, economic, technical and psychological motives for nationalising coal.

In England and France alike it was widely felt by many persons who were not convinced Socialists that, in the special conditions obtaining at the end of the War, the immense task of economic reconstruction could best be carried out if the State were in a position to control the basic industries and the financial system. It was, moreover, believed that the vast sums required for capital development and renewals could not be found by private sources.

There were other over-riding reasons of a more permanent character which played a considerable part in forming opinion. The British Labour Party's programme for the 1945 election, set out in "Let Us Face the Future," emphasised that the key industries ripe for public ownership were of vital importance not only to assure current production but also to guarantee full employment. They required radical reorganisation on the basis of a central plan. The only alternative to public ownership would be a monopoly in private hands, and this would have obvious disadvantages.

The nationalisation programme adopted by the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, in July, 1944, declared that it was necessary to free French economic life from the oligarchy which had hitherto dominated its finance and industry and which had in consequence encroached on the sovereignty of the State. Public ownership of the key sectors of the economy would protect the supreme authority of the State.

The desire to co-ordinate the various forms of inland passenger and goods transport was one of the dominant motives underlying the comprehensive scheme of nationalisation embodied in the British Transport Act, 1947. While in France there have been no advances in this direction since the War,[33] the gas and electricity industries are more closely co-ordinated by recent French legislation than by the corresponding British measures. One Act effected the nationalisation of both industries in France; and there is a common fund.

It can be seen that the aims and motives of the post-war nationalisation policies in the two countries have strong affinities. The principal difference was that in France there was a strong emotional reaction against those who had betrayed the national interests during the occupation. This contributed largely to the nationalisation of particular undertakings, although there were in all instances other important motives as well.[34] The desire to punish the unpatriotic collaborator did not lead inevitably to nationalisation, since the property of the former owners could have been confiscated, and directors and managers displaced, without disturbing the private enterprise basis of the undertaking. The punitive motive played a certain part in the decision to nationalise the coal mines in the north of France, but it was overshadowed by much weightier rea-

[32] "Les Nationalisations en France et en Grande-Bretagne," *op. cit.* p. 9.

[33] But the matter is under active discussion and several proposals have been put forward.

[34] For a discussion of the motives for the nationalisation of the Renault concern, see Wilmet and Faber, *loc. cit.*

sons. In England the punitive motive was not noticeably present at all, since the unity of the nation reached its highest point during the War.

V. METHODS OF ORGANISATION

In England, as in France, there has been a decisive rejection of what the French call *étatisation*. There is no word for this in English but the idea is well understood; and all political parties agree that a public corporation is the proper instrument for administering nationalised industries and a Government department the wrong instrument for securing the requisite flexibility, freedom and independence of management.

All the industries and services which have recently been nationalised in Britain have, therefore, been entrusted to public corporations. In some instances an entirely new organisation has been established to replace the former joint stock companies, as in the cases of coal, inland surface transport, electricity, gas, and air transport. The Iron and Steel Corporation is, however, little more than a holding corporation and the former producing companies have been left with their functions virtually intact but with their shares transferred to the Corporation. The Bank of England continues to be governed mainly by its charter and byelaws but is transformed into a public corporation subject to a few new statutory provisions.

In France the equivalent of a public corporation is an *établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial*. Coal, gas, electricity, the Bank of France, the four nationalised deposit banks, the nationalised insurance companies and the Renault concern, all come under this heading. On the other hand, the aircraft manufacturing firms, the S.N.C.F., the Société Nationale d'Études et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation, Air-France, etc., fall into the category of *Sociétés d'Economie Mixte*. Both types of institution are independent legal entities capable of suing and being sued in contract and tort. Both types have self-contained finance separated from the national exchequer. Both types have managerial freedom in varying degrees. Both types lie outside the Civil Service as regards their employees. Both types are liable to taxation of all kinds. Both types are in many respects assimilated to the law relating to joint stock companies of a commercial or industrial character. In all these ways they resemble the public corporations of Britain.

In France, as in Britain, new institutions have been set up to supersede the former companies and to take over the coal industry, gas and electricity supply. In the case of banking and insurance, the nationalised establishments retain their former identity and continue to carry on more or less as before, but with the State as sole stockholder and with drastic changes in the composition of the governing boards.

The French coal industry is organised on more decentralised lines than the English industry. There is a central body called the *Charbonnages de France*, which is charged with seeing that the programme of production is executed, with the direction of the industry as a whole, and with the control and co-ordination of the activities in the coal fields. It must approve plans of development

and production, make proposals concerning fuel prices, provide the finance for equipment, direct technical research and vocational training, and secure, by means of an equalisation fund, the financial stability of the productive units. It is thus an organ of administration and supervision.

In each of the nine coalfields, in which the mineral resources of the country are found, a separate coalmining corporation is established. These coalfield corporations are called *Houillères de Bassin*. On them falls the responsibility for the production, processing and disposal of coal. The nomination of their Governing Boards and chief executives is effected by decree under the same conditions as those which apply to the *Charbonnages de France*. This assures genuine autonomy for each coal field and at the same time assists good commercial management. In order, however, to provide liaison between the national organisation and the regional bodies, the Chairmen of the Governing Boards of the *houillères de bassin* may attend in a consultative capacity the meetings of the Governing Board of the *Charbonnages de France*, whenever they are considering questions concerning their coal fields. Conversely, the Governing Board of each *houillère de bassin* includes six representatives of the *Charbonnages de France*.[35]

The National Coal Board, by contrast, is a single giant monopoly with responsibility for every aspect of the British coal industry. It has set up divisional coal boards, area managers and other forms of local management. But this decentralisation is discretionary; and the divisional boards are always subject to the ultimate authority of the central body. The Coal Industry Nationalisation Act has been severely criticised for its over-concentration of power at the centre, although the National Coal Board has taken continuous and progressive steps to delegate authority and functions to the divisions, areas and individual collieries.[36] Nevertheless, the more decentralised structure of the French organisation is, in the writer's opinion, much to be preferred to the British model.

The supply of electricity and gas is organised on similar principles in both countries. The general direction of each industry is confided to two national corporations, and below these are regional corporations responsible for supplying their particular areas.[37] Thus, in France there is *Électricité de France, Service national* (E.D.F.), and, in six regions, *Électricité de France, Service de distribution*, each distinguished by a geographical designation.[38] In England,

[35] "Les Nationalisations en France et en Grande-Bretagne," *op. cit.* pp. 9–10.

[36] For details of the Board's organisation see the Annual Report, 1948, of the National Coal Board, Ch. 10. D. N. Chester, "The Organisation of the Nationalised Industries," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 21, p. 122 (April, 1950).

[37] Law of April 8, 1946; Electricity Act, 1947; Gas Act, 1948.

[38] In regard to electricity supply in France, the authority of the central organ appears to be preponderant. It is true that it has exclusive competence only in the sphere of transmission of energy; this attribution is quite natural when one recalls that hydro-electric production must be greatly developed. This factor will contribute to accentuate the separation of production regions (the mountainous zones) from the regions of high consumption. Moreover, the production curve varies each year in each region according to the climate and hydrographical conditions. For all these reasons the problems of transmission, interconnection and distribution present themselves forcibly in France at the national

production and general policy are in the hands of the British Electricity Authority, while distribution is the function of fourteen Area Electricity Boards. In the gas industry *Gaz de France* (G.D.F.) *Service National* corresponds with the National Gas Council, and *Gaz de France, Service de production et de distribution* with the Area Gas Boards in Britain.

The French plan provides for greater co-ordination and integration between gas and electricity than the English legislation. In order to finance the two industries and carry out development, a National Equipment Fund has been established. Its board is composed of representatives of the Government, E.D.F. and G.D.F., the National Credit Council and other bodies.[39] There is also a Superior Council for Electricity and Gas, composed of equal numbers of members of Parliament, and persons representing Government departments, local authorities, consumers and employees.[40] It is consulted before regulations are drafted and can decide disputes arising between the public corporations and the authorities from which they receive concessions. Most important of all, a net surplus resulting from electricity is being used to make good a deficit in gas. Thus, E.D.F. has up to the present always had to subsidize G.D.F.[41] Nothing like this exists in Britain. The gas and electricity corporations are entirely separate, the only link between them being the Minister of Fuel and Power. Indeed, nationalisation has even served to separate the two services much more completely than formerly, when many City Councils owned and operated both gas and electricity undertakings. There appears to be no justification for one form of fuel or power subsidizing another.

Liaison between the national and regional organs is obtained by diverse methods. Thus, the members of the British Electricity Authority must include four of the Chairmen of the Area Electricity Boards, to be chosen by the Minister.[42] The Gas Act goes further in the same direction, for the Gas Council is composed exclusively of the Chairmen of the Area Gas Boards, apart from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, who may be selected from outside. The French legislation proceeds by the reverse method. It gives *Électricité de*

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level. Production is in the hands of the *secteurs du service national*, the precise degree of whose autonomy the law does not define. As regards production, the law envisages six regional services, public autonomous undertakings, but they will be, in fact, strictly subordinated to the national service. In effect, apart from the right of general control that the national service exercises on all the decentralised organs, it will nominate the Governing Board of each regional distribution undertaking. If its competence is limited by the requirement that it must designate representatives of the consumers and of the employees, the national service nevertheless has the right of four representatives on each Governing Board and the Director of each distribution undertaking must be approved by it. In short, the national service exerts over the distributive services the ordinary powers of a Minister over the other public enterprises. "Les Nationalisations en France et en Grande-Bretagne," *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[39] Ventenat, *op. cit.*, p. 175; Auby, "La Nationalisation du Gaz et de l'Électricité," *op. cit.*

[40] "Nationalisation of Banks and Industries in France," *op. cit.*, p. 211.

[41] "La Fonctionnement Financier de l'Électricité de France," *La Documentation Française*, March 11, 1948. *Notes Documentaires et Études*, No. 848, p. 4.

[42] Gas Act, 1948. s. 5 (4); Electricity Act, 1947, s. 3.

France the right to have four representatives on the governing board of each regional corporation, and to approve the appointment of their chief executive. The British method is preferable because it increases the power of the decentralised organs on the national body.

VI. THE GOVERNING BOARD

By far the most important contrast between nationalisation in the two countries lies in the method of constituting the governing board.[43] In England the principle Parliament has followed is to require the appropriate Minister to appoint a fairly small board consisting of persons appearing to him to possess ability and experience of specified kinds. The aim is to obtain persons who are highly qualified in what are considered to be the most relevant spheres of work and knowledge. In France, the equal representation of the State, employees and the consumer is the dominant principle which is embodied in the legislation.

The size of the Board of the British corporations is in some instances fixed at a definite number which cannot be varied, while in others it may consist of any number of members which the Minister chooses between a prescribed upper and lower limit. An example of the former type is the Bank of England, whose Court of Directors consists of the Governor, Deputy Governor and sixteen Directors.[44] Examples of the flexible boards are the air line corporations,[45] which consist of a chairman and not less than four or more than nine other members; the Transport Commission[46] which must have not less than four or more than eight other members in addition to the Chairman; the Overseas Food Corporation and the Colonial Development Corporation, each of which has not less than four or more than ten members in addition to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman.[47] The size of the Gas Council is not specified. No attempt has been made to impose uniformity. The size of the Board must depend partly on the nature of the task which the Corporation is to carry out, and partly on the kinds of experience or knowledge which it is desired shall be represented on the governing body. This may vary from time to time.

Turning to the question of qualifications, the Transport Act, 1947, requires the members of the Transport Commission to be appointed from among persons appearing to the Minister of Transport to have had wide experience and shown capacity in transport, industrial, commercial or financial matters, in administration, or in the organisation of workers. Each Area Gas Board is to consist of persons who have had experience of and shown capacity in gas supply, local government, industrial, commercial or financial matters, applied science administration, or the organisation of workers. The Chairman or Deputy Chairman must have had experience of, and shown capacity in, gas supply. No statutory qualifications are prescribed in regard to the Boards of the air line

[43] One must avoid the term "Board of Directors," because in France a *Directeur* is an executive officer. The French term is *Conseil d'administration*. For a full discussion of the English principles and practice, see W. A. Robson, "The Governing Board of the Public Corporation," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 21, p. 135 (April, 1950).

[44] Bank of England Act, 1946, s. 2.

[45] Civil Aviation Act, 1946, s. 1 (2).

[46] Transport Act, 1947, s. 1 (2).

[47] Overseas Resources Development Act, 1948, s. 2 (1).

corporations, the New Town Development Corporations, the Central Land Board or the Bank of England. The Raw Cotton Commission is composed of two classes of members. One class consists of independent members who devote their time primarily to the work of the Commission. This includes the Chairman and one or two other members. They must have had experience of and shown capacity in industry, commerce or finance, or in administration, or have special knowledge of the cotton industry or some branch of it or of the merchanting of raw cotton or of raw cotton broking. The second class consists of part-time members not exceeding ten, of whom two must have special knowledge of the interests of cotton operatives and the remainder be qualified in various branches of the cotton industry or in industry, commerce or finance.[48] This is the nearest approach to the representation of interests to be found in the English legislation apart from the Port of London Authority.

Members of Parliament are excluded from appointment to the governing boards; and in the case of the Bank of England, Ministers and civil servants are also disqualified for appointment to the Court of Governors.[49]

Workers' control, as such, has been rejected. Trade union officials must cease to hold office if appointed to a Board. Most of the appointments have been non-political in the party sense, although Labour M.P.'s have sometimes tried to bring pressure on the Government either to secure the appointment of party adherents, or at least to exclude men of Conservative views from the Boards.

A typical Board contains the following elements: a leading member of the industry, usually a high executive of wide experience and established reputation; an outstanding ex-trade union official; a top-flight former civil servant; a leading financial expert; an eminent engineer or scientist; perhaps a leading business man from another industry; possibly a lawyer, or a retired air marshal or army general who showed conspicuous organising ability or leadership in the War. M.P.'s are disqualified.

Salaries are paid to all the members, whether they are full-time or part-time appointments. The levels of remuneration are higher than those payable for the principal posts in the Civil Service but below those paid for positions of similar importance under private enterprise. Thus, the Chairman of the National Coal Board receives £8,000 a year and the other full-time members £5,000.

In France the nationalised industries are administered by boards whose members are nominated by the three interests represented thereon.[50] Thus the board of *Électricité de France*[51] consists of eighteen members, of whom six are civil servants representing the State—that is, various Government Departments; six are representatives of the employees, and six represent consumers' organisations. The board of *Charbonnages de France* is similarly constituted. The coalfield corporations (*Houillères de Bassins*) have seven representatives

[48] Cotton (Centralised Buying) Act, 1947, s. 5.

[49] Bank of England Act, 1946, Second Schedule.

[50] "Le Tripartisme et l'Administration des Entreprises Nationalisées" in *Économie Contemporaine*. Centre de Recherches et de Documentation Economiques, April, 1948.

[51] Law of April 8, 1946, Article 20. The members are appointed by decree made on the recommendation of the Minister of Industrial Production.

of the *Charbonnages de France* in place of the State representatives. Each nationalised bank has a governing board of twelve members, of whom four represent trade associations for industry, commerce and agriculture, who may be regarded as consumers of banking services; four representatives of the trade unions of bank employees; two representatives of the Bank of France or other public credit institutions; and two members named for their banking experience. The insurance companies have boards of the same size composed as follows: three representatives of Government departments, three representatives of the National Insurance Council, three representatives of consumers and three representatives of the employees. The National Insurance Council has 21 members, of whom a third are appointed by the State, a third from among the policy holders, and a third from among insurance experts. The Minister of Finance is President. The board of the Renault undertaking contains seven representatives of Government departments, two representatives of consumers nominated by agreement between the Ministry of Industrial Production and the Ministry of Public Works; and six representatives of the employees chosen from among the delegates serving for the time being on the Comité Central d'Entreprise, which is a body for joint consultation on specific matters with the management.[52]

This brief description does not show the complexity of the French legislation in regard to the constitution of the boards. For example, the law of May 17, 1946, requires the governing board of the *Charbonnages de France* to be formed as follows:—(a) six representatives of the State, of whom two are proposed by the Minister in charge of Mines, and one each by the Ministers of National Economy, Finance, Labour and Transport; (b) six representatives of the consumers of solid fuel, of whom three are to represent the principal consuming industries and services and the other three domestic consumers (one of the latter is to be designated by the National Union of Family Associations and two by the most representative confederations of trade unions); (c) six representatives of the employees of the coal industry, nominated by the national trade unions, most of whom are representative of the several categories of personnel, such as workmen, foremen, salaried employees, engineers and managing staff.[53] A subsequent decree[54] specifies in elaborate detail the categories of civil servants who are qualified to represent the State on the governing board of *Charbonnages de France*, and the bodies which are to nominate the consumers' members.

The provisions relating to the boards of other nationalised industries in France are equally elaborate. Members of Parliament are disqualified for membership on several of the boards and for holding the position of director-general.[55] The Chairman of the Board is appointed by the appropriate Minister from among its members. The director-general is appointed by the Government. The nomination is sometimes to be made on the proposal of the Board, sometimes by the Minister on his own initiative. Both the Chairman and director-general (or the combined post of Chairman and chief executive) are full-time

[52] Wilmet and Faber, *loc. cit.* [53] Article 21.
[54] Decree of January 16, 1947.
[55] E. g., Law of April 8, 1946, Article 20.

salaried posts but all the ordinary members of the boards serve without remuneration.

The tripartite conception of the supreme governing organ is an idea which originated in the world of organised labour. The C.G.T. formulated the principle on theoretical grounds, as an alternative to *étatisation*, as long ago as 1920–21.[56] It is the weakest feature of the French legislation and is a threat to the successful operation of the French nationalised industries.

It is hopeless to expect unity of purpose, energetic administration and a coherent policy to emerge from an assemblage of diverse and conflicting interests representing the worker, the consumer and the taxpayer. Frustration and deadlock, log rolling and jockeying for position, are much more likely to result from the juxtaposition of discordant elements. And this, according to most accounts, is what is happening. The money power has been replaced by party politics, rather than by a solicitude for the common good.[57] At best a factious board, or one which cannot agree, may be by-passed by an energetic director-general; but this is scarcely a tribute to the principles on which the board is founded! The governing board is supposed to decide all major questions of policy, to keep informed on all important questions concerning the general administration of the undertaking, to approve its programmes of production, new works and developments, the annual statement of accounts, and so forth.[58]

There are, moreover, certain peculiar disadvantages to be found in the French practices which would not necessarily attach to the representation of interests in all circumstances. First, we may note that no payment is made to the directors for their services, other than the Chairman of the Board. In consequence, their material interest lies entirely with the organisation which they represent, while the public corporation exerts little or no influence on their loyalty.

Second, the civil servants who usually represent the State on the governing boards are heavily occupied with their departmental duties. Their function as a member of a Board is only a supplementary task, and often one of short duration. Their presence on the Boards has certain advantages since they are usually well informed about the current aspects of the Government's economic policy. They also offer an easy means of enabling nationalised industries to keep in touch with Government departments. But, as French writers admit, to expect these officials to exercise a serious and continued guidance on the policy of the nationalised concern is a pure illusion.[59]

Third, the trade union element often appears in two or three different capacities. Thus, the employees' representatives are nominated on the recommendations of the most representative trade unions. This has given the C.G.T. or the C.F.T.C. a determining voice in most cases, though not all. But the consumers' representatives are also often selected by the most representative organisations, whether of employers or workpeople, and this gives the trade unions and the C.G.T. another voice. Furthermore, many civil servants are to-day in trade unions. In the result, observes one critic, one can sometimes

[56] "Les Nationalisations en France et en Grande-Bretagne," *op. cit.*
[57] Wilmet and Faber, *loc. cit.*
[58] See Robson, "The Governing Board of the Public Corporation," *op. cit.*
[59] "Le Tripartisme et l'Administration des Enterprises Nationalisées," *op. cit.*

see "the C.G.T. throwing the ball from one side to another of a triangle."[60] It is surely wrong to regard trade unions as organs representing the interests of consumers. The fact that trade unionists are also consumers does not make of a trade union a consumers' organ.

The overweighting of the trade union element is most pronounced in the case of the coalfield corporations. Each board has nineteen members of whom probably at least ten will be trade union nominees—comprising seven direct representatives of the workpeople, one or two miners among the six consumers' representatives, and perhaps two workers' representatives among the six representatives of Charbonnages de France.

One of the most serious and moderate French critics contends that it is impossible by the existing methods to create an effective or homogeneous directing body. He urges that the system should be improved by reducing the size of the boards; by releasing civil servants who are members from their other duties; by making the personnel of the undertaking elect its own members in place of nomination by the general confederations of trade unions; by enabling the Government to choose freely the consumers' representatives on the basis of their proved capacity; and by appointing full-time paid members on the more important boards in exchange for a renunciation of all outside employment.[61]

VII. GOVERNMENT CONTROL

A fundamental question relating to nationalised industries is the extent of Government control. In England the recent legislation has greatly increased the powers of Ministers. The earlier generation of public corporations, such as the Port of London Authority or the Central Electricity Board, were largely immune from ministerial direction save in regard to a few specified matters not usually of the first importance. The statutes passed since 1945, on the other hand, give general powers of control to Ministers.

A typical formula provides that the Minister of Civil Aviation, after consultation with any of the air line corporations, may give to that corporation "directions of a general character as to the exercise and performance by that Corporation of their functions in relation to matters appearing to the Minister to affect the national interest; and the Corporation shall give effect to any such directions."[62] This formulation of ministerial power over the public corporation is the standard model.[63] In addition, the appropriate Minister is given numerous particular powers such as the right to approve programmes of reorganisation or development involving substantial capital outlay; and to settle schemes of training, education and research. The Minister of Transport must give his consent to the acquisition by the Transport Commission of any transport undertaking; and he may direct the Commission to discontinue any of their activities, or dispose of part of their undertaking or securities held by them. To qualify for a subsidy the air line corporations must submit annually to the

[60] *Ibid.* [61] *Ibid.* [62] Civil Aviation Act, 1946, s. 4.

[63] See Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, s. 3; Cotton (Centralised Buying) Act, 1947; Transport Act, 1947, s. 4; Electricity Act, 1947, s. 5; Overseas Resources Development Act, 1948, s. 9; Gas Act, 1948, s. 7.

Minister their programmes of proposed air transport services together with estimates of revenue and expenditure; and he must approve them with the concurrence of the Treasury.[64]

We have already noted that the appropriate Minister appoints the Governing Board and fixes their remuneration. The Minister can also in most instances vacate the office of any member of the Board whom he regards as unsatisfactory.

In the financial sphere, Government control extends to the approval of raising loans for capital expenditure, and in some instances it is the Minister himself who is to advance money for this purpose to the Corporation.[65] Treasury consent as well as the approval of the sponsoring Minister is usually required for issuing stock. The Treasury may guarantee the principal, interest and redemption of stock issued to finance new development.[66]

The public corporations are required to establish reserve funds to which any surplus revenue is to be allocated. The responsible Minister may, again with Treasury approval, give directions about any matter relating to the establishment or management of the fund.

With certain exceptions price policy is normally a matter entirely for the discretion of each corporation. There is, however, a legal obligation imposed on most of the public corporations (the air lines, the Overseas Food Corporation, the Colonial Development Corporation, and the new town development corporations are excepted from this duty) so to conduct the industry committed to their charge as to secure that its revenues shall not be less than sufficient to meet the expenditure properly chargeable to revenue account, taking one year with another.[67] Transport charges are, moreover, subject to regulation by Administrative Tribunals.

An official French document claims that, whereas in Britain the tendency has been to increase governmental control compared with the pre-war position, in France the trend has been in the opposite direction. The French people have wished to break away from ministerial supervisory procedures because they enclose the undertakings in too strict a tutelage.[68] In England, we are told, the system of public corporations has been deformed by the great recent increase of ministerial control.

This author is by no means convinced that Government control is less in France than in Britain. Certainly the Minister's power of appointment is much more free under the English legislation than under the French system, where interests nominate their representatives. But what about the civil servants who sit on the French boards? What about the Commissaire du Gouvernement who attends every meeting of the governing board of a nationalised bank or insurance company and can veto its decisions? What about the power of the French

[64] Civil Aviation Act, 1946, s. 12; Transport Act, 1947, s. 4 (4) and (5).

[65] Gas Act, 1946, s. 42; Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, ss. 26 and 27.

[66] Electricity Act, 1947, s. 42; Transport Act, 1947, s. 90. The Treasury must guarantee stock issued to compensate the former owners of the nationalised industries.

[67] Gas Act, 1948, s. 41 (1); Electricity Act, 1947, s. 36.

[68] "Les Nationalisations en France et en Grande-Bretagne," *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Government to fix the prices of coal, gas, electricity, etc.? What about the Minister's right to appoint the Director-General of each French corporation and to decide the amount of his salary? There are no controls similar to these in Britain.

Decrees made under the French coal nationalisation Act of May 17, 1946,[69] confer on the Council of Ministers the right to dissolve the governing boards of the national or coalfield corporations. They also require government approval to be obtained in regard to the following matters relating to the *Charbonnages de France:* the delegation of powers to the Director-General; the programme of new works, and the production and working plans for the coal mines; the profit and loss account and the annual reports, the provision for amortisation, depreciation and reserve; the issue of stock and loans for terms of five years or more; the acquisition or disposal of financial holdings; the designation of representatives of *Charbonnages de France* on the boards of the coalfield corporations; the continuance in office or revocation of directors of the coalfield corporations; regulations governing the conditions of employment; measures of financial aid given to privately owned mines; the composition, powers and procedure of the central research committee.[70] Some but not all of these matters are also within the scope of government control in Britain. On the whole, ministerial control appears to be at least as extensive in France as in Britain, if not more far-reaching. It is certainly more meticulous, though its form is somewhat different.

The Chairman of *L'Électricité de France*, at a press conference on February 16, 1948, on the financial operations of his undertaking, concluded by saying that his Board's task was rendered difficult by the fact that the financial autonomy, which the law expressly confers on *L'Électricité de France*, is illusory. The governing board, he declared, in reality controls neither wages, selling prices, or credits. "In these matters it can only make proposals. The decision rests with the government, which is thus the sole master and, in consequence, solely responsible for its policy."[71] The Ordinance nationalising the Renault undertaking requires it to accept the ultimate controls over administration and finance that may be imposed at all times by the Ministries of Industrial Production, National Economy and Finance.[72]

VIII. AUDIT, ACCOUNTS AND REPORTS

As we should expect in legislation setting up great public undertakings dealing with very large sums of money both for capital expenditure and trading purposes, careful provision is made in both countries to ensure proper auditing.

The British legislation requires the public corporations to keep accounts and to prepare annual statements in such form as the Minister with Treasury approval may direct, "being a form which shall conform with the best commer-

[69] Decree dated January 16, 1947 (published in the *Journal officiel* of the following day), Article 10.

[70] Ventenat, *op. cit.*, pp. 131–132.

[71] "Le Fonctionnement Financier de l'Électricité de France," *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[72] Decree of January 16, 1945, Article 7.

cial standards."[73] Several Acts require the accounts of a corporation to distinguish between its main and ancillary activities.[74] The audit is carried out by independent firms of professional accountants appointed by the Minister. Where commercial accounts are kept, they are not submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor-General for his examination and report but are presented to the Minister who lays them before each House of Parliament with a copy of the auditor's report thereon.

Each public corporation is also under a duty to make an annual report to the Minister, dealing with its performance, policy and programmes.[75] The Minister lays the report before Parliament and it is also available to the public. These reports are documents of first class importance. They provide a mass of information and statistics, and give the Board an opportunity to explain and justify their policy. They form the basis for Parliamentary debates on nationalised industries. In addition the corporations are required to furnish the government with whatever information it may demand at any time about the undertaking and they must allow them to inspect their accounts, books and files.

In France a new organ was devised in 1946 to inspect and audit the accounts. This was known as the Chambre des Comptes.[76] It was distinct from both the Cour des Comptes and the Inspectors of Finance. It consisted of full-time officers appointed by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the President of the Council. The officers were men of wide experience in accounting and industrial management.[77]

Each public corporation had to submit its annual accounts to the Chambre des Comptes, whose task was to audit them and to check the reports of the governing boards. The accounts had to be ratified by the appropriate Ministers on the basis of the report of the Chambre des Comptes; and if any public corporation showed a loss, the governing board could not remain in office without special authorisation. The Minister of Industrial Production submitted the accounts and reports of each nationalised industry to Parliament, accompanied by the reports and comments of the Chambre des Comptes.[78]

This method was replaced by a new system in 1948.[79] The Chambre des Comptes was abolished and a new Commission instituted with an impossibly long title.[80] This Commission is presided over by the president of a chamber of the Cour des Comptes. It is divided into sections. Each section is composed of four members of the Cour des Comptes (from whom the chairman is chosen),

[73] Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, s. 31 (1); Overseas Resources Development Act, 1947, s. 16 (1); Transport Act, 1947, s. 94 (1); Gas Act, 1948, s. 50.

[74] Civil Aviation Act, 1946, s. 21 (1).

[75] Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, s. 54; Civil Aviation Act, 1946, s. 22 (1); New Towns Act, 1946, s. 13 (6); Electricity Act, 1947, s. 8; Cotton (Centralised Buying) Act, 1947, s. 8.

[76] Law of April 8, 1946, Article 28. [77] Einaudi, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[78] "Nationalisation in France," *The World Today*, *op. cit.*

[79] Law of January 6, 1948, Articles 56–60.

[80] "Commission de vérification des comptes des établissements publics de l'État de caractère industriel et commercial, des entreprises nationalisées et des sociétées mixtes à participation majoritaire de l'État."

and representatives of the Ministries of Finance and of Economic Affairs. All the members must be of high rank and they possess a substantial measure of independence. They are assisted by a technical specialist from the appropriate Ministry and the State Controller supervising the nationalised industry under review.

The Commission possesses full powers of investigation. It reports annually on detailed aspects to the Ministry of Finance; and it makes a general report to Parliament, the Cabinet and the Cour des Comptes. The contents of these reports extend far beyond the accounting sphere. The scope of the former report embraces "the quality of the commercial and financial management of the undertaking," while the latter deals with "the activities and the results of the undertakings which it controls. It indicates, in suitable cases, the modifications in structure or organisation which it considers necessary and gives its opinion on the future outlook."[81]

The Commission, observes Professor Byé, displays the necessity for an institution of high standing, independent of the government, in direct relation with Parliament, and whose functions exceed the domain of accounting. He makes numerous proposals for reform which he considers would render the Commission more apt for its task.

The principle underlying the latest French development is similar to the idea of an independent commission to conduct an efficiency audit, which was put forward by the author as long ago as 1937.[82] It is the belief of this writer that the French experiments are moving in the right direction. In Britain the subject is still in a state of confused discussion; it has become mixed up with the suggestion that a Select Committee of the House of Commons be set up to deal with public corporations.

The limits of space have been reached with many questions of interest untouched, such as parliamentary control, compensation for stockholders, price policy, and various other topics. For these shortcomings, apologies are offered. They are due to the vastness of the subject.

It is also regretted that the reader cannot be provided with a few neat conclusions which he can stow away for future reference. The writer has not hesitated to generalise, so far as he could, in the course of his observations; and he prefers to leave it at that rather than to run the risk of reducing a complex truth to a simple falsehood by over-simplification.

No doubt many readers would like to know something about the actual results of nationalisation in Britain and France, in terms both of its comparative efficiency in the two countries at the present time, and its relative efficiency compared with the previous performance of private enterprise in the industries concerned. This is a matter on which a substantial book might be written—and still leave a good many people arguing. But it would not all be guesswork, if the right criteria were applied.

[81] Maurice Byé, "Le Conflit des Tendances dans l'Organisation du Secteur Public" in La Morandière and Byé, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[82] *Public Enterprise, op. cit.*, pp. 379–380.

BUSINESS ORGANIZED AS POWER: THE NEW IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO

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President Truman's stubborn determination to build on the New Deal's embattled foundations an imposing edifice called the Welfare State is stirring the business community and its spokesmen to renewed and outwardly bold hostilities. This present outcry for "welfare," it seems, is not what it used to be: "The irresponsible clamor of the mob for bread and circuses." "Welfare" is now recognized as "a justifiable demand, consonant with the necessities of social evolution," and in keeping with our political tradition.[1] The old jungle economy, at long last, must be discarded. All this is now cheerfully conceded. But whose responsibility is it to bring order out of chaos, whose business is it to formulate and administer the welfare program? There is the rub. Certainly not government's, business leaders assert, for ultimately that would spell not a glorious welfare society but an inglorious welfare state. This ignominious prelude to statism, to totalitarianism, to despotism, must be avoided at all cost. That is why certain publicists, ex-New Dealers, industrial leaders and university officials are alerting the business community to a fresh responsibility, the unique venture of capitalism today—"the greatest opportunity in the world," Russell Davenport calls it, and peculiarly the concern of Free Enterprise.

Harvard's Business School Dean, Donald K. David, also points ominously at "The Danger of Drifting," and sharply differentiates between "freedom to" and "freedom from," between "equality of opportunity and equality of results," etc., etc.[2] These refinements are important, Dean David decides, because in them lies the crucial difference between welfare society (which he approves) and welfare state (which he deplores). How easy it is, he warns, to drift into the lethal arms of the welfare state. To foil the octopus of welfare, businessmen must be vigilant and aggressive. "Responsibility for this program," Dean David concludes, "is going to be placed in the hands of the businessman, because we have, whether some people like it or not, an industrial civilization; and the businessman, whether he likes it or not, has to assume new responsibilities."[3]

What prospect is there that the industrialist will at last be able to cope with the task now envisaged by and for him? What capacity has he hitherto demon-

[1] See Russell W. Davenport, "The Greatest Opportunity on Earth," *Fortune*, Vol. 40, pp. 65 ff. (October, 1949).

[2] Donald K. David, "The Danger of Drifting," *Harvard Business School Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 25–32 (January, 1950).

For William Graham Sumner the distinction was much the same—that between equality of "results" and equality of "chances." See *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (New York, 1883), pp. 163–164.

[3] David, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

strated for discharging such high responsibility? Does the current proposal represent any advance over the views long prevalent among industrial magnates? Is the general welfare, in any case, the businessman's primary concern? What follows may help illumine such queries.

Economic power *vis-a-vis* political power, interests versus numbers, property against persons describes roughly an intricate pattern, a basic ambivalence, running through the American political fabric. Our Founding Fathers inherited from James Harrington's *Oceana* of 1656 the maxim that "power always follows property." "This I believe," John Adams commented, May 26, 1776, "to be as infallible a maxim in politics, as that action and reaction are equal, is in mechanics."[4] Latter-day Americans continue to hold to Harrington's party line. John Randolph, in 1829, saw the property-power nexus so inextricably linked as to make it impossible, by universal suffrage or otherwise, to break it. ". . . the moment you have separated the two, that very moment," Randolph declared, "property will go in search of power, and power in search of property. . . . the two sexes do not more certainly, nor by a more unerring law, gravitate to each other, than power and property."[5]

Few today would deny that the man who owns or controls property has more than a species of private right: he has, in addition, a certain measure of social power. And when that private right is organized in the corporate form of business structure with control divorced from ownership, so as to place supervision in the hands of politically irresponsible managers, this modern power-right synthesis is a force able to compete on equal terms with the modern state. Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means recorded their considered judgment in 1932, holding that economic power, organized and concentrated, had already reached the point where the modern business corporation rivaled and threatened to eclipse the authority of official government.[6]

Nor has the trend noted by Berle and Means diminished through the years. Writing in 1948, the industrialist T. K. Quinn (until the mid-30's vice-president and chairman of the Sales Committee of General Electric and a director of several GE subsidiaries) found that in the boom year of 1929 there were only twenty private corporations in this country with more than a billion dollars in gross assets. By 1939, after ten years of depression, there were twenty-eight billionaire private corporations, and ten years later forty-eight of them. "We now have," Mr. Quinn observes, "a billionaire private 'economic state' for every political state in the Union," and "many of our states in the Union have less total wealth than a number of the economic monsters."

"The monsters continue to swell alarmingly in power and number," this former business executive tells us, "and their existence and methods are as

[4] Charles Francis Adams, *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1851), Vol. 9, p. 376.

[5] *Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–30* (Richmond, 1830), p. 319.

[6] Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932).

constant a threat to everything we hold dear as would be ever present herds of uncaged tigers and elephants."[7]

Despite this ever-increasing concentration of economic power, eminent Americans continue to hold, as did John Adams in 1787, that property is "as sacred as the laws of God"; they decry mounting government regulation and control as "collectivism," "socialism," "statism," "despotism." "We're on the last mile to collectivism," ex-President Hoover gravely lamented in his 75th birthday address August 10, 1949. "Our Nation is blissfully driving down a back road [to it] at top speed."[8]

We are threatened with creeping, but ever-advancing "socialistic programs," former New Deal Secretary of State James F. Byrnes chimed in, November 21, 1949. Few Americans, Byrnes suggested, would knowingly make the jump from free enterprise to Communism, but many could be "led over a bridge of socialism into a police state."[9]

"You must not bow your necks to a centralized government," Columbia University president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, admonished a Texas audience, December 8, 1949. You must "not trade the principles that made this nation great for some panaceas dished out by a bureaucrat sitting in an easy chair in Washington. . . . If all that Americans want is security, they can go to prison." The great World War II general likewise sees the remedy for current ills in terms of "voluntary cooperative" effort that will "bind labor and management in every productive enterprise," and condemns government planning as "bureaucratic," as paving "the road to despotism."[10]

And yet, long before the industrial corporation had become "a means of

[7] Theodore K. Quinn, "I Quit Monster Business: An Appeal for Independent, Decentralized Enterprise—To Save Individual Opportunity and Freedom in America," published in 1948 by Public Relations, Inc., 522 Fifth Ave., New York City.

In explanation of his extraordinary action, Mr. Quinn says: "I quit monster business because it is undemocratic, because it is inhuman and not socially responsible, because most of it is big only for the sake of bigness or for purposes of concentrated power and control, because it is inefficient and corruptive, because it is causing a dependent society where only masses count, genuine individual freedom languishes and opportunity and expression are restricted, because it glorifies leaders whose interest is too much in themselves, and because, through its essentially collectivistic forms and methods and mockery of 'free enterprise,' it is leading our country, just as surely as the sun sets, to a brand of totalitarianism which is a perversion as far from individualism, civil liberties and the democratic process as Russian communism."

For a brilliant case study tending to support Quinn's unusual move, see Earl Latham, "Giantism and Basing-Points: A Political Analysis," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 58, pp. 383–399 (February, 1949). See also the reply by B. P. McAllister and M. T. Quigg, *ibid.*, pp. 1068–1078 (June, 1949).

[8] *New York Times*, August 11, 1949, p. 3.

[9] Speaking at the Southern Governors' Conference, and reported in the *New York Times*, November 22, 1949, pp. 1, 40. Byrnes elaborated his position in "Crisis Government Can Ruin Us," *Collier's*, Vol. 125 (March 4, 1950).

[10] Address, Combined Luncheon Clubs, Galveston, Texas, *New York Times*, December 9, 1949, p. 23.

organizing economic life," "definitely committing civilization to the rule of a plutocracy,"[11] defenders of the property right had been constantly confronted by those upholding the sovereign authority of government, by those stressing the role of public power rooted in persons, in numbers, by those who would make politics dominant over—not subordinate to—economics. The Declaration of Independence had committed the American people to the proposition that all governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed. We are also committed, in some measure, to the principle of majority rule.[12] But neither of these high-sounding commitments has ever gone unchallenged. They were openly opposed in the Federal Convention of 1787. They were bitterly denounced, though unsuccessfully, in all the state constitutional conventions, meeting in the decade of the 1820's, to broaden the base of popular power.[13] John C. Calhoun not only repudiated the principle of majority rule but also argued, as did James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, that liberty necessarily leads to inequality—economic inequality.[14] And, reflecting back over the evolution of American ideas and institutions, one marvels at the fertility of privileged groups in formulating theories and devices as safeguards against the ceaseless human struggle for welfare.

The dominant trend of our history has nevertheless been, in the long run, democratic. "We march and rest and march again," as Henry Demarest Lloyd put it in 1894.[15] Democracy, in the elementary sense of adult male suffrage, was largely established about 1850. The vote for white men was then achieved. And,

[11] Language of Walther Rathenau, quoted by Berle and Means, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[12] See Edwin Mims, *The Majority of the People* (Toronto, 1941) and Henry Steele Commager, *Majority Rule and Minority Rights* (New York, 1943).

[13] For pertinent excerpts from Convention proceedings in New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, see my *Free Government in the Making* (New York, 1949), pp. 382–428.

[14] "It was certainly true," Hamilton remarked on the floor of the Philadelphia Convention, June 26, 1787, "that nothing like an equality of property existed: that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great and fundamental distinction in Society." Max Farrand (ed.), *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* (New Haven, 1911), Vol. 1, p. 424.

In *Federalist* No. 10 Madison said: "The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of society into different interests and parties."

" . . . it is a great and dangerous error to suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike. . . . There is another error not less great and dangerous . . . that liberty and equality are so intimately united, that liberty cannot be perfect without perfect equality. . . . Inequality of condition, while it is a necessary consequence of liberty, is at the same time, indispensable to progress." R. K. Cralle (ed.), *The Works of John C. Calhoun* (New York, 1857), Vol. 1, pp. 55–56.

[15] H. D. Lloyd, *Wealth Against Commonwealth* (New York, 1894), p. 536.

during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the enfranchised masses naturally sought to use government as a means of protecting and advancing their own social and economic rights against the imperiling conditions created by industrialism. The new "manufacturing aristocracy," described by the French aristocrat de Tocqueville in 1835 as "one of the harshest which ever existed in the world," now alarmed by popular power asserted in legislative bodies and in the ranks of organized labor, planned and won a major counter-revolution. Put baldly, our industrial oligarchy succeeded in winning from the United States Supreme Court decisions which, in effect, erected impassable constitutional barriers against regulatory power, national and state.[16] In doing this the Court elevated the dogma of pseudo-laissez-faire, of industrial anarchy, to the status of major constitutional principles, thus making economic power, for the time being, largely immune from government control.[17] Judicial review, so expanded and enthroned, meant that American legislators were delayed in or prevented from using methods long approved and practiced by the most advanced industrial nations, and demanded by our own oligarchic-economic situation. It meant that the natural growth of trade unionism was likewise seriously retarded.

It is hardly too much to say that leading Supreme Court decisions from about the year 1895 onward had the effect of creating a power vacuum. And just as the physical world abhors a vacuum, so our human world of political affairs abhors a power vaccum. The Supreme Court had opened the way for emergence, within the framework of our constitutional system, of business organized as power, thus laying the groundwork for establishment of a new "*imperium in imperio*," a new "political monster" not unlike that Hamilton so harshly denounced in 1787.[18] For such a first-hand observer as Theodore K. Quinn this

[16] Notable among them are: *U. S. v. E. C. Knight*, 156 U. S. 1 (1895); *Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.*, 158 U. S. 601 (1895); *Lochner v. New York*, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).

[17] See my article, "The Conservative World of Mr. Justice Sutherland," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 32, pp. 443–77 (June, 1938).

The businessman's devotion to free enterprise, to *laissez-faire*, has always been chiefly verbal. In his *American Commonwealth*, James Bryce noted that "one-half of the Capitalists are occupied in preaching *laissez-faire* as regards railroad control, the other half in resisting it in railroad rate matters, in order to have their goods carried more cheaply and in tariff matters, in order to protect industries threatened with foreign competition." *The American Commonwealth* (New York, 1921), Vol. 2, pp. 3, 4.

"The nostalgia of the American business community for the 'never-never land' of pure laissez faire is . . . ironic," Reinhold Niebuhr observes. "The business community sought, as long as it could, to bend political power to its ends, violating every principle of free enterprise. The tariff policy of the Republican Party is certainly not in harmony with the principles of laissez faire; nor were such devices as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which, originally conceived in the Hoover era, was designed to bail out some of the weakest units of American business. Protests arose against the use of political power in economic life when the masses began to use it to broaden their economic opportunities, to check the centralization of economic power, and to assure basic economic security." Reinhold Niebuhr, "Halfway to What?" *The Nation*, Vol. 170, p. 27 (January 14, 1950).

[18] In *Federalist*, No. 15, Hamilton asserted that opponents of the Constitution "seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an *imperium in imperio*."

analogy is not over-drawn. Alexander Hamilton saw the states' claim to sovereignty as inconsistent with the power necessary in the national government to achieve any semblance of order and security. Quinn, in 1948, condemned "corporate monsters" as "essentially undemocratic," as "the antithesis of what is inherent in individualism, civil liberties and the democratic process," and as "leading us unwittingly toward an inevitable collectivist type rulership."

That the National Association of Manufacturers should have been organized in 1895, the same year that the Supreme Court virtually emasculated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and put an end to income taxation for nearly twenty years, is a coincidence of major significance. Looking back in October, 1929, on its formation, the Association's president, John F. Edgerton, eloquently exulted: "In 1895 . . . there occurred an event which though unheralded was even then generally recognized as of momentous importance to the nation. . . . At that auspicious time . . . the National Association of Manufacturers, fathered by necessity and summoned by conscious opportunity, sprang exultantly like Minerva from the forehead of Jove, into immediate useful existence. Notice was thus given to the world for the first time that the American manufacturing industry had come of age, and that it could and thereafter would speak with one voice on every occasion of common defense and on all occasions pertaining to its general welfare."[19]

The National Association of Manufacturers was formed on the theory that organization is the secret of power, in the conviction that, as NAM President John Kirby, Jr., said in 1911, "little can be accomplished except through organization." " . . . we are living in an age of organization, . . . when organization must cope with organization."[20] The NAM, in other words, saw itself pitted against organized labor and organized government, national and state. But the NAM's objectives are not merely negative; they are positive as well. "The general objectives and purposes for which the said corporation is formed [runs the NAM Constitution and Bylaws] are the promotion of the industrial interests of the United States, the betterment of the relations between employer and employee, the education of the public in the principles of individual liberty and the ownership of property, the support of legislation in furtherance of those principles and opposition to legislation in derogation thereof." In 1929, President Edgerton stated the goals more tersely: better to promote "the universal recognition of those saving principles of American industry—the right of those who own property to control it." Thus defined, the NAM's goals rivalled in comprehensiveness those of government itself—indeed, they were broader than our own government was able to realize, after the paralyzing decisions handed down by the Supreme Court after 1890.

[19] Annual address of President John E. Edgerton, October 14, 1929. *Proceedings of Thirty-fourth Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers*, New York City, p. 16.

[20] *Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States of America*, New York, May 15, 16 and 17, 1911, pp. 65–90, at p. 66.

As might have been expected, NAM policy tends to reflect changes in our general economic and political scene. The technique employed during so quiescent a regime as that of Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover would not be appropriate during the administration of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt or Harry S. Truman. At the outset the Association was primarily concerned with "the dual objectives of tariff protection at home and the promotion of favorable markets abroad." While stoutly proclaiming that "industry needs no privileges and requires no favors at the hand of government or of society," President Edgerton recalled in 1929 that "our organization was called into being . . . and was dedicated in its infancy to the fostering and maintenance of a continuously adequate tariff."[21] NAM held to this dominating purpose until 1903, when, under the influence of a wave of strikes and trade union activity, it shifted its attention to combatting "radical" trade unionism. The original preoccupation with tariffs and government aid in expanding foreign markets was not lost sight of, but the Association's primary worry down to World War I was to block or disarm the growth of organized labor.

World War I sharpened the NAM's working philosophy. As during World War II, businessmen held high administrative posts in Washington.[22] Growing out of this war experience was an enduring idea of major importance—that of "self government in industry"—the notion that the organization of business enterprise should be more extensive, that industry should be autonomous, independent, free, self-regulating and must firmly establish "the right of those who own property to control it." One might say, without exaggeration, that, after 1895, corporate enterprise sought to win, as against the assertion of state and national power, the same sort of freedom and independence, the same degree of autonomy that Luther Martin and William Paterson tried to maintain in the 1780's for the sovereign states. Yet even under the conservative administrations of Coolidge and Hoover, the Department of Justice recognized that so-called self-government in industry might violate the moribund anti-trust act. Still this ideal has persisted. It was especially conspicuous during the 20's under the active support of the Department of Commerce and its vigorous secretary, Herbert Hoover. "Self-government in industry" then became the new economic era's theme song. "When business cures its own abuses"—that is "true self-government," Herbert Hoover said in accepting the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1928.

The booming 20's came to abrupt and disastrous close, and with the crash of 1929, the traditional GOP creed discouraged or prevented any positive action.

[21] Edgerton, *op. cit.*

[22] For a suggestive study of the military-business alliance, during World War II, to maintain the status quo, see Bruce Catton, *The War Lords of Washington* (New York, 1948). Catton finds no evidence that industrial leaders are capable of fashioning a political philosophy beyond "the assertion that management's reponsibility must not be divided or shared." The author sees this as the more deplorable in that "the challenge of the war went far beyond a mere challenge to dig more iron and make more steel. . . . The real challenge said: Your old way of controlling that intricate combination of money, machinery, markets, and human beings which you call modern industry is no longer favorable to the survival of human freedom—*find a new way*" (p. 109).

Under that theory, given time and patience, the natural operation of economic forces would bring about the revival of prosperity. Such faith was not shaken until 1932 when the nation reached the very trough of depression, the national income totaling less than forty billion dollars. Until then businessmen, financiers, Republican politicians and economists chanted a sort of political Coueism: "every day in every way the situation is growing better and better." Hoover's last-minute intervention in business, January 22, 1932, through the device of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, gave some hint of what was to come—whole-hearted assertion by a triumphant Democratic president, Franklin Roosevelt, and finally judicial acceptance, of the Hamiltonian theory of national power adequate in scope to deal with a national emergency "more serious than war." Roosevelt redressed the inadequacies of the Jeffersonian tradition by equipping the Democratic party with a more generous philosophy of popular sovereignty exerted in behalf of the so-called common man. He recognized that "the government has the definite duty to use all its powers and resources to meet new social problems with new controls." "New conditions impose new requirements upon government and those who control government," the Democratic presidential candidate had said in his notable Commonwealth Club speech of September, 1932. As President, Mr. Roosevelt went further and challenged: "The power of a few to manage the economic life of the nation must be diffused among the many or be transferred to the public and its democratically responsible government." (This is, essentially, the caveat former GE official, Quinn, threw down to the business fraternity in 1948.)

Mr. Hoover had spoken confidently of "equality of opportunity," in 1928, as if it were all but realized. In 1932 Mr. Roosevelt said flatly that "a glance at our situation indicates that equality of opportunity as we have known it no longer exists." Broadus Mitchell summed up the contrasting approaches in these words: "Hoover, by and large, was content with socializing the 'public' losses of corporations, because these would reach to the private losses of individuals. The New Deal properly went farther and was willing to socialize the private losses of unemployed individuals on the ground that, unless aided, these would destroy the public, including corporate, welfare."[23] The crude and irreverent stated the difference this way: "Old Dealers would feed the sparrows by feeding the horses, New Dealers would give the sparrows more direct, cleaner fare." President Roosevelt, no less than President Hoover, wanted to save capitalism, but they tried to do it in different ways.

In due course the Roosevelt program took on ever larger dimensions. The President himself pointed graphically to the transformation he had brought about, saying that under his administration the government had been transferred from Wall Street to Washington. Yet FDR's first major enactment—the National Industrial Recovery Act—marked no sharp break with his predecessor's policies. It was, in fact, the embodiment of NAM gospel and of Hoover's key principle—self government in industry. "It is," President Roosevelt re-

[23] Broadus Mitchell, *Depression Decade* (New York, 1947), pp. 88–89.

marked in signing NIRA, "a challenge to industry, which has long insisted that, given the right to act in unison, it could do much for the general good which has hitherto been unlawful. From today it has that right." But when business was thus given its head, it did not cooperate but balked, muttering doubts and misgivings. By 1934 the opposition was bitter and outspoken, though sporadic and unorganized. August, however, saw the American Liberty League take form, its members being drawn from high-ranking personalities in both major parties. Non-partisan membership was highlighted by including the Democratic nominees for the Presidency in 1924 and 1928, John W. Davis and Alfred E. Smith, respectively. *Time* magazine, September 3, 1934, saw the organizers, three Democrats and three Republicans, as "a strange political nosegay." The others were Nathan L. Miller, former Governor of New York, James W. Wadsworth, United States Senator from New York, 1915–1927, Irénéé Du Pont, President of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours, and Jouett Shouse, formerly Kansas congressman and chairman of the Democratic National Executive Committee in 1928.

The American Liberty League had strange origins.[24] It was the outgrowth of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment. The parent organization was not made up, as one might suspect, of topers; it included on its rolls the great financial interests that resented shifting tax burdens from the shoulders of beer drinkers to their own. After 1933, with the 18th Amendment repealed, the Association's objective was to scuttle the 16th Amendment, authorizing Congress, following the Supreme Court's disabling decision of 1895, to levy a tax on incomes. August 2, 1933, Captain William H. Stayton, "nationally known as the father of the Repeal Amendment," denounced the income tax amendment as "the source of nearly all our calamities and woes" and "as an instrument to redistribute wealth, to communize the nation, and to confiscate the property of one man and dole it out to others." But by 1934 a far more serious threat loomed on the political horizon—FDR and his crusading New Dealers. A shift in objectives followed. So what was formerly an association for the repeal of the 18th Amendment became the American Liberty League.

Even prior to formal dissolution on December 30, 1933, the board of directors had passed on December 6 a resolution "suggesting that the individual members of the Executive Committee of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment continue to meet from time to time and have in view the formation of a group, based on our old membership in the Association, which would in the event of danger to the Federal Constitution stand ready to defend the faith of the fathers." Four days earlier Captain Stayton addressed a letter to the Association's members, saying in part: "At a recent meeting of a group of the former members of the Executive Committee of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment, it was the opinion of all those present that governmental conditions and tendencies call for the formation of a patriotic organiza-

[24] The story is told by James C. Pitney, in "American Liberty League, Inc." Typescript copy is available at the Princeton University Library.

tion to advocate the restoration and preservation of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. . . . Some of us believe that the prosperity, liberty and happiness of the people of our country,—and perhaps the very continuation of our old form of government—depend upon the activities of such an organization to represent the people and not the office-holders."

As stated in its constitution, the League's purposes were, among others, "to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United States," "to teach the necessity of respect for rights of persons and property," "to encourage and protect individual and group initiative and enterprise, to foster the right to work, earn, save and acquire property, and to preserve the ownership and lawful use of property when acquired." To win these goals the League went further than any previous liberty-loving, liberty-saving organization in our history. Crucial to its functioning was the National Lawyer's Committee, a group of some 58 prominent attorneys, which issued reports or opinions in advance of Supreme Court decisions, opinions setting aside with solemnity and erudition one after another of the entire New Deal legislative melange. The League went still further: this private court having, for example, formally declared the Wagner Labor Relations Act unconstitutional, openly advised employers to ignore its provisions.[25]

The League's responsibilities, though heavy, were not unshared. Also opposing the New Deal with all the power it could command was the ever-alert National Association of Manufacturers—and, ultimately, the reactionary United States Supreme Court. "Thus far," Raoul E. Desvernine, vice-president of the American Liberty League wrote in 1936, "they [New Dealers] have met with an unsurmountable obstacle . . . the Judiciary. Fearing that this is a barrier they cannot jump, they now propose either to remove it as a barrier, or so to impair it, that it will not block their progress. They make a variety of proposals to deprive the Supreme Court of its power to declare legislation and executive acts unconstitutional. . . . We find latent in their conception of law—and some have been publicly preaching this view—that law emanates solely from the will of the majority of the people, and can, therefore, be modified at any time to meet majority wishes. This doctrine is absolutely totalitarian, and is contrary to our basic conceptions of the course of law. . . . Our political system is predicated on the doctrine that there are some immutable laws of nature and certain other divinely sanctioned rights, which the Constitution and our traditions recognized as being above and beyond the power of the majority, or of any other group of individuals or officials of the Government." "The judiciary," Mr. Desvernine declared optimistically, "has again proved itself to be

[25] See, in this connection, "Fifty-six Unofficial Judges: Constitutional Lawyers Scan New Deal for Liberty League," *Literary Digest*, Vol. 120, p. 9 (August 31, 1935); "A Conspiracy by Lawyers," *The Nation*, Vol. 141 (October 2, 1935); "Liberty League Lawyers," *New Republic*, Vol. 84 (October 2, 1935); "The Fifty-Eight Lawyers," *United States Law Review*, Vol. 69 (October, 1935) and "Discussion," *ibid.* (November, 1935); T. R. Powell, "Fifty-eight Lawyers Report," *New Republic*, Vol. 85 (December 11, 1935); and George Soule, "Liberty League Liberty," *ibid.*, Vol. 88 (September 9, 1936).

the bulwark of defense against the subtle and skillful manipulation of democratic processes to achieve unsanctioned theories."[26]

Desvernine's Maginot line against New Dealism was assaulted in force on March 9, 1937, when President Roosevelt, fulfilling Desvernine's prediction, urged Congress to reorganize the Federal courts: "When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture, to improve the conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our national resources, and in many other ways to serve our clearly national needs, the majority of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these acts of Congress—and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into these laws." "We have, therefore," the President concluded, "reached a point as a Nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. . . . We want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution—not over it."[27]

Judicial frustration of the power to govern proved to be short-lived. Within 11 months after the President announced his so-called court-packing plan of February 5, 1937, and without any change of Court personnel, decisions in cases involving important legislation (including the far-reaching Wagner Labor Disputes Act, unanimously set aside by the American Liberty League's high court) began going in favor of rather than against the New Deal.[28] This face-losing judicial retreat, this "switch in time to save nine," as a wag described it, blighted one of the most patent fictions of American jurisprudence—the notion that judicial review makes for impersonal law, a government of laws and not of men. After the Supreme Court's abdication of 1937, only the most incredulous could believe that "judicial decisions are babies brought by constitutional storks."[29]

The 1936 election re-enforced the popular revolution initiated in 1932. To cancel or to check its momentum, economic power had to accomplish again what it had succeeded in doing many times before—fashion "a retrograde step in the rear of democracy."[30] The judiciary was now no safe reliance, as it had been for Desvernine in 1936, to block the upsurge of popular power. Nor was it enough in the face of Roosevelt's tremendous 1936 mandate, and organization

[26] Raoul E. Desvernine, *Democratic Despotism* (New York, 1936), pp. 175–183, *passim*.

[27] *Senate Report* No. 711, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 41–44, *passim* (1937).

[28] For a discerning account, see Edward S. Corwin, *Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.* (Claremont, 1941).

[29] Max Lerner, "The Fate of the Supreme Court," *The Nation*, Vol. 142 (March 25, 1936).

[30] Confronted with the proposal of universal suffrage in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1821, Chancellor James Kent remarked: "Universal suffrage once granted, is granted forever, and never can be recalled. There is no retrograde step in the rear of democracy." *Reports of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention of the State of New York*, 1821, p. 222.

Kent uttered a half truth, for although universal suffrage has never been "recalled", the property interests found a variety of effective ways to ward off the dangers he feared. For examples, see Benjamin R. Twiss, *Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire Came to the Supreme Court* (Princeton, 1942).

of the CIO, to lobby the formal organs of government. The people—Hamilton's "pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority"—had to be brought in line with the ideology of business.

The new reactionary strategy had been foreshadowed in 1934 when the National Association of Manufacturers began to expand its public relations program. In that year only $36,000 was appropriated for public relations—that is, for propaganda, public education. In 1937 the public relations budget had risen to $793,000, or from 7% to 55% of NAM's budget. The amount spent on NAM public relations continues to grow by leaps and bounds. "Educational" literature is available at reduced rates to public school teachers and university professors. The radio is increasingly utilized; the highways are plastered, or used to be, with the popular slogans "Prosperity Dwells Where Harmony Reigns," "What Helps Industry Helps You," etc.

During the war years corporate enterprise went out on its own—entered the forbidding, seemingly sterile domain of political theory. Unable to sell clients' products, commercial advertisers cast themselves in the elevated role of political philosophers. Propaganda appeared conspicuously on all sides, neatly fitted into the news comment of radio broadcasters, into the addresses and books of businessmen, into the public comment of educators. But nowhere was the effort so skillfully exhibited as in newspaper and magazine advertising. The Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, for one, carried an elaborate interpretation of Jefferson's famous euphemism, "Pursuit of Happiness," and pressed its campaign further in a full-page, heart-gripping spread entitled "Missing in Action." Clad in pajamas, a dejected little boy is pictured groping his way up faintly lighted stairs. The telegram his mother prayed would never come had just been delivered.

"Poor little guy," opines the commercial artist-philosopher. "We—all of us—wish there were something we could do. . . . Why shouldn't it be this?

"We can resolve that the plans your father had for you shall remain within your reach, that you shall have the chance to grow and learn, that your opportunities will be bounded only by your get-up-and-go, that you will progress and prosper in direct relation to your own ability—in a land of freedom and opportunity. Those are the things your dad valued, the things for which he gave his life. Though some may strive to change all that—provide you with the 'benefits' of an all-powerful government, the advantages of regimentation, the 'blessings' of bureaucracy—we can resolve that they won't succeed."

In November, 1943, Merle Thorpe, editor of *Nation's Business*, used less dramatic, but not less pointed words. Thorpe specifically raised the question whether American democracy at the end of the War will throw off political controls of our lives and livelihoods, or whether the people will accept them as a permanent part of our social and economic structure. Giving back a resounding, "No," Thorpe inveighed against "those timid souls who hold that the frontiers are gone—that we have reached a rocking-chair maturity . . . —that private enterprise carries within it the seeds of its own destruction." "These weaklings," according to Thorpe, "would replace our system of private enter-

prise with government authority to regiment every citizen with licenses, permits, directives and allocations." "Today's men of faith," Thorpe concludes tentatively, "foresee a resurgence of private enterprise, if the people through their representatives, permit a program of full production by freeing the individual of handicaps and restrictions."

The editor of *Nation's Business* anticipated by three years the vigorously successful campaign the National Association of Manufacturers waged to end OPA. The *New York Times* of February 10, 1946, carried a full-page statement, signed by NAM, under the heavily-leaded title: "Let's tackle inflation while we can." "Remove price controls on manufactured goods and production," the NAM pleaded; "Goods will then pour into the market, and, within a reasonable time prices will adjust themselves naturally—as they always have—in line with the real worth of things. Competition has never failed to produce this result." And finally, "This is the way you can get the goods you want at prices you can afford to pay."

Organized business won this battle, though subsequent events promptly mocked the NAM's confident forecasts. The war is now being waged against ever more terrifying government objectives, currently catalogued under the ominous phrase, "Welfare State." No longer limited to government care of the sick, the aged and the needy, "welfare" now means, one astute observer of public affairs remarks, "government responsibility for security, prosperity and abundance. Its methods are insurance, subsidies and taxes. Its beneficiaries are everyone—for industrial workers, job security; for farmers, guaranteed prices; for government workers, higher pay; for pensioners, bigger checks; for veterans, windfalls and benefits without number; for foreign governments, billions in cash contributions; for the business man, government contracts beyond any peacetime record."[31] This incredibly ambitious program now appears to be so generally accepted as to make any candidate for political office wary of opposing it. Apparently, even the business community sees in the "welfare" concept a toughness that suggests maturity and permanence.

Franklin D. Roosevelt had given businessmen a rude awakening. He proved that political power can be used to promote the general welfare. He disproved the dogmas of John Randolph and Karl Marx—the theory businessmen, especially since 1932, have worked so strenuously to uphold, the maxim that "political power is always the slave of the dominant economic power." Roosevelt exploded the delusion against which Louis D. Brandeis and Brooks Adams warned more than a generation ago. "Our country is, after all, not a country of dollars, but of ballots," Brandeis said in 1905.[32] "The modern capitalist. . . conceives sovereign powers to be for sale." Adams, elaborating Brandeis, wrote in 1913, "He is not responsible; for he is not a trustee for the public. . . . He is too specialized to comprehend a social relation . . . beyond the narrow circle

[31] Address of Professor John F. Sly before the California Taxpayers Association, Los Angeles, California, February 21, 1950.

[32] "The Opportunity in the Law," an address delivered May 4, 1905, before the Harvard Ethical Society. Reprinted in *Business—A Profession* (Boston, 1933), p. 338.

of his private interests. He might, had he so chosen, have evolved a system of governmental railway regulation, and administered the system personally . . . but he could never be brought to see the advantage to himself of rational concession to obtain a resultant of forces. . . . If an election be lost, and the legislature, which has been chosen by the majority, cannot be pacified by money, but passes some act which promises to be annoying, the first instinct of the capitalist is to retain counsel, not to advise him touching his duty under the law, but to devise a method by which he may elude it, or, if he cannot elude by which he may have it annulled as unconstitutional by the courts . . . . Capital finds the judicial veto useful as a means of at least temporarily evading the law, while the bar . . . quite honestly believes that the universe will obey the judicial decree."

"No delusion," Adams observed in a canny forecast of 1937's judicial switch to save nine, "could be profounder and none, perhaps, more dangerous."[33]

In 1950 President Harry S. Truman, building on antecedents to which no party can lay exclusive claim, continues to vindicate the insight of Brandeis and Adams, and vigorously to push the welfare program. To meet this situation, industrialists seek to fashion an appropriate "retrograde step." Just what form it will take, no one can say, but the broad outlines have been plainly sketched in the handsome brochure—"Welfare Capitalism versus Welfare State"—recently broadcast by Robert Wood Johnson, president of Johnson and Johnson, manufacturer of surgical supplies, and in Russell Davenport's *Fortune* article of October, 1949, "The Greatest Opportunity on Earth."

Messrs. Johnson and Davenport agree that the United States is heading toward socialism; they agree that the welfare state is but a prelude to the "total state," that increasing government intervention in the economic sphere is taking us down "the back road to collectivism." Yet these writers are as confident in 1949 as lawyers and judges were in the 1890's that the socialist trend can be stopped. But whereas formerly the Supreme Court could be counted on to interpose Herbert Spencer's dogma, disguised as the Constitution, Johnson and Davenport know that no such flimsy barrier will hold today. Much of the welfare program has, in fact, already been brought within the four corners of the Constitution. And since the welfare trend can not be successfully blocked by recourse to "the Constitution," free enterprise itself must replace government in providing the requisite social services. In other words, if we are to have a welfare society, it must be firmly grounded in our free enterprise tradition; it must be accomplished under the auspices of competent and efficient business leadership, not under the arbitrary power of wasteful, bureaucratic government.

The problem for Mr. Johnson is fairly simple. Too often, he says, labor and management have turned to government instead of solving industrial puzzles for themselves. But, unfortunately, "our government and all other governments—are 'inherently incompetent'. This is true for the simple reason that

[33] Brooks Adams, *The Theory of Social Revolutions* (New York, 1913), pp. 209–210.

good action and good thinking in any successful and happy society cannot be legislated; it must be self-willed." The American way is for management and labor to get together and work out solutions "under the guidance of Christian principles." "The answers are in the grass roots and will not be found in Washington," Johnson asserts. "The place for the solution of our difficulties is in our own back yard. We must do the job for ourselves—each in his own business and each in his own town, county, and state."[34] In short, the alternative to the welfare state is "welfare capitalism." This is merely "the application of the Golden Rule to business."

Davenport apparently does not share Johnson's faith that "Golden Rule" band-aids can cure our social and economic maladies. For the *Fortune* writer, Welfare Capitalism has more earthly rootage; it actually pays dividends. And, though conceding that welfare demands are justifiable, he begs businessmen not to resign themselves to "an apparently irresistible wave." The "way out is not primarily the task of politicians, or even of the people at large. It is primarily the task of the enterprisers, the businessmen." "The people who are best able to implement such economic rights in all their manifold aspects," Davenport informs the business community, "are the people actually engaged in the economic process, namely the owners, managers, and workers. . . . If the American proposition is to be correctly interpreted, they, not the government, are the actual guardians of the Right to Life." The true solution is "conscious and concerted voluntary action, to transfer the primary responsibility, and therefore the initiative, from government to private hands."

The Johnson-Davenport substitute of Welfare Capitalism for the Welfare State is no isolated phenomenon. It is typical of a farflung campaign to stop the steady march of social democracy. Various questions suggest themselves: Does this represent, as its proponents imply, a new approach, or is Welfare Capitalism but a thinly disguised reassertion of the businessman's beaver-like persistence to maintain status quo—a fresh drive, perhaps, to win "the universalization of those saving principles of American democracy—the right of those who own property to control it"? Is this proposal, as its advocates insist, in harmony with our political heritage? And finally, could it, in the light of basic political principles, and of the lessons of our own experience, succeed in any event?

Treating these questions in reverse order, perhaps the basic flaw in "Welfare Capitalism" is that it ignores the problem of power. At no point does either Johnson or Davenport take into account the revolutionary effect of the modern corporation on business practices and conventional economic concepts. "Corporate action" is still seen as "private action"; the "rights of man" are considered "just as safe in corporate as they are in individual hands." One would never know, except as their proposal is suggestive of it, that concentration of economic power in this country has been carried to the point where these

[34] "Welfare Capitalism Versus the Welfare State," an address before the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, Atlanta, Georgia, September 28, 1949.

Frankensteins can—indeed do—"compete on equal terms with the modern state." In urging business enterprise to annex "welfare" functions, Johnson and Davenport do not broach the leading question of how Free Enterprise is to be held politically accountable for the power it wields. Ignoring the basic difference between government and all other forms of social and economic organization, they disregard the certain risk that the businessman, however competent in his own production, profit-seeking affairs, may not be qualified to undertake the delicate task of rulership.[35] Such narrowing experience may prevent him from achieving that breadth of view necessary for encompassing the public welfare.

"Administration," Brooks Adams observed in 1913, "is the capacity of coordinating many, and often conflicting, social energies in a single organism, so adroitly that they shall operate as a unity. . . . It is precisely in this preeminent requisite for success in government that I suspect the modern capitalist class to be weak. . . . The capitalist seems incapable of feeling his responsibility, as a member of the governing class."[36]

Capitalist obtuseness to a more broadly conceived public interest, and to the inescapable role of government in promoting it, continues. "*Without exception*," A. S. Cleveland wrote in a scholarly article of May, 1948, that stressed the period since 1937, "the measures favored by the NAM provided some sort of aid to business and industry. *Without exception*, rigid opposition was maintained against similar assistance to other groups and against all regulatory measures pertaining to industry."[37] (Cleveland's italics.)

At certain points Mr. Davenport is inclined to repudiate the businessman's penchant for identifying the public welfare with his own private profit. The old slogan, "*What helps business helps you*," he suggests, "is no longer tenable." "The primary function of business," he writes, "and therefore of capitalists, is to provide the goods and services needed by human beings at prices human beings can pay. Other factors, such as profits, are essential, but business will neither get them nor deserve them unless it performs this function and performs it well." In the end, however, Davenport himself returns to the conventional businessman's notion, interpreting his proposal as "no mere reformer's opportunity, no mere dreamer's opportunity," but as "an economic opportunity, a profit opportunity." It is hard to withhold the conclusion that the prospect Davenport envisages is in essence the same one the National Association of Manufacturers was organized in 1895 to safeguard and promote. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau."

Even assuming that this latest version of "Business in the Nation's Service" worked "well," that businessmen could develop a sense of social responsibility, that power could be exercised beneficently, etc., etc., the results would still be

[35] For an illuminating analysis, see Paul Appleby, *Big Democracy* (New York, 1945), Ch. 1.

[36] Brooks Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–208, 213.

[37] "N.A.M.: Spokesman for Industry?" *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 26, p. 357 (May, 1948).

undemocratic, unwittingly anarchistic.[38] "He that is to govern a whole nation," Thomas Hobbes observed in 1651, "must read in himself, not this or that particular man, but mankind." When "the meanest interest brazenly lays hold of the sacred name of 'public good'," Jean Jacques Rousseau commented in his *Social Contract* of 1762, "the general will becomes mute." It is extremely doubtful whether the businessman, or any other special interest group, can rise to the Hobbesian standard, or that any self-appointed guardian of the public welfare can avoid the blighting consequences the "Citizen of Geneva" noted. Civil society is the guarantee that basic decisions as to what constitutes the public welfare and how best to promote it will be made by government, and in a democracy that government must be politically accountable to the people.

Is not the Johnson-Davenport plan essentially a reversion to ill-fated NRA, with government excluded from the scheme, not only in creating the regulation, but in enforcing it? This latest version of "self-government in industry" appears even more anarchic and reactionary. It is suggestive of John Locke's original state of nature, a condition marked by the absence of a common power over all, a situation in which each man was his own executive. But, alas, in Locke's "great and natural community," "all being king," and "the greater part no strict observer of equity and justice, the enjoyment of property" became "very unsafe, very insecure." Each man in deciding controversies involving his own interests proved incapable of transcending the narrow bounds of self, so essential to the process of governing. Might, rather than right, held sway; men were driven to establish government—to set up a common power over all.

Our own history affords telling examples in support of Locke's hypothesis. During the 1920's our modern corporation possessed a freedom of action much like that which Locke's men enjoyed in the state of nature. True self-government, as Herbert Hoover defined it, was then an accomplished fact. Industry was free to do then what Johnson and Davenport insist it should do now—"cure its own abuses." This theory proved altogether untenable—indeed, well-nigh disastrous. The year 1929 stands as a terrible warning of the "inconveniences," to use Locke's mild phrase, that followed in the wake of our own variant of the state of nature. And, in 1932, American businessmen turned as helplessly and imploringly to government as Locke's men did in his mythical state of nature. It was then abundantly proved that free enterprise, far from having an eye single to the public interest, was blind even to its own interest.

Finally, is the Johnson-Davenport alternative in accord, as claimed, with the American heritage? To a certain degree it undoubtedly is. The Founding Fathers expressly repudiated democracy, and framed a Constitution of "Free Government." For them "Popular Government," "Pure Democracy"—government resting on consent of the people, on "frequency of elections," and checked only

[38] "Concentration of power [economic] has been shown to be dangerous in a democracy, even though that power may be used beneficiently." Testimony of L. D. Brandeis before *U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations, Senate Document* No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7663 (1915).

by that dependence—was unacceptable. Under such a government, Madison argued, "a common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; . . . and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual."[39] That is why, Madison explains, "democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property." Pure democracy could not achieve the "first object of government," that is, "the protection of different and unequal faculties . . . from which the rights of property originate."[40] So besides "a dependence on the people" which Madison regarded as "the primary control on government," the Founding Fathers provided "auxiliary precautions."[41] Various safeguards—separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, judicial review—protecting men's "different and unequal faculties"[42] against "the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority," were built into the Constitution itself. This complexus of controls makes for "Free Government."

The attitude of certain business men toward sovereign authority still reflects the precautions our Founding Fathers wrote into the Constitution of 1787. Authority, even that grounded in popular consent, is considered inherently dangerous. Extension of government, however necessary, is suspect, subject to resistance at every successive stage. The strange thing is that so many Americans are not equally sensitive to the enormous power of, say, General Motors or United States Steel.

The British anthropologist, Geoffrey Gorer, sees this as a quaint American "fantasy," as making for a "subtle distinction" between *authority* and *power:* "Control of people—authority—is always morally bad; control over things . . . (natural resources, goods, services, money, chattels)—power—is morally neutral and even, within certain ill-defined limits, highly praiseworthy."[43] Thus corporate power continues its unabated aggrandizement without rousing in eminent Americans any acute sense of danger to their liberty. Increase in government authority, on the other hand, must be justified step by step—even in cases, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, where large scale government planning has proved highly successsful. By the same token, initiation of welfare programs by government is strenuously opposed as "statism," while implementation of the same program by Free Enterprise is seen by Russell Davenport as capable of awakening "everywhere new hope for the perpetuation of Freedom."

"In every extension of governmental functions," Justice Brandeis had warned in 1920, "lurks a new danger to civil liberty."[44] "Experience should teach us," he remarked in 1928, "to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the

[39] Madison in *Federalist*, No. 10. [40] *Ibid.*

[41] Madison in *Federalist*, No. 51. [42] *Federalist*, No. 10.

[43] Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People: A Study in National Character* (New York, 1948), pp. 39–40.

[44] *U. S. ex. rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, Postmaster General of the U. S.*, 255 U. S. 407 (1921) at p. 436.

Government's purposes are beneficent."[45] Brandeis' sentiments, occasioned by government encroachment on freedom of speech and press, are now widely hymned as supplying a conclusive answer to any and all welfare programs. Yet the claims of "adequate security against foreign aggression" continue to enlarge the role of the military,[46] while our growing economic dependence and interdependence inevitably mean ever more government. Whether impelled from conditions at home or abroad, such coercion unavoidably narrows the scope of individual freedom. To hold doggedly to conventional limits and treat these as absolutes denies government the power essential to security and order; such resistance may also provide individuals and groups a sphere of freedom usable by them as a basis for erecting power systems of their own.

The universal tendency of individuals to break off from society and form private power enclaves of their own, at war with the state itself, loomed so perilously before the eyes of the seventeenth century absolutist, Thomas Hobbes, that he would have none of it. Writing in an era of wars and rumors of wars, he denounced corporations as "worms" in the entrails of the body politic; he insisted that enduring peace demanded that they be drastically purged away.[47] Latter-day absolutists, whether Fascists or Communists, follow the same ruthless policy. James Madison confronted himself with this dilemma in *Federalist* No. 10. Like Hobbes, he saw faction (especially that of a majority) as the evil to which popular government is peculiarly addicted. And yet he firmly and specifically repulsed the absolutist solution on the theory that, though liberty is to faction what air is to fire, it would be as foolish to destroy liberty because it nourishes faction as to annihilate air because it gives to fire its destructive quality.

Whether we can hold to Madison's principles of "Free Government" today is at least doubtful. Surely conditions in 1787 were one thing, in 1950, something else. "We only know," Reinhold Niebuhr remarks tentatively, "that a completely free market lacks the self-regulating power once ascribed to it, and that too inclusive [government] planning destroys the flexibility which a healthy

[45] *Olmstead et al. v. U. S.*, 277 U. S. 438 (1928) at p. 479.

[46] See "National Security and Our Individual Freedom." Statement on National Policy by Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, December, 1949.

[47] See Hobbes' *Leviathan* (Everyman ed., New York, 1928), Ch. 29.

Rousseau was equally suspicious of individual and group temptation to break off from civil society, and for the same reason:

"Each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person which constitutes the State as a *persona ficta*, because not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfill the duties of a subject. The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic." *The Social Contract* (Everyman ed., New York, 1938), pp. 17–18. See also p. 91.

economy requires."[48] Liberty, thus doubly imperiled, naturally stimulates pessimism. Professor Robert S. Lynd sees the systematic effort of big business to get a strangle hold on various opinion-forming groups as striking at the jugular vein of free government. He goes so far as to suggest that the present-day conflict between public power and private right may have reached the point where the age in which we live will go down in history as the one in which "western Man at last recognized the contradiction between capitalism and democracy—accepted the fact that the middle way straddle called 'liberalism' is no longer possible."[49]

Surely increasing government control and regulation, however essential and praiseworthy, combined with the obstinate determination of big business to evade or end that trend, or replace government with a power system of its own, raises arresting questions: How far may government safely go into areas formerly considered immune from such control? How much more government planning can society employ without losing its "free" character? The social experiment in Great Britain may, in time, afford clues for an answer to this question.[50] How much social power can a free society permit individuals and groups to annex and hold without depriving government of the authority essential for maintaining order and security? Experience in the USA may, in time, supply the answer to this question.

Of one thing we may be certain: government alone can create and re-create the broad firmament of order under which individuals and groups, including so-called free enterprise, can function for the good of all. Surely, too, the vast extension of government power has not come about primarily as a matter of principle or out of mere "cussedness" in That Man and his followers. It has arisen because of long-felt necessity, and to preserve order in the broad sense. To escape anarchy politics must be dominant over economics. Official, politically responsible government must insist on monopolizing coercive power, as against any and all private aspirants for such power. It must do this, not because there is special virtue in established authority, or because government is or can be omniscient, but because this is the only way of avoiding chaos, the only way, as Locke's men discovered in his state of nature, to prevent individuals and groups from taking law into their own hands.

[48] Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[49] Robert S. Lynd, "Can Liberalism Do It?" *New Century*, Vol. 1 (May, 1948). Published by the Princeton Liberal Union. See also Lynd's article, "Who Calls the Tune?" *Journal of Higher Education*, Vol. 19 (April, 1948).

[50] For Senator Robert A. Taft the answer is clear: "We are close to the line where government expansion must stop, or our free enterprise system is lost." See an elaboration of this view in "How Much Government Can Free Enterprise Stand?", *Collier's*, Vol. 124, pp. 16 ff. (October 22, 1949).

THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

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No concept has raised so many conflicting issues and involved nineteenth-century jurists and political theorists in so desperate a maze as the concept of Sovereignty. The reason is perhaps that the original, genuine philosophical meaning of the concept had not been, from the very start, sufficiently examined and seriously tested by them.

In the same measure as crucial practical problems dealing with international law developed, the controversies about State Sovereignty, considered in its external aspect (relations between states), grew deeper and more extended. The question was asked whether the international community as a whole is not the true holder of Sovereignty, rather than the individual states.[1] And, in some quarters, the very notion of Sovereignty was challenged.[2] Such was the stand taken first by Triepel, then by several other international lawyers, including Willoughby[3] and Foulke.[4] Yet that challenge to the concept of Sovereignty remained only juridical in nature, and did not go to the philosophical roots of the matter.

My aim, in this essay, is to discuss Sovereignty not in terms of juridical theory, but in terms of political philosophy. I think that the grounds for doing so are all the better since "Sovereignty," as Jellinek once observed, "in its historical origins is a political concept which later became transformed"[5] in order to secure a juristic asset to the political power of the State.

It is my contention that political philosophy must eliminate Sovereignty both as a word and as a concept—not because it is an antiquated concept,[6] or by virtue of a sociological-juridical theory of "objective law";[7] and not because the concept of Sovereignty creates insuperable difficulties and theoretical entanglements in the field of international law; but because, considered in its genuine meaning, and in the perspective of the proper scientific realm to which

[1] Cf. Robert Lansing, *Notes on Sovereignty* (Washington, 1921), Ch. 2.

[2] Cf. Hymen Ezra Cohen, *Recent Theories of Sovereignty* (Chicago, 1937), pp. 82 ff.

[3] W. W. Willoughby, *The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law* (New York, 1924).

[4] Roland R. Foulke, *A Treatise on International Law* (Philadelphia, 1920). "The word sovereignty is ambiguous. . . . We propose to waste no time in chasing shadows, and will therefore discard the word entirely. The word 'independence' sufficiently indicates every idea embraced in the use of sovereignty necessary to be known in the study of international law" (p. 69).

[5] Georg Jellinek, *Recht des modernen Staates; Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin, 1900), p. 394.

[6] Cf. Hugo Preuss, *Gemeinde, Staat, und Reich als Gebeitskörperschaften* (Berlin, 1889); Charles E. Merriam, *History of the Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau* (New York, 1900).

[7] Cf. Léon Duguit, *Law in the Modern State* (New York, 1919). I am in agreement with Duguit as regards the necessity of discarding both the concept of the unaccountability of the State and the concept of State Sovereignty, but not for the reasons upon which his conclusions are founded.

it belongs (which is political philosophy) this concept is intrinsically wrong,[8] and bound to mislead us if we continue using it.

I

Just as the words πόλις or *civitas* are often translated by "state" (though the most appropriate name is "commonwealth" or "body politic," not "state"), so the words *principatus* and *suprema potestas* are often translated by "sovereignty" and the words κύριος or *princeps* ("ruler") by "sovereign."[9] This is a misleading translation, which muddles the issue from the start. *Principatus* ("principality") and *suprema potestas* ("supreme power") simply mean "highest ruling authority," not "sovereignty," as has been conceived since the moment when this word made its first appearance in the vocabulary of political theory. Conversely, "sovereignty" was rendered at that moment by *majestas* in Latin and ἄκρα ἔξουσια in Greek, as was recognized at the time of Jean Bodin.[10]

Jean Bodin is rightly considered as the father of the modern theory of Sovereignty. For Bodin the king did not possess supra-mundane Sovereignty, a Sovereignty which has absolutely nothing above itself; God was above the king, and the supreme power of the king over his subjects was itself submitted to "the law of God and nature,"[11] to the requirements of the moral order.[11a] But the king was possessed of *human* Sovereignty. Let us recall Bodin's words:

[8] From another philosophic outlook, this is also the position of Harold J. Laski. Cf. his *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven, 1917), and *A Grammar of Politics* (New Haven, 1925).

[9] Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. III, c. 15, 1286 b 31; Bk. IV, c. 4, 1290 a 32, etc.; where Aristotle said κύριος, the Oxford translation, under the editorship of W. D. Ross, uses *sovereign*.—St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. theolog.*, I–II, 90, 3, obj. 3; 96, 5, corp., obj. 3, and ad 3, etc. Where St. Thomas said *princeps* the translation edited by the English Dominicans uses *sovereign*.

[10] Cf. Jean Bodin, *De la République* (Paris, chez Jacques du Puys, 1583), Bk. I, Ch. 8.

[11] *Ibid.*, Bk. I, Ch. 8.

[11a] Max Adam Shepard in "Sovereignty at the Crossroads. A Study of Bodin," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 45, pp. 580–603 (1930) has insisted that Bodin was at the crossroads between the medieval notion of the Prince—subject to the law (the human law), not as to its *vis coactiva*, but as to its *vis directiva* (cf. *Sum. Theolog.* I–II, 96, 5 ad 3)—and the modern ("monist") notion of the Prince, completely free from any law on earth. It is true that, inevitably, Bodin remained to some extent tributary to the Middle Ages, and did not go the full distance of the road later traversed by Hobbes and Austin. But if he made the Sovereign bound to respect the *jus gentium* and the constitutional law of monarchy (*leges imperii*), this was because (when it came to such things as the inviolability of private property, or the precepts of *jus gentium*, or the "laws of the realm" such as the Salic law, expressing the basic agreement in which the power of the Prince originates) human laws and tribunals were *only enforcing Natural Law itself*, so that, as a result, their pronouncements were valid even with regard to the Sovereign. This peculiar view of Bodin's (based, moreover, on a wrong idea of Natural Law) was to be discarded by the further theorists of Sovereignty, and in this sense he stopped half-way. Yet the fact remains that Bodin's sovereign was subject only to Natural Law, and to no human law whatsoever, as distinct from Natural Law, and that is the core of political absolutism.

"Il est icy besoin de former la définition de souveraineté, par ce qu'il n'y a ny jurisconsulte, ny philosophe politique, qui l'ayt définie.[12]

"La souveraineté est la puissance absolue et perpétuelle d'une République.[13]

"Ceste puissance est *perpétuelle*,"[14] c'est-à-dire "pour la vie de celuy qui a la puissance"[15] [par opposition à ceux qui "ne sont que dépositaires, et gardes de ceste puissance jusques à ce qu'il plaise au peuple ou au Prince la révoquer."[16]]

"Si le peuple octroye sa puissance à quelcun tant qu'il vivra, en qualité d'officier, ou lieutenant, ou bein pour se descharger seulement de l'exercice de sa puissance: en ce cas il n'est point souverain, ains simple officier, ou lieutenant ou régent, ou gouverneur, ou gardien, et bail de la puissance d'autruy."[17] Mais "*Si la puissance absolue luy est donnée purement et simplement*, sans qualité de magistrat, ny de commissaire, ny forme de précaire, *il est bien certain que cestuy-la est, et se peut dire monarque souverain: car le peuple s'est dessaisi et dépouillé de sa puissance souveraine, pour l'ensaisiner et investir: et à luy, et en luy transporté tout son pouvoir, auctorité, prérogatives, et souverainetés.*"[18]

Que veut dire maintenant puissance *absolue?*—"*Le peuple ou les seigneurs d'une République peuvent donner purement et simplement la puissance souveraine et perpétuelle à quelcun pour disposer des biens, des personnes et de tout l'estat à son plaisir, et puis le laisser à qui il voudra, et tout ainsi que le propriétaire peut donner son bien purement et simplement*, sans autre cause que de sa libéralité, qui est la vraye donation: et qui ne reçoit plus de conditions, estant une fois parfaicte et accomplie."[19]

[12] *De la République*, Bk. I, Ch. 8, p. 122. "For so here it behoveth first to define what majestie or Soveraigntie is, which neither lawyer nor politicall philosopher hath yet defined." (The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, written by J. Bodin, a famous Lawyer, and a man of great Experience in Matters of State; out of the French and Latine Copies, done into English, by Richard Knolles. London, Impensis G. Bishop, 1606, p. 84.)

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 122. "Majestie or Soveraigntie is the most high, absolute, and perpétuall power over the citisens and subjects in a Commonweale" (English translation, p. 84).

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 122. "This power ought to be perpetuall" (p. 84).

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 126. "For the tearme of the life of him that hath the power" (p. 87).

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 122. "Seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this soveraigne power, untill it shall please the people or the prince that gave it them to recall it" (p. 84).

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 127. "If the people shall give all their power unto any one so long as he liveth, by the name of a magistrat, lieutenant, or governour, or onely to discharge themselves of the exercise of their power: in this case he is not to be accounted any soveraigne, but a plaine officer, or lieutenant, regent, governour, or guerdon and keeper of another mans power" (p. 88).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 127. "If such absolute power bee given him purely and simply without the name of a magistrat, governour, or lieutenant, or other forme of deputation, it is certaine that such an one is, and may call himselfe a Soveraigne Monarch: for so the people hath voluntarily disseised and dispoyled it selfe of the soveraigne power, to sease and invest another therein; having on him, and uppon him transported all the power, authoritie, prerogatives, and soveraigneties thereof" (p. 88).

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 128. "For the people or the lords of a Commonweale, may purely and simply give the soveraigne and perpetuall power to any one, to dispose of the goods and lives, and of all the state at his pleasure: and so afterward to leave it to whom he list: like as the proprietarie or owner may purely and simply give his owne goods, without any other cause to be expressed, than of his owne meere bountie; which is indeed the true donation, which no more receiveth condition, being once accomplished and perfected" (pp. 88–89).

Ainsi "*le Monarque est divisé du peuple.*"[20]

"Et le poinct principal de la majesté souveraine et puissance absolue, gist principalement à donner loy aux subjects en général sans leur consentement."[21]

"*Le Prince souverain n'est tenu rendre conte qu'à Dieu.*"[22]

"*Le Prince souverain ne doit serment qu'à Dieu.*"[23]

"*La souveraineté n'est limitée, ny en puissance, ny en charge, ny à certain temps.*"[24]

"*Le Prince est l'image de Dieu.*"[25]

"*Or tout ainsi que ce grand Dieu souverain ne peut faire un Dieu pareil à luy,* attendu qu'il est infini, et qu'il ne se peut faire qu'il y ayt deux choses infinies, par démonstration nécessaire: aussi pouvons nous dire que le Prince que nous avons posé comme l'image de Dieu, ne peut faire un subject égal à luy, que sa puissance ne soit anéantie."[26]

Thus Bodin's position is perfectly clear. Since the people have absolutely deprived and divested themselves of their total power in order to transfer it to the Sovereign, and invest him with it, then the Sovereign is no longer a part of the people and the body politic: he is "divided from the people," he has been made into a whole, a *separate* and transcendent whole, which is his sovereign living Person, and by which the other whole, the immament whole or the body politic, is ruled from above. When Jean Bodin says that the sovereign Prince is the image of God, this phrase must be understood in its full force, and means that the Sovereign—submitted to God, but accountable only to Him—transcends the political whole just as God transcends the cosmos. Either Sovereignty means nothing, or it means supreme power *separate* and *transcendent*—not at the peak but *above* the peak ("par dessus tous les subjects")[27]—and ruling the entire body politic *from above*. That is why this power is absolute (ab-solute, that is non-bound, separate) and consequently unlimited, as to its extension as well as to its duration, and unaccountable to anything on earth.

Let us observe at this point that there is no command without some kind of separation. *Separatus ut imperet*, "separate, in order to command," Anaxagoras

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 143. "The monarch is divided from the people" (p. 99).

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 142. "So wee see the principall point of soveraigne majestie, and absolute power, to consist principally in giving laws unto the subjects in generall, without their consent" (p. 98).

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 125. "Whereas the prince or people themselves, in whome the Soveraigntie resteth, are to give account unto none, but to the immortall God alone" (p. 86).

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 143. "A soveraign prince next under God, is not by oath bound unto any" (p. 99).

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 124. "So that Soveraigntie is not limited either in power, charge, or time certaine" (p. 85).

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 156, 161. "The prince is the image of God."

[26] *Ibid.*, Bk. I, Ch. 10, p. 215. "For as the great soveraigne God cannot make another God equall unto himself, considering that he is of infinit power and greatnes, and that there cannot bee two infinit things, as is by naturall demonstrations manifest: so also may wee say, that the prince whom we have set down as the image of God, cannot make a subject equall unto himselfe, but that his owne soveraigntie must thereby be abased" (p. 155).

[27] "Car souverain (c'est à dire, celuy qui est par dessus tous les subjects) ne pourra convenir à celuy qui a faict de son subject son compagon." *Ibid.*, Bk. I, Ch. 10, p. 215.

said of the *νοῦς*, the divine Intellect. After all, does not any man, once put in command, begin by separating himself from others in a certain measure, be it by means of a bigger chair or a less accessible office room? Yet it is the kind of separation which is the point at issue. As regards political command, separation is truly and genuinely required only as an *existential* status or condition for the *exercise* of the right to govern. But with Sovereignty separation is required as an *essential* quality, one with the very *possession* of that right, which the people have supposedly given up entirely, so that the essence of power—henceforth monadic, as indivisible as the very person of the Sovereign—resides in the Sovereign alone. It is no wonder that an essence other than common humanity was finally to be ascribed to the person itself of the Sovereign.

Here we are confronted with that which is basically wrong with the concept of Sovereignty and the original error of the theorists of Sovereignty. They knew that the right to self government is naturally possessed by the people. But for the consideration of this right they substituted that of the total power of the commonwealth. They knew that the "prince" receives from the people the authority with which he is invested. But they had overlooked or forgotten the concept of *vicariousness* stressed by the mediaeval authors. And they replaced it with the concept of *physical transfer* and donation.

In other words, they discussed the matter in terms of *goods* (or material *power*) held either in ownership or in trusteeship, instead of discussing it in terms of rights possessed by essence or by participation. If a material good is owned by the one, it cannot be owned by the other, and it can only be a question of transfer of ownership or a donation. But a right can be possessed by the one as belonging to his nature, and by the other as participated in by him. God is possessed by essence of the right to command; the people are possessed of this right both by participation in the divine right, and by essence in so far as it is a human right. The "vicars" of the people or deputies for the people are possessed (really possessed) of this right only by participation in the people's right.

In reality, then, even in the case of monarchy (but not absolute monarchy) it should have been maintained that since the prince is the "vicar of the multitude" or the deputy for the people, his right in this capacity is the very right of the people, in which he has been made a participant by the trust of the people and which still exists in the people, far from having been uprooted from the people in order to be transferred to him. Thus the Prince should have been considered at the peak (but not over the peak) of the political structure, as a part *representing* the whole (and not as a separate whole), or as a person commissioned to exercise the highest authority in the body politic, who has vicarious possession of this authority as a maximum participation in the right naturally possessed by the people. Such a prince (whose concept never materialized in human history, except perhaps, to some extent, in the case of Louis IX of France) would have been separate from the people as to the existential status required by the exercise of the right to command. But he would not have been divided from the people as to the possession of this right. On the contrary, since

he possessed it in a vicarious manner and by participation, he would have been accountable to the people. He would have been a king, but not an absolute king; a prince, but not a sovereign prince.

II

The concept of Sovereignty took definite form at the moment when absolute monarchy was budding in Europe. No corresponding notion had been used in the Middle Ages with regard to political authority. St. Thomas treated of the Prince, not of the Sovereign. In feudal times the king was but the Suzerain of Suzerains, each one of whom was possessed of his own rights and power. The jurists of the mediaeval kings only prepared in a more or less remote way the modern notion of Sovereignty.

Even leaving aside the theory of the *divine right* of kings[28] which was to flourish at the time of Louis XIV, the idea prevailed that the king as a person possessed a natural and inalienable right to rule his subjects from above. Once the people had agreed upon the fundamental law of the kingdom, and given the king and his descendants power over them, they were deprived of any right to govern themselves, and the natural right to govern the body politic resided henceforth in full only in the person of the king. Thus the king had a right to supreme power which was *natural and inalienable*, inalienable to such a degree that dethroned kings and their descendants kept this right forever, quite independently of any consideration of the will of the subjects.

And since this natural and inalienable right to supreme power resided only in the person of the king, with regard to the body politic but independently of the body politic, the power of the king was supreme—not only as topmost power existing in the highest part of the body politic, but also as monadic and supernal power existing *above* the body politic and *separately* from it. So the king reigned over his subjects from above and took care of the common good from above; he was a full-dressed political image of God (a royal privilege which was to become rather detrimental to God in the sequel). And any restriction on the supernal independence and power of the king could only come from a free and gracious concession granted by the king (though most often, in actual fact, under pressure) to such or such parts of the whole populace beneath.

Such was the idea, and the purpose for which the word Sovereignty was coined.[29] We cannot use the concept of Sovereignty without evoking, even unawares, that original connotation.

What, therefore, is the proper and genuine meaning of Sovereignty? Sover-

[28] That is, absolute power directly conferred on the king by God, not indirectly through the people transferring the "absolute power of the Commonwealth" to him.

[29] I mean, in the vocabulary of political theory. The word "sovereign" (from Low Latin *superanus*, "Ex optimatum ordine, princeps") was employed long ago in the common language, meaning any official endowed with superior authority, for instance "superior judge." Du Cange (see *Summus*) quotes an edict of the French King Charles V, made in 1367, which reads: "Voulons et ordonons que se . . . le Bailli ou autre leur Souverain. . . . "

eignty means two things: First, a right to supreme independence and supreme power which is a *natural* and *inalienable* right and, second, a right to an independence and a power which, in their proper sphere, are supreme *absolutely* or *transcendently*, not *comparatively* or as a *topmost part* in the whole. In other terms, it is *separately* from the whole which is ruled by the Sovereign that the independence of the Sovereign with regard to this whole and his power over it are supreme. His independence and power are not only supreme *in relation to* any other part of the political whole as being at the top or highest part of this whole; they are supreme *absolutely* speaking as being above the whole in question. Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and indivisible, which cannot be participated in or admit of degrees, and which belongs to the Sovereign independently of the political whole, as a right of his own.

Such is genuine Sovereignty, that Sovereignty which the absolute kings believed they possessed, and the notion of which was inherited from them by the absolute States, and the full significance of which has been brought to light in the Hegelian State—and, long before Hegel, in the Hobbesian *Mortal God*. Let us re-read at this point Hobbes' unforgettable page. Whereas the agreement of irrational creatures is natural, he says, "that of men is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit." He goes on to say:

> The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners and the injuries of one another and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, *to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person;* and everyone to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; *and therein to submit their Wills, everyone to his Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment.* This is more than Consent, or Concord; *it is a real Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person,* made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, "I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his actions in like manner." This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a *Common-Wealth*, in Latin *Civitas*. This is the Generation of the great LEVIATHAN, *or rather (to speak more reverently) of that* MORTALL GOD, to which we owe under the *Immortall God*, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, *he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all*, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. *And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-Wealth;* which (to define it) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by naturall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he

may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.

And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, *and said to have* SOVERAIGNE POWER*: and every one besides, his* SUBJECT.[30]

III

Now what is the situation in reality, first, with regard to the body politic and second, with regard to the State?

The *body politic* has a right to full autonomy, including, first, to full *internal* autonomy (or with respect to itself) and, second, full *external* autonomy (or with respect to the other bodies politic). The full *internal* autonomy of the body politic means that it governs itself with comparatively supreme independence (or greater than that of any part of it) so that no one of its parts can, by usurping government, substitute itself for the whole and infringe upon its freedom of action. The full internal autonomy of the body politic means, also, that it governs itself with comparatively supreme power (or greater than that of any part of it) so that no one of its parts can, by substituting itself for the whole, infringe upon the topmost power enjoyed by the agencies of government through which the whole governs itself.

The full *external* autonomy of the body politic means that it enjoys comparatively supreme independence with regard to the international community, that is, an independence which the international community—as long as it remains merely moral, and does not exist as political society and therefore has no political independence of its own—has no right and no power forcibly to make lesser with respect to itself. As a result, each body politic, as long as it does not enter a superior, larger political society, has above itself no power on earth which it should be forced to obey. The full external autonomy of the body politic means also that it can exert externally topmost power in making war on another body politic.

The right of the body politic to such full autonomy derives from its nature as a perfect or self-sufficient society—a nature, be it observed in passing, which present bodies politic are losing, as a matter of fact, to a greater and greater extent; so that they keep their right to full autonomy only as a remnant, and because they are not yet integrated in a larger, really perfect and self-sufficient, political society. In any case, when some body politic decides to become part of a larger political society, such as a federal political society, it gives up, by the same token, its right to full autonomy, though it keeps, in fact and by right, a limited autonomy, much more limited, obviously, as external autonomy than as internal autonomy.

When I say that the right of the body politic to full autonomy, which I have just analyzed, is a *natural* right, even an *inalienable* right, I mean in the sense that nobody has a right forcibly to make it lose this right. This does not suggest that the full independence in question would be itself inalienable, and that the body politic could not freely surrender its right to it, if it recognizes that it is no longer a perfect and self-sufficient society, and consents to

[30] R. A. Waller (ed.), *Leviathan* (Cambridge, 1904), Part II, Ch. 17.

enter a larger political society. As a result the full autonomy of the body politic implies the *first* element inherent in genuine Sovereignty, namely a *natural* and, in one sense, *inalienable* right to supreme independence and supreme power. But it does not imply the *second* element, for it is clear that the body politic does not govern itself *separately from itself* and *from above itself*. In other words, its supreme independence and power are only comparatively or relatively supreme (as proper to this given whole with respect to its parts, and also with respect to the unorganized community of the other wholes). So the *second* element inherent in genuine Sovereignty, namely the *absolutely* or *transcendently* supreme character of independence and power (which in genuine Sovereignty are supreme *separately* from, and *above*, the whole ruled by the Sovereign and which, in the external sphere, make even the possibility of any superior larger political society repugnant in itself to the very essence of the Sovereign), is obviously irrelevant to the very concept of the full autonomy of the body politic.

Let us consider now the State. The State is a part and an instrumental agency of the body politic. Therefore it has neither supreme independence with regard to the whole or supreme power over the whole, nor a right of its own to such supreme independence and supreme power. It has supreme independence and power only with regard to the other parts of the body politic, subject to its laws and administration, and it has a right only to such comparatively supreme independence and power as come to it from the body politic, by virtue of the basic structure or constitution which the body politic has determined for itself. And the exercise of this right by the State remains subject to the control of the body politic.

As regards its *external* sphere of activity, furthermore, it is only as representing the body politic, and under its control, that the State enjoys in the international community a right to a supreme independence (which is only *comparatively* and *renounceably* supreme) and can also exercise the topmost power in making war on another State.

As a result, neither the *first* element inherent in genuine Sovereignty, namely a *natural and inalienable* right to supreme independence and supreme power, nor the *second* element inherent in genuine Sovereignty, namely the *absolutely* and *transcendently* supreme character of that independence and power (which in genuine Sovereignty are supreme *separately* from, and *above*, the whole ruled by the Sovereign and which, in the external sphere, make even the possibility of any superior, larger political society repugnant in itself to the very essence of the Sovereign) can by any means be ascribed to the State. The State is not and has never been genuinely sovereign.

IV

To sum up, let us then say that the concept of Sovereignty, taken in its proper and genuine meaning, does not apply to the body politic, except as regards the first of the two elements it implies, and that it does not apply at all to the State.

No doubt it is permissible to use the term Sovereignty in an improper sense,

meaning simply either the natural right of the body politic to full autonomy, or the right which the State receives from the body politic to topmost independence and topmost power with regard to the other parts and power agencies of the political society or with regard to the external relations between States. Yet in doing so one runs the risk of becoming involved in the worst confusion, since the word Sovereignty always keeps connoting obscurely its genuine meaning. One is consequently in danger of forgetting that no human agency has by virtue of its own nature a right to govern men. Any right to power in political society is possessed by a man or a human agency in so far as he or it is in the body politic a *part* at the service of the common good, a part which has received this right, within certain fixed bounds, from the people exercising their fundamental right to govern themselves.

As concerns finally the people, the second element inherent in genuine Sovereignty—namely, the absolutely and transcendently supreme character of the independence and power, which in genuine Sovereignty are supreme separately from, and above the whole ruled by the Sovereign—is obviously not present in the people any more than it is in the body politic. It is therefore better to say of the people, as of the body politic, that they have a natural and inalienable right to *full autonomy*, that is, to comparatively supreme independence and power with regard to any part of the whole itself which is composed of them, and in order to have this very whole brought into existence and into activity. It would be simply nonsensical to conceive of the people as governing themselves *separately from themselves and from above themselves.*

Yet it is such a nonsensical notion which is at the core of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Contrat Social.* The *Volonté Générale* is in no way a simple majority will, but a monadic superior and indivisible will emanating from the people as one single unit, and which is "always right."[31] This myth of the General Will was only a means of having the separate and transcendent power of the absolute king transferred to the people while remaining separate and transcendent, in such a way that by the mystical operation of the General Will the people, becoming one single Sovereign, would possess a separate, absolute and transcendent power—a power from above—over themselves as a multitude of individuals. As Rousseau put it, "*le pacte social donne au corps politique un* POUVOIR ABSOLU *sur tous ses membres; et c'est ce même pouvoir qui, dirigé par une volonté générale, porte le nom de* SOUVERAINETÉ."[32] "*La souveraineté, n'étant que l'exercice de la volonté générale, ne peut jamais s'aliéner, et la souverain, qui n'est qu'un être collectif,* NE PEUT ÊTRE REPRÉSENTÉ QUE PAR LUI-MÊME."[33]

[31] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Henry J. Tozer trans., London, 1920), Bk. II, Chs. 3 and 4. "It follows from what precedes that the general will is always right . . . " (p. 123). "Why is the general will always right, and why do all invariably desire the prosperity of each . . . " (p. 126).

[32] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 4, p. 125. " . . . the social pact gives the body politic an absolute power over all its members; and it is this same power which, when directed by the general will, bears, as I said, the name of sovereignty."

[33] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 1, p. 119. "I say, then, that sovereignty, being nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign power, which is only a collective being, can be represented by itself alone."

"*L'autorité suprême ne peut pas plus se modifier que s'aliéner;* LA LIMITER C'EST LA DÉTRUIRE."[34] "*La puissance souveraine n'a nul besoin de garant envers ses sujets . . . Le souverain,* PAR CELA SEUL QU'IL EST, EST TOUJOURS TOUT CE QU'IL DOIT ÊTRE."[35]

Thus Rousseau, who was not a democrat,[36] injected into nascent modern democracies a notion of Sovereignty which was destructive of democracy. His concept pointed toward the totalitarian State, because, instead of getting clear of the separate and transcendent power of the absolute kings, he carried, on the contrary, that spurious power of the absolute kings to the point of an unheard of absolutism, in order to make a present of it to the people. So it is necessary that "each citizen should be in perfect independence of the others, *and excessively dependent on the State. . . . For it is only the power of the State* which makes the freedom of its members."[37] The Legislator, that superman described in the *Contrat Social*, offers us a preview of our modern totalitarian dictators, whose "great soul is the true miracle which should prove" their "mission,"[38] and who have to "alter man's constitution in order to strengthen it."[39] Did not Rousseau think, moreover, that the State has a right of life and death over the citizen when he observed: "When the prince has said to him: it is expedient for the state that you should die, he must die, since it is only on this condition that he has safely lived up to that time, and since his life is no longer a nature's boon only, but a conditional gift of the state."[40] Finally as concerns matters of religion, he insisted that "the philosopher Hobbes is the only one who has clearly seen the evil and its remedy, and who has dared to suggest to unite in one single authority the two heads of the eagle, or *to reduce everything to political unity, without which never state or government will be rightly constituted.*"[41] Rousseau's State was but the Hobbesian Leviathan, crowned with the General Will instead of the crown of those whom the Jacobin vocabulary called "les rois et les tyrans."

But let us come back to our subject-matter. As a result of the principles set forth by Rousseau, and because the long acknowledged notion of the *transcendently*-supreme independence and power of the king had been simply transferred to the people, thus making all individual wills lose any independence of their own in the indivisible *General Will*, it was held as a self-evident principle at the time of the French Revolution that the Sovereignty of the people—absolute, monadic, and transcendent—excluded the possibility of any particular bodies or organizations of citizens enjoying in the state any kind of autonomy. "It is of necessity that no partial society should exist in the state."[42]

[34] *Ibid.*, Bk. III, Ch. 16, p. 190. " . . . the supreme authority can no more be modified than alienated; to limit it is to destroy it."

[35] *Ibid.*, Bk. I, Ch. 7, p. 113. " . . . the sovereign power needs no guarantee toward its subjects. . . . The sovereign, for the simple reason that it is so, is always everything that it ought to be."

[36] *Ibid.*, Bk. III, Ch. 4, p. 160. "If there were a nation of gods, it would be governed democratically. So perfect a government is unsuited to men."

[37] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 12. [38] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 7.

[39] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 7. [40] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 5.

[41] *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, Ch. 8. [42] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 3.

Similarly, such a transferring, to the people, of the mythical idea of the inalienable right of the king to *transcendently*-supreme power resulted, in the early and mythical, purely Rousseauist stage of democratic (spurious democratic) philosophy, in making the representatives of the people mere instruments deprived of any right to govern.[43] In truth, however, the representatives are possessed—vicariously, and by participation, but really—of this right, with the responsibility involved, since, having been put in charge, within certain fixed limits, by the people exercising their right to full autonomy, they have been, to the same extent, invested with authority, by virtue of that very choice of the people. First and foremost, they are possessed of this right by virtue of the order through which God maintains nature and societies, and through which alone men can be made bound in conscience to obey other men.

There is no need to add that the will of the people is not sovereign in the vicious sense that whatever would please the people would have the force of law. The right of the people to govern themselves proceeds from Natural Law; consequently, the very exercise of their right is submitted to Natural Law. If Natural Law is valid to give this basic right to the people, it is valid also to impose its unwritten precepts to the exercise of this same right. A law is not made just by the sole fact that it expresses the will of the people. An unjust law, even if it expresses the will of the people, is not law.

Here again the vicious dialectic of Sovereignty has been at work. For although Jean Bodin had subjected the Sovereign to the law of God, the inner logic of the concept was destined to make Sovereignty free from every—even divine—limitation. From the fact alone that it existed, was not the Sovereign always, as Rousseau put it, all that it ought to be? In actual fact Sovereignty required that no decision made by the Mortal God, or law established by the General Will, could be possibly resisted by the individual conscience in the name of justice. Law did not need to be just to have the force of law. Sovereignty was above moral law. The story came to its end once the Sovereignty of the king had been replaced by the Sovereignty of that abstract entity, the State, and the Sovereignty of the State had been confused with the Sovereignty of the Nation and the Sovereignty of the People. The Sovereignty of the totalitarian State is the master of good and evil as well as of life and death. That is *just* which serves the interest of the Sovereign, that is, of the People, that is, of the State, that is, of the Party.

V

It seems to me that the conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion of Sovereignty is clear. The major texts that I have quoted from such unim-

[43] *Ibid.*, Bk. III, Ch. 15, p. 187. "Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; . . . *The deputies of the people, then, are not and cannot be its representatives; they are only its commissioners* and can conclude nothing definitely. Every law which the people in person have not ratified is invalid; it is not a law. The English nation thinks that it is free, but is greatly mistaken, for it is only during the election of members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved and counts for nothing. The use which it makes of the brief moment of freedom renders the loss of liberty well-deserved."

peachable witnesses as Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau should suffice to enlighten us as to the genuine meaning of this concept. In order to think in a consistent manner in political philosophy, we must discard the concept of Sovereignty, which is but one with the concept of Absolutism.

The question is not a question of words only. Of course we are free to say "Sovereignty" while we are thinking full autonomy or right to decide without appeal—just as we are free to say "omnipotency" while we are thinking limited power, or "drum" while we are thinking "flute." Yet the effect upon our own thinking and upon intelligible communication with others would appear highly undesirable. Professor Quincy Wright observes with good reason that "the state still seems to exist different from subordinate government agencies and other associations and a term is needed to define it."[44] The point is that the term needed is not Sovereignty.

Sovereignty is a curious example of those concepts which are right in one order of things and wrong in another. It loses its poison when it is transplanted from politics to metaphysics. In the spiritual sphere there is a valid concept of Sovereignty. God, the separate Whole, is Sovereign over the created world. According to the Catholic faith, the Pope, in his capacity of vicar of Christ, is sovereign over the Church. Even, in a merely moral sense, it may be said that the wise men, and first and foremost the spiritual men, have a kind of sovereignty. They are possessed of an independence which is supreme *from above* (from the Spirit), with regard to the world of passions and the world of the law, to whose coercive force they are not subjected, since their will of itself and spontaneously is in tune with the law.[45] They are further "separate in order to command," that is, to tell the truth. And the spiritual man "judges all things, yet himself is judged of no man."[46]

But with respect to the men or agencies in charge of guiding peoples toward their earthly destinies in the political sphere, there is no valid use of the concept of Sovereignty, because, in the last analysis, no earthly power is the image of God or deputy for God. God is the very source of the authority with which the people invest them, but they are not the vicars of God. They are the vicars of the people, and they cannot be divided from the people by any superior essential property.

Sovereignty means independence and power which are *separately* or *transcendently* supreme and which are exercised upon the body politic *from above* because they are a natural and inalienable right belonging to a whole (originally the person of the sovereign Prince), which is superior to the whole constituted by the body politic or the people, and which, consequently, either is superimposed on them or absorbs them in itself. The equality thus defined does not belong to the State. Ascribed to it, it vitiates the State.

Three implications of Sovereignty are especially to be considered in this connection. First, as regards external Sovereignty: the sovereign State—each

[44] Quincy Wright, *Mandates Under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 281–282.
[45] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. theolog.*, I–II, 96, 5.
[46] St. Paul, I. *Cor.*, 2, 15.

individual sovereign State—is by right *above* the community of nations and possessed of absolute independence with regard to this community. As a result, no international law binding the States can be consistently conceived. Furthermore, this absolute independence is inalienable (*unrenounceable*), because by virtue of its notion the sovereign State is a monadic entity which cannot cease to be sovereign without ceasing to be a State. As a result, as long as the States behave consistently with their so-called Sovereignty, they could not possibly give up their supreme independence in order to enter a larger political body, or a world society.

Secondly, as regards internal Sovereignty: the sovereign State is possessed of a power which—instead of being *relatively highest*, because in actual fact something must be at the top and decide without appeal—is a power *absolutely supreme*, as is necessary with a monadic whole superimposed on the body politic or absorbing it in itself. And this *absolute* power of the sovereign State over the body politic, or the people, is all the more unquestionable as the State is mistaken for the body politic itself or for the personification of the people themselves. Do the people not obey only themselves, by obeying the State? As a result, the pluralist idea is not only disregarded but necessarily rejected. Centralism, not pluralism, is required. It is at the price of a patent self-contradiction that the sovereign States will reluctantly accept the smallest amount of autonomy for particular agencies and associations born out of freedom. Through the inner dialectic of the notion of Sovereignty, they will tend to totalitarianism.

Thirdly, the sovereign State is possessed of a supreme power which is exercised *without accountability*. How could this notion of the unaccountability of the Sovereign be conceivable if it did not refer to something *separately* and *transcendently* supreme? As Mr. Robert Lansing observed, "the power to do all things without accountability" is coincident with the Sovereignty of God. As to human Sovereignty, it "may be defined as the power to the extent of human capacity to do all things on the earth without accountability."[47] The attribute thus defined is all that could be wished for by the deified Potentates, Despots and Emperors of ancient times in their most celestial ambitions. In modern times it has been ascribed to the State on the fictitious ground that the State is the people personified, and that the people can do anything without accountability. Yet the real process has been a transfer of the power without accountability of the personal Sovereign to the so-called juristic personality of the State. Thus was instilled in the latter an element directly contrary to the principle which makes the people the final judge of the stewardship of their governmental officials. Accordingly, the democratic States were involved in serious inconsistency. At all events the State was sovereign. As a result it was to endeavor with perserverance, in accordance with the principle of unaccountability, to escape the people's supervision and control.

To the extent to which the sovereign State succeeds in this effort, the unac-

[47] Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

countability of the supreme decisions by which the body politic is committed has a clear meaning: it means in actual fact that *the people* will pay for the decisions made by the State in the name of their Sovereignty. As a French saying puts it, "ce sont toujours les mêmes qui se font tuer," always the same ones are getting killed. The woes of the people settle the accounts of the unaccountable supreme persons or agencies, State, ministries, committees, boards, staffs, rulers, lawgivers, experts, advisers—not to speak of the *intelligentsia*, writers, theorists, scientific utopians, connoisseurs, professors and newspapermen.

The *intelligentsia* has not been commissioned by the people; it is not accountable to the people, except morally, for to teach or write on the assumption that what one puts forth "is of no consequence" is permissible only to insane persons. But the State is indeed accountable; the State, as well as all governmental agencies and officials, is accountable to the people. Do not the people have a right to supervise and control the State? How could the State be subject to supervision if the power it exercises were a power without accountability?

But if the State is accountable and subject to supervision, how can it be sovereign? What can possibly be the concept of a *Sovereignty, liable to supervision, and accountable?* Clearly, the State is not sovereign.

Nor, as we have seen, are the people. They do not exercise a power without accountability. Their right to self-government and full autonomy makes them unaccountable to any tribunal or particular agency in the body politic. But the power they exercise, either by mass reflexes and extra-legal means, or through the regular channels of a truly democratic society, is in no way a power without accountability, for they are sure to pay for their mistakes in their own sweat and blood.

The two concepts of Sovereignty and Absolutism have been forged together on the same anvil. They must be scrapped together.

GENERALISTS VERSUS SPECIALISTS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW[1]

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"The theorist can never foresee what the experimenter will find when his range is extended to include fields at present inaccessible."[2]

Man behaved economically, politically, and otherwise long before social scientists theorized about his behavior. In fact, present day social science is of comparatively recent origin, being the product of that progressive specialization which began in the eighteenth century.

This specialization has produced diverse problems, with one of which the present paper is concerned. The problem in question is suggested by the central thesis of this paper: that although an economist (or political scientist) must delimit what he studies qua economist (or political scientist), his understanding of economic (or political) behavior is governed by his understanding of human behavior as a whole. While this paper was written primarily from the point of view of an economist to illustrate how psychology and noneconomic social science may contribute to our understanding of economic behavior, it also suggests how political science may draw upon the disciplines treated and indicates how economists envisage a number of questions of fundamental significance to students of government.

I. GENERALISTS VERSUS SPECIALISTS

It is accepted (a) that each social science is superior to others in respect of questions falling within definable though alterable analytical and empirical boundaries, but not (b) that a specialist's skill is materially conditioned by his knowledge of social sciences other than his own. Weisskopf even suggests that the segmentation of social science reflects psychological isolation: each group of specialists sequesters itself, hoping thereby to avoid conclusions which, though valid, are likely to generate anxiety in the speciality and its practitioners.[3]

Analysis of both the empirical and the theoretical content of the subject matter of any social science reveals it to be made up of the behavior of *interacting* individuals, of those forms of human behavior which are directly or indirectly dominated by man's membership in groups. The subject matter of economics answers to this description, since it consists primarily of interpersonal behavior arising out of the scarcity of the means at man's disposal to satisfy the plurality of ends wherewith nature and nurture have jointly en-

[1] This paper is based upon lectures given in 1949 at Yale University and the University of Illinois.

[2] P. W. Bridgman, *The Nature of Physical Theory* (Princeton, 1936), p. 2.

[3] W. A. Weisskopf, "Psychological Aspects of Economic Thought," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 57, p. 306 (1949).

dowed him. Psychology, by contrast, being concerned with the behavior of individuals as such, lacks some of the characteristics distinctive of social science. For, whereas social science resembles the study of the behavior of gas at the level of kinetic theory, psychology resembles its study at the individual-particle level. Economists' occasional reference to the chrematistics of Robinson Crusoe does not invalidate this statement, since economically rational behavior may be exhibited even by an individual in isolation; it may also reflect the subjective emphasis of economics, an emphasis characteristic also of other branches of modern thought and art.

Responsibility for the subject matter of social science is presently divided up among groups of specialists, each body of which is given custody of a segment.[4] Yet, since the several segments are mutually interrelated, a specialist's mastery of the behavior-forms allotted to his social science is governed by his understanding of related behavior-forms treated by other social sciences.

The validity of these assertions flows from the fact that man, the ultimate subject of social science, is not a machine-like aggregate of independent parts, but a psychophysically indivisible organism bound to his fellows by the diverse sinews of culture. This indivisibility is less subtle at the physical than at the psychic level; yet even there it raises problems. Students of medicine, for example, have divided up the therapeutic treatment of man and, for good or ill, parcelled out among specialists responsibility for his various parts. But, since man as a psychophysical totality persists, students of medicine, while remaining sensible of the advantages of medical specialization, now are paying increasing attention to man as a psychophysical totality.

Man is also a social totality. "No man," wrote John Donne, "is an *Island*, entire of itself; . . . any man's *death* diminishes *me*, because I am involved in Mankind. . . . " At one and the same time he is an economic man, a political man, a sociological man, an ethical man, a religious man, and a legatee of the forces of history. Because man is simultaneously all of these things, it is impossible to decompose him physically into his component parts and then hand each such part to specialists supposedly gifted in divining its composition and operation.

Social scientists are not completely frustrated, however, by their inability directly to subdivide man as a social totality. They can, in effect, partly achieve this objective by indirect means. They can resort to the use of fiction and imagine that man as a social totality embodies an economic man, an ethical man, a political man, a reasonable man, and whatever other type of man is called for. They can do this by subdividing man's interpersonal behavior into categories (within each of which a comparatively homogeneous collection of activities is assembled) and assigning custody of each category to the specialists presumably most suited to deal with it. In short, by analytical and mental

[4] See my "The Problem of Order in Economic Affairs," *Southern Economic Journal*, Vol. 15, pp. 1 ff. (1948). Certain epistemological aspects of economic analysis are treated in this paper. But upon this subject see F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York, 1947).

means social scientists can accomplish in part that which they cannot achieve physically by any means. This they have been doing for several centuries, an outcome being the differentiation and specialization so characteristic of contemporary social science.

The specialization consequent upon the analytical decomposition of man as a social totality has borne fruit. It has also exacted a price. (1) Important modes of collective behavior have escaped significant analysis because no unseen hand has been present to coordinate the activities of diverse specialists and insure analysis of *all* significant forms of interpersonal behavior. (2) Developments within fields of specialization frequently have weakened and sometimes have nearly destroyed interfield communication. The comparatively homogeneous tongue of what passed for social science in the past seemingly has given place to a Babel of symbol-ridden jargons. Actually, however, behind this semantic façade there is less heterogeneity than appears, what amounts to the same piece of reality often being represented by symbols that vary with social science. Accordingly, while the analytical system of no one social science is completely transformable into that of some other, it is inferable that interfield communication can be greatly improved through attempts to clarify expression and simplify and translate into a common language the dissimilar symbol-structures of the various specialties. Simplification of language will increase the effectiveness of social science at legislative, administrative, and engineering levels, since action programs call for a simpler language than does analysis as such.

Too highly focused specialization produces bad effects at both the private and the public level. The specialist's attention may be diverted from connections that obtain between the behavior-modes which he pretends to study and modes for which specialists in other fields are responsible. If this happens, the specialist loses sight of the fundamental oneness of interpersonal behavior and comes to conceive of man as a divisible being, each of whose parts can be satisfactorily studied in complete independence of those remaining. Inadequate conclusions inevitably ensue, often to be incorporated in the action programs of private and/or public agencies and thus become a part of man's cultural environment.

The task of philosophy has been defined thus: "to recover the totality obscured by . . . selection."[5] The task of a general, as distinguished from a highly specialized, approach to social science may be similarly defined. An approach that is general as well as particular in scope is indicated also when, because the social situation under analysis has a pluralistic interpretation, the contributions of several specialities are required. How many social sciences may contribute is governed both by their comparative state of advancement and by the narrowness with which the situation under analysis is defined. While it is essential that, in all instances, the interpretation afforded by one social science be compatible with those provided by the others, it sometimes happens, when a situation is narrowly defined, that a single social science will provide an explana-

[5] See A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York, 1941), p. 22.

tion that is both adequate and superior. Given a more broadly defined situation, however, independent analysis by two or more social sciences may be called for, but under such sequential conditions as make for economy of effort. If social science continues to progress, the day may come when many of its individual branches will have been merged into one. Already theories relating to learning, culture, personality-formation, and selected social relationships have been found to dovetail nicely;[6] and so do theories pertaining to political and economic behavior. In time yet other social theories may prove complementary. Even so, the vestiges of unity found to underlie various segments of social theory do not foreshadow realization of the Comtean dream of a social science that is highly general, universal, and at the same time practical.

Though it is likely that particular social sciences will long retain much of their present sovereignty, it is probable that in the near future comparatively the greatest contributions will be made by social scientists equipped to handle subject matter lying along the boundaries and in the march-lands separating their specialties from other specialties. For these borderlands have not been exploited, while solution of the problems arising there calls for the collaboration of diverse though complementary specialists. Moreover, since each type of specialist brings a somewhat unique set of tools, needs, emphases, mental furniture, and intellectual equipment to bear upon a given borderland, collaboration is bound to stimulate the discovery of both varied problems and varied ways of resolving problems.[7]

One social science bears somewhat the same relation to another that one industry bears to another. The augmentation of efficiency in one industry often is the consequence of technological discovery in another. For example, industry A develops a new and more efficient type of machine which it sells to members of industry B and thereby imposes upon all members of B the necessity of adopting this invention. (The transportation industry provides examples.) In like manner one social science adopts a method developed by another or by a nonsocial science. Economics has adopted the sampling approach developed by statisticians; the factor analysis methods developed by psychologists; some of the methodology of classical mechanics and physics; and the structure-function approach taken from physiology by sociology and anthropology. Techniques developed in part by accountants made possible national-income accounting. The construction of high-speed calculators already has made a Walrasian approach practical on a limited scale (e.g., by Leontief).

Interspecialist collaboration is not be to achieved through a shotgun-wed-

[6] On the subject of this paragraph seen W. Leontief, "Note on the Pluralistic Interpretation of History and the Problem of Interdisciplinary Cooperation," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 45, pp. 617–624 (1948); and G. P. Murdock, "The Science of Human Learning, Society, Culture, and Personality," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 69, pp. 377–381 (1949).

[7] The study of vision, issuing out of earlier gestalt-interpretations, is quite suggestive in this connection; it indicates that vision is selective as to its object, and that what is seen is significantly conditioned by past experience and expectation.

ding approach. Fruitful collaboration presupposes exploratory courtship. Conducive to such courtship is an awareness on the part of several complementary specialists that through collaboration they may solve a common problem. Such awareness generates effective cooperation, while the challenge provided by a specific problem sublimates such specialty-centrism and specialty-imperialism as sometimes animate specialists. Opportunities for inter-discipline cooperation may be discovered also through sustained discussion of questions to whose illumination diverse specialists may contribute. Recently consideration of the role of values has served to illustrate the contributive capacities of various disciplines and to indicate the extent to which adherence to common values can reduce tension and conflict at international and intergroup levels.[8]

II. THE ECONOMIST'S ANALYTICAL UNIVERSE[9]

Economics treats of a segment of social action dominated by the means-ends relationship. The economist views this category of action as free of the trammels of time and space. For, while his objective is the apprehension of economic behavior at the *real* level, his approach is pitched largely at the analytical level. Accordingly, he selects from the *formal* world of logic and mathematics relational principles which give promise of representing approximately the connections that appear to obtain in the *real* economic world, or in a sequesterable part of this world. He utilizes these principles to construct models of varying scope and varying complexity, and with their aid describes and/or seeks to discover relations obtaining in the real world. This transfer of generality, though serving to summarize and highlight the real world, entails a price. For the constraints and conditions of the relevant formal world are imposed; and these involve deviations from reality that may or may not be important. The resulting model may be defective, moreover, on statistical grounds.

At the center of the *real* universe of economics, which is a part of the larger and all-inclusive real societal universe, is that category of behavior which flows from man's desire for scarce goods and services and which generates prices, along with price-dominated and related quantities. This universe is represented at the analytical level by a system of mutually interdependent variables whose functional interrelations are hypothetically indicated. This analytical universe is part of the larger, all-inclusive analytical societal universe which embraces, besides the variables that the economist treats as relevant, those elements which

[8] In 1949 the Social Science Research Council sponsored a series of interdiscipline seminars on the content and role of values.

[9] See P. A. Samuelson, *Foundations of Economic Analysis* (Cambridge, 1947); J. R. Hicks, *Value and Capital* (Oxford, 1948); T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), Ch. 19; and Northrop, *op. cit.* For a review of materials relating to economic change see *Problems in the Study of Economic Growth* (New York, 1949), issued by the National Bureau of Economic Research. On the applicability of the concept of entropy in economics see my "Aspects of the Economics of Population Growth," *Southern Economic Journal*, Vol. 14, pp. 238–239 (1948). The notion of "novelty" has been treated by A. N. Whitehead in various of his works.

serve as data or are considered irrelevant. Economic analysis usually is conducted on the assumption that something is being maximized (e.g., profits), or minimized (e.g., expenditure), and that stability is attainable. Accordingly, the stability conditions of analytical economic systems commonly are of interest to the economist.

The behavior of an analytical system of interdependent economic variables may be treated from a statical or from a dynamic point of view. In the former case the mutually interdependent variables are simultaneously and timelessly determined. In the latter case the variables are functionally related in time. The statical approach, which was developed in the nineteenth century, has recently been shown by Samuelson to be a special case of the dynamic approach.

The economist's definition of his analytical system governs his treatment of social change, of which economic change is a species. Change, as viewed by the economist, is of two sorts: (a) *adjustive* (or adaptive), which takes place in accordance with the economist's definition of the behavior of his analytical system; (b) *autonomous* (and sometimes direction-modifying), which takes place outside the system (as defined) and imposes adjustive change on the variable elements composing the system. He may conceive of the participating variables as adjusting simultaneously, or he may trace the propagation of a change (of external origin) through the system until a new equilibrium has been attained.

Change within the all-inclusive societal universe presumably is divisible into that involving adjustment (or adaptation) and that entailing the generation of something initial and novel in character, since it is not likely that the source of all non-adjustive change is locatable within the telluric, solar, and stellar envelopes of the societal universe. Adjustability appears to be a property of most of the components of the societal universe. But how diffused is the capacity for novelty-producing, or autonomous, change is not clear, even on the basis of the present scale of observation.

Adjustive change differs fundamentally and qualitatively from autonomous change. Adjustive change is self-exterminating in that it ceases when the adjustment process has been completed and the adjusting groups (or units) have attained equilibrium at the intra-group and inter-group levels *within* the societal universe and vis-à-vis the relevant *external* universe enveloping that system. Autonomous change, on the contrary, terminates equilibrium, produces disequilibrium, and generates adjustive change. This disequilibrium persists, though in decreasing measure until, barring further autonomous change, the adjustive change consequent upon a given initial increment of autonomous change establishes a *new* equilibrium *within* the societal system and between it and the relevant *external* universe. Adjustive change is analogous, therefore, to an increase, and autonomous change to a decrease, in entropy *within* a societal system, with entropy remaining constant so long as the former is balancing the latter, it being given that the net influence exerted from the external universe remains unchanged.

The contribution which a noneconomist can make to an economist's appre-

hension of economic behavior is conditioned by the latter's definition of his analytical universe and of the model wherewith he is working. In general, it is the function of the noneconomist to explain the behavior through time of those components of the societal universe which the economist treats as data; for these are the elements in view of which the behavior of the economist's system of interdependent variables is defined, and in the light of changes in which the behavior of this system undergoes adjustive change. The noneconomist's function thus becomes largely that of analyzing change. He is concerned with the varying tenability of the economist's usual assumption that the relevant constitution of the behaving individual is not affected by the economic activity in which he is engaging. He is concerned with the adjustive change taking place in the economic system, since effects of this change may be felt in the non-economic segments of the societal universe and there set up repercussions which in turn act upon the economic system until the societal universe has accommodated itself to the original change. But most of all, given the economist's present disposition to concentrate upon adjustive change and largely neglect autonomous change, the noneconomist must concern himself with all relevant aspects of autonomous change, the most interesting, and perhaps the most important, of the properties of the societal universe.

III. PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

Psychology (together with psychiatry) is not a full-bodied social science, since it is concerned primarily with the supra-physiological behavior-mechanisms of the individual and treats of his *intra*personal (as distinguished from his *inter*personal) activities. These mechanisms set limits and give direction to that portion of man's behavior which is or may be of significance to the economic analyst.

Of continuing significance are (a) the economist's psychological postulates respecting the behavior of individuals inhabiting his analytical universe, and (b) his so-called "psychological laws," formulated to generalize his empirical observations concerning relevant human behavior and accommodate them to his theoretical system. (a) The economist assumes, for example, that just as the motion of a gas particle modifies its position but not its constitution, so does the economic behavior of an individual modify his position but not his constitution; and that individuals are bound together in his analytical models and universes much as the components of a mechanical model are bound together. Are these and other psychological postulates valid? Do man's psychological properties produce this supposed constancy? Do the psychological properties of social cohesion transcend the analogous properties of a mechanical model? And so on. (b) The economist's "psychological laws" purport to describe how the representative individual responds to changes in economic variables and data: how much, how fast, how long. Yet only one familiar with the properties of the psychological elements composing such "laws" is prepared to make warrantable use of them.

Let us now turn to specific problems. (i) Current job-evaluation schemes

presuppose various distributions in the working population of those "aptitudes" which supposedly suit individuals to perform the tasks associated with defined jobs. The supposed distributions, however, appear to differ from those actually obtaining, with the result that many workers have to be upgraded or downgraded, and that an economically indefensible wage-structure is brought into being. Psychological analyses can be employed to discover the actual distribution in populations of relevant aptitudes. After this information has been made available, jobs can be better adjusted to prevailing aptitudes, the job-structure can be made to correspond more closely to the aptitude-structure of the working population, and wage-structures can be put on a basis more rational than the present.

(ii) Economists commonly look upon effort-supply as under the empire of remuneration in societies where the threat of force is not operative. Effort-supply curves may, of course, be correctly drawn on this assumption. But, since psychologists have shown economic incentive to be intimately bound up with goals and tensions, it is desirable that students of effort-supply utilize these findings and assist the psychologist in extending our information concerning "economic" and related incentives.

(iii) Trade cycle analysis involves psychological elements, for it has to do with (among other things) the manner in which both strategically situated and less important decision-makers initially form and subsequently modify their plans respecting the quantity and the quality of the economic activity they propose to undertake. The non-routine activity of both decision-makers and consumers is dominated by their expectations concerning the implications of an uncertain and mystery-ridden future for the ventures and plans they have under consideration. Accordingly, what appear to be essentially similar economic data may give rise at different times to quite dissimilar behavior: e.g., witness the path traced by prices in 1946–49. Expectations, therefore, are not mere epiphenomena, mere psychical correlates of non-physical phenomena. Instead they vary with the subjective state of the individual, and this state reflects in some degree the supposed subjective states of other individuals. It may be, therefore, that the responsivity of decision-makers and consumers to given objective situations will become subject to qualitative change as our information about the state of expectations and its causes improves.[10]

(iv) The economist has long been interested in the maximization of the "welfare" of individuals and aggregates of individuals, subject to various

[10] Most of man's behavior, being future-facing, is dominated by expectations. But these expectations are diverse in nature. For example, the entrepreneur (and all others in so far as they resemble the entrepreneur) acts on suppositions respecting the stability of institutions, the integrity and responsibility of those with whom he deals, the probability of continuity-breaking events such as war, the course of business in general and in his own industry in the months ahead, and the prospects of his own firm. In the text above we refer principally to an entrepreneur's suppositions respecting business in general, his industry, and his firm. Of especial interest in this connection are the studies of G. Katona and the inquiries being conducted by F. Modigliani. See also Cowles Commission, *Report*, 1948–1949, pp. 6 ff.

conditions. Initially the economist was handicapped by the lack of a common denominator seemingly suited to overcome the incommensurability of the capacities of heterogeneous goods and services to minister to man's wants under varying conditions. Yet, not until the middle of the nineteenth century, did the economist adopt the concept of "utility" to serve as a common denominator, although its supposed appropriateness to this purpose was suggested already by late eighteenth century writers (e.g., by A.–N. Isnard). For a half-century thereafter, however, the economist viewed as cardinally measurable the "utility" derived by an individual from various goods, and as susceptible of addition, under more circumscribed conditions, the utility aggregates enjoyed by discrete individuals. Upon these suppositions there was built a kind of "welfare economics" that held sway until after World War I. Further analysis revealed, however, that the nineteenth-century notions of measurability, addibility, and interpersonal and intercommodity commensurability were not tenable; and that formal and practical difficulties, together with arbitrary assumptions, are involved in passing from tastes and values at the individual level to those at the collective level. Even so, interest in welfare economics remains great. Welfare-maximization remains a practical objective of economics, to be attained through intergood substitution and interindividual compensation, subject (as a rule) to the limitation that an increase in the welfare of any one individual is not to be attained through the reduction of that of some other individual (e.g., through income-redistribution).[11]

The economist's approach to the welfare problem differs from that of the psychologist, being conducted at a different level, in different terms, and on different assumptions. Consider intergood substitution at the individual level. The economist (using an indifference-curve or related technique) looks upon a quantity of one good as a substitute for a given quantity of another good so long as, under the conditions given, it is a matter of indifference to the individual concerned whether he takes one or the other quantity. The economist supposes, moreover, that consumption as such, or a change in consumption arising out of price or income changes, does not modify the consumer's tastes (i.e., his indifference map). The economist supposes, furthermore, that welfare-changes are produced within the framework of an unchanged indifference map, thus ruling out by assumption effects which may flow from man's being plastic and susceptible of modification by activities such as consumption.

Whereas the economist looks at certain end results of the substitution process the psychologist looks at the intraindividual effects produced by that process. The psychologist emphasizes what the economist passes over, namely, the multi-faceted nature of many commodities. The economist views a smoked

[11] See K. J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Value*, Cowles Commission Discussion Paper No. 258, Chicago, 1949; M. W. Reder, *Studies in the Theory of Welfare Economics* (New York, 1947); P. A. Samuelson, *op. cit.*, and "Evaluation of Real National Income," *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 2, 1950, pp. 1 ff.; and the papers by I. M. D. Little appearing in *ibid.*, pp. 132 ff. and Vol. 1, 1949, pp. 90 ff., 227 ff. For an appraisal of Lerner's interesting defense of income-equality, see M. Friedman, "Lerner on the Economics of Control," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 55, pp. 409 ff. (1947).

mullet as an inexpensive salt-water fish suited to sate certain food wants. The psychologist looks upon it as capable of simultaneously satisfying diverse needs: appeasing hunger; supplying chemical elements required by the body; affording a pleasing reminder of fishing excursions, or of a youth spent along the Florida coast; furnishing esoteric prestige, for did not (so report Juvenal and Martial) the well-to-do Roman often pay a pretty penny for mullet; and so on. The psychologist's emphasis thus leads him to envisage substitution in terms of activity. Substitute activity is defined in terms of the tension system corresponding to an original goal: action B is a substitute for action A provided that action B can discharge the tension system whose relaxation theretofore has called for action A. This approach has been adopted also by anthropologists who look upon a goal-object as something whose attainment reduces the tension issuing out of the need for this goal-object, and who define a system of living as a more or less recurring pattern of tensions generated and in turn reduced.[12]

The psychologist's approach suggests what the economist rules out by definition, namely, that a consumer's welfare may be increased by altering his indifference map in such wise that he substitutes less costly for more costly means of want-satisfaction. Suppose that a consumer (or a community), having been induced to look upon soya beans (corrected for any nutrient shortcomings) as serving the same purpose as beef, substitutes the former for the latter. The difference in resource-cost which the consumer (or community) saves may be devoted to leisure or to other goods and thus made to add to real income. Substitution along these lines is limited, of course, to orders of goods whose components are comparatively interchangeable.[13] It entails more detailed information concerning the characteristics of commodities than does the much more restricted approach of the economist.

(v) The sometime economic proposition that income equalization necessarily augments "aggregate welfare" raises psychological questions. (a) Does not evidence respecting interpersonal differences in hedonistic and other forms of sensitivity suggest that some persons have a greater capacity than others to derive satisfaction directly from particular forms of personal consumption and possibly imply that some persons are more efficient pleasure-machines than others? (Relatively few persons can distinguish select from ordinary tea or wine; the sky above Reading Gaol meant more to Oscar Wilde than to many of his fellow prisoners.) Do not some persons indirectly derive greater satisfaction or dissatisfaction than do other persons from the direct personal consumption of others? (b) Will not income equalization reduce aggregate output and thus partially offset such increments in aggregate welfare as are imputable to

[12] See K. Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* (New York, 1935), Chs. 6, 8; C. L. Hull, "Value, Valuation, and Methodology," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 1, pp. 128 ff. (1944); C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York, 1949), Ch. 1; S. S. Sargent and M. W. Smith, *Culture and Personality* (New York, 1949).

[13] On limitations to substitutability see C. R. Noyes, *Economic Man* (New York, 1948), e. g., pp. 866–867, 884–885.

equalization? Propositions relating to income equalization must take into account empirical psychological evidence elicited by questions (a) and (b).

(vi) It is commonly assumed that income and welfare levels are highly correlated and that representative inhabitants of (say) present-day high-income America are much happier than their forebears of a century ago or their contemporaries residing in low-income countries. The validity of this assumption is largely undermined by the fact that man, being highly plastic and adaptable, so adjusts his responses to variations in his material and societal environments as to counterbalance much of their supposed influence. This assumption also overlooks the very important fact that "happiness," or "satisfaction," is a function not only of anticipation and consummation but also of activity as such. Accordingly, since the variation of activity in time and space is limited, this limitation imposes a constraint upon the variability of happiness. For like reasons the validity of intercultural and interpersonal comparisons is restricted.

(vii) It is commonly assumed that consumers should enjoy both freedom of choice and sovereignty respecting consumption: i.e., be free to spend their incomes as they choose for goods and services whose production has been guided solely or almost solely by consumer demand. The doctrine of consumer sovereignty at times is vulnerable on the practical political ground that it may endanger the national safety, or, in the case of backward countries, unduly retard industrial progress. It appears to be vulnerable also on the psychological ground that, within limits at least, a restriction of the range of choice open to the representative individual does not or presently will not reduce his satisfaction and may even increase it. Both the doctrine of consumer sovereignty and that of consumer freedom of choice may be vulnerable also on other psychological grounds.[14]

IV. SOCIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND ECONOMICS

Because much of the subject matter of anthropology and sociology is shared in common, they may be treated together. The anthropologist is concerned primarily with the whole of man's culture, with the aggregate of adaptable group habits that are transmitted, with more or less modification, from members of the community to individuals newly entering it via birth or immigration; with intercultural similarities and differences; with the connections obtaining among the elements making up given cultures; and with the generation and propagation of change within and between cultures. The sociologist deals, at both the empirical and the analytical levels, principally with those relatively stable social organizations called institutions; with social structure and function and their reciprocal relations; with static and dynamic aspects of the value-systems that permeate man's culture and underlie his goals and institutions; and with the movement of individuals in social space (e.g., with role, status, etc.).

Anthropology and sociology are equipped to direct the economist's attention

[14] On consumer sovereignty and freedom of choice and related issues, see A. Bergson's essay in H. S. Ellis, *A Survey of Contemporary Economics* (Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 412 ff.

to the essential nature of human society and to its implications for economic analysis. The distinguishing qualities of this society have had their origin in the plasticity of man's mental traits. For this plasticity has freed man of many of the constraints which environment and biology impose upon lower forms of life; it has enabled man to invent new responses and to adopt those which prove more suitable; and it has permitted him to cumulate culture and thereby extend to succeeding generations the discoveries, inventions, innovations, and improvements made by any one generation.[15] Anthropology and sociology are particularly suited to appraise the validity of the economist's assumptions concerning interpersonal behavior and to uncover (if they are present) the noneconomic components of problems, even of those that initially appear to be wholly economic in character.

Sociological and anthropological analysis suggest that man's economic behavior is both less and more canalized than economic theory supposes. On the one hand, economic activity is carried on within a cultural milieu that is both economic and noneconomic, under the overriding influence of a somewhat integrated and stable system of ultimate and intermediate values, and with the assistance of institutions. These social elements operate in combination both to facilitate and to contain and channelize the flow of economic behavior. In virtue of his plasticity and adaptability, on the other hand, a man's behavior patterns are susceptible of modification by the economic and noneconomic activities in which he engages. Some of these modifications, whether of economic or of noneconomic origin, get imbedded in the personalities of the acting individuals and/or in institutional and related components of the cultural milieu, whence they influence the course of subsequent economic behavior until such time as they in turn undergo modification.[16]

Sociological and anthropological analysis suggests that the empirical economic world is not mutually determined so completely as its conceptualization by economists suggests. First, since determination is exercised *through* time rather than *athwart* time, *contemporary* variables (e.g., prices) cannot be so mutually determinative as economic theory has them. Variables which coincide in time are as they are in virtue of their immediate past and of such novelty-creating forces as are operative; in like manner their coinciding states condition, but do wholly determine, their subsequently coinciding states.[17] Second, neither modern industrial cultures nor their predecessors are marked by so high a degree of integration as characterizes the economist's conceptualized universe. Finally, components of culture may undergo modification while the integrating process

[15] See T. Dobzhansky and M. F. Ashley Montagu, "Natural Selection and the Mental Capacities of Mankind," *Science*, Vol. 105, pp. 587–590 (1947), and F. H. Knight, "Free Society: Its Basic Nature and Problem," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 39–58 (1948).

[16] On the influence of historical development upon the formation of personality types see A. Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York, 1945); also the last two works cited in note 12 and G. Murphy, *Personality* (New York, 1947).

[17] Cp. A. N. Whitehead's argument in another connection in *Adventures of Ideas* (New York, 1933), pp. 255 ff.

is under way, thereby preventing attainment of a complete and persisting integration.

Cultural systems are shot through with play. Since the day of Sumner,[18] it has been supposed that the components of each culture "strain toward consistency." It has correctly been assumed to be axiomatic, moreover, that a minimal degree of consistency is essential to the survival of any culture as a going concern. It has become accepted, nonetheless, that while the ways in which cultural elements may be permuted and combined are always quite limited in number, cultures—modern industrial cultures in particular—do not become so integrated that a change in any one component always imposes upon many other components the necessity of making adaptive changes. This necessity arises, rather, only when the initial change has been one of *critical* magnitude, with what constitutes a critical magnitude being governed by (among other things) the nature of both the component initially undergoing change and that envisaged as the dependent variable.[19]

Several conclusions follow from the preceding analysis. First, Marxian (and similar) analysts assume the existence of a greater degree of connectedness among their defined variables than obtains in the real world. Second, societal analysis would be facilitated by reducing modern cultures to terms of their components and then classifying these components according to (a) their susceptibility of autonomous change, (b) their capacity to impose adaptive change on other components, and (c) their sensitivity to autonomous change taking place in other components. Third, the effective functioning of economies, free-enterprise and otherwise, presupposes adaptability and flexibility; for then only can an economy be appropriately readjusted as the imperfectly foreseeable future approaches the more perceivable present. The uncertainty to which this flexibility is a counterweight issues out of both the unpredicability of autonomous change and the loosely integrated state of modern cultural systems; and it is accentuated by the fact that action often tends to produce unanticipated consequences.[20] Uncertainty merely tends to change its guise in response to efforts intended to eliminate it from an economy by completely rigidifying it.

Sociology and anthropology are correcting the inadequate conception of motivation long dominant in economic literature. They have demonstrated that what a man wants and how he goes about getting it are culturally determined. It is largely from his culture and his conception of his societal role and status that man derives his interests, his purposes, and those goals whose attainment is essential to the reduction of his tension. What constitute acceptable and unacceptable ways of achieving these objectives are defined, regulated, and controlled by this same culture. The solution of the problem of economic

[18] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1906), pp. 5–6.

[19] Integration, change, etc., in primitive cultures have been treated with precision by G. P. Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York, 1949), esp. Chs. 7–8.

[20] On this point see R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1949), pp. 51, 122, 179. On unpredictability in the societal realm see also Northrop, *op. cit.*, pp. 115 ff., 235 ff., and my "The Role of the State," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 7, Supplement 7, pp. 139 ff. (1947).

motivation in the Western World thus appears to be one of fixing in each individual a level of aspiration to which he can hope to attain by means that are both legitimate and socially useful, provided that he regularly puts forth an amount of effort which, while appreciable, is not beyond his capacities. The strategic points of emphasis appear to be the level and content of the representative individual's aspiration and the conditions that he must observe if his pursuit of the objectives comprising his aspiration-level is to remain compatible with law and custom. Parsons' studies suggest, moreover, that the content of a given man's aspirations, together with the means he employs to realize these aspirations, will be workably compatible with the aspirations and methods of other men, only if the ultimate value system of a society is sufficiently well-integrated.[21]

The sociologist's interest in the formation and content of value-systems converges nicely with the interest of the economist and the political scientist in the formal aspects and the mechanics of choice. The transit from individual to collective welfare entails certain conditions (e.g., the similarity of attitudes required).[22] Sociological analysis may discover the extent to which stipulated conditions are or may be realized.

The evolution of the free-enterprise system and the rise of other economic systems is precipitating essentially economic questions to the solution of which other disciplines, in particular sociology and political science, can contribute. What, for example, are the implications of the fact that the making of economically-oriented decisions is becoming more and more collective in character, with the result that simple individual psychological assumptions and elementary decision-making processes are no longer applicable? How can the institutional framework within which labor and management negotiate be redefined so that the outcomes of these negotiations are consistent with the optimum use and pricing of productive agents and conducive to a high rate of material progress? How can adequate supplies of appropriate forms of capital, of inventors and innovators and individuals possessing requisite craft and professional skills, and of inventions and innovations be made forthcoming in the longer run? How can the enterprise-freezing influence of the decline in population growth be countered? What economic, juridic, and sociological conditions favor respectively, free-enterprise, mixed, and collective systems? How can the obstacles (e.g., lack of appropriate tastes, incentives, capital, and know-how) to industrialization in "Point-Four-Program" countries be liquidated most expeditiously?[23] How do public differ from private bureaucracies, and how does

[21] See R. K. Merton, *ibid.*, esp. Parts I–II; T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, *op. cit.*, and *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (Glencoe, 1949); R. Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, 1949), and (with H. Cantril) "Income Satisfaction and Income Aspiration," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 41, pp. 64–69 (1946).

[22] See Arrow, *op. cit.*

[23] On the incentive problem see W. E. Moore, "Theoretical Aspects of Industrialization," *Social Research*, Vol. 15, pp. 277 ff. (1948), and papers there cited. On the use of various social sciences in the study of labor relations see, e.g., W. L. Warner, "Social Science in Business Education," in G. V. Cox (ed.), *The Challenge of Business Education*, (Chicago, 1949), and Earl Ross, *Trade Union Wage Policy* (Berkeley, 1948).

growth of bureaucracy as such affect the character and the operations of economic and political systems?

Supplementation of economic by sociological analysis frequently entails modification of economic conclusions. For example, the formation and the perpetuation of wage structures in particular industries often reflect the forces of institutionalization almost as much as the forces of competition and productivity. Again, income-differentials owe their persistence in considerable measure to the operation of the principle of hierarchy inherent in social structures. Because of this principle, income equality is impossible of attainment, even in a society in which all adults are of like ability and industry. Yet again, consider the accentuation of the problem of the aged occasioned by the prolongation of life in a society such as ours in which agriculture is becoming less and less important, in which the household normally consists of parents and minor children, and in which social prestige and standing depend largely upon occupational status.[24] Yet in this society shortsighted persons are proposing and enacting that men retire at ages 55–65, in utter disregard of the consequent reduction in both national income and individual sociopsychic satisfaction. The answer, of course, is to prolong man's occupational life to and beyond 70.

Economists, who have been neglectful of economic change, may adapt to its analysis the structure-function approach of contemporary sociology. Let us (with Parsons) look upon a social structure as analogous to an organism and define it as a relatively persisting system of relationships which bind together individuals engaged in playing (relevant) social roles in respect to one another. Let us describe as functional that which on the balance makes for the persistence of such a system; as dysfunctional that which produces an opposite effect; and as nonfunctional that which is without relevant effect. Conditions and elements, accordingly, may be classified as functional, dysfunctional, or nonfunctional with respect to social structures of economic significance; the source of change may be sought in that which is dysfunctional on the balance; and the limits to change may be found in circumstances that counterbalance dysfunctional conditions or circumscribe the variability of a social structure as such. The economist employing this approach may utilize the principles of structural analysis to give form and meaning to his detailed knowledge of particular economic structures.[25] He must, however, take into account the role of novelty-producing forces in so far as they are neglected by structural analysis.

V. HISTORY AND ECONOMICS

History is differently related to economics (and political science) than are the social sciences already considered, since it differs from them in method and content. It is the concern of these sciences, as Parsons has pointed out, to

[24] E.g., see Parsons, *Essays*, *op. cit.*, pp. 231, 247.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 22 ff., 34 ff., 44 ff.; Merton, *op. cit.*, Ch. 1, esp. pp. 49–55, 115–119. On limitations to the variability of distribution and structures see G. K. Zipi, *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort* (Cambridge, 1949). A good bibliography is included. See also R. B. Cattell, "The Dimensions of Culture Patterns by Factorization of National Characters," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 44, pp. 443 ff. (1949).

"develop logically coherent systems of general analytical theory" respecting categories of behavior. The object of historical sciences in contrast, "is to attain the fullest possible understanding of a class of concrete individuals or of one of the class."[26]

The historian is interested in particular events that occur in particular places and at particular points in time. He is extremely sensible, therefore, of the very time and place which economic and other social theorists usually attempt to squeeze out of the materials under examination. His materials thus are particularized precipitates of man's past history-making behavior. He deals with his human data, be they singular or plural, as individual particles rather than as units of a statistical universe concerning which generalizations are possible.

The matters with which history deals are of significance to the economist in an indirect rather than in a direct way. The historical deals with the time dimension of the milieu within which economic behavior takes place, with the time dimension in the guise of *past* time. In this the economist is not greatly interested. He is directly concerned only with those modes of time (lags, horizons, etc.) that define the path to equilibrium in the future, or indicate conditions of convergence, oscillation, or divergence. The historian's time dimension is indirectly significant, however. The milieu within which men behave economically has evolved within the womb of time and is, in effect, the residual deposit of past time, the influence of any particular segment of which probably varies inversely with some root of the time-span separating that segment from the present. Accordingly, if the economist would understand the restrictions imposed by this milieu in the past and in the present, and if he would know the conditions of reciprocal interdependence that have obtained in the past between this milieu and economic behavior, then he must ascertain how this milieu evolved. And he cannot know how this milieu evolved unless he is familiar with the history of that part of the milieu which affects or bears upon economic behavior.

The contributions of the historian to the economist's understanding of economic behavior are thus at least three in number. (a) He can supply particularized information respecting the past functioning and the natural and evolutionary history of man's culture and institutions from the point of view of their influence upon man's economic behavior. (b) He can alert the economist to the frequent importance of those very *particularities* which his methods of analysis often cause him to gloss over or to ignore. (c) Economists frequently have attempted to formulate laws of growth and change. They have pretended to discover invariant cultural lags, the allegedly overwhelming influence of technological change, interclass relations, etc. Marx and Veblen were but two among many. The historian is well-equipped to make the economist aware of the empirical limitations, or factual invalidity, of the propositions out of which such theories of economic change tend to be constructed.[27]

[26] See Parsons, *Structure of Social Action*, *op. cit.*, pp. 760 ff.

[27] Cp. A. P. Usher, "The Significance of Modern Empiricism for History and Economics," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 9, pp. 137–155 (1949).

VI. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS

The subject matter of economics is more akin to that of political science than to that of any other social science, certain basic features of the two sciences resembling each other closely. The forms of behavior of which each treats, while not identical, flow largely out of distinguishable but related kinds of scarcity. Both sciences, therefore, are much concerned with problems of allocation and collective choice.[28] This common concern, while occasionally recognized in the past, is rapidly being revealed in those parts of the world where allocation is accomplished by collective means instead of through dictatorship or convention. For in these parts the exercise of collective choice through the economic instrument of the market and the price system is being superseded in increasing measure by its exercise through the political method of voting; and economic selection is gradually being replaced by what many consider to be an inferior mode of selection, namely, the political.

Before turning to the broader connections obtaining between politics and economics, it should be noted that the import of political choosing for economic behavior has been growing. Formerly, major economic decisions usually were made by individuals. Today these same decisions are made in a more or less political manner by *collective* persons who purport to represent the views of many interests and individuals; that is, by corporate boards, by groups of trade-union representatives, and by organizational policy bodies, and so on. Two "political" questions, therefore, present themselves. How do the members of the higher- and top-level policy-making bodies ascertain and represent the desires of interested rank-and-file individuals and/or members? By what mechanisms in turn are these desires merged with the individual views of the policy-body members and converted into a single policy presumably representative of both? Upon such "political" choosings rest most of the important economic decisions taken in the American economy; and by them "welfare" is largely governed. Yet our knowledge of the actual effectuation of these choices remains too slim to permit much generalization. Political science may illuminate the making of these choices and of analogous choices at the legislative level.

Contrast of multi-seller and multi-party competition highlights the similarity of economic and political subject matter. When but two sellers are offering a differentiable but competing commodity, each makes his brand resemble closely that offered by his rival, hoping thereby to attract his rival's customers. When, however, the sellers exceed two in number, each progressively varies his product, hoping thereby to capture and retain a fraction of the customers. In like manner, when there are but two overwhelmingly dominant political parties, each tries to make its platform resemble that of its rival closely enough to attract voters from the latter. But when the *relatively* significant parties exceed two in number, each differentiates its platform from those

[28] On this and related matters see Arrow, *op. cit.*, and Duncan Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 56, pp. 23 ff. (1948), and "The Elasticity of Committee Decisions with an Altering Size of Majority," *Econometrica*, Vol. 16, pp. 262 ff. (1948).

of other parties, hoping thereby to attract a comparatively homogeneous and sequesterable body of voters. In general, in proportion as the number of differentiable parties (or sellers) exceeds two, their competitive search for adherents diversifies and disperses their appeals, bringing into being arrangements that run from one extreme to the other.[29] While the effect of the multiplication of sellers may be good or bad from the consumer point of view, depending upon circumstances, the effect of the increase of significant political parties beyond two is bound to be political instability, even as experience with proportional representation and multi-party systems has demonstrated.

Despite the similar properties of their respective subject matter, and despite the interconnectedness of political and economic behavior, political science presently affords economics much less assistance than it might. For this, fundamental scientific shortcomings of the study of government, as practiced, are responsible. Political science remains without an adequate frame of reference and a sufficiently systematic approach; it still lacks a set of consistent theorems suited to introduce order among its heterogeneous facets and findings. These shortcomings have their origin in the parentage of political science, it being the offspring (so it has been said) of a subterranean union between law and history, with philosophy serving as midwife.

Political science may be transformed into a full-bodied social science even as economics was. It is essential only that political science explicitly center itself about "power" and power-oriented behavior just as economics has centered itself about scarcity and scarcity-oriented behavior. For in actuality power—the capacity of any person or group to induce others to do its bidding—and its exercise are at the bottom of nearly all the specific subjects with which political scientists concern themselves, particularly those of especial interest to economics. The study of the formal and the empirical aspects of choosing at the political level is essentially a study of aspects of power. The analysis of political structure—the organizational apparatus established to enable the state to carry out for the community those functions for which the state and its agencies are held responsible—has much to do with aspects of power. Even consideration of questions of administration, which is here defined to embrace the processes employed by the state and its agencies to accomplish their allotted tasks, boils down largely to a consideration of yet other aspects of power. Presumably, therefore, a set of interdependent power elements somewhat similar to a typical system of interdependent economic quantities may be conceptualized and utilized to systematize and unify the approach of political science to the study of man's coercive behavior.

Effective organization of political science around the concept of power presupposes a careful definition of "power," a definition whose formulation requires time and experience. This definition must distinguish actions and problems which are political from those which are non-political; it must cover interpersonal relations involving coercion, order, etc., at all levels; it must lend itself

[29] See E. Chamberlin, *The Theory of Monopolistic Competition* (Cambridge, 1938), Appendix C. Chamberlin's thesis is an extension of H. Hotelling's.

to the formulation and resolution of meaningful questions; and so on. The failure of political science to orient itself about the concept of power, despite the frequent recognition of its basic importance, presumably is traceable in part to the failure of students of government to give shape and content to the concept of "power."[30]

When power is assumed to play in political science the role played in economics by scarcity, many parallels become prominent. The problem of social choice is formally the same in each field. The mechanisms of choice in each field are subject to institutionalization and can be biased in favor of some persons or groups and against others. While inter-group conflicts (e.g., between political groups, between "labor" and "management," etc.) have as their principal object changes in the rules and mechanisms of choice, they serve also to produce catharsis (in the Aristotelean sense) whenever they partially alleviate aggressive tendencies which, whatever their immediate causes, would otherwise give rise to more destructive forms of struggle. Political stability is favored by certain political circumstances much as economic stability is favored by certain economic circumstances. The permutation and combination of political elements is limited just as is the permutation and combination of economic elements. Power relations tend to become institutionalized just as do economic relations, but not permanently, since institutional edifices yield to internal and external social pressures. The structure-function approach is as suited to the analysis of political change as to that of economic change. The relations relevant to games and now being found illuminative of the behavior of economic coalitions is equally suited to the analysis of political coalitions at various levels.[31] And so on.

[30] While this is not the place to review the history of the political scientists' treatment of "power," it may be noted that twenty years ago H. Heller made "political power" the core concept of political science, yet declared it impossible for its practitioners to give it precise content ("Political Science," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12, pp. 207, 209). The role of power was variously treated in the course of a controversy that appeared in the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW several years ago; W. F. Whyte, "A Challenge to Political Scientists," Vol. 137, pp. 692–697 (1943), calling for the study and interpretation of political behavior in terms of social structure; a reply by J. H. Hallowell, "Politics and Ethics," Vol. 38, pp. 639–659 (1944), calling for a rejection of positivism and the making of ethical judgments; and evaluations of this view by G. A. Almond, L. A. Dexter, and W. F. Whyte, Vol. 40, pp. 283–312 (1946). Considerable recent literature relating to "power" is cited by these writers. Needless to say, the subject of "power" had received attention long before its reexamination was compelled by the appearance of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. The nature of "power" has commanded the interest of writers on politics from the day of Locke to that of Mosca and Pareto and their successors. Illustrative of the diverse approach made to the subject of power in recent years are the following works: Parsons, *Structure of Social Action*, *op. cit.*, Ch. 19; C. E. Merriam, *Political Power, Its Composition and Incidence* (New York, 1934) and *Systematic Politics* (Chicago, 1945); B. R. Russell, *Power, A New Social Analysis* (New York, 1938); and C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (New York, 1946). On the scope and method of political science, see *ibid.*, Ch. 25.

[31] See J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1st ed., Princeton, 1944). Cp. L. F. Richardson, "Generalized Foreign Politics," *British Journal of Psychology, Monograph Supplements*, Vol. 7, Suppl. 23, 1939.

Manifestations of coercion, like those of scarcity, vary quantitatively and qualitatively with time, the passage of which may be accompanied sometimes by an intensification and sometimes by a reversal of the manifestation under observation. This time dimension must be taken into account. Consider a reversal. Suppose totalitarian system T replaces a free-enterprise system E. Initially T takes over the physical equipment, knowledge, institutions, and customs of E. Conceivably, therefore, if T takes over only the better components of E (even as post-1850 Germany took over many of the better elements of the British industrial system) T may initially make a better showing in terms (say) of per capita output than did E. The short-time effect of the changeover, thus measured, would be favorable. Conceivably, however, in the longer run the knowledge, institutions, and customs taken over by T may improve less rapidly in the T-environment than in E-surroundings. In this event, the longer run effect of the change-over would be unfavorable. In other situations a manifestation may increase until it has attained a new and persisting maximum.

Values play the same role in political as in economic analyses, for political like economic action is predominantly instrumental in value, while the political scientist (like the economist) is a divided man, at once both a presumably detached analyst of behavior and a bearer of values whose diffusion he favors. It is incumbent upon the political scientist, accordingly, to prevent any of his personal values and biases from denying to him an internally and externally consistent apprehension of the functional relations obtaining in the relevant world of reality. It is equally incumbent upon him to be aware of the roles of values and valuation in political behavior (e.g.: the presence of arbitrary elements in valuation schemes; the interrelations among ends and between means and ends; the cohesion-supplying force of commonly held values; the limitations imposed upon the exercise of power by value systems; the interrelations between values, value systems, and political structures; the interdependence of values and political stability at various levels).[32] Needless to say, the success of a propagator of given values is conditioned, *ceteris paribus*, by his knowledge of determinants and effects of these values.

It is because political and economic behavior are so intertwined that a thorough understanding of political behavior is essential to effective economic analysis, and conversely. This interconnection was seldom adequately recognized by nineteenth-century economists who usually assigned a highly restricted peace-time economic role to the state, inadequately aware that the functioning of any economic system is conditioned by political and moral cir-

[32] On arbitrary elements, see Arrow, *op. cit.* That civilization presupposes a communal unity issuing out of emotionalized ideas, and that ethical ideals and aspirations constitute a primary source of social change, has been well stated by A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 21, 299. W. Fellner's analysis (*Competition Among the Few*, [New York, 1949] pp. 24 ff.) of the manner in which ethical beliefs restrict exploitative tendencies is easily extended to the field of political behavior. Some of the earlier literature is touched upon in my "Have Values a Place in Economics?" *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 44, pp. 313–331 (1934). See also the works cited in note 30 and Northrop, *op. cit.*, esp. Chs. 17, 21, 23.

cumstances and that the supply of many individual-transcending services is amenable only to public or to public-private enterprise. The formulation and enforcement of overriding rules for the governance of economic conduct, being largely legislative and executive functions, received too little attention. In consequence the theory and the practice of politics were not accommodated to advances in technology and associated changes in the scale of organization. Accordingly, the state, when called upon in the present century to assume a much larger economic role, proved unequal, and remains unequal, to the tasks imposed on it.[33]

Of fundamental importance from the economic point of view is the manner in which political power is actually distributed, for upon this distribution depend the volume and the continuity of economic activity and the disposition of its fruits. In the light both of our ultimate values and of our economic requirements the most desirable distribution of political power appears to be one involving wide dispersal, coupled with susceptibility of speedy assembly in times of emergency and crisis. In ordinary times, on this view, economic and political power should be widely dispersed, with concentrations of political power in governmental hands serving principally to counterbalance concentrations of economic power in private hands. In periods of war, a high concentration of both forms of power is indicated, and in periods of emergency only so much concentration as resolution of the emergency requires.

The prevailing distribution of political power appears to be deviating increasingly from that which has been described as the optimal distribution. Strategically situated organized minorities have amassed considerable political power and through its exercise have tilted the apparatus of the state in their favor. In consequence political instruments of choice have come to be substituted for economic instruments, with the result that "aggregate welfare," as usually defined, has been reduced. For voting mechanisms are technically inferior to market mechanisms as means for registering choice; and this inferiority is reenforced by the obscurity of the objects of suffrage and the ease and eagerness with which the statistical significance of voting returns is misrepresented, particularly when short-purses are being courted at the expense of long purses. This inferiority is augmented, furthermore, by the tendency of the individual (especially when he is part of a large and disciplined organization)[34] more easily to lose moral and political than economic autonomy, and by the sometime disposition of "politically-minded" representatives of the executive and judicial branches of governments to favor seemingly vote-rich minorities.

The political scientist may contribute to our knowledge of the relations that obtain between the disposition of political power and the capacity of an eco-

[33] In this country and elsewhere, for example, many actions of the state appear calculated to undermine the role and the power of the entrepreneur, the focus of dynamic economic force in western society. At the same time, the state refuses to take over the necessary role of the entrepreneur. It can only be inferred either (a) that the role of the entrepreneur is not understood, or (b) that practical theory regarding the economic role of the state excludes its performing the entrepreneurial function.

[34] See N. S. Timasheff, *An Introduction to the Sociology of Law* (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 184–187.

nomic system to serve specified ends. Under what circumstances can state-sanctioned rules (e.g., those suggested by M. Weber, Hayek, H. Simons, and Lerner) give appropriate form to economic conduct? Is there a continuum between the free-enterprise type of economic system and the wholly collectivized type? Or does the mixed type of economy tend to be transformed into a wholly collectivized type when the proportion of tasks entrusted to public instead of to private agencies passes a so-called peril-point?

Analysis of political structures at both the smaller-unit and the larger-unit level resembles that of the economic structure at comparable levels (e.g., plant, division of firm or plant, firm, industry, etc.). In general, that political structure is best which permits the accomplishment of its assigned functions at minimum net economic cost. The structure of a more-inclusive unit conditions the effectiveness and economy with which its components carry out assigned policies, be they good or bad.

Analysis of political administration resembles that of economic administration, nearly every public administrative process in western societies having its private counterpart. But there are differences. Consider, for example the selection, utilization, and promotion of personnel. These processes are governed, in the public as well as in the private domain, by both economic and political considerations, with the political dominant in the public realm and the economic ascendant in the private realm.

While the ascendance of political considerations in the public realm is attributable in part to its political character, it is traceable also to the fact that there is far less scope in the public than in the private realm for the application of accounting analyses and the use of appropriately defined tests of profitability. For this reason it is more difficult to appraise political than economic processes, and it is harder to determine the comparative efficiency of diverse political structures. For this reason, too, other forms of political choice and selectivity tend to be inferior to their economic counterparts. Conceivably, political science may develop tests similar to that of profitability. Yet, judging from the persisting uncongeniality of responsible political electees, appointees, and employees to improvements in political structure and administration, the development of any such test would not necessarily contribute greatly to their improvement.

CONCLUSION

This paper, written primarily from the vantage point of economics and secondarily from that of political science, has called attention to points of convergence between these sciences and sociology, anthropology, history, and psychology. It has disclosed vestiges of unity underlying broad areas of social science. It has demonstrated that, since the social sciences are interdependent, there is great need for collaboration by diverse social-science specialists. It suggests that such collaboration will produce fruits of which Karl Pearson's observation, made in another connection, is predictive: "Every great advance of science opens our eyes to facts which we had failed before to observe, and makes new demands on our powers of interpretation."[35]

[35] *The Grammar of Science* (Everyman ed.), p. 17.

DISCUSSION

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Professor Spengler's emphasis upon the need for "collaboration by diverse social science specialists" will be widely approved, and the "central thesis" stated in his second paragraph has this critic's complete concurrence. I do find a bothersome hiatus between his title and textual exposition. Some of the questions implied in the first but unanswered in the second seem to me important.

Are the "generalists . . . in social science" the philosophers who "recover the totality obscured by . . . selection" or a new group of specialists in social science generalization, perhaps still to be evoked or identified? Are they perchance (as has sometimes been assumed) the sociologists; or even the political scientists, pending their orientation about the concept of power? Generalization in social science has often been confused with fuzziness and political science seems in the author's mind to have displaced sociology as the social science most lacking in "an adequate frame of reference and a sufficiently systematic approach."

The generalist, I agree, should seek the improvement of interfield communication by "attempts to clarify expression and simplify and translate into a common language the dissimilar symbol-structures of the various specialties." Can this be done effectively by anyone but specialists turned generalists when the need or occasion arises? Can inter-specialty relationships be initiated or facilitated fruitfully by a separate group of generalists or "expediters" of collaboration?

In my opinion the functions of generalization cannot usefully be separated from the pursuit of one or another of the specialties that are brought together. The best generalists are the specialists themselves, whenever they have come to recognize their inter-dependence and have learned, possibly the hard way, how to collaborate. I see no evidence to indicate that Professor Spengler would differ with me about this, but others may. Some profess, as I cannot, to find "administrators" possessed of skills unrelated to knowledge of the functions administered; "educators" in possession of a profession apart from the subjects they teach; and "generalists" who do not require intimate familiarity with the specialties generalized upon.

The possibilities of collaboration among specialists in different fields are limited only by the potential combinations and permutations among their specialized interests. It is obvious that no generalist in social science can be sufficiently versatile to effectuate more than a few among these many possibilities. When particular "points of concurrence" between specialties are established the results may be incorporated in either or both of the parental sciences; alternatively, they may become the nucleus of a new specialty somewhere "along the boundaries" or "in the marshlands" between these sciences.

Modern research tends to focus upon fairly specific problems, and current developments in social science seem to me more closely related to this tendency

than to the schematized segments into which it is traditionally divided. I think this could be demonstrated by a further examination of the eight "specific problems" of the economist, requiring psychological assumptions, that are cited by the author. Every such problem presents a bewildering variety of facets. The number and complexity of its potential relationships with other problems are unlimited except by the fictional boundaries of a model or a universe of discourse. When someone breaks through the boundaries to establish a relationship with data outside the universe, the "analytical decomposition of man as a social totality" may have to be revised. It follows that the old established boundaries of the social sciences are tenuous and insecure, bringing nostalgic grief to some; but allowing adaptation to man's changing interests, knowledge and conceptions.

This may carry us even farther from home base than Professor Spengler implies. Consider the recent wartime birth of a science of *cybernetics* as the outgrowth of collaboration by specialists upon certain common problems of communication control in the machine and in living tissue.[1] Those initially involved were a mathematician, a physicist, and a physician; but the area of collaboration presently included biologists, physiologists, physical chemists, engineers, statisticians, psychologists, and social scientists of various kinds and varieties; even officials of American labor organizations were ultimately consulted.

Cybernetics is in much the same state as statistics still remains. An earnest fraction of those calling themselves "statisticians" contend that statistics is a unique scientific specialty. Others hold that there are only economists, sociologists (and astronomers, physicists) or others who know how to obtain, or use, or interpret statistics. I have not yet heard of a cyberneticist. When he appears, as he undoubtedly will, a central core of the new science (distinct from the results of collaboration among specialists) must have been developed. But whether his generic classification may then be viewed as mathematical, physical, biological or social science seems to me of small consequence provided the collaboration among the specialists concerned continues whenever it is useful. Continued collaboration will be more likely to result from the experience of past collaboration—self-breeding like atomic fission—than from any abstract belief in the need to generalize.

Some other excursions beyond the periphery of Professor Spengler's thesis may be suggested: Not only the specialist's understanding "of human behavior as a whole" but his understanding of other types of phenomena, his unconscious acceptance of the folkways of scientific inquiry, and everything connoted by the title of David Lindsay Watson's book *Scientists Are Human* will condition his understanding and his analysis of his chosen field.

So too will the data available for his use. The social scientist is particularly vulnerable to limitations of data. Those that he uses (for example, to stratify a sample) may be wholly objective and free of bias; yet they may have been collected for some other purpose. The choice of a subject about which data are

[1] Cf. Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics; or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine* (New York, 1948).

obtained and the particular facts collected regarding it are unavoidable sources of possible bias whenever the resulting information has to be *adapted* to some purpose not fully foreseen and allowed for when the inquiry was undertaken.

Decennial Censuses, for example, have usually been conducted scrupulously and with all possible care to obtain accuracy and avoid distortion. Yet the conceptions underlying them and the methods and procedures employed in them have constantly changed from decade to decade, affecting the comparability of seemingly identical tables. The questions asked and the definitions employed have been selected from thousands of candidates. Each time that a choice among alternatives is made, the results of innumerable future researches and analyses will imperceptibly and perhaps indeterminately be affected. The social scientist who is later on looking for data may be unaware of the choice that was made; or if aware of it he may wish devoutly from the standpoint of his own research purposes that some other decision had been made.[2]

These are a few of the considerations, in addition to those so excellently developed by Professor Spengler, which will lead cultural determinists to welcome and praise his article.

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Professor Spengler has written the language of "method" for those who are specialists. It is, let us say, the terminology of an élite in the social sciences. It is the manner of expression of those who have devoted themselves to this part of the subject-matter of the separate social sciences. But as a world of discourse between specialists, its language hardly ranks in precision and depth with the technical language of the law, of philosophy, of theology, or of mathematics. No doubt, when the language of the specialist is simplified at the hands of the journalist or the advertisement writer, the distinction between layman and expert ceases to be. But that distinction has been characteristic of our thought since the emergence of Western civilization.

It is proper that a language of method should exist. Its function is to communicate between methodologists with economy, precision, and terseness. The language of method in the natural sciences is a shorthand of intellectual understanding, and in the social sciences it should be the same. Perhaps some day it will be, but that language does not speak today to the social scientist in clarity and precision of the reality that he knows. This function of communication between specialists should apply to those who would simply and with intellectual curiosity understand the world of individual and group experience. It should extend to the social scientist who is in a position to make, or assist in making, political decisions, and it is this area with which Professor Spengler seems most concerned. Finally, it should be a means of communicating with the

[2] Excellent samples of changing census conceptions are contained in a recent monograph by Leon E. Truesdell, *The Development of the Urban-Rural Classification in the United States: 1874–1949*, Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 1.

political public, who in a democracy are called upon in some degree to give or withold support.

In the end, we all wish to be rational, even in our imagination, and in our intuition of esthetic reality. But what is being rational? Here is the profound issue that divides us into schools of philosophy and into divergent appreciations of group experience. The nature of rationality is at the heart of all the great controversies of Western intellectual history. In sum, what gives distinctness to an idea of social science method is, first, the kind of questions that one asks about the social world; and, second, the kind of evidence that is admitted as relevant in answering acceptable questions. The discussion of method should throw light on these two issues. A method, therefore, is a means of saying that some questions are rational, and that some evidence is proper. It is customary to say, in effect, that the rational and the scientific are the same, but this issue is in itself involved in the centuries-old controversy of the nature of rationality in various fields of study. In the problem at hand, the issue is, of course, what is rational study in the social sciences?

The artificial division of the social sciences, according to the traditional and budgetary behavior of university administrators, has obscured an important fact. That fact is that contemporary American social scientists share very largely in a common metaphysics, that is, a common theory of knowledge, and a common idea of the nature of social reality. Behind the often labored terminology of a social science, there is yet the common sharing of a mutual system of metaphysics. That philosophy is not often explored with frankness, and it lives in the shadows between the lines that Professor Spengler has written. It says that natural science method is our model, because such a method absorbs or contains the whole of social science rationality. A respectable social scientist is an empiricist; he is a pragmatist or an instrumentalist; he is a willing heir of the tradition of positivism; in morals he is a relativist; and his definition of value is operational. Outside of the values included and affirmed in the formal and majority philosophy in the social sciences, all other values are operational; they are facts of politics. But it is not legitimate to ask that reason in social science say whether they are true or false. The social scientist, as a pragmatist and betimes a decision-maker, must deal with the illusory values that most of mankind hold, but he cannot say there is any use of reason that is capable of affirming or denying them. Here, then, is the great common ground of the orthodox social scientists; here is the nature of rationality that Professor Spengler's article assumes but does not in reality discuss. Yet on any large canvas, or in any panorama, the ultimate philosophical issues must be seen, they must be known, and they cannot be hidden effectively by any language of method.

Of course, a political scientist must ask whether and how a policy can be put into effect. That question is the flesh on the bones of decision. The question must be asked within a legal, cultural or economic pattern, and here values can certainly be assumed as part of the data of politics. But can one ask which of any two historic patterns of value is preferable? Is it legitimate to ask whether a value is true? If we do this we are beyond a mere technical description of

choices. Good and evil, let us say, are beyond power. The Freudian may explore the motivation of his *bête noir*, but he must, logically, submit himself to the same method of evaluation. The vicious circle of judging values by some theory of motivation, for example Beard's economic interpretation of the Constitution, can be broken only by asking if a proposition is true or false, better or worse, good or evil, and why. If this is so, much of the meaning of the social sciences, as sciences, is to be found in their emergence from the notable philosophies of Western thought. And if a social scientist is philosophically inept and historically unimaginative, he can never get within the minds of those whose values or political judgments he may regard simply as operational data of political decision. And his method carries no conviction to those who may question his inarticulate philosophical premises.

In one sentence Professor Spengler suggests that the task of the social sciences is like that of philosophy, that is, the recovery of a social totality obscured by selection. But the far-reaching implications of this proposition seem themselves obscured. This discussion is devoted, in effect, to an examination of a few of these implications, and to the argument that had the author noted the fundamental conflicts in philosophy as to the nature of values, both his generalists and specialists would wear a different brand. But there are in fact many detailed issues that cannot be treated here. A political scientist could hardly accept the argument that power and scarcity are similar, either in nature or in social function. While there may be a limit or a scarcity in the effectiveness of coercion, that limit is not often reached in a democracy. And in result, the failure to examine values in philosophic terms signifies that political science must consist in a series of theorems about power.

No modern methodologist would suggest that we take David Hume's theorems about political science, which may be regarded as theorems about power, or the system of any other student of power, such as the Florentine Secretary. The new theorems of power will come in the future, when political study has become a science. Who can object to the study of power? Who can deny the hope that political science, for example, will be able to state one day the contours, the patterns, and even the laws of power? Let us hope that in time the student of politics can plot the course of power, extrapolate it with statistics, and analyze it with verbal prophecy. But that is not the issue at stake, for the issue is far more explosive and revolutionary in its meaning. The issue is: is this all? Can political science be anything more? Can it ask why it is better for A or for B to have power? This issue is what has divided us, and no terminology and no quantitative technique can remove the issue from philosophical or practical politics. For politics is finally the expression of a view of the world, and of a philosophy of being, which is to say, that in the end the issue of a science of politics is ontological. In another sense, if we follow this thread of implication, the science of politics must include, not merely an instrumental, an empirical, or an operational treatment of values, but also a logical, analytical, and philosophical test of values. In implication, the result is that we can discover valid ethical knowledge by other than merely operational means.

Political science is broader than a set of theorems about power, for it includes, it must include, judgments as to the ends or purposes that power may serve. The political scientist must ask why it is better that A and not B should have the power that practically and operationally is present in the modern state.

In these terms, political science is the proper social science for the integration of knowledge. It can use the knowledge and the terminology of other social sciences, and it includes in its scope the divergent philosophies of ethical truth. It can use the empirical data, the observational methods, and the analytical techniques that are available to any student of society. But it cannot be focused simply on power, it cannot simply be empirical, and it cannot be committed as an orthodoxy to any given set of theorems about the pattern of power. The issue at this point is one of great subtlety and complexity; it is virtually intangible, and it is nearly all mere implication. Can we say the issue is the limit of empirical or instrumental methods? The methodologist does not say formally that "science" includes all that is rational, but he apparently means it; he does not say that reason may not function other than in experimental or operational terms, but apparently he means it. He does not often say that all ethical knowledge is relative and hypothetical, but he seems to mean it. If the methodologist will state either the limits of social science, or, alternatively, define his science so that there is no validity in speculative, logical, or analytical thought, at least the issue is clear. In the first case, that of limitation, he can say simply that science as such cannot say that, for example, a principle of social justice is either valid or invalid in the framework of science; but he does not deny the vast importance of trying rationally, and in terms of ontology, to define justice. He must admit that perhaps a given definition of justice is valid, and a true criterion for the use of power. In the second case, that of the imperialism of empiricism or experiment, in which speculative knowledge derived by reason can be of no validity, the lines of battle are drawn to the ultimate issue.

The reality of the issue about the nature of political science is clear when we consider the issues that actually are debated and decided in politics. One reads frequently that we must use the knowledge gained by the various social sciences in the statements of public policy and in making decisions. It is said, too, that the social sciences now have enough knowledge to enable us to plan politically a happy and frustrationless society. But just what that knowledge may be is seldom, if ever, stated. Such a claim for the social sciences without any details is fatuous, to say the least, but in practice it would mean simply the espousal of one of the interpretative systems present in any one of the social sciences. What method must seek, finally, is answers to the questions that actually are raised in the competition for power. For even the political philosopher must do his thinking and his analysis in the market place and in the forum. Here the search for information is real, but just as real is the search for criteria, for moral principles, and for a practical justice that reason can defend. Consider some of the questions. How can we defend our democracy against the Soviet application of dialetical materialism? What shall we do about Germany? What economic aid from the United States can be best defended and is most

practical? What is the relation of tax and fiscal policy to the accumulation of capital? Should we adopt socialized medicine? And there are a thousand others, but they must be answered in terms of ethical principles, historical appreciation, and the uncertain predictability of human behavior, or, indeed, in terms of what we may know about the complexities of power. Much of the prudence of politics is taking philosophical and historical conflicts into account, in attempting a working reconciliation between ethical, theological, and philosophical differences that extend back to the emergence of Western society.

The science of politics, as the integrative science, is more than a formal terminology, a descriptive analysis, or a set of theorems about power. It is, as an integrative and broad study of the state, grounded in a recognition of the importance of ends and purposes in policy. It has matured in a knowledge of profound philosophical differences in intellectual history, and in the appreciation that such differences are vitally concerned in the fragmentary issues of day-to-day politics. While much social science is remote from political or economic reality because of its implicit or explicit philosophical orthodoxy, such is not the case with political science. For the study of politics does not and cannot assume that a great and historically grounded difference in social ethics is merely a cultural pattern, and not an enduring spring of social existence itself.

In some respects, the discussion of method has reached a crisis. It is remote from the citizen and the expression of what is most profound and meaningful to him through group behavior. Method is often such an intense verbal specialization that only those who know the language can speak to each other about it. At best, method is often an aspiration toward a Newtonian formula, combined with a twentieth-century version of the eighteenth-century belief in the benevolence of science and the inevitability of moral progress. At worst, it is a closed circle of discussion, in which energy is exhausted in the simple attempt to communicate between its votaries. It might be better if political science should drop the word "science" out of its name, since it carries with it the weakness of argument by analogy that social science is a science like the natural sciences. It might be better if, as at one distinguished university, we should organize our discipline into departments of politics. We would be no less scientists than we are, and the inevitable humanistic and philosophical parts of our study would be faithfully recognized, as well as the appreciations of politics that are found in literary and artistic expression.

The discussion of method is never unimportant, and the argument of an economist should be welcome to political scientists. This discussion has, perhaps, been too insistent on the philosophical and historical emergence of knowledge, and the attainment of knowledge by other means than those analogous to the laboratory or the techniques of the mathematician. It has been concerned with denying such implication as there may be in Professor Spengler's paper that for the social sciences, and in particular for the study of politics, it must be assumed ethical knowledge is impossible or irrelevant in a rational social order.

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I

I find myself in complete agreement with Professor Spengler that any man, however disharmonious, is a single whole; that abstraction of his various motivations or interests, however useful, and even necessary, for study, does violence to that whole. I agree further that specialized social sciences devoted to the study of particular aspects of mankind are in danger of producing misleading generalizations when those studies are cultivated autonomously. I agree, too, that the development in particular social sciences of specialized vocabularies may lead to illusions of insight among the practitioners and to lack of communication between social scientists. Indeed, it is my conviction that specialized terminology should be developed only where, by reason of the inadequacies or ambiguities of existing language, it is necessary to analysis and exposition. I should add that, where the ambiguity or multiple meanings of common words are great, every effort should be made to achieve clarification by definition and context rather than to invent new and generally awkward terms.

My disagreement with Professor Spengler[1] arises fundamentally from my conviction that a unified social science such as was dreamed of by Comte, though probably not one constructed along his specific lines, and certainly not one ending in his social organization, is necessary and possible, however difficult; only by the creation of such a science may we hope to overcome the dangers of specialization and the limitations of the technical specialist. Not only is the individual a unity: humanity is one, and knowledge is one. It is impossible to achieve science by the addition of specialized sciences, or of the partial knowledge gained from them. It is impossible to arrive at a more adequate science of society by the pooled contributions of specialists, in the absence of an architectonic social science in which the normative and descriptive are properly related and unified on a philosophical basis. There are indeed lacunae at the borders of the present social sciences, and the gaps may be filled by concentration at those points of diverse specialists. While such a technique will probably add, through the establishment of new subjects and professions, to the number of social sciences, it will not solve the problem of achieving an adequate system of knowledge of such a kind that no area will be border and no other area central, and within which different problems and different insights will have positions of greater or less centrality as parts of a total unified pattern.

[1] A moderate sized article, compressing much learning and reflection, lends itself readily to misinterpretation, as it is almost certain to contain ambiguities and seeming contradictions. A yet briefer comment readily exaggerates differences. I have stated my agreements and disagreements with Professor Spengler, however, without qualification, for the sake of forcefulness. For the sake of fairness, and as a caveat to the reader, I feel it important to note my own conviction that dissents and disagreements would probably be diminished, and in some cases dissipated, by extended debate.

Essentially, my argument is that science, whether natural or social, attains maturity and develops effectively only when general and unified. Its essence does not consist in techniques, in experimental or statistical methods alone. Nor do particular analytical and deductive theories for particular realms collectively constitute a full and sufficient scientific system. Science, when fully achieved, is generalized interpretation. It rests on postulates, yet explains facts of observation, themselves given meaning and locus within its scheme. General theory directs, encourages, selects the work of further exploration, the collection of further fact. Resultant discoveries modify or offset existing theory, lead to reformulation or to radically wider general explanation.

In the realm devoted to investigation and explanation of man, at once person and social animal, such an approach is now necessary and possible. Historically, early social philosophy was marked by a universalism of concept without a concomitant universalism of scale. When the latter was first achieved in the middle ages, interest was centered on ethical ends rather than on experiment and control of environment through development of empirical understanding. A later cosmopolitanism failed similarly, and even more profoundly, while the emergence of modern nationalism led to the perversion of generalized theory and its service in the promotion of particular interests. Thereafter positivism and a false concept of the meaning and method of science jointly produced specialized and increasingly isolationist social sciences, a development which clearly and curiously paralleled the development of integral nationalism itself. Yet modern technology and resultant shared problems make necessary, as well as possible, a genuinely generalized social science. Moreover, the mass of material collected by specialized social scientists makes abundantly clear the urgent need for general social theories, analogous to that partially developed in natural science before, and first completed by, Newton. Nor are the manifest limitations of particular social sciences to be corrected by any additive or complementive process.

The preceding judgments have certain implications for teaching, as well as for research. I am not advocating, but opposing, merely synthetic generalized social science courses, as I am opposing the view that the pooling of specialized information and skills will in itself overcome, rather than merely complicate, the inadequacies of specialization. I am urging that the social scientist today must be a philosopher, and must refuse to contemplate his field as a series of compartments. I am urging that, while the great generalizing genius cannot be deliberately produced, the chances of his emergence, and of recognition of him should he emerge, are enormously decreased when specialized technical competences are regarded as the main highway to understanding. I urge further that no doctrine which, on the premise that a specialist's skill is not conditioned by knowledge of other social sciences, tries to overcome the difficulties either of isolationism or of imperialism by formal cooperation between such specialists, has any value. It is, rather, a hindrance. The creative specialist himself is one who works on particular questions with an awareness of the relatedness of his efforts to the formulation, the testing, or the modification,

of a generalized science of society. Hence he views his research problem as it fits into a total pattern of systematic knowledge; not into the partial, and necessarily erroneous, pattern of any individual social science as at present organized. The specialist in this sense must be rigorously separated from the technician, the user of tools of inquiry and the collector of information under orders. Quite clearly, I note in passing, we need far more statistical and similar collections of evidence than we at present possess. But we also need meaningful ones: experiment and collection must alike be directed by an existing structure of philosophy of social science. That framework we must forthwith create; and any attempt to provide a substitute, however praiseworthy its intent, must be condemned.

II

Whether, once such a unified social science is established, the appropriate subdivisions for more specialized inquiry will remain in name and substance even roughly coterminous with the existing social sciences is at present unpredictable, though it is clear that their problems and their assumptions will be somewhat radically changed. In my own view, such sciences will be organized either around major motivations or around the fundamental institutions within whose ambit men live. In either event, I should argue that they will include questions of norms, and not simply of value facts; and that they will therefore not be unphilosophical or purely descriptive. Not improbably, indeed, their basic ethical concepts will be deductions and applications of that more fundamental social ethics which constitutes part of the over-all social theory here envisioned.

A somewhat analogous situation will prevail in their relation to history. Mr. Spengler correctly insists that history is devoted to the particular happenings of times past. I wish, however, here to argue that it is not therefore something extraneous to analysis in the social sciences, but an integral part of all of them. While historians are no doubt in duty bound to record, to discover, and to interpret the past, and though they cannot, by the very nature and conditions of their art, practice the historian's craft on events which have not hitherto occurred, I should judge that they have a major concern alike with change and with the future, and that, where they can use statistical techniques appropriately, they should do so.

I add, further, that the historian is properly concerned with causation; and, like any other student of society, with what might have happened, and did not, as a means to make intelligible what did. In my own view not the least defect of so-called analytical social sciences has been that they have either disregarded history; or have, like some modern sociologists, endeavored to fit it to a pattern of generalization, which, under profession of general interpretation of social change, has often done violence to, or led to neglect of, the very evidences which might help in the formulation of more intelligible and general rules. The empirical particularity of history is not the enemy, but the friend, and indeed the foundation, of adequate social dynamics.

A unified social science, and all its branches, will have to depend on history, no less than on philosophy, itself not to be separated from history as human experience; and will have to embrace not only the history of the present formal fields of social science, but the whole of history, precisely because that whole is the record of man's adventures as a social being even when its concern is not social causes or consequences. I am not here urging that the social sciences may monopolize history. Furthermore I am not arguing for a mere cult of the past to the neglect of the task of social theory; quite to the contrary, I believe this task is to be accomplished only by recognition that the history of man is the raw material and the testing ground of its interpretations.

III

My greater concern is, however, with the sciences on which Mr. Spengler comments more fully. Here I can only note that economics, whatever its triumphs, over what is now a considerable historical span, through logic working on neatly postulated assumptions concerning man and the specific field of his activities with which it deals, has continued to be, even with the revivification derived from Keynes, somewhat less than adequately broad in its treatment of the material basis of the good life, and has not avoided dubious ethical judgments under the guise of objective dictates.

In his discussion of psychology, indeed, Mr. Spengler somewhat backhandedly admits some of these limitations. Yet I think his comments on wage structures, on means to welfare, on the relation of consumption to taste, on income equality and satisfaction, and on work and retirement, are all indicative of the dangers of a postulational science of economics which is not deliberately a part of a total social philosophy or science.

I would, indeed, go further. I would grant that economics, which has been mainly concerned with the best allocation, from the point of view of efficiency, of scarce means, has developed through marginal analysis some neat general rules covering this subject. Yet, while I accept the economist's general disgust with facile talk of an age of plenty, I suggest that his proper study concerns the optimum utilization of available knowledge in relation to resources, in order to bring about maximum total satisfaction, optimumly distributed, as a combination of supply of material means to free personal activity and of effective leisure for its enjoyment. Ultimately I do not think the economist can avoid the ethical issue, the nature of the good life, and the making of the pursuit thereof available to all: I argue the essential impossibility of separating ethical judgment and technical analysis. In so far as the economist insists that his field is the second only, he becomes, I think, a technician, not a creative scientist.

I myself would further argue that too often the economist reads back certain limits arising from technical necessities of the moment, which are properly to be used as criticisms of bad ethics, or bad applications of moral principle, and makes of those limitations general criteria, not simply of immediate alternatives of policy, but of social dynamics, of goods to be pursued through time. At root,

though the concept of scarcity, as a statement that not all human material wants can at present, or in any predictable future, be satisfied completely (if indeed they ever can) is correct, scarcity thinking has precisely led to an avoidance of the proper task of a sane and serviceable economics, which is to discover answers to questions of how to satisfy wants to the maximum and to minimize scarcity. That false emphasis itself flows from specific concepts, not radically examined, of property and of motivations supposedly fundamental and without effective substitutes. It is not unrelated to the predisposition, partly religious in origin, to regard the curse of Adam as the blessing of man. Not the least of the limitations of such contemporary economic science is that a theory of full employment is regarded as a triumphant solution, or at least a road to such a solution, of man's demand for security; whereas the root problem at least of industrial society is how to accomplish maximum production with minimum labor, maximum income with maximum leisure. The proper issue of economics is to find ways by which men may use their knowledge and control of their environment so as to have the widest variety and amplitude of material means to diverse satisfaction with the least possible labor. Our alternatives not improbably are maximum absence of all save a minimum of compulsory work in a free society or maximum employment in an unfree society where security means servitude. The object of technological development is surely to have as few people work for merely instrumental reasons as little time as possible, consonantly with a sufficiently high and widespread standard of living to allow all men means to cultivate their tastes, to develop their personalities, to perform from interest functions which usually profit society indirectly, and often directly.

IV

I add that political scientists have been guilty of equally technical and specialized analysis without reference to overall aims; and they have been so particularly in the so-called science of public administration. If they have failed to achieve quite the degree of misguidedness of the economists, it has been largely because they have not achieved an equally clear set of postulates, and certainly have not worked with them for so long. In my own judgment, again, they are in danger of following the same road of false and abstracted precision, which has marred economic analysis, precisely by reason of their development of, and attachment to, the concept of politics as power, and their treatment of it as a scarce commodity. I do not question the value of analyzing the ways in which men get, exercise, and maintain power; and the ways in which they are subject to it. I do very much question whether the elimination of ethical value judgments in political thinking would be desirable, even were it possible. Nor do I think power analysis can be rendered adequate simply by inclusion of value-facts as factors in the creation and use of power.

In this context I question especially some of the generalizations Mr. Spengler himself makes, as that the presence of more than two political parties necessarily leads to instability. I question again his judgments as to the reduction of

welfare by the substitution of political for economic choice, and that the political structure is best which accomplishes its *assigned* (my italics) functions at minimum net economic costs. For the problems of politics would seem to me to involve again, in so far as power is at all its proper province, questions of how to maximize the amount of power available, to maximize its spread, to maximize its use as a means to promote the sorts of ends already indicated in discussing the economic problem, and to minimize its application in such ways as to frustrate the fulfillment of the diverse personalities of men harmoniously. I should deny that market and government are opposed, though they may be often alternative, institutional techniques. I should insist that delimited postulational sciences about these institutions are inadequate, lead to false antitheses and erroneous moral judgments. I should argue that these institutions are properly instrumentalities to a larger purpose, transcending both; and that no scientific study of either is capable of achieving effective results save when conceived and developed in that wider context.

V

Space does not permit me to discuss psychology and sociology at all, though I would remark that Mr. Spengler's statement that psychology is concerned with the individual, with *intra-* and not *inter*-personal issues, is ambiguous and misleading. I question, further, many of his judgments on institutionalization and conditioning, as well as his statement on the nature of hierarchy and the impossibility of income equalization. I question even more his concepts of choice; of the formal as against the real; of means-ends as against final goods; and of the adjustive and the autonomous, and their relationship. Intending no discourtesy, in short, I find myself driven to a judgment that the dichotomy and divisions of his whole analysis, and the concepts on which it rests, are artificial. They precisely illustrate the evils of separatism followed by artificial joining in the development, first of individual social sciences, and then of an overall social theory.

I insist that the consequence of this whole approach is in each and every field to regard the task of its so-called science too narrowly, and so never to reach the goal of a science of society, by reason, not of the impossibilities of the task, but of the unsuitability and even irrelevance of attitude and approach. I think at bottom the failure is not one either of conscious sympathy or of logic. It arises from the unexamined, and, as I believe, erroneous assumption that that which avowedly serves the moral ends of man and is inspired by moral purpose is not scientific. Quite manifestly, to let wishes enter into observations is unscientific. But the only reason for eliminating them is to serve human purposes more effectively. I am not here supporting the short-sighted cult of practicality, which I deplore. I am arguing that recently the influence, and the misunderstanding, of the natural sciences has produced in the social sciences quite erroneous concepts of objectivity, and a quite false identification of scientific method with certain, useful, instrumental, subordinate techniques. Devotion to these in turn, though it has led to humility and awareness of difficulty

in our fields as compared with, say, physics or chemistry, has also led to a misguided fear, of which the consequence has been avoidance of bold proclamation of the special nature of our subject matter. That material not only includes value facts: it must include a science of values. Our self-imposed exclusions have in turn made it impossible to conceive and bring to birth a true social science. They have led us precisely to the cultivation of ill-begotten substitutes, which have grown and have achieved vested interests, and so have become themselves barriers to a radically new, and urgently necessary, concept.

Essentially, pure science is a system, imaginative, theoretical, measured by adequacy in unified explanation of phenomena. So, too, must be a sufficient social science; and to be so it must include, and rest on, the peculiarity of man, his purposiveness, on the logical and empirical necessity of his nature, and on ethical principle as condition of effective formulation and pursuit of purpose.

THE SEMANTICS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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That an animal, presumably a cousin of the simians and certainly very similar to them, has developed societies in which millions and even hundreds of millions of individuals live and act together in orderly relation to each other is one of the astounding facts of history; and an impartial observer would hardly be surprised if the incredibly intricate network of cooperation, overstrained, should suddenly tear apart.

The aggregation of men into huge organized groups is, of course, relatively recent. For a million years or longer men or near-men lived an animal-like existence, scattered in small groups. It was not until fifteen or twenty thousand years ago that men, perhaps as a consequence of unprecedented pressure from the environment,[1] organized groups of any considerable size; it is only within the last three or four thousand years that large-scale societies have existed; and it is only in the last three or four hundred years that complex orderly interplay and interaction among individuals and subgroups in societies have been developed.

It is clear that modern mass society, with its complex and delicate organization, was not consciously contrived by man, was not planned, blueprinted, and then constructed according to specifications. Many of its features are the unintended consequences of the actions of men who neither foresaw nor desired the consequences. There was trial and error; and one thing led to another, frequently in very surprising fashion. Sometimes men learned a little from their mistakes and sometimes they saw a few steps ahead. At any rate, we now find ourselves in the middle of, and dependent on, vast, intertwined mechanisms of whose principles and internal structure we know very little. It is the case that "History reveals no society which has gained a consciousness of the mechanics and dynamics of its institutions sufficient to prevent their operation to ends quite different from those for which they were devised and quite alien to any comprehensible purpose."[2]

It is equally clear that the construction of advanced societies has involved considerable foresight, inventiveness, and understanding, and that in the later stages of social development more and more understanding of the functioning of institutions is needed. As individuals, groups, and the factors of existence become more and more interdependent and delicately organized, there is increasing danger that the malfunctioning of some part, or the operation of some factor not considered, or a lack of proper adjustment among institutions will produce a serious or even disastrous breakdown.

Whether or not systematic knowledge of the workings of social institutions does or will match the need for such knowledge (it may be that the owls of

[1] Cf. Rushton Coulborn, "Survival of the Fittest in the Atomic Age," *Ethics*, Vol. 57, pp. 235–258 (July, 1947).

[2] Frank D. Graham, *Social Goals and Economic Institutions* (Princeton, 1942), p. 5.

Minerva take wing only when the shades of night are falling), the development of complex societies has involved a concomitant development in man of a considerable body of social lore, compounded of techniques, skills, myths, attitudes, habits of mind, and some foresight and understanding. Institutions, despite figures of speech, are not mechanisms; they are resultants of human behavior; and the existence and operation of institutions are dependent on something which individuals have learned or acquired. Corresponding, then, to the large and complex societies which man has developed there is a body of social lore, perhaps equally complex.

What needs emphasis is the newness and the highly artificial character of this social equipment. Though some of it doubtless has very ancient roots, most of it must have been invented or created just when it was first used, developed in action to meet problems that arose. It is highly artificial, not merely because it is made up of artifacts but also because in the cumulative process of invention and creation later inventions were so based on earlier ones that the relation of the result to nature or to human nature became extremely tenuous. Double entry bookkeeping, for instance, is the result of artifice piled upon artifice.

The relation between human behavior and the social lore by which it is guided is, of course, not an external one. Social techniques are not tools which one picks up and lays down as one might a hammer. They are integral with the behavior in which they function. It is true that civilized man, like his savage ancestors, is born, eats, sleeps, has children, and dies; but the social roles and the behavior that correspond to social institutions and organizations are invented along with the institutions.

If society is a recent and relatively sudden creation, then it would seem that a question fundamental to any social science would be whether there is any invention or creation or group of them which is central to the development of complex societies and upon which other social inventions directly or indirectly depend. There would, I think, be little doubt nowadays as to the answer. Language, and various systems of symbols more or less directly dependent on language, are not merely the basic technique but even today the framework upon which the superstructure of society is supported.

Politics is obviously mostly a matter of talk, and so is the law, whether considered in terms of the compelling utterances of judges or the binding words inscribed in the books. Accounting, money (which is a system of symbols), contracts (oral or written), and other linguistic phenomena are the essence of business and the market. Production and engineering are dependent on calendars, maps, timetables, blue prints, computations, and specifications. In these forms of social behavior, and in others, language is not merely a tool or instrument, external to the behavior, but is rather the essential stuff or structure of the behavior.

Language, of course, is not merely chatter. Monkeys chatter a great deal; but their chatter is functional only in a simple and immediate way. The distinctive fact about language is that man has made chatter functional in a far-reaching and complex fashion so that all of his behavior is guided by and built

upon systems of language and symbols. Language is, one might say, what language does, the functions it performs or supports. The functional existence of language is found in the inventions or constructs the development of which constitutes the development of language. These, in conventional terms, are social institutions, art, technology, and science, or, collectively, civilization. Civilization is the functioning of language; and, of course, it is the functioning of language which is interesting and important—considered merely as chatter, language is unimportant and interesting only to specialists in phonetics.

We have arrived now at a double fact which has baffled many social scientists and semanticists. If one sets out to study civilization, or any part of it, such as science or social institutions, one is confronted with the fact that the objects to be studied are artificial and that their existence and modes of operation are radically conditioned by systems of language and symbols. If, on the other hand, one turns attention to language, as many people have done from the time of the Greeks, one finds that language is not a self-contained or independent system of natural entities but rather a system of functions coincident with the operation of the various parts of civilization. The frustrated semanticists who hope to discover an isolable system of denotable objects exhaust themselves in constructing a barbarous terminology for talking about some of the accidental and superficial aspects of language.

It is certainly the case, as previously suggested, that the development of civilization has involved the creation and conservation of a considerable body of lore. This body of lore, compounded of techniques, habits of mind, attitudes, sets of distinctions, and, if one may use the term, knowledge, may aptly be called "commonsense," not that it is common in the sense of being a native endowment of man or in the sense of being evenly distributed among men, but because it is the common stock of artifices which men in varying degrees assimilate by learning language and by learning to participate in the institutions which make up civilization.

Two important facts about commonsense are here relevant. The first is that commonsense contains a great deal of what, for want of a better word, may be called "knowledge." Despite the difficulties of semanticists, ordinary men know language in that they can use it; and the use of language (meaning, of course, not merely gossip or polite conversation but also arithmetic, accounting, political discussion, and the talk of the courts, the market, the factory, and the pulpit) involves a large mass of distinctions, information, and other material which may be transmitted by education, which may be exhibited or described in meaningful sentences, and which may be critically judged in various ways as being more or less reasonable, adequate, clear, or correct. Similarly, ordinary men know a good bit about social institutions in that they act in such institutions; and, at least in advanced societies, social action requires, especially on the part of the more prominent members of society, a great deal of knowledge, much of which is explicitly formulated and transmitted by formal or informal education, of the structure of society and an immense amount of information

about the specific facts relating to a society's actual composition and day-to-day operations.

Thus, it is clear that the amount of social knowledge contained in commonsense is not negligible in quantity. Until very recent times such commonsense knowledge of human behavior and the working of social institutions made up the major part of human knowledge. As to its quality there is at least the pragmatic test that it sufficed to mediate the transition in a relatively short time from simple simian life to the complex civilization of modern mass societies.

The second relevant fact about commonsense is that commonsense was formed in relation to and for the guidance of practice. Its distinctions and terms reflect the purposes, needs and exigencies of action—not crude physical action, to be sure, but the subtle actions and complex kinds of behavior that were created by language and which proliferated in the social exploitation of language. Commonsense is anthropocentric and anthropomorphic. It apprehends and portrays the environment as opportunities and obstacles to human action, as relevant to and providing material for various activities of man. Accounting, for instance, that elegant discipline which is rapidly becoming a basic part of commonsense, is so correlated with highly artificial kinds of activity and complex institutions that any attempt to translate it into a non-teleological, value-free, naturalistic or scientific version would be fantastic.

The teleological, anthropomorphic character of commonsense, though long ago noticed, has been obscured by lack of an effective contrast. In recent years, however, the natural sciences have succeeded to an amazing degree in freeing themselves from teleology and in avoiding the projection into the description of the nature of the peculiarities of the human point of view. Science as a social institution and as practice is, to be sure, rooted in commonsense; but in its explicit theory it uses terms and distinctions which are detached from reference to human desires, needs, or activities. Science uses language, and its use thereof is subject to the criteria of language and to the norms of the artificial behavior of which scientific language is a correlate; but the subjectmatter of the natural sciences does not include language or behavior built on language. Simian chatter does seem to have been transformed into an impersonal, objective description of nature.

Suggestions may indeed be found, in the pragmatists, operationalists, Marxians, and sociologists of knowledge that the popular account of natural science is incorrect or at least in need of some qualification or interpretation. However that may be, the success of natural science, whether real or apparent, furnishes a contrast by which the anthropomorphic and teleological character of commonsense is emphasized. This contrast between science and commonsense, though not the source of the central problems in social science, has certainly influenced the shape such problems have taken in recent years. Social science has its foundations and most of its substance in commonsense; but commonsense, though it has been useful, is not regarded as science.

The impressive accomplishments of the physical sciences suggested to many

brilliant minds that a like application of scientific method to the study of man would furnish a new and solid basis for the construction of a rational society and rational institutions, including political institutions. Such an attempt has been under way for two hundred years or more. The subtitle of Hume's *Treatise*, in 1739, proclaimed that work to be "an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." It is more than a hundred years since Comte asserted that the customary bases of Euopean civilization were fast crumbling and that civilization would soon fall unless new and firm foundations were provided by a science of society.

Social knowledge has indeed been greatly extended and improved in the last two hundred years; but so far as I know there have been no important contributions in the field resulting from the application of scientific method. The zeal for science has probably been quite important as a motivating force but as a guide to investigation it has been almost, if not completely, sterile.

Economics, which has had the most impressive development of any of the social sciences and has come nearest to the construction of a substantial structure of theory, has certainly developed along lines quite different from those projected by the proponents of scientific method. Such, of course, is the ground of the criticism directed at classical economic theory by Veblen and other Institutionalists. "It may be taken as the consensus of those men who are doing the serious work of modern anthropology, ethnology, and psychology, as well as of those in the biological sciences proper, that economics is helplessly behind the times, and unable to handle its subject-matter in a way to entitle it to standing as a modern science. . . . In the general body of knowledge in modern times the facts are apprehended in terms of causal sequence. This is especially true of that knowledge of brute facts which is shaped by the exigencies of the modern mechanical industry. To men thoroughly imbued with this matter-of-fact habit of mind the laws and theorems of economics, and of the other sciences that treat of the normal course of things, have a character of 'unreality' and futility that bars out any serious interest in their discussion. The laws and theorems are 'unreal' to them because they are not to be apprehended in the terms which these men make use of in handling the facts with which they are perforce habitually occupied."[3]

As Veblen's remarks suggest, the desired transformation of the study of man into a science involves much more than the superficial application of scientific method to a given subjectmatter. It involves a transformation of the subjectmatter, a substitution of one point of view and set of terms for another. To put the matter briefly, for the commonsense universe of discourse (what Veblen calls the archaic, teleological point of view), there must be substituted a system of terms, concepts or categories which abstract from human purposes, needs, and ideals, in Veblen's terms, concepts which disclose a "colorless impersonal sequence of cause and effect."

Veblen is perhaps no longer regarded as a great man; but he was a perceptive

[3] T. Veblen, "Why Is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 12, pp. 373, 396 (July, 1898).

mind and sensitive to the currents of thought of his day. His criticisms of economic theory would apply with equal or greater force to political science. His dissatisfaction with economics and his fumbling attempts to delineate an "evolutionary science" reflect a problem which has disturbed the social sciences for generations and is still unresolved. As he says, "The intellectual attitude and the method of correlation enforced upon us in the apprehension and assimilation of facts in the more elementary ranges of knowledge that have to do with brute facts assert themselves also when the attention is directed to those phenomena of the life process with which economics has to do; and the range of facts which are habitually handled by other methods than that in traditional vogue in economics has now become so large and so insistently present at every turn that we are left restless, if the new body of facts cannot be handled according to the method of mental procedure which is in this way becoming habitual."

That Veblen was correct in his insight that there is a radical discrepancy between the terms and distinctions functioning in natural science and those functioning in economics (and, we may add, in the other social sciences) can hardly be doubted. There is little reason for doubting, either, that existing social lore is something less than adequate for dealing with present problems and that improvement is badly needed. Veblen, nevertheless, was quite unable to construct a substitute for economic theory. The classical theory, despite its limitations, is useful and in some sense true.

The teleological, normative, or even moralistic terms in which economics and political theory are stated seem, however, to the modern mind to belong to a subjective or fictitious universe of discourse quite inappropriate to a genuine science of society. There is wide acceptance of Veblen's ideal of apprehending human behavior in non-teleological terms, in terms of "colorless impersonal sequence of cause and effect." We do not, however, as a matter of fact have any such apprehension. We know the terms used in physics and chemistry as applied to natural phenomena but when applied to social phenomena such terms furnish only feeble and opaque analogies. There have been many attempts, notable among them in recent years the efforts of the behaviorists, to describe behavior in terms appropriate to natural science; but such attempts have been abortive because the distinctions and preconceptions of commonsense have quickly reimposed themselves even when mutilated by a strained terminology. There is a deep gulf between the actual social sciences and the ideals or canons through which a real social science is prescribed.

The outstanding fact, then, in the present situation is that political science, along with the other social sciences, is suffering from a bad case of schizophrenia. As a body of theory and facts political science is developed and stated in commonsense terms, in the "archaic" system of teleological concepts. Aristotle, if brought back to earth and given a good corps of research assistants, could begin immediately grinding out research monographs, treatises and textbooks. On the other hand, to many people who have become habituated to science, the propositions of political theory "have a character of 'unreality' and futility that bars out any serious interest in their discussion."

This dilemma or neurosis has an influence that spreads far beyond the people who explicitly discuss method. It inhibits the systematic exploitation of the commonsense conceptual scheme, it leads to extensive and sometimes fantastic exploration of possible new approaches, and, perhaps, most important, it produces considerable confusion in the selection, utilization, and organization of the vast amount of information that is now available. It has had a part in the unfortunate divorce of the social sciences and the humanities; and it has compounded confusion in the confused ideal of a value-free social science.

Though the dilemma of social science is not easily resolved, certain considerations are clear. First and foremost, the universe of discourse of language and commonsense, however subjective and fictitious its teleological categories may seem, is certainly real, since it is the counterpart of society and civilization, which are certainly actual. Any projected study of society which disregards the intricate ways in which behavior is structured by linguistic functions will surely be vain and empty. The way to social science must be through and not around the teleological categories of commonsense.

Second, it is absurd to think that there is no knowledge except that which runs in terms of the concepts of natural science, in non-teleological categories, in terms of "colorless impersonal sequence of cause and effect." That there is a considerable body of other knowledge is attested by the existence of modern civilization, the development and continued operation of which surely depend on the effective utilization of large amounts of knowledge constructed in other terms. Moreover, knowledge about science, of scientific method, and of logic is not stated and cannot be stated in the concepts which are used in explicit scientific theory. Consequently, social knowledge does not lie unborn, awaiting the midwifery of a new conceptual system. It may be too weak for its present tasks and badly in need of therapeutic treatment; but it has been doing a man's work in the world for a long time. My own belief is that it is suffering from a typical modern malaise, a psychic disorder resulting from the strain, frustration, and insecurity of contemporary civilization, and that the indicated therapy is not an operation but rather expert psychiatric ministrations. However that may be, it is obvious that the services of an obstetrician are not needed.

Further considerations depend on some elucidation of method and on reference to some of the most obvious ways in which social behavior is structured by the operation of language. Method, in general, consists in clear posing of problems, the selection of data relevant to the problems posed, and the organization of the data to constitute significant and warranted solutions. Possible problems are usually classified into three main types and mixtures of these. One may ask what happened or what is the case; one may attempt to establish what is always or generally true of events or objects of a certain kind; or one may consider what is a prudent or reasonable line of action. Thus, Hume asserts that "after the dissolution of the commonwealth, the Roman yoke became easier upon the provinces, as Tacitus informs us; and it may be observed that many of the worst emperors, Domitian, for instance, were careful to prevent all oppression of the provinces." He then goes on to say: "The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of a free

state." And somewhat later he remarks that "Here, then, is a sufficient inducement to maintain with the utmost zeal in every free state those forms and institutions by which liberty is secured, the public good consulted, and the avarice or ambition of particular men restrained and punished."[4]

The three broad lines of inquiry indicated by the questions and illustrated by Hume's statements may be identified as history, science, and ethics, each of these terms being used in a very wide sense. Political science at the present time is, of course, mostly history and ethics (including under history a great mass of information about the current organization, constitutions, laws, personnel, and actions of governments and other public or semi-public organizations), and, to a considerable extent, a mixture of the two. It is no depreciation, however, of this entirely proper state of affairs to suspect that inquiry directed to generalizations is in some sense crucial, not merely because some modicum of this component seems required to justify the "science" in "political science," but, more importantly, because some generalized theoretical structure seems needed to furnish terms and articulation to history and to provide rationale and cogency to formulations of policy.

We do not nowadays share Hume's confidence that generalizations may rather easily be established; and so far as I know the general proposition quoted has not been carried forward into contemporary political science. Indeed, enough is known now about science and scientific method to warrant the assertion that no important generalization has been or will be established in any science by crude correlation of unanalyzed phenomena. General statements as to what is always or usually true about kinds or types of objects or events depend upon the establishment or isolation of kinds or types. Furthermore, the specification of a subject matter about which generalizations can be fruitfully made seems to involve a system of interrelated distinctions. Pareto stated very well the general form of a social science, though he failed miserably in his attempt to bring social phenomena under the scheme he projected.

The proper procedure for making scientific generalizations, according to Pareto, is to abstract from concrete reality a system of events which can be described by equations. The equations contain factors or variables, and "ties" or types of change or variation appropriate to the system, and should state conditions of equilibrium for the system. The term "equation" may, perhaps, be construed loosely; and the ideal of stating conditions of equilibrium might be relaxed to the requirement that the kind or direction of change introduced into the system by change in one of the variables or factors must be determinable. We may grant also Pareto's contention that such a generalized descriptive system may be very useful in picking out factors relevant to a specified kind of change and in seeing how such factors interact even though it is not possible to give exact or numerical values to the variables.[5]

[4] All three sentences are from the essay, "That Politics may be reduced to a Science," *Essays, Moral and Political*, Part I, Essay III.

[5] Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* [*Trattato di sociologia generale*] (New York, 1935). An excellent brief account of Pareto's methodology is given by Lawrence J. Henderson, *Pareto's General Sociology* (Cambridge, 1935).

If we accept Pareto's schematism as having some heuristic value, and turn to the phenomena of political science, we must at the very beginning take account of the fact that most of the objects and processes pertaining to government are artifacts or artificial objects. As Merriam has emphasized, the organs, devices, and techniques of government are not fixed or frozen but are in a process of change and development, occasioned by new needs, new problems, and new instruments, and limited only by human ingenuity and imagination.[6] There can be, strictly speaking, no science about artificial objects though various sciences may be relevant to the arts by which they are constructed and operated. The scientific generalizations of political science must refer to processes more fundamental than the concrete organs and operations of actual governments.

That an abstract, generalized scheme of action is possible is suggested by the example of economic theory. The means-end and exchange framework exploited by economics seems a necessary condition of any action intelligently directed toward the accomplishment of results; and the analysis of action in terms of the allocation of resources among alternative means for attaining ends is of wide applicability. It is true that such analysis must be supplemented by various assumptions regarding the conditions of action and even by considerable factual or historical material before it has much content; but it nevertheless furnishes a powerful guide for the selection of factors relevant to the organization of behavior through markets and for the determination of the kind and direction of change occasioned by changes in the relevant factors. Economic analysis has, however, only a limited application to political processes.

When one turns to a consideration of the functioning of language in social behavior, one notices, first, that language has been used to construct patterns of cooperation and social action. These patterns of cooperation are analogous to games and dramas in that they prescribe roles or differentiated types of actions for the participants and also provide the rules of the game and the plot whereby the various roles are integrated. At a very simple and low level social patterns involve, perhaps, merely the coordination of behavior which might occur separately. Above this simple level, however, the social roles or types of action and the pattern of the action are constructed on the basis of language and significant symbols. Courts, for instance, with their apparatus of judges, clerks, lawyers, bailiffs, and litigants, seem to perform actions and to provide diverse social roles which are created by, and are specifiable only in terms of, a structure of significant symbols. The courts, one may presume, administer justice; and the administration of justice is not a simian activity merely more efficiently performed through division of labor mediated by language.

Language not only orients men to each other but also orients behavior to the environment. By means of words and other symbols, such as maps and calendars, men are able to refer to and locate objects and events absent in space

[6] Charles E. Merriam, *Systematic Politics* (Chicago, 1945), pp. v, ix, 325 and *passim*.

or time, and to attach appropriate information to such objects and events. This means that the behavior of advanced societies is formally, and to some extent effectively, oriented, to events in space extending at least over the surface of the earth and events spread an indefinite distance in the past and future. Language also enables men to apprehend and to put into communicable form interpretations and generalizations directed to important similarities and relationships lying beneath the superficial appearances of facts. Current accounts of the environment and of the problems and opportunities which it presents are in process of constant change; and they, of course, interact with social behavior. The control and exploitation of the environment, mediated by social institutions as well as by technology, tools, and inventions, seem a cumulative process, each new technical advance occasioning a series of unplanned social changes, creating new problems, and requiring additional inventions, techniques, regulations, and social adaptations.

Language, also, to abbreviate what might be a long story, orients men to what, for want of a better term, may be called "values." The patterns of social cooperation and the various types of action which occur in society are not mechanical combinations or aggregations of fixed elements. They are, rather, shifting combinations of changing components given unity by organizing principles and given stability and persistence by conventions, customs and disciplines which are shaped by the accidents of social history but are oriented to the organizing principles. Such organizing principles are not objects of desire or concrete objectives but norms or criteria of success or failure. Social behavior is not a colorless sequence of cause and effect; it has a sense of direction and a series of polarities—good-bad, right-wrong, true-false, appropriate-inappropriate, correct-incorrect, rational-irrational, and many others. In technology the norm of efficiency is conspicuous; and economic activity is characterized by the norm of economy or economic rationality. Courts are directed, one might say, though certainly this does not tell the whole story, to the administration of justice.

Norms may be talked about at a high level of abstraction; but in actual social behavior they are usually mixed with more concrete material and combined into groups or constellations. Norms in this form, such as liberty, equality, democracy, justice, science, progress, power, education, furnish the major themes of human history and make possible the dramatic oppositions, the suspense, and the sense of movement toward a climax and a resolution which are so characteristic of, and apparently essential to, human history.

Even this birdseye view of linguistically conditioned behavior suggests the main factors or conditions in the problem of finding isolable systems of change and determining the general ideas or conceptual schemes in terms of which they are described.

The description of what is happening in some specified society or group is radically limited by the fact that the institutions and actions of any society are conditioned by what has happened or is happening in other groups and by the even more important fact that, under modern conditions, what is hap-

pening elsewhere may, through communication, enter directly into the calculations and socially effective processes of the specified society. Nevertheless, we do describe what is going on in New York, or Russia, or Middletown, even though such social groups or regions hardly constitute isolable systems in any scientific sense. The important fact, however, is that the specification of a limited group or society or area of social changes does not provide the terms or general ideas in which the description is constructed. It indicates what we are going to describe but not how or in what terms we construct the description.

Though the processes of civilization interact factually and also have a tendency to fusion or integration by reason of the fact that one process is related to others in discussion and speculation, one may, within narrow limits describe or even analyze systematically selected segments. Thus, one may take technology as given, and attempt to see how technology has influenced various social institutions; or one may take certain social institutions for granted and attempt to see how they have conditioned or guided (or misguided) technology. Such descriptions, though useful, are severely limited and do not give us isolable systems; but this is not the important fact about them. What is important is that no such partial description gives us the terms which are necessary for describing even the limited segment of social behavior to which the partial description is directed. Technology and institutions must each be described in terms which include reference to both.

The various functions of language are all necessary components in any instance of social behavior. They are, so to speak, the framework in which action occurs and through which it must be described. Any behavior involves knowledge of the environment, a conventional or institutional component through which the behavior is patterned, norms or systems of norms through which the behavior is guided, and an agent (whether an individual or a group) with capacities for action (needs, abilities, resources).[7] These components or dimensions of behavior are interdependent, they are definable only in terms of each other, they are known concretely only through acquaintance with or participation in social behavior in which they function, and they furnish the conceptual schema in which behavior must be described.

It would follow, of course, that the indicated schematism of action would furnish the fundamental principles through which specific problems are formulated, in terms of which data are selected as relevant, and against the background of which empirical generalizations would be interpreted and evaluated. It may be that within this general framework certain lines of inquiry appropriate to special social sciences can be discriminated, as the example of economics suggests. Though the separation of economics from the other social sciences is easily overestimated and is largely illusory, nevertheless other dis-

[7] No exact or complete analysis of the components of action is here intended; for detailed presentation of a view having important similarities to the one suggested see Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), especially Ch. 19; for another view, similar in a quite different way, see John R. Commons, *Institutional Economics* (New York, 1934).

ciplines might be differentiated in a similar way, that is, by taking certain aspects of components of action as given, as facts, and concentrating on changes or the manner of change in those aspects selected for attention. Talcott Parsons in the work cited, argues that sociology, political science, and psychology (in so far as it is a social science) may, as well as economics, be differentiated. I am inclined to believe, however, that political science is, in some sense, an architectonic science, or, at least, an eclectic discipline having something of the same relation to the social sciences as medicine has to the biological sciences.[8] The differentiation of political science from social science in general is not important in regard to the issues here examined, since the discussion both applies to all the social sciences and also suggests that any distinctions made would not cut very deep.

Though the preceding discussion has indicated the general terms or conceptual system utilized in the social sciences, namely the components or dimensions of action which are related to, and indeed equivalent with, the functions of language, a basic problem remains. The schema of action seems subjective, the way action appears to an agent, and perhaps also to an observer, but appearance nevertheless. Behavior, however, is not merely appearance. It occurs in or upon or in some relation to the real world; it makes use of physical instrumentalities; and it involves a physical component. What, then, is the relation of appearance to reality? How do the terms of social science have objective reference?

It would seem that the answer to such questions must be given by reference to norms or normative principles. Though norms cannot be defined except in relation to the other dimensions of action, or exhibited except in the behavior which they organize, they seem to be the central factor in the schema of action and the aspect of behavior by which it is at once distinguished from and related to physical change. Consider, for instance, the simple case of a two-dimensional map of North America made, say, in 1713. The map is a physical object and considered as such it has some slight resemblance to the area mapped. If, however, we consider the map and the making of it as items of social behavior, the points we consider are the accuracy and scope of the maker's knowledge of the area mapped, his more or less appropriate selection of means for representing a large curved surface on a small plane surface, and his more or less correct utilization of such means for presenting the knowledge he had in relation to the purposes for which the map might be used. If we ask,

[8] Political science seems to be concerned with whatever social actions, techniques, and institutions are used by a society or civilization to bring order into, or to maintain equilibrium among, the lesser institutions and groups. Though similar disorders and sources of instability occur and recur in societies and more or less standard procedures for dealing with some of these disorders have been developed, the sources of disequilibrium, the kinds of disequilibrium occurring, and the possible means for dealing therewith vary widely as the institutions and historical circumstances of society change. Political scientists, like their fellow specialists, the military experts, should be on their guard against assuming that the next war or political crisis will be just like the last one.

now, what is the relation of the mapmaker's behavior to reality, the answer must be given in terms of the component activities, viewed in terms of, and in relation to, appropriate norms. Our description of the mapmaking is related to reality in the same terms, with the added complexity that our apprehension of the mapmaker's activities may be more or less correct and more or less adequate. In other words, to describe behavior is to relate it to reality in terms of the purposive activity involved; and to relate behavior to reality is to describe its purpose in terms of the component activities as guided by appropriate norms.

To say that behavior is apprehended and related to reality in terms of norms is not to assert that norms are the explicit objects of knowledge but to assert, rather, that they are the preconceptions or principles by which factual material is selected as relevant, organized, and interpreted. This, of course, was Veblen's indictment of economics; and it seems that his view is correct (though not his conviction that the case should be different) for economics and for the other social sciences as well. This is the basic fact in the semantics of the social sciences, that is, the manner in which their terms are related to reality.

One would like to find some easier, simpler, and more direct way of understanding political phenomena than is here indicated; and when one attempts to describe the action of a court ruling on a fair rate of return for a public utility and is faced with the intricacies of accounting, money, the enterprise system, and legal rules one is tempted to make a short cut through the tangle of words, intentions, abstractions, assumptions and rationalizations which seem to have such tenuous relations to any tangible facts. Civilization, however, is built on words, uncounted billions of them; and any one who fails to follow words through their proper logic to the purposes and activities they reflect must pay the penalty of being himself entangled in words, beguiled by logodaedaly and in danger of becoming a logomaniac.

DISCUSSION

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In Mr. Perry's paper, he develops a distinction, which he considers basic, between the natural and the social sciences. This distinction he rests upon the unique role of language in social behavior, and upon what he describes as the "artificiality" of social institutions (as distinguished, presumably, from the "naturalness" of nature). From his consideration of this basic distinction, Mr. Perry concludes (1) that the methods of the natural sciences are not applicable to the social sciences, and (2) that the social sciences must make use of a particular conceptual scheme—the scheme of *action*. In the action scheme, language functions to orient behavior to the environment, to social institutions, and to values.

In this comment, I shall argue that Mr. Perry's first conclusion is incorrect, and that his second conclusion is correct—but not for the reasons he gives. Instead of developing my argument as a criticism of Mr. Perry's criticism of naturalism in the social sciences, I shall attempt to state it in a positive fashion.

The "frustrated semanticists" of whom Mr. Perry speaks discovered one very important principle which, if consistently applied, clears up much of the confusion about natural versus social science. This principle is that one must not speak of "language" but of "languages." When I say: "It is snowing," I am speaking in a language that refers to events in the external environment. But when I say: " 'Snow' is an English word," I am speaking in a language that refers to events in language—that is, to social events. For many purposes, various languages can be mixed in a single discourse without confusion, but a discussion of scientific methodology is not one of these purposes. In discussing the methodology of social science, we must be careful to distinguish between sentences in the scientist's language (i.e., sentences in social science), and sentences in the language of the society he is observing.

To postulate a language of social science is to assume the existence of a scientist, employing this language, who is not (and whose statements are not) a part of the system of behavior to which this language refers. The necessity for this assumption is easily seen from the following example of a self-confirming prediction. If I say, "There will be a depression in 1950," I am making a prediction, in the language of social science, about social events. But if my prediction is communicated to many other people, and if I have a reputation of infallibility, then there almost certainly *will* be a depression in 1950—brought about by the panic induced by the communication of my prediction. But the sentence I have just written is not in the same language as my prediction—it is in the language of a social scientist who is observing a larger social system that contains my prediction as a part.

As Mr. Perry shows, language is an integral part of social institutions, and the language employed by a society embodies a mass of "commonsense" that affects and directs behavior. But a science of society must explain the phe-

nomena of society, including the phenomena of language and the commonsense imbedded in language. Therefore, commonsense, far from providing the basis for social science, is not even expressed in the same language as social science. Rather, it is a part of the data with which social science must deal. Systematic ambiguity between these two languages—the common practice of using for social science the same vocabulary and rules of grammar as are used in the society we are studying—should never conceal from us the fact that two distinct languages really are involved.

Hence, in methodological discussions we are in great danger of confusion unless we assume that our social scientist is a man from Mars (or from a flying saucer), who does not communicate with the people whose behavior he is observing and predicting, or alternatively, that he is a man to whose predictions other people do not pay any particular attention. In either case, we may exclude statements in the language of social science from the system of behavior to which these statements refer. This is an exclusion we cannot avoid, regardless of whether we accept or reject the natural science framework.

Let us, for simplicity, adopt the Martian alternative. Then we must distinguish statements in Martian from statements in English. The former are propositions of social science that refer to social phenomena, including English language phenomena. Our Martian, being incurably addicted to the methodology of the natural sciences, wishes to make generalizations and predictions about the behavior of the curious people who speak English.

If our Martian is wise, he will begin his investigations not with the whole society of English-speaking people, but with a particular individual. He will discover, first of all, that this individual does not really distinguish in his own language between statements about the natural environment and statements about "artificial" society. To the individual, the society in which he lives is just as much a part of his environment as are stones and trees. When he touches a bare wire, he receives a shock; when he tickles the hind leg of a mule, he receives a kick; when he raids the cookie jar, he receives a slap (commonsense regarding child psychology being quite primitive in the society our Martian is studying). Through such experiences, he learns "appropriate" ways of behaving in relation to wires, mules, and parents. His ways of behaving may include "appropriate" language behaviors (in English). He swears at the wire, says "Whoa!" to the mule, and lies to the parent. "Role playing" is one of the adjustments he makes in order to get the responses he desires from his environment, including among these responses the approval of other people. This process of socialization, as analyzed by Cooley, Meade, and others, involves nothing "unnatural" or "artificial."

II

You will notice that our Martian scientist is already using the action scheme —and in particular, the notion of purpose or value—in his analysis of the behavior of his subject. This does not, in itself, imply any peculiar role for language. If he were observing rats instead of men he might still find it useful

to describe their behavior in terms of the purpose of obtaining cheese, the desire to avoid a shock, or the desire for the approval of a lady rat.

To say that it is often convenient to use the term "purpose" in social science means no more and no less than to say that it is often convenient to use the term "force" in physics. A physical force is no more directly observable than a social purpose (and indeed, physical laws are generally capable of being translated into fully teleological terms—e.g., the principles of least action and of conservation of energy). To bar from natural or social science all terms that do not refer to directly observable events is to confuse deduction with induction. All that we require of the language of a science is that its propositions, whether directly observable or not, permit us to deduce other propositions that *are* directly observable, and hence testable. Propositions about "purposes" and "desires" do permit such predictions and tests, and hence are not different from propositions in the natural sciences. It is very easy to test whether a rat has a desire for cheese, and even how strong this desire is in comparison with other desires.

Suppose, to borrow Mr. Perry's example, our Martian wished to test whether a particular document is a "map" of a certain area. He would first examine the geometry of the design on the paper in relation to the geometry of the area, and discover certain rules of isomorphism between them. He would then contract with the Martian Survey Research Center to conduct an opinion survey in order to determine on what occasions English-speaking people utter the sentence, "The paper, A, is a map of the area, B." He may discover that this statement is uttered whenever A reveals the same isomorphism to B that he discovered in the relation of his piece of paper to the geographical area. He then concludes that the paper was indeed intended to be a "map." He can even discover to what extent it is an accurate "map"—i.e., to what extent the map-maker correctly interpreted the meaning of the word "map." Through all this procedure, our Martian is operating exactly like a natural scientist. When he says: "The map-maker made these marks because he was trying to make a map," this is much the same as if he said: "This apple fell because it was acted on by the force of gravity." Both propositions are tested in about the same way.[1]

Thus far I have set forth (although not demonstrated in any rigorous fashion) three propositions:

1. The action scheme is very likely a useful scheme—perhaps the most useful—for the framework of a theory of human behavior (and indeed, of rat behavior).

2. The use of this scheme neither requires nor permits any deviation from the methodology of the natural sciences. The task of the scientist is still that of framing and testing propositions about observable events, including behavioral events and language events. The techniques of social, as of natural, science are those of model-construction, deduction, and observation.

[1] It should be noted that throughout this discussion the word "map" is a word in English, not in Martian.

3. The action scheme may be very useful for describing systems of behavior (e.g., animal behavior) where language is not involved.

III

If these propositions are correct, Mr. Perry is wrong in arguing that it is because of language the action scheme is required in the social sciences, and that the action scheme implies some "artificiality" of social phenomena. But perhaps the artificiality of social phenomena is implied by language alone, apart from the matter of teleology. Let us examine this question next.

With Mr. Perry's acute observations about the intertwining of language and institutions one cannot quarrel. It must likewise be admitted that in some sense both language and institutions are conventional—they certainly are not uniquely determined by physical or biological circumstances, except possibly in some long-term developmental sense. Yet we have seen that for a particular individual in our English speaking society, social institutions have the same reality as natural laws.

Mr. Perry argues that: "There can be, strictly speaking, no science about artificial objects." Yet our Martian has been able to test propositions of the following kind: "Given a child who has had certain experiences in a society with certain mores, and given a particular situation in which the child is placed, he will behave in such and such a fashion." This is a proposition of exactly the same kind as: "Given a planetary system with particles having certain positions and masses, and given a comet having a certain position and velocity, the comet will move along such and such a path." To be sure, in the first case we do not explain how the mores of society got to be what they are; but in the second we do not explain how the planetary system got where it is. In each case we fail to explain why the play is what it is, but we do explain why the actor acts as he does.

As a matter of fact, our predictions in social science can go much farther than the above illustration indicates. Just as in natural science we can predict for a whole system from a given (unexplained) situation to later situations, so in social science we can predict from an initial (unexplained) social state to a later state. And I would submit that the construction of such predictions, rather than the construction of generalizations which are independent of initial conditions, is the task of the social, as of the natural, sciences. The institutions of society appear "artificial" only when we impose on social science the meaningless task of explaining why they are as they are without any assumptions as to what they have been in the past. Nature would appear equally artificial if we attempted to impose the same task on astronomy or geology.

Mr. Perry may be quite right in asserting that the application of natural science methods to social phenomena has not yet produced much of a science. Some of us would be a little more sanguine than he about progress to date, but this is not the essential point. The real question is whether acceptance of the action scheme requires a departure from the methods of natural science, and this it does not.

IV

One can find many things to complain about in political science. Excessive emphasis on natural science methodology is not one of them. On the other hand, we must agree with Mr. Perry that a fruitful application of any scientific methodology to political science requires us, as political scientists, to be much more sophisticated than we have ever been about the semantic underpinning of our work. From a semantic standpoint two basic methodological reforms are needed:

1. We must learn to distinguish the various languages with which we are concerned. We must separate the commonsense that is part of our data from the propositions of our science. In particular, it is time that we maintained consistent distinctions between political theory (i.e., scientific statements about the phenomena of politics) and the history of political thought (i.e., statements about what people have said about political theory and political ethics).

2. We must develop more explicitly the action scheme as a basic framework of analysis of behavior. We must clarify the status of such concepts as "purpose" in our scientific scheme by specifying the kinds of observations that will test the correctness of scientific propositions containing these concepts. Through such clarification we will in time recognize that, while social phenomena are teleological, social science (statements about such phenomena) is not.

In conclusion I should like to add my enthusiastic endorsement to Mr. Perry's comments about the unfortunate consequences of the excessive specialization of the several social sciences. Political science has probably suffered more than any other from its separation from its sister sciences, for it has inherited from its origins in history, law, and ethics an antiquated methodology that is in need of drastic reconstruction. A fuller communication with psychology and sociology in particular would save political scientists the task of rediscovering the important methodological advances that have taken place in these fields in the last generation. In those areas of political science where there has already been some effective communication—notably in the field of political behavior and public opinion—the impact of newer methods upon our field is noticeable and encouraging. Political theory, public law, and public administration need and deserve similar assistance.

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Mr. Perry's study seems to be based on two key-words, "commonsense"—written as a single word and not as a hyphenated compound—and "language." Evidently these words must be examined rather than defined. It is—or should be—a semantic axiom that definition in the sense of precise delimitation, *per genus et speciem*, is quite impossible for any words except symbolic references to individual concrete objects.

But since I regard both these terms as good and useful, it is highly desirable to see where they direct our thoughts and analysis.

Although Mr. Perry rejects the notion that commonsense is something which gets its name from the fact that it is the common possession of most persons, this must after all be a part of what he has in mind. I take commonsense to be the conscious reaction of ordinary people to the world they know, above all to the presence in it of other persons, who form a group to which they themselves belong, as well as to the physical surroundings in which and with which they all work. And I exclude from the class of "ordinary" people in this situation those who are especially gifted or exceptionally unendowed, as well as those who *ex professo* have made social relations their object of interest. Commonsense is therefore the means by which ordinary persons mentally adjust themselves to their human and non-human environment.

The danger in the use of such a term is that once it is established, it tends to get invested with a precision and unified character which it can possess only to a limited degree, since the "ordinary man" is as much a fiction as the economic or the rational man, and the commonsense will vary with the individual in its penumbra of connotations and indeed in a great many aspects that any particular individual will treat as important. But there will be, after all, a common core which most persons will expect to find when they think of the commonsense of others as well as of their own, that is to say, there will be a substantial group of aspects in which the social and physical world will seem alike to the people to whom commonsense may be attributed.

To pragmatists, this kind of commonsense is not only knowledge but it is the only kind of knowledge, since it is as Mr. Perry says, concerned with "practice," and what is not so concerned, pragmatists do not regard as knowledge at all. But we must take care to enlarge "practice" to include much more than bodily activity and the satisfaction of bodily needs. Commonsense takes a great many moral valuations into account and in a large number of situations will pronounce acts and results of acts to be "good" or "bad," "right" or "wrong," "desirable" or "undesirable." Polities are built on such valuations and no social group has continuity or a qualified permanence until valuations are made and become a part of commonsense. That the penumbra of individual variations will be larger and more diverse in political matters than in other commonsense aspects of the social environment is undoubtedly true but does not change the basic character of just these value-terms. And since we are dealing with the "semantics of politics," they must not be disregarded because they are difficult.

That commonsense operates through language and can operate through nothing else is undoubted. Mr. Perry is quite right in making "language" his second key-word and calling attention to the fact that there are other groups of symbols besides the ordinary verbal ones which make up language. There is in speaking of language, however, a danger somewhat akin to that which attends the word "commonsense." The impression might be created that language is a force by itself, something that operates independently. Mr. Perry

certainly intends no such thing. Language is not something independent, but merely the externalizing of commonsense.

This results from the fact that commonsense is the adjustment of a person to an environment in which other persons are far the most important elements, elements which are essential to his living, since man as man is a social and not a solitary animal. The specific difference between man and other animals—Mr. Perry speaks of "simian" creatures—is the fact that in order to live, man must put himself in communication with his human environment and this communication is language, i.e., a system of conventional symbols, chiefly but not exclusively, verbal ones.

It becomes at once apparent that we can know the character, and even the existence, of commonsense only in its external form. Persons use language not only in a commonsense effort to induce other persons to act in a certain way but also to express valuations and, if they are generally accepted, to construct institutions by means of them. But what form commonsense takes in the minds of the persons who possess it, only each individual can know for himself and only if he has skill in introspection, which is a rare skill.

And it is here that we discover logic, an operational method necessary for sciences of all kinds including the science of politics. That commonsense unexpressed—let us say, "thinking"—uses logic is very doubtful. We may forego the attempt to apply any particular psychological theory or to create a new one. But it is scarcely open to question that thousands of the things of which we are ourselves conscious and which we call mental facts are presented, when they occur or before they are arranged for communication, in a form that certainly cannot be called logical.

But when commonsense is externalized, that is to say, when we try to communicate with other persons, this form must be given to it. The commonsense, as it then appears, must be rationalized. Nothing is communicable unless it "makes sense," i.e., unless it is capable of being put in "logical" form.

This does not mean that it takes the form of "logic" as logic is studied by logicians and mathematicians. They use logic as an operational device of great value for their purposes which are only in a small degree the purposes of language. But to that small degree logic is quite necessary. Communication, I have said, must "make sense." There must be no obvious contradictions. The premises under which, after the event, the justifications for action are subsumed, must have some general acceptance, although they might frequently fail to sustain themselves on factual examination.

Whether with all this we can have a "science" of politics, depends on what we want a science for. If we wish merely to describe the situations under which groups of men have managed to organize themselves for internal order and external defense—the bare bones of government—it is perfectly good English and in accord with commonsense, to call the result a science. And if government assumes welfare functions within a polity and seeks by combination to create the basis for what may be a world polity, this expansion merely makes the materials to be scientifically put together more diverse and more complicated.

But if the purpose for which we want a science of politics is to relate political facts in some way to other complexes of social data like economics and sociology or to such specialized sciences as psychology, so far as the human environment is concerned, or geography or technology for the non-human part of the environment, if this is the purpose of our science, we have a more difficult but by no means an insuperable task. We cannot find precise quantitative relations between sequences of human behavior, even if the non-human conditions remain constant, as they do not remain. But in spite of all the variables for which we must allow, we can make valid statements about many sequences of behavior and these statements can be expressed in commonsense terms. We can say that certain situations "generally" produce certain political results. That is different from saying that when we apply heat to pure distilled water at the pressure of one atmosphere at sea-level, the water will boil when the heat reaches 212 degrees, Fahrenheit. I suppose no one will doubt that the latter is a scientific statement. Our political statement may even be different in kind from our statement about water. But is is nonetheless a scientific statement and its scientific character can be denied only by begging the question.

In dealing with politics as a science, all that is necessary is to avoid the always present danger of assuming that words exist independently of the phrases of which they are parts, or that all the suggestions and directions involved in word-groups are either invariant or precise. There is, likewise, the almost equal danger in assuming that there is no persistence whatever in semantic symbols, either as single words or as larger or smaller word-groups. Commonsense, both as inferred in the minds of men and as externalized in language, is not quite so chaotic as that.

In these comments on Mr. Perry's paper, I have, as is apparent, attempted no detailed criticism. What I have presented here has, however, it seems to me, relevance to the problem he attacks. I offer it as a group of suggestions which do not involve any change in the results he reaches.

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I use the title, "The Semantics of Charner Perry," for these remarks not because I want to be unduly personal, but because I think the title describes what is in fact the subject of my paper and, also, I think, of Professor Perry's essay. I find his discussion very much more revealing as an *example* of his own semantic difficulties than as an analysis of the actual semantic problems frustrating the development of a science of political behavior. Accordingly, my remarks will be directed mainly at this particular presentation rather than at political science or political scientists generally.

Professor Perry declares categorically that "institutions, despite figures of speech, are not mechanisms." The statement betrays one of the most fundamental of semantic fallacies, namely, that words have intrinsic meanings which make it unpermissible for us to classify together, as similar in some ways and

for some purposes of understanding phenomena, things that are in other respects vastly different from each other. Since Professor Perry's difficulty with this phase of semantics recurs at many other points in his paper, and since it is an illustration of the kind of crippling semantic confusion which has unnecessarily retarded the development of the social sciences and especially political science, let us consider the above *obiter dictum* from a semantic viewpoint.

In science it is not a question of what institutions (or anything else) *are* in a metaphysical sense by *a priori* declaration. The question is how it is scientifically profitable to *regard* them. It is a matter of deciding experimentally in what category to classify a phenomenon in order to advance most efficiently our *scientific* understanding of it. What institutions (or man, society, mind, culture, invention, artifact, etc., etc.) *are*, is therefore to the scientist a practical question of *what assumptions regarding them most effectively advance our scientific understanding of them*. We decide on *this* basis whether to *call* them (whether they "are"!) mechanisms or not. Scientific utility is subject to demonstration because the criteria of scientific understanding reduce to certain practical tests of corroboration, predictability, or control. Until this attitude in science toward the adoption or rejection of categories like "mechanism" is thoroughly grasped by social scientists, they will never rid themselves of pre-scientific preconceptions regarding social phenomena, which today frustrate the development of social science.

It is precisely on this basis that the word "mechanism" has been adopted both in physiology and in sociology to describe segments of behavior and sequences of events. Professor Perry's declaration that institutions are not mechanisms is almost a paraphrase of one of the most pious clichés in philosophy, namely, that "after all, [*sic*] man is not a machine." When pronounced in the right tone of voice and preferably with a rolling of the eyes heavenward, it is almost impossible to resist this fine phrase or to doubt that it partakes of the nature of eternal and self-evident truth. Yet, if we turn to any respectable recent treatise on physiology, we find numerous references to *mechanisms of the human body* without apology or implication that this is a "figurative" usage.[1] Physiologists have adopted the word mechanism to describe specific sequences of events because they recognize that the success of the physical and the chemical sciences has consisted precisely of this: the designation of important phe-

[1] Note on this subject the title as well as the content of the recent text by A. J. Carlson and V. Johnson, *The Machinery of the Body* (3rd ed., Chicago, 1948). See especially the section on mechanisms, pp. 4 and 5. The authors' illustrations of the fallacy of confusing (a) the evolution and *utility* of a system for (b) the machinery for bringing it about is wholly applicable to much writing in the social sciences. The appearance of such chapter headings as "The Decline of the Mechanistic View" (A. Einstein and L. Infeld, *Evolution of Physics* [New York, 1938], Ch. 2) in respectable physics books has misled many to the conclusion that we are returning to an orientation (e.g., vitalism) in vogue *before* the mechanistic view developed. A little further reading will soon convince anyone of the error of that assumption. The point is that field theory and relativity instead represent much more sophisticated "mechanical" views. The same may be said for the unwarranted glee with which some theologians greet Heisenberg's principle of indeterminism.

nomena by a careful description of the observable sequences of events, rather than by words purporting to designate *utility, purpose, motive, property, being* or other vitalistic terms of no determinable reference, which are imputed to the behavior by the speaker instead of being observable and subject to corroboration by rigorously specified methods.

In short, to call something a mechanism suggests the permissibility and, indeed, the necessity, of further inquiry and corroboration. To ascribe the behavior to a "purpose" or a "property" leaves nothing to investigate. It is not all "merely" a question of words but of *what the words in accepted usage stand for*, in terms of the concrete operations through which science tests its understanding, in corroboration, prediction, and control. It is not true that a rose by any other name smells as sweet, as the psychologists have shown. The character of man's activities in a situation *depends largely upon the kind of words and sentences in terms of which he appraises that situation*—whether he attempts, for example, to influence it (a) by magical incantations or (b) by scientific methods. The only scientific importance of whether or not to call institutions mechanisms, or e.g., "group instincts," lies in the effect of one or the other usages on the scientist's further inquiry. If he regards institutions as mechanisms, many questions call for inquiry and answers—inquiries of the sort that have advanced science in every field. If he regards institutions as instincts or "properties" of human groups, scientific inquiry tends to stop at that point.

What has been said above regarding the physiologists' use of the word "mechanism" to explain human behavior applies with equal force to the desirability of regarding social institutions as mechanisms.[2] For that matter, the dictionary defines mechanism as "the arrangement or relation of parts of anything as adapted to produce an effect." Doubtless this describes the various gadgets which, in a technological culture, we most frequently think of as mechanisms. But does not this definition also describe the phenomenon social scientists aim to designate by the word institution?

Further illustration of how the projection of Professor Perry's language structure upon the nature of phenomena affects his methods of inquiry in the social sciences may be found throughout his whole paper. For example, he elects to regard social phenomena as "artificial" as compared with the other phenomena of nature. He quotes Merriam to the effect that "the organs, devices, and techniques of government are not fixed or frozen but are in a process of change and development occasioned by new needs, new problems, and new instruments," etc. The clear implication is that the organs, devices, and techniques of "nature" are, in contrast, fixed and frozen! Having thus erected an entirely unwarranted (in the sense of blocking scientific understanding) dichotomy in the phenomena of nature, he follows it with another *obiter dictum* to the

[2] For a full statement of this position see my *Foundations of Sociology* (New York, 1939), Chs. 5 and 6. For a briefer and more recent statement see my paper before the AAAS, December 28, 1947, "Human Social Problems as a Type of Disequilibrium in a Biological Integration," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 13, pp. 689–699 (December, 1948).

effect that "there can be, strictly speaking, no science about artificial objects." Such are the real semantic muddles that have handicapped and are handicapping the social sciences.

In spite of the inhibitions mentioned, the word "mechanism" and other terms designating behavior subject to observation and corroboration are coming increasingly into usage in reference to social behavior. Thus, perhaps no one but a pedant would challenge the increasing tendency to refer, for example, to a committee as a mechanism for achieving certain ends. Doubtless the lore-language which is so highly valued in some quarters, originated in the same way except that in first selecting his terminology man drew on anthropomorphic, anthropocentric, and metaphysical sources instead of on terms drawn from a technological culture and from science. His subsequent attitude and approaches to the phenomena designated was largely influenced by the kind of terms with which he happened first to designate them, and subsequent liberation from the preconceptions created by anthropomorphic concepts has been a major problem in the history of every science.

Scientists, realizing these facts regarding the nature of all language, proceed quite cavalierly either to invent entirely new terms or to select colorful ones from the folk lore (such as horsepower, candlepower, etc.), but defining them operationally in specific ways that may or may not have the slightest relation to the traditional meanings. Like Humpty Dumpty, they make their words mean what they want them to mean—neither more nor less. Thus they circumvent the whole dreadful morass of traditional philosophizing simply by observing what results they get with the terms they select, as defined and used, and adapting both their words and their methods accordingly. It is a practice social scientists could profitably adopt instead of arguing whether man *is* a machine, whether institutions *are* mechanisms, whether culture and inventions *are* artificial, etc., etc. In so doing, it is highly likely that a great many terms drawn from the physical sciences will be adopted and, even with their present definitions, will be found applicable to social phenomena. The principle of parsimony and the constant striving of scientists for greater generality in their concepts is likely to result in bringing human social behavior and the behavior of "nature" increasingly under common concepts and laws.[3] Professor Perry, however, apparently believes that only the terminology ordained by folk lore to designate social behavior is suitable or useful for this purpose, because "the distinctions and preconceptions of common sense have quickly reim-

[3] See in this connection the opinion of a physicist, Lancelot Law Whyte, "Scientific Thought in the Coming Ages," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 197 (November, 1948). "It is not possible to set out the evidence here, but there are many signs that the coming period may see the establishment of a *single unified science* covering the inorganic and organic realms and also providing the valid scientific approach to the subject matter of psychology and possibly also of sociology." For illustrations, see S. C. Dodd, *Dimensions of Society* (New York, 1942), pp. 742–743 and J. Q. Stewart, "Empirical Mathematical Rules Concerning the Distribution and Equilibrium of Population," *The Geographical Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 461–485 (1947); also, G. K. Zipf, *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort* (Boston, 1949), esp. Part 2.

posed themselves even when mutilated by a strained terminology." Doubtless the physicists had the same trouble with terms, such as horsepower and candlepower, to begin with. But it may be noted that today the preconceptions of common sense have been supplanted even in folk lore by the scientific meaning of these terms.

Except for the fact that the whole burden of Professor Perry's paper is that the phenomenon of language behavior is not only unique but that it apparently precludes the application of the methods of natural science to the study of social phenomena I should not, of course, devote so much space to his mere statement that institutions are not mechanisms. I refer to that statement at length only because it seems to me to typify the fallacy and the confusion that underlies his whole paper. For other examples, consider the following: "Institutions are not mechanisms; they are resultants of human behavior." Are not the mechanisms of the solar system or of digestion also "resultants" of behavior? (Actually, of course, *the behavior*, viewed in a certain sequential way is, in science, the referent of the word "mechanism.") Another illustration: "Politics is obviously mostly a matter of talk." The implication is that therefore it is not subject to scientific study. And again: "Justice is not a simian activity merely more efficiently performed through a division of labor mediated by language." This appears to be important only because it has previously been decreed by Professor Perry that simian chatter is subject to scientific study as a natural phenomenon, whereas sophisticated language behavior apparently is not.

The basic difficulty in Professor Perry's analysis is that he commits the semantic fallacy of assuming that the barriers erected by his language represent, in fact, barriers in nature; that, as a result, the phenomena of nature are divided into compartments corresponding to the language structure in which much current philosophy and social science happens to be carried on; and that we must behave toward nature according to this language structure rather than by modifying our language and our abstractions to serve the ends we seek. This attitude is widespread in the social sciences in spite of the plain fact of history that scientific triumphs have come largely through the abandonment of traditional barriers erected by folk language. Instead, scientists have prospered by recognizing that the unique data of different fields are subsumable under more and more general abstractions and linguistic structures. As Whitehead has said, "A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress." It would be impossible to find a better illustration of the principle than in most philosophy and social science.

Professor Perry finds language and cultural phenomena "artificial," the result of "invention," with the latter ones so based on the earlier ones that the relation of the result to "nature" or to "human nature" is extremely tenuous. To be sure, all this is "learned," "acquired," "external," etc. But except for the language forms in terms of which we are accustomed to dichotomize and discuss these phenomena, how are they any less natural processes evolving, changing, developing, growing in environment than the mechanisms of breath-

ing, digestion, etc? Do these mechanisms and functions have a determinable natural history (and, for that matter, a probable future course of development) or are they still mysterious "instincts," "properties," or "essences" not to be further inquired into?

In short, does not the word "invention" stand for a social process or development as observable, and describable as osmosis, digestion, or maturation? "Social techniques," says Professor Perry, "are not tools which one picks up and lays down as one might a hammer." I don't know what *he* means by a social technique, how literally he wants his figure to be taken, and, in any case, the significance of his illustration. The difference, he implies, is that social techniques are "integral with the behavior in which they function." In what sense is a hammer *not* integral with the behavior *in which it functions* (i.e., in a hammering situation)? How is the hammer "external" to this situation? Why is it not part of the "essential stuff or structure of the behavior situation about which we are talking"? Is it a social technique for me to communicate to a student that the square root of 300 is 17.3205081? If so, is the table of squares which I pick up and lay down and by means of which I accomplish the communication *sufficiently* "like a hammer" for purposes of the present discussion?

Professor Perry concludes quite correctly that language "and the various systems of symbols more or less distinctly dependent on language are not only the basic technique but even today the framework upon which the superstructure of society is supported." My question is, what of it? Is not this language behavior and its results and residues in all forms of culture, material and "spiritual," a wholly natural phenomenon subject to study by the same general methods as the rest of the natural universe of which it is surely a part?

Having erected an unnecessary linguistic barrier between civilization and nature by calling the former artificial, the difficulties with which Professor Perry labors throughout the rest of his paper doubtless follow. He has correctly recognized that while both the chatter of monkeys and the discussion of social scientists are doubtless functional, the latter is far more complex and far-reaching in its cultural ramifications, as represented by our institutions and culture generally. In this connection, also, he correctly finds that culture (such as science and social institutions) is "radically conditioned by systems of language and symbols" and that language, in turn, is "a system of functions, coincident with the operation of various parts of civilization." This "double fact," he says, "has baffled many social scientists and semanticists." Alas, yes; but why? What is more common in *scientific* thinking than the fact of *interaction* in the parts of a situation? I leave to the semanticists the pleasure of further comment on Professor Perry's remark that in their alleged attempt to "construct an isolable system of denotable objects semanticists exhaust themselves in constructing a barbarous terminology for talking about some of the accidental [?] and superficial[?] aspects of language" (brackets mine). I suppose he refers to symbolic logic and new mathematical systems. The very least that the semanticists can retort is that, if we accept the dictionary's definition of "barbarous" as meaning pertaining to or like a barbarian, then an objective examination of

the case will probably reveal that it is Professor Perry's terminology rather than that of the semanticists that most closely resembles the language of barbarians.

Professor Perry is surely right when he emphasizes the vast quantity and importance of common sense knowledge couched in common sense language. It is true, as he says, that "commonsense was formed in relation to and for the guidance of practice. Its distinctions and terms reflect the *purpose, needs*, and exigencies of action." Social scientists should remember that the advancement of the other sciences has been characterized by the abandonment of the primitive method of explaining their phenomena in terms of *needs* and *purposes*. Having established that a great deal of the social sciences has to do with language behavior, Professor Perry notes that "the subject matter of the natural sciences does not include language or behavior built on language." I suppose that conclusion inevitably follows as long as he has arbitrarily excluded social behavior as a proper subject matter for natural science. This superstitious attitude toward language which has inhibited social scientists from dealing with it as merely another phenomenon of nature has been a vast detriment to the development of social science.

Regarding Professor Perry's statement that "so far as I know there have been no important contributions in the field [social science] resulting from the application of scientific method," there is no disputing his privilege to so appraise the situation. Nevertheless, this is an amazing statement even as qualified by the phrase "as far as I know." I do not know what are Professor Perry's criteria of *important* contributions or to what extent his statement is a considered one based on familiarity with what has in fact occurred in the social sciences in the last thirty years. He is entitled to his judgment. I shall, therefore, merely register my disagreement, and in support thereof mention only one recent survey of the subject in fairly popular form, which is by no means the full story nor does it include many of the choicest exhibits. I refer to Stuart Chase's recent volume, *The Proper Study of Mankind*.[4] Again, I do not know what Professor Perry's notion of *scientific* work may be. But at least it may be said that physical scientists of unquestioned repute have recently stated that *on the basis of actual performance*, there appears to be no reason or barrier to the achievement of strictly scientific results through the proper study of the subject matter which Professor Perry finds beyond the reach of such methods.[5] Finally, it may be pointed out that, if it is a test of science to be able to predict with reliability the important political behavior of millions of people, then such social science has indubitably appeared in the last fifteen years. Nor is that fact altered by the journalistic comments of political scientists and others about other shortcomings of the new methods.

With Professor Perry's designation of the present situation in political science as well as in the other social sciences as a bad case of schizophrenia, I am inclined to agree. It corresponds in fact with the diagnosis which I have elabo-

[4] (New York, 1948). [5] See *Science*, Vol. 111, p. 500 (May 5, 1950).

rated in *Can Science Save Us?*[6] The remedy, however, I have argued, seems to me to be to go over to the scientific orientation in our approach to the social as well as to physical problems. Professor Perry deplores this. He says "it inhibits the systematic exploitation of the common sense conceptual scheme." But is it not the continued exploitation of this common sense conceptual scheme in the social field *while* and *after* the physical sciences have abandoned it, which is responsible for the schizophrenia he correctly diagnoses?

The psychiatrist may agree with Professor Perry that contemporary culture, of which science is a major component, being incompatible with the infantile and fantastic orientation of many a common sense conceptualization is, in fact, the cause of his patient's schizophrenia. But the practical situation is such that the treatment, nevertheless, consists of an attempt to reorient the patient to this culture with which he must come to grips, rather than to attempt to refurbish the culture to conform to the patient's primitive and pre-scientific orientation. As Professor Perry correctly says, "to many people who have become habituated to science, the propositions of political theory have a character of unreality and futility that bars out any serious interest in their discussion." The fact that scientists "bar out serious interest" in the "unreality" of current political theory, indicates that they have either been cured from (or have never suffered) the schizophrenia which Professor Perry correctly detects in those who try to operate according to (a) the orientations of modern science in their adjustment to the physical world and according to (b) the orientation of Plato and Aristotle in relation to their social world.

Unless we contemplate the abandonment of the whole structure of modern science and a return to Aristotle also in physical science, the only cure for Professor Perry's schizophrenics is to adopt the orientation of modern natural science also for the social world. The first step in the therapy is to find out what the methods of natural science are. For such has been the result of our absurd reliance on the "humanities," and especially on the definition of the humanities which excludes modern science from them, that the overwhelming majority of college graduates have no adequate grasp whatever of what natural science and scientific methods are. The unfortunate divorce of the social sciences and the humanities which Professor Perry mentions is only a byproduct of a far more unfortunate divorce, namely, that between humanities and science. As a result, people apparently think that Hume represents modern science. Herein lies the main source of the schizophrenia correctly discerned by Professor Perry. He obviously does not share my idea as to the remedy, however. He speaks vaguely of "the confused ideal of a value-free social science."[7]

I certainly agree with Professor Perry that "any projected study of society which disregards the intricate ways in which behavior is structured by linguistic

[6] (New York, 1947). See especially, Ch. 1.

[7] I have dealt with that subject in a separate paper, "Alleged Obstacles to Social Science," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 70, pp. 299–305 (May, 1950). See also "Human Values—A Research Program," forthcoming in *Research Studies of the State College of Washington* (September, 1950). (Mimeographed copies available from author.)

functions will surely be vain and empty." But his further statement on this subject seems to me most dubious: "First and foremost the universe of discourse of language and common sense, however subjective and fictitious its teleological categories may seem, is certainly real, since it is a counterpart of society and civilization, which are certainly actual." If I understand this statement, it seems to assert the grossly fallacious notion that because there are words in folk language, there must be referents in nature for these words. It is a widespread but a thoroughly mischievous semantic error. I have no objection to his further statement objecting to the idea that "there is no knowledge except that which runs in terms of concepts of natural science in non-teleological categories in terms of 'colorless, impersonal sequences of cause and effect'." I would merely distinguish scientific knowledge which, as a matter of definition, has this character, from other knowledge which falls short of these characteristics.

There are many things in Professor Perry's paper which I have not commented upon and to which I have no objection. His suggestion that perhaps political science should devote itself to the art of public administration, analogously to the medical profession, engineering, or social work, rather than strive for independent status as a science, is an idea which I also advocated in a paper at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1948. Even in this role political scientists need to be on their guard against the kind of semantic fallacies I have discussed elsewhere.[8] In any event, the importance of the semantic aspect of the social sciences at present cannot be overestimated. I am not sure I understand exactly what Professor Perry means when he says, "social knowledge does not lie unborn, awaiting the midwifery of a new conceptual system." But I would call his attention to the following views on the subject by a person who speaks with some authority regarding the role of concepts in science: "The only justification for our concepts and system of concepts is that they serve to represent the complex of our experiences; beyond this they have no legitimacy. I am convinced that the philosophers have had a harmful effect upon the progress of scientific thinking in removing certain fundamental concepts from the domain of empiricism, where they are under our control, to the intangible heights of the *a priori*."[9]

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No useful purpose is served by trying to establish uniformity of usage for a word of such importance in modern civilization as "science." Not long ago it was common to regard as science any systematic body of descriptive rather than "intuitive" or "supernatural" knowledge. In this sense "political science" continues to be a well-chosen name for the empirical study of power and its institutions. More recently many specialized and narrowed definitions of science have been proposed, usually modelled upon some of the more complex and successful branches of physical science. Science comes to mean a body of descrip-

[8] "Some Views on Semantics in International Relations," *American Perspective*, Vol. 2 (June, 1948), reprinted in *Etc.: A Review of General Semantics*, Vol. 6 (Summer, 1949).

[9] A. Einstein, *The Meaning of Relativity* (Princeton, 1945), p. 2.

tive propositions which are not at once obvious to commonsense, and which depend upon rigorously constructed theoretical models which are verified by the data assembled by special procedures of observation. A "perfectionist" definition can be used to assert roundly that some of the physical or social sciences which are often called sciences are not "really" sciences. The restrictions that can be made to qualify nuclear physics as a science may exclude plant and animal ecology. And what of it? Is the implication that they cannot become more scientific, even in the "perfectionist" sense? I doubt whether the history of past guessing about the future of knowledge gives us much confidence in contemporary prophets, or that much energy can usefully be expended on perfectionist definitions.

So far as political science is concerned Mr. Perry, for instance, apparently has some doubts because Aristotle would not be startled by present results in the field. Although I do not accept the idea that shocking Aristotle is a valid criterion of attainment in political science, I think a Rip van Aristotle would look with warm approval at many of the methods and findings of modern research into political personality and perspective. His broad experience in empirical inquiry would probably render him peculiarly alert to advances in procedures of observation, no less than findings.

The following additional remarks are numbered solely for convenience of reference.

1. It needs to be more generally recognized that the most important generalizations of political science relate to contexts which are rather circumscribed in time and place.

We can dispense with the truistic statements that sometimes pass for the "universal laws" (or hypotheses) of all cultures, classes, crises and forms of personality. It is more important to know the interdependencies which characterize voting responses, for example, in contemporary American civilization.

2. Many if not all of our generalizations need to be "kept up to date" by appropriate institutions for the self-observation of society.

As the context changes, personal strategies connected with decision change. Hence the relations which have been found to hold true in the past between income and voting may be modified in the future. Our modes of self-observation must be on the alert for such significant shifts of context.

3. In the immediate future it is probable that political scientists can improve their results by paying more attention to the construction of theoretical models.

We now know that there are examples of "oligarchical" and of anti-oligarchical tendencies in mass parties. Further advance depends upon improving the theoretical models provided by Roberto Michels, perhaps transforming them into "cycle" models in which the significant factors working for and against concentration of power are revised.

Many other cyclical models would be valuable aids to the unifying of scattered observations on political behavior. One example is the "expansion-purge-expansion" cycle of single party systems. Another is the "reform-relapse-reform" cycle so often noted in American municipal affairs.

It is not a question of a spurious "law of the pendulum," but of discovering by research the component factors sufficient to account for deviations from

and restorations of a given pattern of political equilibrium. Cycle models are especially helpful in revealing structural changes, and in contributing to improved "trend models." (This has been convincingly shown in modern work on business fluctuations, as reviewed in the volumes of Wesley C. Mitchell or Joseph A. Schumpeter.)

4. Among the theoretical models which look promising for political science is the "impact model."

An impact model would be the equivalent in political science of the "input-output" models which Leontief and associates have worked out for American industry. Each industry is considered as receiving economic inputs from other industries and sending economic outputs to other industries. When these connections are understood, it is possible to trace the effect of a specific innovation—such as increased use of oil by the railroad industry—through the entire economy.

An agency of government, or a group, is always making political impacts upon other agencies or groups, and receiving impacts in turn. During a given period agency A may reduce the influence of B by cutting appropriations, by curtailing authority, by rejecting policy proposals, by criticizing in public; meanwhile agency A may be suffering similar treatment from C. It is possible to supplement the picture of our economy with a detailed and verified model of the polity.

5. Attention needs to be given to newly developed models of the decision making process.

The mathematician von Neumann and the economist Morgenstern collaborated in 1944 in applying game theory to the study of choice. This is the first mathematically well-developed theory of rational judgment and confronts the political scientist with the problem of determining whether the terms used in the mathematical notation can be given operational meaning in the situations relevant to political science.

The von Neumann—Morgenstern theory can be modified in order to "explain" choices as well as to advise on "rational" decisions. The votes of electorates, legislators, administrative bodies and courts may be accounted for by allowing for various degrees of true, false and doubtful information; by permitting *several* values to be demanded; and by allowing some demands to be rather vaguely formulated under postulated conditions of expectation.

6. From the point of view of theory and data-gathering political science can be improved by the more skillful employment of teams in the conduct of research.

The modern tools of theory building and observation are so complicated that scholarly Robinson Crusoes are often actual drags on the growth of knowledge. We need more, rather than fewer, experiments in joint investigation between mathematicians, economists, sociologists, geographers, psychologists, anthropologists and political scientists.

Consider how field interviews can be more effectively handled by joint effort. It is unnecessary for the field interviewer to be a trained psychiatrist or test psychologist if he has the benefit of advice and aid from these specialists while his work is planned and executed. By "interviewing the interviewer" it is pos-

sible to sensitize the field worker to many items of behavior that he would otherwise ignore. A trusted field worker can often obtain the consent of his subjects to take a test, provided that he administers it.

It has often been pointed out that the work now done in scattered fashion at many colleges and universities by political scientists could be more effectively performed if some of it, at least, were voluntarily fitted into a common program. This could be done through a national office, such as the REVIEW. Many surveys of opinion, personnel and impact relations—whether cyclical or not—could be made more meaningful for science and policy in this way.

It is often inexpedient for local scholars to study and make public major facts about local politics. This difficulty can be largely overcome by agreements which enable a political scientist based on Chicago to study Los Angeles, and a political scientist based on Los Angeles to study Chicago. (The same point applies across frontiers, like Mexico City and Washington.)

7. In the selection of research problems, it is important to take the major policy issues of our epoch into consideration.

Several sciences of politics are possible, including a science of democracy, and a science of pacific relations. No problem of objectivity need arise, since scientific objectivity refers to the use of the tools and not to the preferences of the observer about choice of topic.

Among the urgent questions are: How can the prospects of peace be improved in a bipolar pattern of world politics? How can the likelihood of cooperation be increased under such conditions? Under crisis conditions how can the influence of civilian agencies and policies be sustained? How can the influence of political police be kept at a minimum in such a continuing crisis? What disclosures endanger national security, and how can secrecy be restricted to such matters?

8. As theory and procedures are improved many of our predictions will become more trustworthy.

Already we do rather well in predicting many kinds of political phenomena; so well, in fact, that failure brings consternation.

9. But the ideal aim of scientific work in political affairs is not prediction but freedom.

The ultimate aim of scientific generalizations about politics is to increase the indeterminacy of important political judgments. Consider the following: Assume that research on personnel selection reveals a tendency on the part of top administrators to choose as assistants and successors persons who are calm, conciliatory, but uninterested in substantive policy. If this is not brought to general notice, the tendency may continue. But if the findings are advertised, the resulting insight may modify future selection policy. The policy may thus be evaluated (and rejected) as inconsistent with the goal values of a democratic society.

Ideally our generalizations increase freedom of choice by revealing compulsive rigidities which have determined choices in the past, and which may now be modified through insight. Hence, the ultimate aim of discovering past determinacies is to increase the indeterminacy of the future among all who have access to the findings.

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

A POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT IN FRENCH REGIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE "*SUPER PRÉFET*"

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French government traditionally has been characterized as a highly centralized system in which local officials are made generally dependent on decisions—even of a very minor character—from Paris. Emphasis has also been placed on the *préfet*, the national career administrator-politician operating at the local level of the *département*. In supervising the locally elected officials as well as applying Paris-made decisions at the local level, the *préfet* assumes an important centralizing administrative (and sometimes political) role.

Accompanying this recognition of the centralization of government and of the vital role of the *préfet* is the realization of many years' standing that the organization of French local administration on the basis of many *départements* (now ninety) is highly artificial and inefficient. Upon occasion, this arrangement may even hamper seriously the maintenance of internal order. Such was the case during the serious social-economic disturbances in France, especially in the coal mining region, in the autumn of 1947.[1] Paradoxically, French government, while highly centralized, was not equipped to deal expeditiously with crucial regional situations inevitably spreading over many *départements*. Nor was this structure well devised for promoting economic and other coordination within and among regions of France—a matter of especially great importance in this postwar period.

Discussion concerning the possible interposition of institutions of regional administration between the level of the *département* and of Paris antedated the last war by many years but led to no changes. During the early war period this subject was not ignored by the Vichy regime, which instituted a system of

* M. Sicard is also serving as *Directeur du Cabinet* of the *Préfet* (Haute-Garonne), who is also the *Inspecteur Général de l'Administration en Mission Extraordinaire* in the region of Toulouse (Fifth), or "*Super Préfet.*"

[1] It is not suggested that the structure of local administration was a causative factor in these disturbances, which grew out of the harsh difficulties of the postwar inflation, exploited by Communists. Cf. Fred W. Riggs, "France: The Fourth Republic on Trial," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 24, p. 207 (Jan. 15, 1949). The lack of regional officials at a higher level than that of the *département*, however, presented a serious problem to the Government in its efforts to take swift and well-coordinated action to preserve order and prevent destruction in the mines.

six regional *préfets*.[2] Upon Liberation, this institution was replaced by that of the *Commissaires de la République*, an innovation which had been projected several months earlier. With the possibility in mind of a long and difficult military operation, it was decided to grant these regional officials rather extensive legislative and administrative powers to be exercised during the period of destroyed and inadequate communication facilities.[3] Although a few of these officials were the instruments of unprecedented decentralization during the limited period of disturbed communication following the unexpectedly short military action,[4] this new organ was abolished in March, 1946, after having been reduced in scope in October, 1945.

It then appeared that this brief experience of regional administration was to be succeeded by a complete return to the prewar system. The dropping of the war-time innovations was due in part to their association with the name of Vichy and to the fact that certain administrative abuses had developed in the institution of the *Commissaire* as a result of the unusual circumstances under which it existed. Why, then, did the Government introduce a *projet de loi* in late 1947,[5] providing for the establishment of a system of *Inspecteurs Généraux de l'Administration en Mission Extraordinaire*, whose title was understandably (although not entirely accurately) telescoped by the press to the term "*Super Préfets?*"

Before examining briefly the nature of the functions of the new *Inspecteurs Généraux*,[6] the thinking underlying their creation may be noted. When the previously cited large-scale disorders occurred in October, 1947, attention was focused on the atomization of civil authority at the local level among ninety *départements* and on the contrast between this and the more practicable structure (at least for policing needs) of the existing eight military regions (for army administration). In his explanation of the *projet*, the Minister of the Interior,

[2] Space limitations do not permit an analysis of this development. Suffice it to mention that a *Décret* of April 19, 1941, created in the southern unoccupied zone six prefectoral regions: Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, Clermont-Ferrand, Limoges, and Toulouse. Notwithstanding a reference to the need for institutions of regional administration and coordination, the regional *préfets* were merely endowed with special police and economic powers (rule-making power relating to production, rationing, and price control).

[3] *Ordonnance* of January 10, 1944. Their powers related generally to maintenance of public order, economic affairs, legislative elimination of Vichy laws and regulations, and certain emergency matters. Their number was not fixed.

[4] This was especially true in the region of Toulouse, which had practically no effective communications with Paris for a few months. The statement regarding unprecedented decentralization is based partly on observations of one of the authors (Abbott) during his service as economic analyst in southern France for the Auxiliary Foreign Service. The increased scope of local initiative in decision-making, however, proved to be very ephemeral.

[5] Enacted March 21, 1948.

[6] Although the term "*super préfet*" appears in the title of this article and has been employed rather widely by the French press, it was decided to use the more exact term *Inspecteur Général* during the course of this analysis. An evaluation of the validity of the former term may be inferred from this article.

Jules Moch, particularly stressed the disparity between the civil and military units of local administration; it is apparent that the problems of dealing with possible future strike violence were uppermost in his mind.[7] While this attitude is comprehensible, in terms of the Minister's preoccupations of the period, it resulted in the creation of regions whose geographical limits were conceived primarily in terms of military expediency, that is, the preservation of internal order. Economic and other civil criteria were thus ignored, or given secondary consideration, in the delineation of the eight administrative areas. Largely by chance, three of the areas were well constituted in terms of non-military considerations, while five were poorly defined.[8] This institution, however, is not rigidly set up—either in terms of its area or functions. Its flexibility may enable it to eliminate or minimize this handicap. In other respects, to be indicated later, this quality may prove to be an important asset.

Established in March, 1948, the institution of *Inspecteur Général en Mission Extraordinaire* was assigned the following general functions: (1) to coordinate on a regional basis measures of public security; (2) to carry on specific functions delegated by the Minister of the Interior or other Ministers (delegated by means of *lettres de service*); and (3) to provide information and coordination when requested by national Ministers.[9]

At first glance, this grant would seem to imply the creation of a new administrative layer in local government largely supplanting the historic *préfet*. Such, however, is not the case. Unlike the Vichy *Préfet Régional* and the post-Liberation *Commissaire de la République* who had general rule-making power in the police and economic fields, the present *Inspecteur Général* does not have a regulatory jurisdiction. He has not been delegated specific powers by national Ministers (although this is possible). The *préfet*, generally, has kept his prewar functions.

The significant feature, however, of the new institution is that a very useful mechanism for coordination is provided. There is a tendency toward coordination not only among the *préfets* and *départements* in a region but also among the national ministries carrying out activities affecting the region.

[7] Indirectly, this was given emphasis by Moch in that he sought to assure the *préfets* (members of a special career service directed by the Minister of the Interior) that they would continue to exercise the existing functions. The only change would be that the *Inspecteurs Généraux* would receive from the Minister of the Interior certain of his own powers. Rather than a decrease in the functions of the *préfets*, this would amount to a certain decentralization from Paris. This assurance reflected, in part, the Minister's desire to maintain the *esprit de corps* of the *préfets* and, in part, the influence and political pressure of these officials.

[8] The former category includes the regions of Toulouse, Rennes, and Dijon. For civil administration the headquarters cities are poorly located in the regions of Bordeaux, Marseille, Metz, and Lille. The region of Lyon is so constituted that communication between distant points is quite difficult. The number of *départements* within a region varies from eight to thirteen.

[9] *Décret* of March 4, 1948. In addition to the *Inspecteurs Généraux*, there are several assistant grades of *inspecteurs* and *adjoints à l'inspection*.

More and more the new *Inspecteurs Généraux* appear to be developing into veritable general secretaries of the national government in the provinces. They are increasingly assuming a role never fully discharged by the *préfets*. Although the *préfets* are supposedly the agents of Paris and the focal point of the central government in the *départements*, in practice the central ministries developed the habit in many instances of ignoring the Ministry of the Interior and its agents—the *préfets*—insofar as the ministerial functions relating to the *départements* were concerned. Certain local representatives of the Paris ministries (*chefs de service départementaux*), in carrying out their technical functions, had sought to deal independently and directly with local officials (*conseils départementaux* and *maires*, etc.). This resulted upon occasion in confusing and costly duplication and overlapping of ministerial activities in the locality. It sometimes had the further effect of reducing the prestige and usefulness of the *préfet*.

The new institution of *Inspecteur Général* has been able to check this undesirable trend and to enhance the value of the *préfet*. At the national level this change has been due in considerable measure to the stimulus of the Minister of the Interior. M. Moch, in speaking to an assemblage of *préfets* on May 18, 1949, pointed out that the *Inspecteurs Généraux* had not only carried out successfully the task for which they had been especially created (the preservation of internal order)[10] but also had rendered service to various ministries, in particular, Finance, National Economy, Agriculture, Labor, Industry, and the president of the *Conseil National*.

M. Moch reminded the *préfets* that most of them had reacted unfavorably to the creation of the *Inspecteurs Généraux*, fearing that they represented a resurrection of the Vichy hierarchy and a serious blow to their prerogatives. These apprehensions, however, were unfounded. Furthermore, continued Moch, the new officials were helping to bring together the various *préfets* in a region into closer contact, and thus to enhance the effectiveness of their operations.

This coordination of the *préfets* as well as of the representatives of the ministries has been facilitated by the technique of assigning some *Inspecteurs Généraux* the second and simultaneous role of *préfet* in the headquarters *département* of their region. Four *préfets*—in Rennes, Toulouse, Lyon, and Metz—were given this double job. The other four, curiously, were instructed to operate out of Paris.[11] The stated reason for employing the two contrasting methods is that a useful experimentation would result. Residence in Paris, supplemented by occasional visits to the region, would assure a closeness of contact between

[10] M. Moch had reference to the second wave of strikes during October and November, 1948, succeeding the first in October, 1947, which had inspired the creation of the new institution. The 1948 disorders were more easily suppressed. He suggested to the *préfets* in his audience that they—like himself—had felt more secure this later time due to the sureness of decision and rapidity of execution resulting from the effective decentralization of authority to these new civil officials in the regions concerned.

[11] In July, 1949, the ratio was altered to five resident in the regions and three in Paris. One of those resident in Paris, M. Jouany, interestingly, was appointed to the *Conseil d'Etat*, where his administrative knowledge is put to another use. His successor, M. Haas-Picard, is also *Préfet* of la Côte-d'Or.

the new institution and the Ministry of the Interior and the central government. On the other hand, residence in the region would give the new official a close familiarity with the daily problems of the region. This knowledge, in addition to his frequent association with local officials, would bolster his local standing.

While it is too early to conclude which of the two methods is preferable, there appear to be certain advantages in a residence in the region. With the emphasis on his role as a coordinator, rather than a commander, the *Inspecteur Général* is particularly aided in his rapport with the *préfets* of his region by the fact of his service in the same work.

The case of M. Emile Pelletier, *Inspecteur Général* of the region of Toulouse (Fifth) and *Préfet* of la Haute-Garonne, is illustrative of this point and also well indicates the types of contributions which this new post has made. To take an expression of the famous poet, Charles Peguy, Pelletier is among the new officials who have "le plus empli leur mission."

In part, he is aided by the fact that he has had the longest service of the *préfets* of his region. Moreover, he is the *préfet* of the most important *département* of the region. However, the significant fact is that his authority is suggested, rather than imposed. He has no veto power over the decisions of the *préfets*. Such negative means, however, would not be effective in seeking the attainment of cooperation, particularly in the important area of economic affairs.

In this field, unanimity is essential to success. For example, the fixing of meat prices is effected by prefectoral regulation in the individual *départements*. To achieve cooperation and to avoid the possibility of speculators taking advantage of a break in the administrative front, the *Inspecteur Général* assembles the various *préfets* in order to work out a common program. Thus, regional coordination is achieved without sacrificing local autonomy.

Other instances of cooperative activity under the auspices of this official have been the creation of an interdepartmental sanatorium; the development of a program to stimulate more tourism in this region of the Pyrenees; the handling of the problem of clandestine immigration from Spain; and the working out of coordinated departmental budgets.

The advantage of flexibility achieved by means of informal coordination appears in that some subjects have not required the attention of all twelve of the *départements* in the region. For example, the tourist program interests only seven, the sanatorium only six, a certain water project only three, etc. Regarding these, as well as other economic and administrative matters, the *Inspecteur Général* has the additional task of keeping the central government informed. The consolidating of this operation in the hands of eight, rather than ninety, officials has simplified and aided the work of Paris officials.

The new institution of *Inspecteur Général* has not impinged basically on the functions of the purely local governmental agencies, the assemblies or councils of the *départements* and the *communes*. In fact, as previously noted, the jurisdiction of the *préfets* remains substantially unaltered, with the result that there are no official relationships between the *Inspecteur Général* and the local organs.

The *préfet* continues to be the point of contact between the national and local governments.[12] Moreover, he is still the adviser (*tuteur*) of the local assemblies, a role which has been his since long before this century.[13] The Constitution of 1946 implied a certain increase in the local functions of the councils *vis-à-vis* the *préfets*,[14] and a legislative proposal has been advanced along this line.[15] However, parliament has not approved this change (as of December, 1949). Even if such a modification were to be made, its effect would be largely illusory in view of the decreasing importance of the *département* in real economic and administrative terms.[16]

In conclusion, while the expression "*super préfet*" may give an exaggerated impression of the powers and position of the new regional officials, it is clear that practical necessity and influential governmental thinking have recently led to the creation and implementation of a significant device for regional coordination. The new agents have not supplanted the historic officers of local government, nor are they the instruments of any appreciable decentralization. However, it is quite probable that they will become increasingly effective in stimulating, coordinating, and improving the relations between the national ministries, the *préfets*, and the local units of government and in enabling Paris to handle better the many difficult problems of regional and national scope. The new institution has the advantage of not operating under rigid textual provisions. It may therefore develop empirically and adapt itself to the necessities of the hour—a factor essential to its utility and durability.

[12] Informally, the *Inspecteur Général* may make suggestions (e.g., regarding the budget of the *département* or *commune*), which he can ask the appropriate *préfet* to pass on to the assembly.

[13] The relationships between the *préfet* and the *département* are still governed by the law of August 10, 1871, and those between the former and the *commune* by law of April 5, 1884.

[14] Article 87: "Les collectivités territoriales s'administrent librement par des Conseils élus au suffrage universel. L'exécution des décisions de ces Conseils est assurée par leur Maire ou leur Président."

[15] This proposal would make the president of the departmental council the chief of departmental administration. The role of the *préfet* would be concentrated mainly in the area of coordinating the national officials in the area and representing national interests.

[16] For example, jurisdiction over roads has been increasingly transferred from the *départements* to the national government. Prefectoral personnel are now under national control. Departmental property has been turned over partially to national direction, etc.

VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AS COMPARED WITH 1924 IN A TYPICAL OHIO COMMUNITY

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The AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW in November, 1925, contained a brief report* of a study and survey made in Delaware, Ohio, in connection with the 1924 presidential elections. This report was based on data sheets secured by interviewing over 4,000 individual residents of the community who were qualified voters. After the completion of these individual personal data the voters were separated from the non-voters by consulting the official poll books of the presidential election of November 4, 1924. The results were tabulated under the following heads: nativity, parentage, length of residence in the community, sex, age, race, family relationship, marital status, type of neighborhood, type of dwelling, education, religious affiliation and occupation.

The percentage of voters and non-voters in each category made many interesting comparisons possible. The favorable attention given to the report by political scientists in many parts of the country seemed to bear out the belief of the author that the "microscopic study of political units has value."

In the fall of 1948, it was decided to repeat the study using the same procedures and exactly the same data sheets for the same community examined twenty-four years before. The purpose of the 1948 survey was two fold: (1) to make comparisons again between the various categories of voters, and (2) to make comparisons between the voting habits of voters in the same community now and twenty-four years ago.

As in 1924 the personal solicitation in 1948 was done almost entirely by undergraduate students in political science at Ohio Wesleyan University. A group of advanced students under the supervision of members of the faculty was placed in charge of interviews in each precinct. Students were organized into canvassing teams for each precinct with a specially trained advanced student acting as captain. As in the earlier survey the student solicitors were cautioned not to be unduly aggressive in asking for information. Over 4,000 persons, eligible to vote, were interviewed. Since the estimated population of Delaware is about 9,500, the data sheets represent a fairly complete record of the voters of the community. Every precinct of the city was canvassed with equal thoroughness, although very naturally a number of voters could not be reached because of absence from home and for other reasons, and a very small number refused to give the requested information. The data sheets of the voters were separated from those of the non-voters by using the official poll books for the 1948 presidential election.

It would be unfair, of course, to generalize from such a limited study. On the basis of this local survey, however, the most satisfactory voting records were found among (1) voters in their fifties and sixties (although those in the sixties

* Ben A. Arneson, "Non-Voting in a Typical Ohio Community," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 19, pp. 816–825 (1925).

did not do as well as in 1924), (2) those living in the best neighborhoods, (3) persons who had been in college, (4) those engaged in banking, insurance or real estate, (5) those engaged in public service, including public officials, (6) professional men, including teachers, and (7) persons engaged in clerical occupations. Very poor voting records were found among (1) voters who had resided in the city less than two years, (2) voters in the twenty to thirty year age group, (3) those living in the poorest neighborhoods, (4) those with no religious affiliation, and (5) retired persons.

In general the percentage of voters in the various categories followed much the same pattern in 1948 as in 1924. For example, the five religious denominations which showed the best voting records in 1924 (Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Catholic, Reformed and Methodist) were also the leaders twenty-four years later—not in exactly the same order, to be sure. With one exception, however, the voting percentages of the five were slightly lower in 1948 than in 1924. This is not surprising because the average participation of all voters dropped from 64.3 per cent in 1924 to 62.2 per cent in 1948.

An interesting change took place in the percentage of women voting (from 57.1 per cent in 1924 to 61.5 per cent in 1948). Other instances of improvement in the voting participation included: (1) voters of foreign parentage (from 37.4 per cent in 1924 to 62.6 per cent in 1948), (2) persons over seventy years of age (from 56.5 to 63.3 per cent), (3) colored voters (from 50.4 to 57.1 per cent), (4) public school teachers (from 72.5 to 77.5 per cent), and (5) those living in the best neighborhoods (from 74.0 to 80.0 per cent).

At the same time certain categories showed decreases in voting participation. Among these were: (1) voters in their twenties (from 59.1 per cent in 1924 to 49.7 per cent in 1948), (2) voters in the sixty year age group (from 81.2 to 69.9 per cent), and (3) Those whose formal education terminated sometime during the high school level (from 69.6 to 60.2 per cent). Both business executives as well as members of the skilled and unskilled labor groups showed decreases. In some categories the total number of voters interviewed was so small as to make any generalizations of little or no value. Hence, no comparisons or comments are made. At any rate these are the results of two "microscopic" studies of the voting habits of the same community made twenty-four years apart, but with the use of exactly the same techniques and procedure.

PERCENTAGES VOTING, 1924 AND 1948

	1924	*1948*		*1924*	*1948*
TOTAL	64.3	62.2	SEX		
PARENTAGE			Male	72.9	63.1
Native	64.8	60.8	Female	57.1	61.5
Mixed	69.1	69.1	AGE		
Foreign	37.4	62.6	21–29	59.1	49.7
TERM OF RESIDENCE IN CITY			30–39	64.0	61.4
Over two years	65.9	62.4	40–49	64.9	65.5
Two years or less	48.6	44.6	50–59	69.8	69.9

	1924	*1948*
60–69	81.2	69.9
70–	56.5	63.3
RACE		
White	65.0	64.0
Colored	50.4	57.1
FAMILY RELATIONSHIP		
Head	71.7	64.6
Wife	57.2	62.8
Son	67.9	52.9
Daughter	66.3	64.7
Parent	43.0	67.5
Boarder	43.9	50.0
Miscellaneous	63.9	58.3
MARITAL CONDITION		
Married	65.7	61.4
Single	60.7	56.7
TYPE OF NEIGHBORHOOD		
Very good	74.0	80.0
Good	67.6	65.4
Fair	60.8	57.1
Poor	44.5	45.9
TYPE OF DWELLING		
House	64.9	64.5
Apartment	61.6	59.9
Flat	65.8	46.4
Store	66.7	61.5
OWNERSHIP OF HOME		
Yes	68.9	63.3
No	57.8	54.6
EDUCATION		
None	34.9	53.1
Elementary	57.2	53.5
High School	69.6	60.2
College	78.1	75.7
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION		
Methodist	66.0	67.0
Presbyterian	76.2	69.6
Catholic	73.7	64.1
Protestant	61.6	59.3
Reformed	69.7	68.3
Lutheran	65.7	63.1
Baptist	56.1	57.3
Episcopalian	78.0	67.9
United Brethren	57.1	57.6
Congregational	64.3	61.9
Seventh Day Adventist	54.5	41.7
Miscellaneous	50.4	63.3
None	46.8	50.0
OCCUPATIONS		
Agriculture	71.2	47.4
Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries—		
Business executives incl. contractors	85.9	69.0
Carpenters and painters	75.2	61.7
Laborers	63.1	52.4
Machinists and mechanics	65.1	54.4
Total	66.8	55.5
Transportation—		
Railroad and traction employees	80.2	63.4
Trade—		
Banking, insurance, and real estate	85.7	72.7
Merchants	77.7	72.7
Salesmen and clerks	74.0	69.4
Total	77.3	71.7
Public service incl. public officials	88.1	75.2
Professional service—		
Professions, including doctors, lawyers, ministers	79.5	76.6
College teachers	84.7	79.5
Public school teachers	72.5	77.5
Total	78.3	77.9
Domestic and personal service	60.4	62.4
Clerical occupations	69.4	72.7
Housekeepers	55.6	59.8
Students	79.5	69.1
Retired	68.8	41.9
No occupation	53.5	62.5

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES AND INSTITUTES

The International Political Science Association will hold its first Conference in Zurich, Switzerland, from September 4–9, 1950. Several joint sessions will be held with the International Sociological Association, which will meet during the same period, to discuss the "Role of Minorities in International Relations." The following topics will be included on the agenda of the International Political Science Association:

a. Comparative electoral systems, with particular reference to their influence upon political parties, public opinion, and the nature of the political regime.
b. The role of the citizen in a planned society, political and sociological aspects.
c. What are the *minimum* conditions for an effective and permanent Union of States, with special reference to powers, jurisdiction, and finance?

Information regarding the activities and program of the Association and the Conference can be obtained from its Executive Secretary-Treasurer, M. Jean Meynaud, 27, rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7e. Applications for individual membership may also be made to the Secretary-Treasurer. The dues are $2.00 per year for members of the American Political Science Association. Members receive the *International Social Science Bulletin*, published quarterly by UNESCO.

The Provisional Executive Committee, of which Professor Quincy Wright is President, will meet during the Conference and will include in its discussions a consideration of teaching methods and the status of political science in universities, the question of preparing a monograph on methodology and the publication of an *International Political Science Review*.

James K. Pollock, President of the American Political Science Association, has made tentative plans to represent the Association at the Zurich meeting.

The International Committee for Comparative Law, organized under the auspices of UNESCO in March, 1949, will hold its first meeting for general discussion in London on Thursday, July 20, 1950. The meeting, which will be in association with the International Bar Association meeting to be held at the same time, will be devoted to the subject of the teaching of comparative law. Morning and afternoon sessions will be divided between two problems of primary concern to teachers and students of comparative law, namely (1) the teaching of common law by schools of common law to persons trained in other systems, and (2) comparative law as a means of education in culture patterns. The common law discussion will be led by C. J. Hamson, reader in comparative law at the University of Cambridge, and will draw upon that University's extensive experience, particularly with French jurists. The discussion of comparative law in culture patterns will be led by René David, professor of comparative civil law in the Faculty of Law of Paris. Chairmen of the two sessions

will be Dean Leon Julliot de la Morandière of Paris and Professor H. C. Gutteridge of Cambridge.

The London sessions are but a part of the extensive program inaugurated by UNESCO in the field of law. A contract has been signed with the University of Paris to prepare the first of a series of volumes to be devoted to tensions caused by differences in the French and English legal systems. This work is part of the "tensions project" inaugurated three years ago by UNESCO and furthered by Otto Klineberg of Columbia University.

The International Committee for Comparative Law brings together national organizations concerned with comparative law. For national groups having no fully representative national organizations it has endeavored to bring about the formation of such organizations. Especially has this been the case in England and the United States. In all probability the American Foreign Law Association will make application to represent the comparative lawyers of the United States on the International Committee. It is expected that groups from all continents will ultimately be represented. Meanwhile a provisional executive committee, selected by UNESCO, continues to function under the chairmanship of Dean de la Morandière. Election of a new executive committee is expected to occur in 1951. Under present plans the comparative lawyers of the United States through their association would have a permanent seat on the executive committee.

Reports having to do with the work of the International Committee appear in the semi-annual bi-lingual *International Social Science Bulletin*, published by UNESCO and distributed in the United States by the Columbia University Press.—JOHN N. HAZARD.

The American Society for Public Administration held its annual conference in Washington, D.C., March 10–12, with a registration of 651 persons. Featured on the program of the conference were addresses by Gordon R. Clapp, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and of the recent United Nations Survey Mission for the Middle East, and Thomas A. Morgan, chairman of the Board of Speary Corporation and of the President's Advisory Committee on Management Improvement. The former spoke on administrative frontiers in the Middle East, while the latter described the purposes and activities of the Advisory Committee on Management Improvement. A summary of the conference sessions appears in the spring issue of the *Public Administration Review*.

In addition to its annual conference, the Society held several regional meetings during the academic year 1949–50. These included a meeting for the Pacific Northwest area held in Seattle on September 30, a meeting for the Pacific Southwest area held in Los Angeles on November 10, and a meeting for the Southern area held in Knoxville on November 12. The Society now has 47 local chapters which bring together public officials and teachers and students of public administration, as well as other interested persons.

The Citizenship Clearing House of New York University held a series of conferences during the academic year 1949–50. These conferences were attended

by representatives of departments of political science and of institutions of higher learning, men engaged in active political life, and representatives of non-partisan political organizations. A conference for the New England area was held in Boston, November 18–19, with Lashley G. Harvey of Boston University cooperating in planning the program. Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New Jersey, former Governor Joseph B. Ely of Massachusetts, and John C. Atkinson, city manager of Cambridge, addressed this meeting. At the invitation of President Harold W. Dodds of Princeton University, a conference was held on December 3 at Princeton for all the institutions of higher learning in New Jersey, and, at the invitation of President Arthur Fleming of the Ohio Wesleyan University, a conference for the institutions of higher learning in Ohio was held in Columbus December 9–10. The latter conference was addressed by Charles P. Taft of Cincinnati. Ben A. Arneson, director of the Institute of Practical Politics of Ohio Wesleyan University, assisted the staff of the Citizenship Clearing House in making arrangements for this conference.

The California Institute of World Affairs held its twenty-sixth annual session at Riverside, California, December 11–14, 1949, under the chancellorship of Rufus B. von Kleinsmid of the University of Southern California, and the directorship of Charles E. Martin of the department of political science of the University of Washington. Representatives of colleges and universities of the Pacific Coast area as well as government officials participated in the presentation of the program, which was devoted to the general theme, "Prospects for World Stability." Professor J. William Robinson, chairman of the department of political science of Whittier College, was elected director of the Institute for its twenty-seventh session, to be held in December, 1950.

The seventh annual meeting of the Institute of Public Affairs of the University of New Hampshire was held December 14, 1949. Members of the New Hampshire Reorganization Commission participated in the program, which was devoted to state government reorganization. The meeting was addressed by Governor Sherman Adams of New Hampshire.

A conference on modern France was held at Princeton, New Jersey, February 1–4, under the joint sponsorship of the Institute for Advanced Study and Columbia, Harvard, Princeton and Yale Universities. Participants in the conference included representatives from sixteen American universities, the United States Department of State, and the Economic Cooperation Administration. A special feature of the program was a public lecture on "Approaches to an Understanding of Modern France" by André Robert Siegfried, French political scientist and economic geographer.

A symposium on the topic, "The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality," was presented at the University of Notre Dame February 7–8, 1950. Included in this symposium were papers by Waldemar Gurian, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame and editor of the *Review of Politics;* Michael Karpovich, professor of history and chairman of the Slavic

department of Harvard University; Stephen Kertesy, former Hungarian minister to Italy and now visiting professor at Yale Law School; Philip E. Mosely, professor of history and international relations and member of the Russian Institute at Columbia University; Valadimir Petrov, instructor at Yale University; Naum Jasny, economist and member of the Food Research Institute at Stanford University; N. S. Timasheff, professor of sociology at Fordham University; and Francis Dvornik, professor at the Dumbarton Oaks Research Center of Harvard University. The symposium was sponsored by a committee on international relations which is financed in part by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The committee was organized by the University of Notre Dame in October, 1949.

The Minnesota World Affairs Center sponsored a Far East Institute February 17–19, in cooperation with the University of Minnesota. The Institute was addressed by A. T. Steele, American newsman who has covered China for the New York *Times* and the Chicago *Daily News;* U So Nyun, Burmese ambassador to the United States; and Livingston T. Merchant, deputy assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs, United States Department of State. Other participants on the program included: Colonel Roland S. Henderson, former military government officer for Nara Prefecture, Japan; Herman S. Reisig, international relations secretary, Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches of America; Mrs. Theodore D. Walser, field representative, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; and Jan O. M. Broek, George P. Conger, Richard B. Mather, Harold S. Quigley, Robert F. Spencer, Roland S. Vaile, and George B. Vold, all of the University of Minnesota.

Two Institutes will be conducted by the University of Denver during the period June 19 to July 21. An Institute on International Administration will have as lecturers officials of the United States Department of State and the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The course of study will be devoted in part to the following subjects: "Concepts of International Administration," "Administrative Problems in the Development of the United Nations," "Administrative Problems in the Operation of the United Nations Specialized Agencies," "Administrative Problems in the Conduct of United States Activities Abroad," and "International Administration and United States Foreign Policy." The Institute will be under the direction of Albert H. Rosenthal, of the University of Denver.

An Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union will feature a series of lectures by four members of the faculty of Harvard University: Merle Fainsod, professor of government; Alexander Gerschenkron, associate professor of economics and director of the Economic Project at the Russian Research Center; Alex Inkeles, lecturer on social relations and research associate of the Russian Research Center; and Michael Karpovich, professor of Russian history. C. Dale Fuller of the department of international relations of the University of Denver will serve as coordinator for this Institute.

The third session of the Mount Holyoke Institute on the United Nations will be held in South Hadley, Massachusetts, from June 25 to July 22, 1950. The theme for this session is: "Toward a World Community." The weekly program topics are: "Building the Foundations: Technical Assistance and Point Four," "Extending the Community of Nations: Germany and Japan," "Developing Regional Groupings: Intermediate or Final Step," and "Prospects for a World Community: A Five Year Appraisal of the United Nations." Weekly trips to Lake Success will be a special feature of the session.

The 1950 Institute for Annual Review of United Nations Affairs will be held June 26-30 under the joint auspices of the Program of Studies in United Nations and World Affairs of New York University and the Department of Public Information of the United Nations. The program of the Institute will include a review by United Nations officials of the activities of the United Nations during the past year. Day sessions will be held at Lake Success, and evening sessions will be held at New York University.

The second annual Colgate University conference on American foreign policy will be held at Hamilton, New York, July 7–13, 1950, with Charles R. Wilson as director. The conference will feature a series of panels, symposia and round-tables on the general theme, "American Foreign Policy: An Offensive for Freedom." The round tables will be devoted to the following topics: "Round-up on Point Four," "Business and Foreign Policy," "The United Nations: Economic and Social Activities," "Latin America," "The Far East," "Russia, Central Europe and the Near East," and "Strategic Considerations and Foreign Policy." The program for the conference was developed in consultation with the Division of Public Liaison of the United States Department of State, the United States Mission to the United Nations, the United States National Commission of UNESCO, the Foreign Policy Association, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the New York Citizens' Council, and the Adult Education Bureau of the New York State Education Department.

The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan will hold its third Institute in Survey Research Techniques July 24 to August 18, 1950. In connection with this Institute, courses will be offered for university instructors, graduate students, and persons employed in business and governmental research.

A special summer session in Latin American studies, emphasizing political science in Hispanic America, will be conducted at the University of North Carolina in the summer of 1950. The faculty for the session will include representatives from the modern language, political science, history, geography and anthropology departments of the University. In addition, the faculty will include J. Lloyd Mecham of the University of Texas, as well as several distinguished Latin American historians and political scientists. Collaborating with the University of North Carolina in sponsoring the session will be the Institute

of Latin American Studies at Chapel Hill. The session will be the third of a series of cooperative summer schools conducted by the University of North Carolina, the University of Texas, and Tulane and Vanderbilt Universities. These four universities are participating in a broad program of Latin American studies under the provision of a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

A program for visiting German experts on the subject of American legislation and legislative processes was recently inaugurated at the University of Michigan, in cooperation with the Commission on Occupied Areas. The department of political science of the University of Michigan has had major responsibility for conducting this program. The program was planned with a view toward providing opportunities for observation and study at the federal, state and local levels, as well as with a view toward emphasizing democratic influences in the total legislative process and in legislative-administrative relationships. The first group of German experts, some of them members of German legislative bodies, arrived in the United States early in March.

Responding to a suggestion originating with the Washington chapter of the American Political Science Association, the United States Office of Education has made arrangements to assist persons visiting Washington, D.C., for conducting research in political science. It will assist visiting political scientists in finding persons in various government and private agencies in the Washington area who know the nature and location of their agencies' documents, who are able to explain the agencies' programs, organization, and operations, who are acquainted with those of the agencies' displays and exhibits which may be useful in explaining to interested visitors the agencies' activities, or who may be available to talk with visiting groups about the agencies' work. Claude E. Hawley, chief for social science in the Office of Education, will attempt to facilitate the arrangement of interviews and conferences between government officials and the visiting scholars. The Office is working with the committee on the advancement of political science teaching and the research committee of the American Political Science Association in conducting studies of current teaching practices and research projects in political science.

The University of Denver recently observed significant anniversaries in the history of Czechoslovakia with a view toward emphasizing the influence which the Czechoslovakian tragedy may have in strengthening American concepts of democracy and freedom. The program for the celebration of the anniversaries included a panel of three authorities in foreign affairs: Josef Korbel, former Czechoslovak ambassador to Yugoslavia; Richard Brown of the United States Department of State; and S. Harrison Thomsen, professor of history of the University of Colorado and editor of the *Journal of Central European Affairs*.

The American University, Washington, D.C., announces the award of fourteen Dunham-Devor fellowships in public management to federal employees.

Selectees for the eleventh administrative intern program are: Cumbie Bowen and Arthur M. Martin, Department of Agriculture; Richard B. Belknap and Aubrey A. Gunnels, Department of the Army; Eugene G. Brame and John M. Williams, Civil Service Commission; Charles T. Dye, Federal Security Agency; Milton J. Friedman and Donald L. Goodwin, General Services Administration; Richard L. Saintsing, United States Maritime Commission; Carl W. Easton and Laurin A. Knutson, Department of the Navy; and Edward J. Bush and Harry V. Elkner, Veterans Administration. Selection of the interns is based on a screening process, which includes review of experience and academic records, recommendations of employing agencies, written examinations, and personal interviews.

A school of Public Administration was recently created at Florida State University as successor to the department of public administration which was organized at the University in 1947. The staff of the School includes Wilson K. Doyle, dean; Michael P. Balwan, E. Maxwell Benton and Edward Eikman, associate professors; Lewis J. Lapham, assistant professor; Juanita Gibson, instructor; and Angus Laird, supervisor of the Florida state merit system, and D. P. Wolfe, city manager of Albany, Georgia, visiting professors. The School has inaugurated a research and instructional program and is rendering consultation services to public officials. It sponsored more than thirty lectures by state and federal officials during the academic year 1949–50.

The bureau of municipal research of the University of Texas became the Institute of Public Affairs with an expanded program of research, training and consultation services, on February 1, 1950. The staff of the bureau forms the nucleus for the staff of the Institute, while additional personnel is to be employed as the new program develops. Stuart A. MacCorkle, professor of government at the University of Texas and director of the bureau of municipal research since 1937, has been named director of the Institute.

Ralph J. Bunche, United Nations mediator in Palestine, is the recipient of the first annual Yale Political Union award for distinguished public service. The award was presented on the occasion of the Gardner White Memorial debate meeting in January.

John M. Gaus of Harvard University was guest lecturer at Emory University during the week of January 16, 1950. His engagements for the week included an address before the Georgia Academy of Social Sciences on the topic, "The Place of the States in the Federal System." In addition, he delivered a series of lectures before classes in political science and conducted a seminar on the topic, "The Role of Administration in the Process of Government." Participants in the seminar included members of the faculties of Emory and neighboring universities as well as representatives of civic organizations and local, state and federal offices in Atlanta.

The University of Minnesota and its department of political science were

hosts on March 6 to a Japanese Diet delegation consisting of fourteen persons and including ten members of the Diet.

Professor Andrew Nuquist has recently been given leave with salary by the trustees of the University of Vermont in order to permit him to spend the summer in the field surveys which are being made by the Committee on the Advancement of Teaching under the chairmanship of Professor Marshall Dimock. The Committee on the Advancement of Teaching has received an additional grant of $10,000 from the Carnegie Corporation in order to complete further studies in preparation for a final report.

Professors Herman Beyle of Syracuse University and R. C. Spencer of Coe College have been appointed to represent the American Political Science Association on a committee on Mathematical Training of Social Scientists established by the Mathematical Association of America.

Professor Joseph Ray of the University of Maryland will represent the American Political Science Association on the National Committee for the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth.

Fulbright Act Opportunities for Political Scientists. The Fulbright Act provides for a program of educational exchange with the following countries: United Kingdom and British Colonial Dependencies, Australia, Egypt, Iran, Belgium and Luxembourg, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Burma, the Philippines, New Zealand, India, and Norway. Programs for Austria, Turkey, Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand are in the process of formulation. The senior members of the American Political Science Association will be interested in the opportunities for obtaining visiting lectureships or for pursuing advanced research, while student members will be interested in the assistance offered for further graduate study. Heads of departments and university and college administrators will be interested in the facilities provided by the program to bring foreign scholars to their institutions as lecturers or staff members on research projects. Since the funds which support the program are in foreign currencies, it should be borne in mind that foreigners receive only travel grants to the United States and that they therefore must have other means of financial support for living and travel while in this country. The maximum expenditure which any country can spend on the program in any one year is the equivalent in its foreign currency of one million dollars.

The general supervision of the program, including the approval of policies and projects and the selection of all candidates and institutions participating in the program, both in the United States and abroad, is the responsibility of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, consisting of ten members appointed by the president and serving without compensation. The responsibility for the general administration of the program rests with the Division of International Exchange of Persons of the Department of State. At the request of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, four agencies in the United States have been designated to assist in the selection of candidates and in performing related services: The Commit-

tee on International Exchange of Persons of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, for lecturing and advanced research awards; the Institute of International Education, for applications for graduate and predoctoral research awards; the United States Office of Education, for elementary and secondary-school teaching awards; and the American Council on Education, for awards to teach in American schools abroad.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships carries out its responsibilities in each participating country through an American educational commission or foundation. This commission or foundation usually consists of an equal number of nationals of the respective country and of American citizens resident in the country. Its responsibility includes the formulation and general administration of the annual program for the country, the preliminary selection and recommendation of candidates for travel grants to the United States, and assistance in the institutional placement of United States candidates.

The Conference Board Committee is assisted in the selection of candidates for advanced awards by advisory selection committees set up on a subject-matter basis. There were sixty such committees this year. Although international relations and political science are regarded as distinct fields, for the past two years the same advisory committee has functioned for both. This committee has set very high standards in making recommendations to the Conference Board Committee. It considers it of utmost importance that awards be given in the initial years only to those representatives of the United States who show unquestioned promise of being able to contribute to the success of the program. This standard, however, permits considerable variations in fields of specialization, method of approach, and level of lecturing and research. In reviewing applications, weight is also given to the suitability of the applicants' projects to the respective countries to which the applicants wish to go.

Recommendation by an advisory selection committee is only the first step in the process of selection. Since the total number of candidates recommended without reservation by advisory selection committees in all fields far exceeds the total number of openings, the Conference Board Committee is faced with the difficult task of selecting candidates from the lists recommended by the advisory committees. Among the factors determining selection are the specific requests for scholars in certain designated fields made by the United States educational foundations in response to particular current needs of the respective countries. These openings vary from year to year. This means that for most of the country programs even well qualified and outstanding candidates often cannot be accommodated.

The usual length of time for which a grant is made is the academic year, although, in exceptional cases, an award may be granted for six months. The amount of the award, payable entirely in foreign currency, is ordinarily sufficient to cover the costs of living and travel within the foreign country and provides an additional allowance for dependents to accompany the grantee. Transportation to and from the United States is provided if payable in the currency of the foreign country. Modest supplementary grants-in-aid for ad-

vanced research projects are also available on the basis of demonstrated need.

Awards to political scientists for the academic year 1949–50 were made as follows: to Wilfred E. Binkley, professor of political science at Ohio Northern University, to serve as visiting lecturer in political science at Oxford University, England; to Guy H. Dodge, associate professor of political science at Brown University, for research in political science at the University of Paris; to Robert K. Gooch, professor of political science at the University of Virginia, for research in political science at the University of Paris; to Selden Gale Lowrie, professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati, to serve as visiting lecturer in political science at the University of New Zealand; to John T. Salter, associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, to lecture at the University of the Philippines; and to Foster H. Sherwood, assistant professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles, for research in political science at Oxford University, England.

The programs for 1951–52 will be announced in the late summer or early autumn. Those interested in applying for lecturing or advanced research awards, or in requesting the services of a visiting foreign scholar, should address their inquiries to the executive secretary of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, Committee on International Exchange of Persons, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington 25, D. C. Inquiries concerning awards for graduate study or pre-doctoral research should be addressed to the secretary of the Fulbright Program at the college or university in which the student is enrolled or to the director of the Fulbright Division, The Institute of International Education, 2 West 54th Street, New York 19, New York.—Ernest S. Griffith.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Spencer Albright of the department of political science at the University of Richmond is a visiting member of the faculty of Emory University for the summer quarter of 1950.

Richard N. Baisden has been appointed assistant professor and director of the curriculum in applied politics and economics at Occidental College.

Paul Beckett has been promoted to an associate professorship in public administration at the State College of Washington.

George I. Blanksten will be on leave from Northwestern University for the academic year 1950–51 for study and research in Latin America under a grant from the Social Science Research Council. He will be a visiting professor at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, La Paz, Bolivia, for a six weeks term beginning on July 5.

Henry S. Block has been appointed acting director of the Fiscal Division of the Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations.

Royden Dangerfield, now professor of political science at the University of

Wisconsin, will become professor of political science and director of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois on August 1.

Herman Finer of the department of political science at the University of Chicago is a visiting member of the faculty of the University of Miami (Florida) for the first summer session of 1950.

Dayton E. Heckman has been promoted to an associate professorship at Ohio State University.

Frederick W. Heimberger recently became dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio State University.

Russell O. Hess has resigned his position in the department of government at the University of Miami (Florida) to accept a position in Washington, D. C.

Lane W. Lancaster, chairman of the department of political science of the University of Nebraska, is visiting professor of political science at the University of Hawaii for the summer session of 1950.

Albert Lepawsky, on leave from the University of Alabama for the period April 15 to October 1, 1950, is serving as a member of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia.

Harvey C. Mansfield was on part-time leave from Ohio State University during the winter quarter of 1950 to assist in the drafting of the report of the Connecticut Commission on State Government Organization.

Edward W. Mill, formerly chief of the political section of the American Embassy in Manila, has been assigned to Surabaya, Indonesia, as principal officer and consul.

Louis Nemzer has been promoted to an associate professorship at Ohio State University.

Frank W. Prescott, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Chattanooga, is a visiting member of the faculty of Emory University for the summer quarter of 1950.

Coleman B. Ransone has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at the University of Alabama.

J. E. Reeves is serving as acting head of the department of political science at the University of Kentucky during the absence of Amry Vandenbosch, head of the department.

Robert L. Sommerville, formerly chief sub-editor of the London *News Chronicle*, was visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Alabama for the spring quarter of 1950.

Henry R. Spencer, professor emeritus of political science at Ohio State

University, was visiting professor of political science at Tulane University, New Orleans, for the second semester of the academic year 1949–50.

David Spitz has been promoted to an assistant professorship at Ohio State University.

J. Ben Stalvey of the department of government of the University of Miami (Florida) is visiting professor of political science at West Virginia University for the summer of 1950.

Willem J. Thorbecke recently resigned from his position as visiting professor of political science at Emory University to accept a position in Washington, D. C.

Amry Vandenbosch is on a six months' leave of absence from the University of Kentucky for study in Southeast Asia.

D. D. Wallace, professor emeritus of Wofford College, was a visiting member of the political science faculty of Emory University for the spring quarter of 1950.

Robert E. Ward, instructor in political science at the University of Michigan, left the United States in February for a year of research at the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies at Okayama City.

James Watson, formerly assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, has joined the staff of the department of government at the University of Miami (Florida) as instructor.

Howard White of the department of government at Miami University (Ohio) was recently named chairman of a committee created by the Ohio Program Commission to study the advisability of calling a constitutional convention in Ohio.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE NUREMBERG TRIALS AS SOURCES OF RECENT GERMAN POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL MATERIALS

From July, 1945, until July, 1949, the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg housed the world's greatest research institute of European foreign relations and history, and of German government, military and business administration. This organization, known officially as the United States Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, was the agency in charge of prosecuting 199 major German war criminals in thirteen trials for crimes against the peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and membership in criminal organizations.[1]

Out of the 199 defendants 38 were aquitted. Their names are marked in this article with an asterisk. Thirty-six defendants were sentenced to death and eighteen of them executed. Twenty-three persons were sentenced to life imprisonment and 102 to prison terms ranging from one and one-half to twenty-five years.

The tremendous amount of documentary and testimonial evidence brought to light in the course of the trials covers political, historical, legal, sociological, and economic events for the period from 1918 to 1948. Expressed in figures, the Nuremberg material amounts to about 2,500 pages of judgments running to one million words. The Court transcripts total 134,765 mimeographed pages averaging 250 words in addition to 10,000 printed pages of the record of the International Military Tribunal.

A very important part of the Nuremberg research material consists of 42,000 Court exhibits of various sizes, mainly of German origin, all of them numbered individually. Two-fifths of them were introduced by the prosecution, three-fifths by the defense. In addition, tens of thousands of documents have been screened for possible use and partly incorporated into so-called document books. The total of documents reproduced for the trials amounts to more than 750,000 mimeographed pages.[2] Most of the documents were captured by the United States Armed Forces after the defeat of the Third Reich in May, 1945. They consist of German Foreign Office files, the files of other German departments such as the Reich Chancellery,[3] the Reich Central Security Office (RSHA),

[1] During the trial before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) against Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, et al., Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, Washington, D. C., was the United States Chief of Counsel for War Crimes; during the twelve subsequent trials, Brigadier General Telford Taylor was the Chief of Counsel.

[2] *Brief survey of the records of the Nuremberg War Crime Trials.* By Fred Niebergall, Chief of the Document Division. (Nuremberg: mimeographed as press release. 1949.)

[3] These files are now located in England; microfilms are kept by the United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office which, with the French Foreign Ministry, are publishing parts of the material. These volumes are already published: *Documents on German Foreign Policy; Volume I: From Neurath to Ribbentrop, September 1937–September 1938; Volume II: Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937–1938.* (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1949. Pp. cv, 1220 and pp. lxxxv, 1070.); *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941.* (Washington, D. C.: Department of State. 1948. Pp. xxxiii, 362.)

the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Areas, also known as the Alfred Rosenberg files, and the military files of the various German armies.[4] Besides the tons of captured official documents, confiscated correspondence records of the Friedrich Flick, I. G. Farben and Alfred Krupp industrial empires became part of the Nuremberg collection.

The research on the foreign language material for the use of the prosecuting attorneys and the tribunals was a difficult and responsible assignment. Fortunately, the prosecution had on its staff highly qualified multi-lingual American and British research associates, familiar with German government, military and business administration. Defense counsel had at their disposal hundreds of Nazi diplomats, and military, government, and business associates of the defendants, who worked untiringly for their former superiors, the 199 of the Nuremberg dock. Since most of these researchers had worked as Hitler's officials for twelve years, they were fully familiar with the sources of the documentary evidence, the German office routine, the ways of governmental control, the analysis of signatures, and other factors of importance for the evaluation of the material.

In connection with the trials, the Office of Chief of Counsel investigated thousands of suspects, and prosecution and defense counsel interviewed numerous witnesses from many European countries who testified or gave depositions. Among them were almost all former German diplomats and generals of the armed forces and élite guard formations. Non-German witnesses included such key figures as Lords Robert Vansittart and Edward W. Halifax of England, Premier Paul Reynaud of France, Regent Nicolaus von Horthy of Hungary, and the Commissioner for Danzig, Carl Burckhardt of Switzerland.

Usually, research institutions publish their findings in book or pamphlet form, either printed or mimeographed. In substance, the Office of Chief of Counsel and the defense have done the same. But since the research work served the conduct of international trials, the results were prepared as trial briefs and document books of prosecution and defense, as pre-trial interrogation records, and as Court transcripts. In thirteen judgments, the tribunals laid down their findings. Since the conduct of the trials was quadrilingual before the IMT, and bilingual in the other cases, nearly all material is available in English and German.

No scholar and student can analyze the recent past and the contemporary scene without looking into the Nuremberg records and document collections.[5] Only a small part of the material has been published as yet, namely the 41 volumes of records and original documents of the trial before the International Military Tribunal,[6] and the nine volumes of prosecution briefs and English

[4] A great part of the military documents used in Nuremberg were provided from the valuable collection of the Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.

[5] This paper is not concerned with other German material kept in the various governmental departments and the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C.

[6] *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal.* (Nuremberg, Germany. 1949. 41 volumes.) The excellent chronological, subject, and name indices are of great value not only for research on the IMT case but also as providing leads for research work on the subsequent twelve cases. (Blue series.)

translations of the IMT documents.[7] Fortunately, a fifteen volume publication of the indictments, judgments, and other important portions of the records of the twelve subsequent cases is in preparation and the first volumes have already been published.[8] Even after these fifteen volumes have appeared, about ninety per cent of the Nuremberg material will still be available only in mimeographed form.

In view of this situation, the scholar engaged in research on the Nuremberg material must, first of all, find out which Nuremberg defendant has been connected with his particular field of interest.[9] For instance, if he is working in German foreign relations, he has to consult the files concerning the former German foreign ministers Constantin von Neurath and Joachim von Ribbentrop, and state secretaries Ernst von Weizsaecker or Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland. The next step would be the consultation of the trial briefs written on these four persons. They contain the references to the testimonial and documentary evidence on the particular subject.

In order to show how the trial briefs of prosecution and defense are organized, a representative sample will be given from the Wilhelmstrasse case. The State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Ernst von Weizsaecker, and his Under Secretary, Ernst Woermann, were on trial for crimes against the peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and membership in a criminal organization. For the convenience of the Tribunal, final trial briefs were written by the prosecution and defense on Weizsaecker's and Woermann's participation in the aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Low Countries, the Scandinavian countries, the Balkans and the United States. Another brief—of about 300 mimeographed pages—concerned their participation in the annihilation program against six million European Jews. A further brief dealt with Weizsaecker's alleged resistance activities.

The briefs contain the references to the Court transcript and to the various documents assembled in document books. After the documents had been collected, verified, analyzed, translated and mimeographed, they were divided up according to defendants and subdivided according to topics or *vice versa*. Therefore, document books exist on nearly all phases of activities of the leading officials of the German Reich, e.g. on von Ribbentrop's or von Weizsaecker's connection with the invasion against Poland, or with the deportation of Catholic priests and Jews to extermination camps.

In a similar manner, the defense counsel prepared their document books, assembling for instance affidavits of character witnesses or documents of historical significance in order to prove that their clients had signed some of the

[7] *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression.* (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1946. 8 volumes.) See also *International Conference on Military Trials, London 1945.* By Robert H. Jackson. (Washington, D. C.: Department of State. Publication 3080, 1949. Pp. xx, 441.) (Red series.)

[8] *Trials of War Criminals; The Medical Case.* (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1949. 2 volumes.) An excellent selection from the available material. (Green series.)

[9] About one hundred scholars and students in the United States and Germany are already doing research work on the Nuremberg material.

prosecution documents for certain political reasons or could be credited with "inner resistance" against the Hitler regime.[10]

The majority of documents in these books became Court exhibits. Others, often not less important for research work, were not admitted in evidence by the Court because of prosecution or defense objections against their technical admissibility.

These samples show that the names and positions of the defendants are important keys for the researcher. Therefore, an index of the names of the defendants and their positions will be given together with a survey of the main subjects investigated and analyzed in the thirteen trials.[11]

The IMT Case. The defendants in this case were Hermann Goering (Reich Marshal, Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe); Rudolf Hess (Deputy of the Fuehrer); Joachim von Ribbentrop (Reich Foreign Minister); Wilhelm Keitel (Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces); Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Chief of the Reich Security Office RSHA); Alfred Rosenberg (Reich Leader for Spiritual Indoctrination and Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories); Hans Frank (Governor General of Poland); Wilhelm Frick (Reich Minister of the Interior and Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia); Julius Streicher (Gauleader of Frankonia, Editor of *Der Stuermer*); Walter Funk (Reich Bank President and Minister of Economics); Hjalmar Schacht* (Reich Bank President and Minister of Economics); Karl Doenitz (Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy); Erich Raeder (Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy); Baldur von Schirach (Reich Youth Leader, Gauleader of Vienna); Fritz Sauckel (Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation); Alfred Jodl (Chief of Operations, High Command of Armed Forces); Franz von Papen* (Vice Chancellor, Special Plenipotentiary to Austria, Ambassador to Turkey); Arthur Seyss-Inquart (Reich Governor of Austria, Deputy Governor of Poland, Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands); Albert Speer (Reich Minister for Armament and War Production); Constantin von Neurath (Reich Foreign Minister, Reich Protector of Bohemia and

[10] The following German-language publications, written by Gisevius of the Police Administration, von Hassel of the Foreign Service, the author Pechel, the lawyer and officer von Schlabrendorff and the poet Rainer Hildebrandt of the Action Group against Inhumanity, are important contributions to the history of the German resistance movement: *Bis zum bittern Ende.* By Hans Bernd Gisevius. (Zuerich: Fretz & Wasmuth Verlag. 1946. Vol. I, pp. 469; Vol. II, pp. 462.); *Vom andern Deutschland.* By Ulrich von Hassel. (Zuerich: Atlantic Verlag. 1946. Pp. 416.); *Deutscher Widerstand.* By Rudolf Pechel. (Zuerich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag. 1949. Pp. 343.); *Offiziere gegen Hitler.* By F. von Schlabrendorff and Gero von S. Gaevernitz. (Zuerich: Europa Verlag. Pp. 203.); *Wir sind die Letzten; Aus dem Leben des Widerstandskaempfers Albrecht Haushofer und seiner Freunde.* By Rainer Hildebrandt. (Neuwied-Berlin: Michael Verlag. 1949. Pp. 207.)

[11] For further details see: *Nuremberg Trials, War Crimes and International Law.* By Telford Taylor. (New York: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace. 1949. Pp. i, 128.) A German translation of this excellent study is in preparation. A French edition has already been published. See also *Final Report to The Secretary of War on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10.* By Telford Taylor. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1949. Pp. vii, 345.)

Moravia); Hans Fritzsche* (Ministerial Director in the Propaganda Ministry, in charge of German Radio); Martin Bormann (Chief of the Nazi Party Chancellery).

The defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The trial briefs submitted to the IMT cover the organization of the Nazi Party and State, the means used by the Nazi conspirators in gaining totalitarian control in the political, military, administrative, educational, cultural, spiritual and labor fields; the economic aspects of the conspiracy; the launching of wars of aggression from the early plotting to December, 1941; the slave labor program and the concentration camps; the persecution of Jews, Germanization and spoliation and the plunder of art treasures. Additional trial briefs submitted to the Tribunal contained a catalog of the sins of the individual defendants and the indicted organizations such as the Nazi Party Leadership Corps, the Reich Cabinet*, the SA Storm Troopers*, the SS Elite Guard *Schutzstaffeln*, the Gestapo with the SD Security Service and the General Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces*. The complete records of this trial are printed in English, French, and German. However, the documents are published in the original language, that is generally in German.[12] The trial briefs of the prosecution and the prosecution documents have been printed in eight English language volumes.[13] Recently published German, French and British source books are of additional value.[14]

[12] *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Op. cit.*

[13] *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Op. cit.*

[14] *Portraet eines Menschheitsverbrechers; Alfred Rosenberg.* By Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck. (St. Gallen: Verlag Zollikofer and Co. 1947. Pp. xii, 356.) An analysis of defense material written by Alfred Rosenberg in the Nuremberg prison for the use of his defense counsel; *Aus Alfred Rosenbergs Geheimakten.* By Robert M. W. Kempner. (Berlin: Der Monat. Jahrgang 1. Heft 10. 1949. Pp. 26–38.) The plans of Hitler's advisor on Church affairs for the liquidation of the Christian Churches in Germany after a victorious conclusion of the war; *Dokumente aus dem Kampf der Katholischen Kirche im Bistum Berlin gegen den Nationalsozialismus.* By Bischoefliches Ordinariat. (Berlin: Morus Verlag. 1946. Pp. 118.)Numerous official documents on the persecution of the Catholic Church in Berlin; *Kreuz und Hakenkreuz.* By Johann Neuhaeusler. (Muenchen: Verlag Katholische Kirche Bayerns. 1946. Pp. x, 464.) This book by the Catholic Bishop of Munich with a foreword by Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber is the best documented account of the persecution of the Catholic Church by the government of the Third Reich; *Der Bayerische Klerus in der Zeit dreier Revolutionen 1918–1933–1945; 25 Jahre Klerusverband 1920–1945.* By Alois Natterer. (Muenchen: Verlag der Katholischen Kirche Bayerns. 1946. Pp. xii, 427.) A valuable description of the persecution of the Catholic Church in Bavaria; *Abrechnung mit Hitler.* By Hjalmar Schacht. (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag. 1946. Pp. 47.) A report by Hitler's much overrated financial wizard on his alleged opposition to the Third Reich's regime; *Hier spricht Hans Fritzsche.* By Hans Fritzsche. (Zuerich: Interverlag. 1948. Pp. 308.) A whitewash report of psychological interest; *Goebbels Tagebuecher.* Edited by Louis P. Lochner. (Zuerich: Atlantic Verlag. 1948. Pp. xi, 528.) The diaries of the the former German Propaganda Minister are among the most valuable historical documents of the history of the Third Reich; *Joseph Goebbels, Daemon einer Diktatur.* By Werner Stephan. (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlangsanstalt. 1949. Pp. x, 311.) A

The Wilhelmstrasse Case. This case, also known as the Ministries case, was the eleventh case subsequent to the IMT trial but the one most similar to the Goering case. "The evidence of this case presents a factual story of practically every phase of activity of the Nazi Party and of the Third Reich whether political, economic, industrial, financial or military."[15]

The defendants were charged with crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They were as follows: Ernst von Weizsaecker (State Secretary of Foreign Affairs and later Nazi Ambassador to the Vatican); Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland (State Secretary of Foreign Affairs); Wilhelm Keppler (Special Secretary for Foreign Affairs); Ernst Wilhelm Bohle (Special Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Chief of the Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party); Ernst Woermann (Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs); Karl Ritter (Ambassador, Liaison between Foreign Office and High Command); Otto von Erdmannsdorf* (Ministerialdirigent in the Foreign Office); Edmund Veesenmayer (Reich Plenipotentiary for Hungary); Hans Heinrich Lammers (Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery); Wilhelm Stuckart (State Secretary of the Interior); Walther Darré (Reich Minister of Agriculture); Otto Leberecht Meissner* (State Minister and Chief of the Presidial Chancellery); Otto Dietrich (State Secretary of the Press); Gottlob Berger (General of the SS, Chief of the SS Central Office); Walter Schellenberg (Chief of the Combined Civil and Military Intelligence); Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk

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former councillor of the Propaganda Ministry gives a sincere account of Goebbels's personal life and his propaganda machine; *The Belsen Trial.* Edited by Raymond Philipps with a foreword by Lord Jowitt. (London: William Hodge. 1949. Pp. 1, 479.) Josef Kramer, the Camp Commandant of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, and 44 other guards were tried by a British Military Court at Lueneburg to answer for their deeds at Belsen and Auschwitz. The book contains a masterly and exact summary of the facts and the law. It is the second volume of the British War Crime Trials Series under the general editorship of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe which includes: Vol. I: The "Peleus" Trial; Vol. III, The Gozawa Trial; Vol. IV: The Hadamar Trial; Vol. V: The Natzweiler Trial; Vol. VI; Trial of von Falkenhorst. Other volumes are forthcoming; *La persécution des Juifs en France et dans les autres pays de l'Ouest, presentée par la France à Nuremberg.* Edited by Henry Monneray with a preface by René Cassin and introduction by Edgar Faure. (Paris: Editions du Centre. 1947. Pp. 426.); *La persécution des Juifs dan les pays dé l'Est presentée à Nuremberg.* Edited by Henry Monneray with a preface by General Telford Taylor and introduction by René Cassin. (Paris: Editions du Centre. 1949. Pp. 358.) German documents concerning the persecution of Jews in France and the Western countries are reprinted and analyzed in these books which are part of a French series on the Jewish persecution by German government agencies; *La Condition des Juifs en France sous l'Occupation Italienne.* By L. Poliakow. (Paris: Editions du Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine. 1946. Pp. 1741.) German Gestapo and Foreign Office documents on the persecution of Jews in the Italian occupied region of Southern France; *Le pillage par les Allemands des oeuvres d'art et des bibliotheques.* By Jean Cassou. (Paris: Editions du Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine. 1947. Pp. 267.) German documents on the spoliation of art objects in France by Hermann Goering, Alfred Rosenberg, Otto Abetz and others; *Das Organisationsverbrechen.* By Carl Haensel. (Muenchen: Biederstein Verlag. 1947. Pp. 61.) One of the most prominent of the Nuremberg defense counsel discusses the legal aspects of crime by organization in a scholarly manner.

[15] Judgment Case XI, p. 5.

(Reich Minister of Finance); Emil Puhl (Vice President of the Reich Bank); Paul Koerner (State Secretary of the Four Year Plan); Paul Pleiger (Managing Director of the Reich Werke Hermann Goering); Hans Kehrl (Chief of the Planning Office of the Central Planning Board); Karl Rasche (President of the Dresdner Bank).

The trial briefs against eight Foreign Office defendants and Lammers cover the political and diplomatic preparations for the initiation of aggressive wars, the fabrication of pretexts for the justification of wars, the making and breaking of international treaties and conventions, the diplomatic implementation of the genocidal program for the annihilation of six million Jews in Europe, and the persecution of the Catholic Church.

Various books recently published in Germany and Austria offer additional source material in these fields.[16]

The trial briefs against Lammers, Stuckart, Meissner, Dietrich and Schwerin

[16] *Als Botschafter in Berlin 1931–1938.* By André Francois Poncet. (Mainz: Florian Kupferberg Verlag. 1941. Pp. xvi, 366.) An important contribution to the history of European foreign relations by the former French Ambassador to Germany; *Moskau Tokio London; Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahren deutscher Aussenpolitik 1919–1939.* By Herbert von Dirksen. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. 1949. Pp. viii, 279.) A realistic and sincere contribution to the history of German foreign relations by a long-time German career diplomat. The chapters concerning the period before the German attack against Poland are of great interest; *Ruheloses Leben; Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen eines deutschen Diplomaten.* By Rudolf Rahn. (Duesseldorf: Verlag Diederichs. 1949. Pp. 298.) A valuable contribution by the former German Ambassador to Italy. The chapters on the last days of Mussolini are of special interest; *Wahn und Wirklichkeit.* By Erich Kordt. (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. 1949. Pp. xiii, 430.) A valuable report on German foreign relations under Hitler written by Joachim von Ribbentrop's Bureau chief. The otherwise accurate report omits an account of the criminal activities of the Foreign Office in the field of genocide and murder by government; *Was wirklich geschah; Die diplomatischen Hintergruende der deutschen Kriegspolitik.* By Heinz Holldack. (Muenchen: Nymphenburger Verlag. 1949. Pp. ix, 547.) A valuable attempt to present documentary evidence on Hitler's plans for aggressive wars. Its value is reduced by frequent quotations of unreliable testimony of defendants; *Statist auf diplomatischer Buehne.* By Dr. Paul (Otto) Schmidt. (Bonn: Athenaeum Verlag. 1949. Pp. 604.) Hitler's former chief interpreter gives a vivid eyewitness account of important diplomatic conferences, unfortunately suppressing the darkest chapters of his experience in the German Foreign Office; *Der Hochverrats prozess gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt vor dem Wiener Volksgericht.* (Wien: Oesterreichische Staatsdruckerei. 1947. Pp. viii, 698.) The official transcript of the war crimes trial against the former Austrian Foreign Minister, containing important material on the Anschluss; *Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjet Union 1939–1941*; *Dokumente des Auswaertigen Amtes.* By Dr. Alfred Seidl. (Tuebingen: H. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung. 1949. Pp. xxxix, 414.) A German edition of *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1931–1941* (see note 3) by one of the German defense counsel, containing a total of 251 documents; *Canaris, Patriot und Weltbuerger.* By Karl Heinz Abshagen. (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. 1949. Pp. xii, 408.) A glorification of the chief of the military German intelligence, the Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who sabotaged the peaceful efforts of the Weimar Republic after World War I, sacrificed thousands of German soldiers in suicidal missions during World War II, ordered German sabotage in the United States, and was executed as a resistance fighter against Hitler; *Der Diplomat vor Gericht.* By Margaret Boveri. (Berlin: Minerva Verlag, 1949. Pp. 88.) A whitewash report for von Weizacker published by a personal friend before judgment was passed.

von Krosigk contain a large amount of material on the Nazi administration of personnel, police and internal affairs, pardon and parole, press and propaganda, and finances. The documents concerning Berger and Schellenberg are sources for research in the field of intelligence and police state methods. The material on the economic affairs defendants concerns mainly governmental slave labor practices and spoliation in German occupied territories. In this case and in the IMT case only, the tribunals convicted a number of defendants for crimes against the peace. Therefore, scholars interested in the development of international law will find important material in the records of these two cases.

The Medical Case. This case was listed as No. 1 because it was the first in the series of proceedings after the IMT trial. The defendants were as follows: Karl Brandt; Siegfried Handloser; Paul Rostock*; Oskar Schroeder; Karl Genzken; Karl Gebhardt; Kurt Blohme*; Joachim Mrugrowsky; Rudolf Brandt; Helmut Poppendick; Wolfram Sievers; Gerhard Rose; Siegfried Ruff*; Viktor Brack; Hans-Wolfgang Romberg*; Hermann Becker-Freysing; August Weltz*; Konrad Schaefer*; Waldemar Hoven; Wilhelm Beigelboeck; Adolf Pokorny*; Herta Oberheuser; Fritz Fischer.

These defendants, among them one woman, were high officers in the medical service of the German Air Force, of the Elite Guards and of the Police. They were charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes. The material is of great interest to medical science. It covers such topics as experiments in high altitude, freezing, typhus and malaria. It also deals with mass sterilization, mass murder of "useless eaters", and the medical "ethics" of the Third Reich. Important material in this case has already been printed in two volumes published on the subsequent proceedings. A number of recent German publications deal with this particular case.[17]

The Milch Case. Case No. 2, against Erhard Milch, State Secretary in Goering's Air Ministry, provides additional evidence of government supervised medical experiments and material on the German slave labor program.

The Justice Case. The defendants were as follows: Josef Altstoetter; Wilhelm von Ammon; Paul Barnickel*; Hermann Cuhorst*; Guenther Joel; Herbert Klemm; Ernst Lautz; Wolfgang Mettgenberg; Guenther Nebelung*; Rudolf Oeschey; Hans Petersen*; Oswald Rothaug; Curt Rothenberger; Franz Schlegelberger.

The case involved leading judges and public prosecutors of the People's Courts and special Courts, the acting Minister of Justice, and other high officials of the Department of Justice under the Hitler regime charged with war

[17] *Das Diktat der Menschenverachtung; Der Nuernberger Aerzteprozess und seine Quellen.* By Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke. (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider. 1947. Pp. ii, 176.) An analysis of documents presented in the medical case; *Um die Menschenrechte der Geisteskranken.* By Werner Leibbrand. (Nuremberg: Verlag Die Egge. 1946. Pp. 117.) Contains material on the systematic killing of the insane; *Wissenschaft ohne Menschlichkeit; Medizinische und eugenische Irrwege unter Diktatur, Buerokratie und Krieg.* By Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke. (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider. 1949. Pp. viii, 307.) A scholarly analysis of the Nuremberg material on medical experiments.

crimes and crimes against humanity. The record gives a detailed picture of the "justice" administered by the Nazis towards German citizens and citizens of occupied countries.

The SS and Concentration Camp Case. Case No. 4 defendants were as follows: Hans Baier; Hans Bobermin; Franz Eirenschmalz; Heinz Fanslau; August Frank; Hans Hohberg; Max Kiefer; Horst Klein*; Georg Loerner; Hans Loerner; Karl Mummenthey; Oswald Pohl; Hermann Pook; Rudolf Scheide*; Karl Sommer; Erwin Tschentscher; Joseph Vogt*; Leo Volk.

The defendants, charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, were SS generals and other high SS officers of the central administration of concentration camps. Records and documents picture the administration of concentration camps, the economic enterprises of the SS run with concentration camp labor, death rates and important aspects of the genocidal program of the Third Reich. The publication, *The SS State*, by the eminent German author Eugen Kogon and other recent German publications offer additional source material on genocide.[18]

The Race and Settlement Case. The defendants in Case No. 8 were as follows: Ulrich Greifelt; Rudolf Creutz; Konrad Meyer-Hetling; Otto Schwarzenberger; Herbert Huebner; Werner Lorenz; Heinz Brueckner; Otto Hofmann; Richard Hildenbrandt; Fritz Schwalm; Max Sollmann; Gregor Ebner; Guenther Tesch; Inge Viermetz*.

The defendants, including one woman, were high officials of the Race and Settlement Office of the SS Elite Guard and the "Lebensborn" organization. They were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. This record offers evidence on the Nazi organizations in charge of increasing the Teutonic population and decreasing other populations and races, biologically as well as intellectually. Programs and methods of this enterprise are explained in detail.

Extermination Squads Case. The defendants in Case No. 9 were as follows: Otto Ohlendorf; Erich Naumann; Erwin Schulz; Franz Six; Paul Blobel; Walter Blume; Martin Sandberger; Willy Seibert; Eugen Steimle; Ernst Biberstein; Werner Braune; Walter Haensch; Gustav Nosske; Adolf Ott; Edward Strauch; Waldemar Klingelhoefer; Lothar Fendler; Waldemar von Radetzky; Felix Ruehl; Heinz Schubert; Mathias Graf; Heinz Jost.

The defendants were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. They were generals, colonels, and majors of the SS Elite Guards who were in charge of special SS extermination squads (*Einsatzgruppen*) in German occupied areas in the East. Their progress reports are unique research material for

[18] *Der SS-Staat.* By Eugen Kogon. (Muenchen: Verlag Karl Alber. 1949. Pp. xxiii, 339.) The outstanding study on the mechanics of annihilation in a totalitarian state; *Reise durch den letzten Akt.* By Isa Vermehren. (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag. 1948. Pp. 233.) A vivid eyewitness account of genocidal methods in concentration camps; *Lucifer ante Portas; Zwischen Severing und Heydrich.* By Rudolf Diels. (Zuerich: Interverlag, Genferstr. 25. 1949. Pp. 326.) The first chief of the Gestapo tells the story of that agency in its first beginnings when the groundwork was laid for the abolition of all civil liberties. The author is forthright enough to present his experiences without too much caution about his own role.

the student of psychology and perversion of the human mind in a totalitarian system.

The Flick Case. Defendants in Case No. 5 were as follows: Friedrick Flick; Otto Steinbrink; Konrad Kaletsch*; Bernhard Weiss; Hermann Terberger*; Odilio Burkhard*.

The I. G. Farben Case. Defendants in Case No. 6 were as follows: Carl Krauch; Hermann Schmitz; Georg von Schnitzler; Fritz Gajewski*; Heinrich Hoerlein*; August von Knieriem*; Fritz Ter Meer; Christian Schneider*; Otto Ambros; Ernst Buergin; Heinrich Buetefisch; Paul Haefliger; Max Ilgner; Friedrich Jaehne; Hans Kuehne*; Carl Lautenschlaeger*; Wilhelm Mann*; Heinrich Oster; Karl Wurster*; Walter Duerrfeld; Heinrich Gattineau*; Erich von der Heyde*; Hans Kugler.

The Krupp Case. Defendants in Case No. 10 were as follows: Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach; Ewald Loeser; Eduard Houdremont; Erich Mueller; Friedrich Jansen; Karl Pfirsch*; Max Ihn; Karl Eberhardt; Heinrich Korschan; Friedrich von Buelow; Heinrich Lehmann; Hans Kupke.

The defendants in these cases were the highest officers of the Flick, the I. G. Farben, and the Krupp industrial empires. The records, trial briefs and documents contain a tremendous amount of material on the connection of the defendants with the Hitler government, on their participation in the German rearmament program between the two world wars in the steel, chemical, and related fields, and on the use of slave labor and spoliation for the aggrandizement of the Flick, I. G. Farben and Krupp combines. The re-armament activities of Krupp during the period of the Weimar Republic and the connection of I. G. Farben with medical experiments are of special interest.

The Hostages Case. Defendants in Case No. 7 were as follows: Ernst Dehner; Helmut Felmy; Hermann Foertsch*; Kurt von Geitner*; Walter Kuntze; Hubert Lanz; Ernst von Leyser; Wilhelm List; Lothar Rendulic; Wilhelm Speidel.

The defendants, charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, were generals in the German Army, assigned to Southeast Europe. The record concerns the conduct of war, especially the treatment of hostages, partisans, and civilians under the laws and customs of war. The student of the record and of the army diaries presented in this case will gather many suggestions for the development of the law of warfare.

The High Command Case. Defendants in Case No. 12 were as follows: Wilhelm von Leeb; Hugo Sperrle*; Georg von Kuechler; Herman Hoth; Hans Georg Reinhardt; Hans von Salmuth; Karl Hollidt; Otto Schniewind*; Karl von Roques; Hermann Reinecke; Walter Warlimont; Otto Woehler; Rudolf Lehmann.

This case against German field marshals and other high ranking military men, both in the field and in the central office in Berlin, dealt with the personal responsibility of military chiefs for the preparation of aggressive wars and the various invasions launched by Germany. It also concerns the dividing line between the permissible and non-permissible conduct of war, especially the killing and mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied areas. For students of military science, both military cases offer a wealth of research material,

including the diaries of the German Generals Franz Halder, Alfred Jodl and Georg Thomas. Recently published German books on the conduct of World War II offer additional information.[19]

Finally, it must be mentioned that in addition to the 199 war criminals who were tried, ten additional men were indicted but not tried because of illness or suicide after the indictment: Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach; jurist Karl Engert; Farben official Max Brueggemann; general Max von Weichs; Flick official Otto Rasch (illness); and Reich Leader Robert Ley; jurist Carl Westphal; generals Franz Boehme and Johannes Blaskowitz; Flick official Emil Hausmann (suicide).

This case survey enables the scholar and student of a specific subject to focus his attention upon one or more of the thirteen records or document collections. The researcher on aggressive warfare, European foreign affairs, and diplomacy may concentrate his efforts on the IMT, the Wilhelmstrasse case, and the Krupp and High Command trials. Problems of the conduct of war are mainly discussed in the records of the IMT, and the Hostage, High Command, and Wilhelmstrasse cases. The subject of slave labor, plunder and spoliation is exhaustively treated in briefs of the Flick, I. G. Farben, Krupp, IMT, and Wilhelmstrasse cases. Evidence on racial policy can be found in the IMT and the Race and Settlement case records. The best sources on genocide are the IMT, Wilhelmstrasse, Extermination Squads and SS-Central Office case records, and also the files of the I. G. Farben, Medical, and Justice cases. Material on Nazi ideology can be found particularly in the cases against Alfred Rosenberg, Julius

[19] *Invasion 1944.* By Hans Speidel. (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag. 1949. Pp. 203.) An historical account of the Allied invasion of France in 1944 and the liquidation of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel written by his able former Chief of Staff; *Afrikanische Schicksalsjahre; Das Deutsche Afrikakorps unter Rommel.* By H. G. von Esebeck. (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag. 1949. Pp. 278.) A real contribution to the history of the German Africa Corps under Rommel; *Ein General kaempft gegen den Krieg; Aus nachgelassenenen Papieren des Generalstabschefs Ludwig Beck.* By Wolfgang Foerster. (Muenchen: Dom Verlag, 1949. Pp. iii, 139.) Important notes of historical value written by one of the few German generals who really were opposed to Hitler; *Der Fritsch-Prozess 1938; Ablauf und Hintergruende.* By Graf Kielmansegg. (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag. 1949. Pp. xiv, 152.) A contribution to the problem of the relationship between Hitler and his generals during the spring crisis of 1938; *Hitler als Feldherr.* By Franz Halder. (Muenchen: Dom Verlag. 1949. Pp. 64.) An apologia for the German generals who could have done things better. The contents are in crass contradiction to Halder's own war-diaries from the Nazi time; *Der letzte Monat.* By Karl Koller. (Mannheim: Norbert Wohlgemuth Verlag. 1949. Pp. ix, 138.) The former Chief of the General Staff of the German Luftwaffe lodges the accusation against Hitler that he had, through the attack on Russia, brought on a "situation far transcending Germany's armed capacities"; *Die letzten Tage.* By Gerhard Boldt. (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag. 1947. Pp. 91.) An accurate account of a sincere officer on the last days of the Reich Chancellery; *Es begann an der Weichsel.* By Juergen Thorwald. (Stuttgart: Steingruber Verlag. 1950. Pp. ix, 350.) A valuable contribution to the history of the Russian invasion of Silesia during the last months of World War II; *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934–1938.* By Friedrich Hossbach. (Wolfenbuettel: Wolfenbuetteler Verlagsanstalt. 1949. Pp. 224.) An important contribution to the knowledge of Hitler's war plans with a rather naive approach towards the obligations of an officer.

Streicher, Hans Fritzsche and Otto Dietrich. Students of international law, penal procedures, sociology, psychiatry, criminology, and totalitarianism should consult the material of all thirteen trials.

The knowledge of the location and availability of the Nuremberg collections is important for the research worker.

The *original* trial record of the IMT, the document books and documents are kept by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The original records of the twelve subsequent proceedings with document books and documents are in the United States Archives, Washington, D.C.

While the *published* trial records and documents of the IMT are available in most of the large libraries, the material on subsequent proceedings is distributed among various institutions.[20]

Complete sets of the *Court transcripts* of subsequent proceedings in the English language are available at the following Universities: California, Michigan, Chicago, North Dakota, Wisconsin, Washington, Duke, Harvard, and Northwestern; also at the Hoover Institute, the New York Public Library, the United States Military Academy, and the United Nations at Lake Success.

In addition to the motions and briefs which are part of the trial record, one set of motions, briefs and trial records is available at the Harvard Law School.

The *voice recordings* of all trials are at the Library of Congress.

Complete sets of *prosecution documents*, consisting of either a photostatic or a mimeographed copy of the German original document, the translation and staff evidence analysis, are available with photostats at the New York Public Library, Hoover Institute, Harvard Law School and the University of Chicago; and with mimeographed copy at Princeton, Lake Success, West Point and the University of Washington Law School at Seattle. Defense documents can be obtained only from defense counsel, aside from their availability in the United States Archives at Washington, D.C.

Sets of *prosecution document books* in English are located at the Library of Congress and the Harvard Law School. Sets of *defense document books* in English are at the New York Public Library and the Harvard Law School.

Sets of *interrogations* are available in the United States Archives, the New York Public Library, and the Harvard Law School. In addition, interrogation summaries are to be found in the United States Archives, Harvard Law School, New York Public Library, Columbia Law Library and Hoover Institute. The defense counsels did not distribute copies of defense interrogations or summaries.

In Europe, English transcripts of the trials and document books are kept by the British, French, Dutch and Norwegian foreign offices, by the Wiener Library in London, the Institute for Social Research in Zuerich, and the Jewish Documentation Center in Paris.

German transcripts with sets of document books and documents are available

[20] According to the Final Report of the Document Disposal Division by Fred Niebergall, Director, July 10, 1949, submitted to the Department of the Army.

at the Bavarian State Archives in Nuremberg, and the Universities of Frankfurt, Goettingen, and Heidelberg. Furthermore, sets of documents are at the State Chancellery in Munich, and the Universities of Bonn, Cologne, Erlangen and Freiburg, Breisgau. Unfortunately, the twelve Judgments of the subsequent trials have never been printed in the German language, thus leaving the general German public completely ignorant of their important historical and political contents, and creating a myth about Nuremberg detrimental to the United States policy in Germany.[21] English or German copies of the transcripts, document books and documents were also distributed to the judges, to the prosecuting and defense attorneys of the various cases, and to the press. They have been kept for research in private libraries or turned over to universities or other institutions.

Thus, from this unique research laboratory, the Nuremberg trials, there is now available to scholars and students a wealth of source material covering such fields as European foreign affairs, governmental administration, international law and penal procedure, cross examinations of German diplomats and generals, and the military, economic, industrial, medical, legal, psychological and sociological aspects of totalitarianism. The study of the material both in the United States and Germany will provide one of the most important weapons in the fight against totalitarianism.

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The Pre-Election Polls of 1948. By FREDERICK MOSTELLER, HERBERT HYMAN, PHILIP J. MCCARTHY, ELI S. MARKS, DAVID B. TRUMAN. (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1949. Pp. xx, 391. $2.50.)

The Polls and Public Opinion. EDITED BY NORMAN C. MEIER AND HAROLD W. SAUNDERS. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1949. Pp. x, 346. $2.75.)

The Social Science Research Council for many years has taken an active interest in opinion and attitude research. When, therefore, the major polling agencies failed to pick the winner in the 1948 presidential election, it was logical for the S.S.R.C. to appoint a committee to investigate. Hence, a Committee on Analysis of Pre-Election Polls and Forecasts was appointed on November 10, 1948, just eight days after the election. The members of the Committee were not only distinguished experts in opinion research and analysis—they were men of unimpeachable integrity as scientists and citizens. With S. S. Wilks of

[21] The detrimental effect of the failure to publish the Court decision in German is augmented by the fact that the German nationalistic circles provided publications of whitewash material suppressing incriminating evidence or distorting facts. See: *Warum wurde Krupp verurteilt?* By Tilo von Wilmowski. (Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag. 1950. Pp. 224.); *Zur Frage einer Revision der Kriegsverbrecher Prozesse.* By Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer. (Muenchen: Hoefling Verlag. 1950.)

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Princeton as chairman, the Committee included James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, President of Williams College; Philip M. Hauser, of the University of Chicago and more recently Acting Director of the U. S. Census; Carl Hovland, of Yale; V. O. Key, then of Johns Hopkins and now Chairman of the Political Science Department at Yale; Isador Lubin, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics; Frank Stanton, President of the Columbia Broadcasting System; and Samuel A. Stouffer, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard.

With funds from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, the Committee recruited a technical staff, and the present volume is a report of this group to the larger Committee. Working with Frederick Mosteller, of Harvard, as chief of staff, were Herbert Hyman, of the National Opinion Research Center; Philip J. McCarthy, of Cornell; Eli Marks, of the U. S. Census Bureau; and David B. Truman, of Williams College.

I have enumerated the names of the members of the Committee and the technical staff to dispose at the outset of the charge that the report is a "whitewash" of the public opinion polls. No committee and no staff composed of men of the caliber represented here could conceivably write a "whitewash" report. Even if some of them had wished to do so, they were surrounded by enough skeptics to neutralize any natural bias they might have had.

The American Association for Public Opinion Research "pledged support to the inquiry, and urged other organizations to cooperate." The major polling organizations opened their files for examination and "made their staffs available to the committee for interrogation and discussion." And these included not only nationally known organizations like Gallup, Roper and Crossley, but most of the state and local polls as well. The S.S.R.C. and the Committee deserve vast credit for this impressive mobilization of scientific talent to deal with an emergency in an important and crucial area of the social sciences.

For it was an emergency. Attitude-opinion measurement and analysis had come to represent one of the outstanding achievements of social science research. Applying scientific methods of sampling, interviewing, coding, and analysis to complex problems of human behavior, the "pollsters" have made an invaluable contribution to the advancement of the social sciences. By insisting upon objective standards of observation, classification and analysis in the handling of data and in support of generalizations they have helped to shift the basis of social science research (as August Comte would have said) from imagination to objective observation. Moreover, they have been willing, in the best scientific tradition, to "stick their necks out" as forecasters by basing their forecasts on their data and not on revelation or intuition.

Hence it was that when their predictions went awry in 1948, the pollsters became the butt of an avalanche of criticism, ridicule, and hostility. They were accused of incompetence, and even dishonesty. Laughs were mingled with sneers at "so-called social scientists with their I.B.M. equipment and their naive efforts to ape the natural scientists." Those who have always resisted the application of intelligence to social and political problems were jubilant at the

"exposure" of those to whom they referred contemptuously as "social science fakers."

Although no one to my knowledge accused the pollsters of being agents of Moscow, it *was* suggested that they were subversive of representative democracy and the American Way of Life. As a political scientist, I blush for some of my own colleagues who joined in this hue and cry. Cartoonists, columnists, and commentators had a field day. The failure of the polls in 1948, said Marquis Childs, who should have known better, "undermined the tyranny of the poll taker and the arrogant expert prone to use the most revolting of all phrases 'the little people'." Their sampling techniques, he wrote, are based on the theory that there "is a mass man—a mass mind at the dead level of mediocrity." This refrain was taken up by others, including Morris Ernst who wrote that "books, movies, the radio are being enslaved by the so-called science of the polls. The public opinion survey becomes a substitute for the publishers' judgment . . . for the producers' selectivity . . . for the radio executives' intelligence. The result is a deplorable leveling off of cultural expression."

It was not enough for the polling organizations to answer these charges by donning sack cloth and ashes, promising to eat crow, or even by asserting, what was obviously true, that most of the critics didn't know what they were talking about. The fact is that the pollsters themselves were not blameless. Few of them had been conspicuous for the humility that characterizes the true scientist. To describe their work as a reading of the "pulse of democracy" was, to say the least, immodest. To say that the polls made possible direct democracy on a continental basis was to give aid and comfort to those who attacked them as subversive of representative democracy. To say that the polls might even be better devices than elections for recording the general will on public issues was easily construed to imply a lack of faith in the American Way. To go beyond all this and say that "the most significant use of surveying in the post-war world would be to serve the United Nations as a barometer of international security . . . to measure political pressures that threaten another storm," was to be starry-eyed to say the least.

Many of the pollsters had also taken refuge, not in hyperbole of this kind, but rather behind a barrier of polysyllabic statistical and often pseudo-scientific gobbledygook. Their talk of quota versus area sampling, of coding, stratification, regression equations, modes, quindimensional analysis, and so forth, was incomprehensible to the layman. He was mystified by it all and more than a trifle suspicious of what he did not understand. Instead of trying to explain, there was a disposition in some polling circles to take pride in this atmosphere of mystery and to imply that the average man and even his own colleagues in other fields were too damn dumb to understand anyway. Some of the pollsters, moreover, were less than humble about their own ability to analyze and predict human behavior. With their neat mathematical formulas, they often forgot that quantitative methods, applicable to the behavior of billiard balls, buckshot, or Beta and Gamma rays, may not be equally applicable to human beings.

Many, not unfriendly critics, had long resented what appeared to be a Jeho-

vah complex among the pollsters and were therefore not sorry to see them discomfited by the election of 1948. "We have never claimed infallibility," said George Gallup just before the election, "but next Tuesday the whole world will be able to see down to the last percentage point how good we are." This statement, made in all modesty, was interpreted as sheer boasting, and the rejoinder after the election was inevitable. People did see, or at least thought they saw, that the polls were most decidedly fallible. And, as often happens in such cases, what proved to be fallible might easily be dismissed as worthless or worse.

The emergency, then, which confronted the S.S.R.C. and its Committee was the danger that a crude but immensely promising instrument of the social sciences—i.e., the sampling survey—might suffer a serious set-back, if not irreparable damage. It was to forestall, or at least to mitigate, this through a searching and critical analysis of polling methods and procedures, that the S.S.R.C. set up its Committee on Analysis of Pre-Election Polls and Forecasts.

No adequate summary of this report of the technical staff can be presented in this review. By the same token, no social scientist, whatever his particular discipline may be, can afford to neglect this volume. Although the study was made under a sense of great urgency and under considerable pressure, it represents a notable contribution to social science. Moreover, it stands as a tribute to the basic integrity, not of the Committee alone, but of the much maligned pollsters, too.

The reader will find here a summary of the development of election forecasting by polling methods; the actual election predictions made in 1948 by all major polling organizations; and critical analyses of (1) the manner in which polling results were presented to the public, (2) methods of measuring the error in predictions, (3) The cross-sections used in predicting the 1948 elections, (4) the interviewing and questionnaire design, (5) the processing, estimating and adjustment of survey data, (6) the problem of the undecided voter, and (7) the last-minute swing to Truman. There are over forty tables and charts summarizing the basic data used in writing the report. In addition, there are eight appendices containing other valuable information used by various polls in making their predictions.

To meet the public clamor for some explanation of the 1948 denouement, the S.S.R.C. Committee had issued a preliminary report, as early as December 27, 1948. This volume by the technical staff furnishes a detailed analysis of the conclusions set forth in the preliminary report, which were in summary:

> 1. The pollsters overreached the capabilities of the public opinion poll as a predicting device in attempting to pick, without qualification, the winner of the 1948 presidential election. They had been led by false assumptions into believing their methods were much more accurate than in fact they are. . . .
>
> 2. The pollsters could have foreseen the possibility of a close contest had they looked more carefully at their data and past errors. They acted in good faith but showed poor judgment in failing to apply in 1948 what they knew about their past errors, and failing to ascertain late campaign shifts.
>
> 3. The over all operation of making election predictions from pre-election polls is a complex one involving eight major steps at each of which error may enter. . . . The evi-

dence indicates that there were two major causes of errors: (a) errors of sampling and interviewing, and (b) errors of forecasting, involving failure to assess the future behavior of undecided voters and to detect shifts of voting intention near the end of the campaign.

4. These sources of error were not new. . . . Hence, it is possible that their errors in 1948 were due to much the same causes as those that produced the earlier forecast errors, but if so, these causes operated more strongly. . . .

5. To improve the accuracy of pre-election poll predictions satisfactorily it is necessary to reduce the error at every step in the over-all polling process. The error at some of the steps, notably sampling and interviewing, could be reduced by using methods now available. But reduction at other steps depends on further basic research in psychological and political behavior.

6. The manner in which the pre-election polls were analyzed, presented and published for public consumption contributed materially to the widespread misinterpretation of the results of the polls and to the great public reaction to their failure to pick the winner. This led to a poor understanding of the lack of accuracy of the polls and of the nature of the errors residing in the polls, with the result that the public placed too much confidence in polls before the 1948 election and too much distrust in them afterwards.

The report of the S.S.R.C. Committee has apparently stemmed the tide of hostile criticism of the pollsters, and it is reassuring to see that most of them are still on the job. One can only express the hope that the 1948 fiasco will teach them some humility and induce in social scientists in academic and commercial fields alike greater zeal in mending their ways and learning better ones. In taking themselves too seriously, the pollsters have done themselves and the social sciences a disservice. Why should they aspire to be more than one other channel of communication through which the "phantom public"—that brooding omnipresence in the sky—expresses itself? Isn't it time to stop talking nonsense about the polls as the "pulse of democracy" or suggesting that they might supplant the general election as a means for determining the general will? Isn't it also time for the pollsters to cease confusing the verbal reactions of a selected sample of people to hypothetical questions with the voice of God and themselves as the high priests through whom Vox Populi is heard?

I heartily commend this volume, and particularly the chapter by David Truman on "Political Behavior," to all pollsters and their critics alike. For Mr. Truman (David, not Harry) emphasizes what should have been obvious all along—that political behavior is molar, not molecular; that it is a group experience, not an individual reaction; and that until the basic assumptions upon which analysis rests are made explicit, "adequate description and prediction of political behavior are not possible."

It is only fair to those who labor in the vineyard of opinion research to note that in no other field is there more searching self-criticism or critical stocktaking. This is evidenced by the numerous conferences on Attitude and Opinion Research that have been held in recent years. The Meier-Saunders volume on *The Polls and Public Opinion*, listed above, is a report of such a conference, held at Iowa City, February 10–12, 1949. At most such conferences or conventions, depth is sacrificed to breadth, and the Iowa conferences were no exception. Many of the best people in the business participated—Sam Stouffer, Clyde Hart, Arch Crossley, Bernard Berelson, Ralph Nafziger, Ralph Casey, Paul Lazarsfeld, George Gallup, and Had Cantril, to mention a few—but no one

really had a chance to get his teeth into the subject assigned to him. Moreover, there is repetition, overlapping, duplication, and the usual quota of sociological gobbledygook. The report itself shows inexpert editing and is needlessly verbose and diffuse. Nevertheless, it should be on the shelf of every student of public opinion. For the reader who is willing to forage far and dig deep for nuggets, there are plenty here to be found.

At the Fourth Annual Conference on Public Opinion Research in Ithaca, New York, last June, Stuart Rice posed a question which can most appropriately conclude this review, since it is a question I have myself posed many times. "One thing I wonder," said Mr. Rice, "is whether the quantitative methods developed two decades ago have not been too quickly seized upon and used for utilitarian purposes at the expense of basic social science. I am questioning whether there is not a cumulative deficiency in our basic knowledge of the nature and characteristics of public opinion and social attitudes, relative to the superstructure erected upon it."

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British War Economy. By W. K. HANCOCK AND M. M. GOWING. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1949. Pp. xvii, 583. 21 s. or $4.75 from British Information Services, New York.)

This is the first of a series of United Kingdom "civil histories" authorized by the War Cabinet in 1942. The authors of *British War Economy* are painting on a broad canvas, as will also Professor M. M. Postan in *British War Production* and Mr. R. M. Titmuss in *Problems of Social Policy.* These synoptic volumes are to be supplemented by ten books in a "General Series," each on one of the following topics: food, economic blockade, shipping, agriculture, the social services, fuel and power, manpower, civil industry and commerce, education, and civil defense. Finally, a "War Production Series," directed by Professor Postan, is expected to result in volumes on raw materials, labor in munition industries, factories and machinery, design and development of weapons, munition contracts and finance, the royal ordnance factories, and administration of war production. There is the possibility of ten additional volumes in the total program.

W. K. Hancock, formerly Chichele Professor of Economic History at Oxford University and now Director of the Institute of Colonial Studies, is editor of the whole series of civil histories. He and his staff of professional historians and economists were located centrally through attachment to the Cabinet Secretariat. Access to official documents, conferences with the officials active in war administration, and submission of early drafts for criticism by administrators and government experts are the unique advantages of the official historian and played an important part in the British approach. Official historians, however, must overcome a suspicion that their product is simply an apologia for the government or agency within which it is prepared. Professor Hancock takes a position on this that is no less uncompromising than that of the American official war historians. "The aims of the research were . . . 'to fund experience for

Government use.' This meant that the histories must be critical. To have told a 'success story' . . . would have been futile and dangerous; the main processes of trial and error had to be revealed."

The present volume is concerned principally with problems of imports, shipping, inland transport, manpower, civilian supplies, inflation, rationing, and coal. Although individual chapters are devoted to each of them, these are not treated as discrete subjects. Each is regarded as a phase of an integrated strategy of economic mobilization. The book is well organized, with over half of its pages appropriately devoted to the period before Pearl Harbor. The analysis has both perception and perspective. The style of writing, a challenging problem in a book of this character, is admirable.

The most nearly comparable book in this country is the Bureau of the Budget's *The United States at War*. Three contrasts stand out. *British War Economy* is far more complete and masterly in its treatment of economic policy. But it omits the whole area of war production proper, and it gives far less attention to wartime governmental organization than does the American volume. The omission of war production gives the book something of the tone of a study of how all the supporting players adjust to an undelineated Hamlet. It is true, of course, that Professor Postan's volume will tell us all about Hamlet. The brevity of the treatment of governmental organization will leave political scientists somewhat dissatisfied. References to the leadership of the Prime Minister, the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, the shaping of the War Cabinet, and the succession of interagency committees do not fully meet our need to understand how conflicting ideas, ambitious individuals, and segmental pressures are brought into harmony in British administration. A peculiar handicap in achieving such understanding is the authors' scrupulous respect for "those conventions of government that are an essential part of the constitution —for example, the impersonality of the civil service and the collective responsibility of the Cabinet." Accordingly, British Cabinet members are almost always referred to by title rather than by name, though the excellent index straightens out any confusion; British civil servants, however highly placed, are veiled in anonymity; and virtually no estimate of individual contributions by such political and permanent officials to the war effort is undertaken (with the exception of Sir John Anderson and Lord Keynes). A curious result is that French and Canadian citizens serving as British officials (*e.g.*, Jean Monnet and Arthur B. Purvis) do not fall under the ban on naming names and are warmly praised, and Herbert Hoover and President Truman are each accorded an uncharitable reference.

The authors' review of government organization problems, brief though it is, permits several generalizations of interest to political scientists. Committees, far from being the bane of government, proved to be major instruments in the development of policy and the adjustment of interdepartmental frictions. British government did not achieve definitive form for war purposes on the outbreak of war. Instead, even the central coordinative machinery remained substantially in flux into early 1942. At the end of 1940, over a year after the declaration of war and a half-year after the fall of France, "it was clear that

no answer had as yet been found to the complaints about the lack of unified and comprehensive direction in the sphere of economic policy." A major reorganization was effected by the Prime Minister in January, 1941, but "during the next twelve months it did not altogether work out according to expectations." The performance of the two key executive committees, one for production and one for imports, "proved disappointing"; the former "never took charge of the main production plans," and the latter was "only a little more successful." Major committees rose and fell in power and effectiveness during this period, as did particular members of the Cabinet. For example, Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council and later Chancellor of the Exchequer, grew into a role not unlike that of James F. Byrnes in the United States. At the same time, the Lord President's Council, by gradually displacing all other major committees in the civil sphere, became "the most important focus of civil government under the War Cabinet, handling and settling a great deal of the business which the War Cabinet itself would otherwise have had to carry as an additional burden." Interdepartmental collaboration in important areas, such as manpower, did not fully mature until late 1941. Until that time the "supply departments . . . were apt neither to know, think nor care about any other part of the programme than their own." They "were persistently reluctant to decentralise responsibility to local officials or to provide them with adequate knowledge of programmes and priorities." But, say the authors, "By the time of Pearl Harbour, the supply departments had learnt enlightenment and the administrative techniques for distributing scarce resources had been mastered. No other war-making country acquired the same skill in co-ordination. The United States, with their colossal reserves of productive power, could achieve a mighty war effort in spite of the jurisdictional quarrels that persisted in the administration right up to the end of the war. In Germany, the shortcomings of planning and co-ordination were much greater."

On the substantive side, "The year 1941 was certainly a watershed in the conduct of the war, producing firm policies of taxation, of free and forced saving, of price control, of rationing and control of civilian supplies, together with exhaustive discussions of wages policy." In the important area of manpower, however, effective programming of requirements was not achieved until the Fall of 1942, and pending this development it appears that there was lacking an integrated control of the war economy. "Manpower budgeting," we read, "was, in fact, the only method the War Cabinet ever possessed of determining the balance of the whole war economy by a central and direct allocation of physical resources among the various sectors. During the first two or three years of war, physical and financial controls had been dispersed among many departments and committees. When manpower became the decisive shortage, the situation was transformed; every economic enterprise needed manpower, and to control its distribution from the centre signified direct central planning of the whole economy."

The United States does not come off too well in the authors' treatment of "Cash and Carry," Lend-Lease, combined British-American economic activities after Pearl Harbor, and the post-war adjustment of British-American

finances and trade relations. The authors are puzzled over the political and psychological conditions that occasioned the American neutrality policy and the American Government's fertility of "suggestions to the British for stripping themselves bare." With an apparent misconception of appropriate chronological analogies, they contrast American aid in 1917, when the United States was at war, with that of 1939 and 1940, when the nation was not at war. Britain, the authors point out, spent her blood, stinted her civilians, and cast economic prudence to the winds; on all these counts the United States did less. America appears to have been a hard bargainer in Anglo-American negotiations, never fully contributing to that complete pooling of economic and financial resources that commanded so much lip-service; against this must be put the magnanimity of the final settlement of Lend-Lease accounts and other occasions on which the Americans accepted the British position, to which full tribute is paid. The United States' assumption of the senior partner's chair in the British-American partnership was a bit awkward for the British, and the authors bridle at the Americans' insistence on detailed justification of British estimates of requirements, although Russian estimates were subjected to no such searching scrutiny. Britain's disinvestment abroad, her loss of foreign trade, and her disdain of economic prudence resulted in the emergence of the United States in the role occupied by Britain at the end of the Napoleonic wars.

The time is ripe for capitalizing on the "great volume of precise data which could be used for the comparative study of the British and American war economies." With the British and American series of volumes on war economy management might be linked the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey's reports on the German and Japanese war economies, and such useful non-official works as Jerome B. Cohen's *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction.* In the reviewer's judgment, comparative study would demonstrate that the management of the American war economy involved much less bungling than is popularly assumed. In Great Britain, according to the present study, the period from the declaration of war in September, 1939, to December, 1941 (and late 1942 for manpower programming), was required for the shakedown cruise of both government machinery and policy clarification. If our declaration of war in December, 1941, is accepted as the base date for a comparable analysis of American mobilization (though this base date is debatable), the comparable maturity point would be in early 1944. In fact, it can be argued that war organization and policies were stabilized during 1943. Perhaps more significant in a comparative study, to which *British War Economy* would contribute so substantially, are the numerous exact or approximate parallels in bungling—a parallelism that lends tolerance to the critical study of any one war economy. Until 1932, it was official British doctrine that no war, or at least no great war, need be anticipated during the succeeding ten years; until March, 1938, it was assumed a war could be fought under a "business as usual" policy; "a bare six months before the war" planning was based on the assumption of "a war of limited liability," involving no such expansion of the Army and military supply as occurred in World War I; a three-year war was the basis of planning in September, 1939; and as late as March, 1940, the Prime Minister regarded

economic blockade and economic warfare as "the main weapon." As for control of the civilian economy, even after the nation was at war, and well into 1940, control of shipping, imports, and exports was so weak as to occasion bizarre extravagances and to tolerate "departmental boggling at the extent of the economies and efforts insistently demanded by the facts of the shipping situation"; there was no government authority willing to execute the War Cabinet's policy of dilution of skilled labor; and the Ministry of Supply's orders were going mostly to larger firms and it was building factories in areas of labor scarcity. An efficient system of licensing iron and steel was not working properly until the end of 1940; licensing of civilian construction did not become effective until October, 1940; not until the Spring of 1941 did the government establish effective control over the railways, which had displayed, the Ministry of Food said, "a purely commercial outlook wholly inappropriate in war time."

Despite its judicious criticism of missed opportunities and lags in institutional adjustments to war needs, *British War Economy* is primarily a record of how Great Britain mastered the incredibly complex and challenging task of managing her war economy. As such the book is indispensable for American political scientists who have an interest in crisis government, who are students of the British scene, and who acknowledge the concern of political science with government planning and control of a modern economy.

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Congress Makes A Law; The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946. By STEPHEN KEMP BAILEY. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. 282. $3.75.)

Congress Makes A Law is a penetrating study of the living techniques and processes in the making of public policy. Professor Bailey analyzes step by step the Employment Act of 1946 (S.380—79th Congress) from its origin with the background of popular fears of postwar unemployment and the impact of the Keynesian economic philosophy through complex and frustrating incidents to final passage of the bill. Even political scientists will find some of these intermediate steps revealing.

The skillful and decisive work of the staff in Room 15A (particularly Bertram Gross) at every stage of the bill is one of the outstanding contributions of the volume. "At the beginning, most of these men limited their activities to research, analysis, and report writing. But as the war years progressed, some of them—perhaps inevitably—became more and more engrossed in the legislative implications of their research and the various strategic factors in the legislative process. The increasing importance of these staff assistants in the whole field of policy formulation is one of the most significant developments in Congress in recent years and deserves careful study and analysis."

The contribution of pressure groups to the enactment of the Employment Act reveals their varied role. Particular attention is paid on the liberal side to the National Farmers Union, which authored the proposal, and the "Lib-Lab"

lobby under the leadership of the Continuations Group, composed of progressive and labor organizations which worked diligently for a strong bill. On the conservative side, the Committee on Economic Development, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Machinery and Allied Products Institute were of great importance in shaping the substance of the final bill.

In the absence of a sustained and widespread public interest in S.380, many congressmen identified pressure group activity as the "public opinion" of their home constituencies. In most cases this was ideologically receptive to their own ideas. Of very special significance to students of government is the two-way relationship between Congress and pressure groups through which, in the case of S.380, the liberal organizations "willingly cooperated with political strategists on Capitol Hill playing the game as the sponsors and the staff wanted it played."

In addition, the study of the Employment Act offers a very interesting analysis of the *different* forces and personalties at work in the two houses. On the Senate side, liberal sponsorship of the bill under experienced leaders and its referral to a sympathetic committee were reflected in the nature of the hearings and the form in which the bill passed the Senate. These factors are vividly contrasted in the House with the referral of the bill to the conservatively manned Committee on Expenditures, the lack of adequate staff assistance for the House sponsors, inexperienced leadership, and the drafting of the House substitute with the aid of conservative business economists and the cooperation of the Rules Committee.

At a critical point in the pre-conference stage, the role of the administration in support of a strongly endorsed substitute bill was dissipated by a feud between two of the President's most powerful subordinates, Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury, and Snyder, Chief of the OWMR. In fact, the maneuvering of the negotiators in the conference committee makes a fascinating behind-the-scenes story in which Senator Alben Barkley played the "master broker," pointing up the areas of agreement and relieving at appropriate moments the tension of ideological and personality conflicts by humorous touches.

Closely associating the draftsmen of bills with the policy formulators is an essential part of bill making. Representatives of the Senate and House Offices of the Legislative Counsel sat with the conferees during the negotiations, and kept track of the various agreements and disagreements. In this way working drafts were ready for each conference session.

In the chapter on "Personalties: Interpretations and Influences," Bailey attempts to establish the subtle and overt influences, presuppositions and value judgments of the twelve members of the conference committee to whom the Senate and House bills were submitted. Making brief field trips to the home towns and states of these conferees was just one way in which Bailey tried to establish the social philosophy that led them to view the Full Employment bill as they did. This provocative chapter also illustrates the desperate need for understanding the motivation and behavior patterns of political leaders from a fully rounded point of view which invites the insights and techniques of the

psychologists and sociologists. In fact, an outstanding feature of Bailey's study is the skill with which he weaves the psychological and social factors with the political and economic in his analysis.

A penetrating final chapter summarizes the factors in congressional policy-making that make the process "unbelievably complex." The author concludes on a familiar note that one of the most important ingredients for the survival of the American system is a responsible political system in which presidential leadership and party cohesion are strengthened. "Until we move in that direction, national economic policies will continue to be formulated by a kaleidoscopic and largely irresponsible interplay of ideas, interests, institutions, and individuals."

The Appendix is rich in its varied tool and source materials. The list of "major" interviews includes only part of the 400 held which added so much to the dynamic quality of this study. The bibliography shows careful selection.

Professor Bailey has made a scholarly and valuable contribution to the literature of public policy formulation that deservedly won for him the Toppan Prize at Harvard for the most distinguished thesis in political science in 1948. To political scientists its value does not lie merely in the fact that the author has given us a provocative case study. What is more important, perhaps, is that he has drawn attention to problems and issues in the interrelated social sciences that call for serious investigation.

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A Communist Party in Action; An Account of the Organization and Operations in France. BY ANGELO ROSSI. TRANSLATED AND EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY WILLMOORE KENDALL. (Yale University Press. 1949. Pp. xxiv, 301. $4.00.)

M. Rossi's study of the French Communist Party during the years 1939 to 1942—that is, to be more exact, from roughly the outbreak of World War II in Europe to some time after the entrance of the Soviet Union into the War—is an exemplary work in political science, a rebuke to those who waste time and research money on fiddling with trivialities from the outside and a tonic to those who believe that political science should concern itself with major phenomena from the inside.

It looks at the operations of the French Communist Party at a time when souls were tested with the penetrating concentration of X-rays. It is powerful in description, incisive and sagacious in philosophy. Students may remember how this same author illuminated the rise of Fascism in Italy in a book published before the War, and they will therefore appreciate the length of his experience in contemplating the slice of history to which he has given his attention, and his practical immersion in the stream of European and especially French history which gives reality to his findings.

Mr. Kendall sets the background for M. Rossi's observations in a brilliant introduction, in which he deprecates many common Pollyanna judgments

about the vincibility of the USSR, its good intentions, and the possibilities of a kindly domestication of Communists everywhere.

It is not the purpose of this review to give a summary of M. Rossi's analysis, but to commend it and say a word on its general character.

The most tragic question raised in a very tragic book is this: Is international peace, or domestic peace, likely to be furthered by the truth about the Communist movement? Shall we be driven by our fuller knowledge to arm ourselves and repress liberty within the democracies in order to prevent the entire subversion of democracy? This question has been raised already by the memoirs of the men having dealings with the Soviet Union, whether in its outward formal guise of a national state or in the cloak and dagger mantle of the Comintern. It has recently been raised more painfully by the periodical publications which translate and reproduce précis and articles *in extenso* from the Soviet Press. Now M. Rossi reveals in all the naked detail the principles, the ends, and the tactics of this blend of political party and *ekklesia* which is a Communist Party, a way of life which has severed itself by the scalpel of hatred from the society in which it dwells, from which it sucks the life, and which it intends to enslave in the name of its own peculiar form of freedom, glory and salvation. For here is the thoroughly authenticated story of a Party capable of any transformation of theory and practice so long as the Utopia which the Soviet Union is supposed to represent needs support at home and abroad.

Coolly, and in a sense regretfully, M. Rossi demonstrates that this pretended international Party is nothing but a nationalist party in the interests of the USSR. He does not affirm this; he demonstrates it. And, in so doing, he is led back to consider the value of nationalism in France, as a potential safeguard against the process of grinding France to pieces, a disintegration which might afford the Party its opportunity to come into power. One cannot help reflecting, especially in the light of the reactions of Tito and Nehru, that there is a blessing in nationalism, insofar as it is an obstacle to the unmitigated rule of the Kremlin, with all the severities and indecencies that seem inevitable when Karl Marx's errors of history, psychology, and philosophy constitute the main drives of an irresponsible sovereign.

Those who open this book will be especially interested in the chapters on the mobilization of the intellectuals, organization, personnel, the role of doctrine, the psychology of party membership, the building of community, and the Communist Party and democracy. These constitute less than one-fifth of the entire work, but they constitute four-fifths of its special interest because they treat largely of the Communist Party mentality.

It is far from a digression to draw particular attention to the attraction of the Party for the intellectuals. M. Rossi thinks the Communist Party attracts the French intellectual because it takes off his mind the responsibility of *not taking sides* on the big problems of modern society. It will be remembered that in the late 'twenties Julien Benda found that one of the most dangerous tendencies of our time was the unwillingness, and perhaps incapacity, of intellectuals

to hold fast the function and obligation of remaining above the battle, of seclusion in the laboratory of the natural or the social sciences, so that some few men, at least, should be able to offer to society accounts of the truth in their fields that were not wishful from the very beginning. It is the hardest thing in the world for a man of character and intellectual energy to stand outside the fray on avowal of the truth that he will, thereby, help humanity in the long run. For he is then under a double set of fetters, putting off his own hopes and even his immediate bread and butter to years beyond his own lifetime, and preferring anonymous humanity to himself and the personalities that impinge immediately upon him from whom he might draw many needed gratifications. The easy escape is into the Party which, as M. Rossi puts it (p. 226), "gives him a welcome taste of certainty." Yes! What a release and feeling of freedom there is in accepting somebody else's certainty! And then too, public applause is loud for the man who, as Max Weber warned, is ready to desert the arid land of scientific a-moral discovery, for the cheers that await him at meetings of the Party, for the joy of being a person.

Two things leave me puzzled in M. Rossi's book. The first is his discussion of what to do with the Communist Party, which sets about to subvert democracy by the use of democracy's freedoms, just as Hitler and Goebbels did; the second is what he means by a "national" revolution in France.

It appears (pp. 253 ff.) that, heinous as M. Rossi regards the Party's doctrines and its practices of lying, force, fraud, betrayal and subversion, he would have the state do nothing more than exclude Communists from the army, the police and the courts. I see nothing about the schools, for example. He leaves the trade unions to fight their own fight. For the rest, he would apparently have nothing done by the state as such, but would leave the combatting of Communism to its private citizens. And then, at once, he admits that private citizens (of course, we assume grouped in parties and other associations, as well as individuals) would prefer not to assume the responsibilities, for they are onerous, but to have them fulfilled for them by somebody else. No! He will have them confront the Communists in the factories, the streets, the villages. But then he says: "The state should step in only when the Communist action takes a form that private citizens simply cannot cope with" (p. 259). We can all imagine such circumstances. But suppose it is reasonably guessed that the only way to put down some Communist activities is by the formation of counter-organizations, forced into measures and ideas as extreme as those of the Communists, since the power and drive would need to be at least equal and opposite? What would prevent the state going up in the flame of assassinations, secret societies, the stealing of official documents, and conspiracies with foreign enemies of the potential Communist state of France?

Moreover, why should the millions of ordinary indifferent citizens be forced to come under Communist rule unless they come out of their pacifism? Why, in other words, should it be tacitly assumed (M. Rossi does not commit this enormity) that the Communist is by his very possession better than the unpossessed? It may be that the only way in which to deal with the possessed—if they are wrong about human nature and destiny—is for the leaders on the

non-Communist side, "the camp" as the USSR always calls it, to marshal all their forces and put them down.

I cannot see the absolute tenability of Rossi's conclusion that "the fight for freedom cannot, in the very nature of the case, be won by adopting the methods of the enemy." This is a fallacy which would have left the kingdom of Hitler to rule for ever and ever, and I am sure that M. Rossi was militarist when it came to the liberation of France and Italy, not to speak of Germany. The fallacy is, that in the means both sides use, Communist and non-Communist, the latter includes the *tempering* and the merely *temporizing* of the means with the purpose of arriving again at freedom as the end. This makes all the difference, and I deny the common escape from civic burdens which consists of a chastity about the use of force, and which resides in the argument that those who use it cannot purge themselves of it when it is no longer needed. But I respect also the arguments which M. Rossi puts forward to explain why France has been favorable ground for the growth of Communism, arguments relating to the blindness and obstinacy of the French upper classes.

What, finally, M. Rossi does not fully instruct us about is the set of principles (which he believes that the democratic Socialists might provide) for "creating a *people* where, strictly speaking, today there is no people." "It is impossible to point to any group which did not, in the course of the events leading up to the defeat, fail to measure up to even minimum standards of civic virtue" (p. 266). *Eh bien!* A social revolution will not suffice. "That means, first of all, attacking that sickness in the minds and hearts of its sons, who must relearn the human values that are France's most precious possession—and the gage of its greatness." Where is the doctrine, and whose is the tongue?

HERMAN FINER.

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Cases and Readings on Law and Society. By SIDNEY POST SIMPSON AND JULIUS STONE, WITH THE COLLABORATION OF M. MAGDALENA SCHOCH. Vol. I, *Law and Society in Evolution;* Vol. II, *Law in Modern Democratic Society;* Vol. III, *Law, Totalitarianism and Democracy.* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1948–1949. Pp. xlvii, xliii, xlii, 2389. $7, $8, $7.)

Any political scientist who has been hankering to teach a course on "Law and Society," or "Introduction to Law," or "Law and the Social Sciences," will find this tremendous collection of cases and materials the answer to his prayers. In fact, any political scientist who would like to have three large volumes of interesting reading-matter at his elbow, if only for an occasional dip, will find pleasure and instruction in almost any section of this work to which his fancy may lead him. In many ways this is a pioneering job, and we are told by the editors that it was fourteen years in the making. Nothing quite like it is presently available.

It is difficult to describe adequately a work of this magnitude in a brief space. It should be pointed out, first of all, that this treatise is a product of careful scholarship and impeccable workmanship. The book is properly put together:

it is edited with painstaking care, and the proof-reading is up to the highest standards of book-making. It is well organized, conveniently blocked out in well-marked divisions and subdivisions, and properly equipped with tables, indices and other devices essential for a book of this nature. The editors use a variety of methods to integrate the materials, including introductory essays for each section, numerous footnotes, and valuable bibliographical references. The contributions made by the editors, in terms of original writing and compilation, are very considerable.

The materials are drawn from an impressively wide range of sources: law cases, statutes, constitutions, codes, government reports, historical and anthropological treatises, and various political science, economic and other social science writings. Over one-third of the materials used are, strictly speaking, non-legal in character. The range of these materials is briefly described in the preface as follows: "The outline of the work is historical and the method is comparative. It includes materials drawn from 4000 years of legal history from the Code of Hammurabi of 2090 B. C. to the 1948 proceedings of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy. These materials come from legal systems as diverse as those of Ifugao of Northern Luzon, the Ashanti of the Gold Coast, the Cheyenne and Comanche Indians, and the natives of Melanesia; from civilizations as far apart in time and space as the Greece of Homer and Pericles, the Rome of the Republic and Empire, the regime of the first Princes of Kiev in medieval Russia, and the league of the Hansa towns; and from legal sources as divergent as the European codes of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the modern common and civil law as variously applied from England, France and the Netherlands to New Zealand, India and the United States, and the legislation and judicial decisions of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the USSR. The emphasis throughout is on law in action rather than on the law in the books. Philosophic speculation about law is dealt with only in so far as it has had demonstrable effects on the social, economic and legal order."

The law cases are drawn from all sorts of courts in the United States, state and federal, with some emphasis on United States Supreme Court decisions. Many cases are taken from English and continental European courts, including Russian courts. Some writers are represented by many selections, others by only one or two. There are in the first two volumes, according to a quick computation, no less than forty-two selections from the writings of Sir Henry Maine, sixteen selections from Hartland's *Primitive Law*, fifteen selections from the writings of Roscoe Pound, nine from Maitland, ten from Dicey, eleven from Vinogradoff's *Historical Jurisprudence*, eight from Malinowski, eight from Blackstone, and six each from Bentham, Holmes and the Berle and Means treatise on property and the corporation.

Perhaps the most useful service of a reviewer of such a work as this is to summarize its coverage. The first volume, *Law and Society in Evolution*, is divided into four parts. Part I deals with law in a kin-organized society, spelling out its basis of social cohesion, and describing the nature, role and machinery of social control in such a society. Most of the selections are taken from the writings of anthropologists and historians and from ancient codes of

law. Part II deals with law in an emergent political society. Here the transition from kin to political institutions is examined, with special reference to status as the product of the transition. The early development of law as a specialized branch of social control is then set out, with the rise of secular interpreters of law, and the growth of remedies, formalism and fictions, and the evolution of machinery for securing interests. Part III describes the relationship between law and the rise of commerce, showing in what various ways law was adjusted to new conditions, both as regards changes in interests secured, in substance and personality, and changes in the machinery of the law. Part IV examines the impact of an expanding industrialism upon law. Here are considered the rise of legislation and codification as the means of legal growth, and the impact of industrialism upon the substantive law, with particular attention to the theory and practice of *laissez faire*. The closing chapter of the first volume considers the effect of industrialism upon the judicial process.

The second volume is concerned with "law in modern democratic society," and will probably be most suitable as a textbook for a single political science course on "Law and Society" for those who would shrink from imposing three large volumes upon the students. The over-all purpose of this volume is to study law in a complex economically organized society. Most of the case material in this work will be found in this volume. After a brief consideration of social and ideological changes affecting the law, the bulk of this volume is devoted to an examination of interests "pressing and secured." These interests include: public safety, health and comfort; protection of investors and bank depositors; conflicts between business enterprise and organized labor; business cycle problems; and political, religious, cultural and social institutions. A great deal of space is devoted to the conservation of social resources, both natural and human. Interests of personality and of substance are then examined, with special reference to freedom of economic activity and restrictions imposed upon each activity. The next chapter of this volume deals with the machinery of social control through law. There are excellent readings on the rise of the administrative process, administrative procedure, and the administrative process and the courts. The judicial process is then studied from the points of view of judicial law-making, judicial administration, and preventive justice. The remaining sections touch upon the legislative process, the personnel factor in government, and the means of law enforcement. The last chapter of the second volume contains a great deal of suggestive material on the intriguing subject of limitations on social control through law.

The third volume is devoted to "law, totalitarianism and democracy." Five of the six chapters of this volume deal with the three totalitarian systems of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Communist Russia. The Fascist and Communist brands of totalitarianism are, for the most part, handled separately. The first chapter describes the rise of totalitarian politics and ideologies. The next two chapters are concerned with law under Fascist and Communist totalitarianism. The fourth chapter examines in great detail the changes in interests secured under totalitarian politics, such as those relating to business enterprise, labor, agriculture, political, domestic, religious and cultural institutions, the

utilization of human resources, and the submergence of private rights. The next chapter examines the changes in the machinery of social control under totalitarianism: the unification of governmental powers, the rise of executive legislation, the dominance of the administrative process, the decline of the judicial process, the growth of new methods of enforcing social control, and the party as an instrument of social control. The long chapter which brings the third volume to a close focusses attention upon law and democratic politics in a time of change. The trend toward collectivism, and its impact upon the maintenance of freedom, are examined. The last sections of the chapter, appropriately enough, are concerned with the implications of atomic energy and the internationalization of positive law.

This is what *Law and Society* is all about. It seeks to explain law in terms of change and growth. Its approach is historical and sociological. It ranges far and wide over the vast panorama of history, drawing attention to the role of law in the life of man. It introduces to the readers the thinking of a large assortment of judges, lawyers, scholars, historians, sociologists, officials, political scientists, anthropologists, and legislators. Its purpose is to instruct, to stimulate thought, to raise problems. Everyone—student and teacher, and even the casual reader—will find something here which will ferment the juices of imagination and reflective intelligence.

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Western Political Heritage. By WILLIAM Y. ELLIOTT AND NEIL A. MCDONALD. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1949. Pp. 1027. $6.75.)

This work began with a collection of readings used in Government I at Harvard University. While stating that they have departed from the original list of these readings by additions and subtractions of their own, the authors acknowledge their indebtedness to the staff instructors and the senior members of the Government Department at Harvard who have participated in planning and offering Government I for the past two decades. The authors have, in addition to making changes in the selection of readings, added their own commentary, which is sufficiently extensive to occupy approximately one-third of the space in the completed volume. This commentary includes a general introduction and an interpretative essay for each of the fifteen chapters into which the readings have been grouped. It also includes separate statements introducing the readings of the various chapters, and briefer notes emphasizing the significance of each of the readings included. Professor Elliott is the author of the general introduction and of twelve of the interpretative essays, while Professor McDonald, formerly chief of sections for Government I at Harvard, has had the major responsibility for the remainder of the material which makes up the commentary.

The book is meant to emphasize the development of constitutional democracy through the study of the writings of great thinkers of the past. In view of this, the authors have given little attention to the East and Middle East but have concentrated their attention on the political heritage of the West, which they

believe to be the area of the world in which the idea of constitutional government has achieved mature form in highly developed civilizations (p. 18). Except for several readings that have been drawn from the Bible, the literature and experience of the East and Middle East have not been drawn upon. The readings selected from western political thought, however, cover a wide range and include selections from most of the great classics of political thought that are known to the West. Among them are extensive selections from the dialogues of Plato, the *Nichomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* of Aristotle, the *Prince* and the *Discourses* of Machiavelli, Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Locke's *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, and Rousseau's *Social Contract*. The shorter selections, which number more than fifty, include further excerpts from the ancients, as well as selections from the church writers of the Middle Ages, the early Protestant Reformers, and numerous British and American tracts and documents of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Modern totalitarianism is illustrated by selections drawn from Fichte, Marx and Engels, Mussolini and Hitler. What has been done, in fact, has been to bring together materials which illustrate, not only the development of the idea of constitutional democracy, but also the ideologies which have impeded this development. The result is a collection of writings and documents through which most of the main currents in the political thought of the West may be traced.

In the commentary the authors attempt to relate the important developments in political ideas to the principal movements and events of history, and to focus attention on the more significant ideas of the writers discussed, without going into detailed analysis. They place special emphasis on ideas which they believe to have contributed to totalitarianism and on those which they believe to have contributed to constitutional democracy. Basic to these two systems of ideologies, according to the introduction and the interpretative essays by Professor Elliott, are two widely different views of human nature. One of these views he attributes to the Sophists of ancient Greece, and he states that the other one of the two views is generally attributed to the Stoics in Greece and Rome, and later to the fusing of Hebraic and Stoic thought that went into the making of Christianity (pp. 11, 13). According to the first of the two views, man is no more than an animal, whose obedience to government is very largely a matter of convenience or necessity. This view is held to be reflected in the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes (pp. 430, 436), both of whom supported authoritarian regimes, and it is also held to be the basis of the fascist theory of Mussolini and Hitler (p. 12). The same view of human nature is held to be reflected in Marx's analysis of capitalist society, while it is pointed out that true human nature, according to Marxian theory, is to be achieved after the proletarian dictatorship has purified human nature of all self-interest (pp. 12, 771). According to the second view, man possesses a character different from that of animals and partakes in some measure of an eternal soul. This view has been appealed to by democratic thinkers, who have asserted the ultimate rights of the individual as a moral person. It is this view which is reflected in the philosophy of John Locke, which supports human rights and limited government, created by the natural consent of free men (pp. 447, 542).

While it is not difficult to see that the Stoic-Christian tradition, with its emphasis on human equality and world brotherhood, has played a highly significant role in the development of western democracy, Professor Elliott's thesis is not altogether satisfactory. At least it must be said that all views of human nature on which totalitarianism and constitutional democracy depend do not fit easily into two categories. Many writers who have been well within the Christian tradition have been sufficiently pessimistic about the ability of the masses to govern themselves to support authoritarian regimes. Luther and Calvin would hardly be said to have thought of human beings as possessing only animal natures, but both of these writers taught passive obedience to political authority, and the latter set up in Geneva one of the most authoritarian and dictatorial regimes of all times. In discussing certain writers, Professor Elliott does not really follow through with his general thesis. He recognizes, for example, that Plato's conception of human nature was different both from that of the Sophists and from that of the Stoics. Yet, he states that the authoritarian doctrines which developed alongside and in opposition to notions of democracy and constitutional morality stemmed at the outset from Plato's low estimate of the wisdom of the people and his élitist conception of the role of a ruling class (p. 768). He apparently sees a marked similarity between Plato's view of human nature and that of the Stoics, but he notes the important fact that the Stoics accepted the universality of human reason while Plato did not (pp. 13, 100).

Inadequacies in the authors' interpretations, however, do not appear serious when one keeps in mind the several excellent features of the volume. The authors have shown that most of the great political questions of the present day are not new, and that there is a certain continuity in attempts by political thinkers to answer them. The volume should fulfill the authors' desire to assist the reader to achieve a truer perspective on the present-day conflict between constitutional democracy and totalitarianism. Moreover, the carefully selected and arranged readings will make the volume extremely useful in general courses in the history of political ideas.

WALTER H. BENNETT.

University of Alabama.

The Ramparts We Guard. BY R. M. MACIVER. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1950. Pp. 152. $3.00.)

The Design of Democracy. BY LAURENCE STAPLETON. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 301. $4.00.)

Despite the voluminous literature on democracy, there is no lack of misunderstanding as to its meaning and implications. We need not only to document the obvious but also to illuminate the unclear. It is the merit of these books that they recognize, and effectively meet, this twofold need.

MacIver's book is in part an extension of the ideas on democracy set forth in his earlier works, *Leviathan and the People* and *The Web of Government.* He re-emphasizes that democracy is a form of state characterized by the right

of the people constitutionally to make and to unmake government, with no deprivation of civil liberties for those who oppose its policies; that it is rooted in consent based on common interest; and that it requires equality—conceived not as identity of treatment or the absence of distinctions but as equality of citizenship and of opportunity—and freedom. He views freedom as social, and therefore relative, particularly in the economic sphere where the concentration of economic power may create great inequalities of opportunity. He argues, on the other hand, for maximum, if not absolute, freedom of the mind. It is not only the one area where "the liberties of some are not intrinsically hampered by the liberties . . . of others" (p. 20); since democracy has no fixed system of values, it is the necessary condition of democratically determining which values are to prevail.

These largely familiar details are presented with insight and lucidity, and in themselves constitute a model handbook for the student of democratic theory. But this book's more important contribution is the author's searching analysis of the challenges to democracy both from within and without. MacIver is concerned, as all of us are, with the threat of Soviet Communism. But he understands too that there is an equal peril from the proponents of uniformity, from the cleavages—economic, racial, and the like—that dissipate the sense of common interest, and from *anomy*, that socially disruptive malady which divorces man from his moral roots and leaves him with only a philosophy of denial. Throughout, in line with his sociological approach to politics, MacIver seeks a basis of unity, but it is a unity to be achieved through the integration rather than the elimination of difference.

Miss Stapleton, who is Professor of English and Political Theory at Bryn Mawr, makes no reference to MacIver (or to any number of contemporary writers on democracy). However, the first part of her book affirms with equal understanding, if not equal brevity and felicity of style, a generally similar position. In this respect her work, with MacIver's, commends itself to teachers in need of a manageable and effective supplementary reading on the meaning of democracy.

But the larger part of her book is an attempt to relate democracy to the economic and cultural conditions in which it is likely to flourish or decline. Her observations on education, literature, and religion are stimulating, though controversial. However, one questions the necessary relationship of these ideas to democracy. Miss Stapleton, for example, says: "This . . . democracy asks of the writer— to do his best; and of the citizen—to make room for the life of art" (p. 198). But why is this not equally true of literature in the non-democratic state? Her refusal (with MacIver) to identify democracy with a particular economic system is convincing. On the other hand, her immediate proposals for the achievement of world government are much more open to debate than her analysis of its ultimate desirability.

Miss Stapleton's theories of political obligation are likely to provoke considerable disagreement. She would justify disobedience where (a) the citizen cannot participate in the political process; (b) the citizen does not participate in the making of standards or otherwise voluntarily accept them; or (c) the

law would cause a grave injustice to the citizen or another (pp. 78, 95–97, 280–281). There is a difference between *cannot* and *does not* which apparently escapes Miss Stapleton; but more important, her third and basic ground for disobedience depends not only on the definition of injustice but on who is to define it. If it is the citizen, then it is questionable that Miss Stapleton's position differs materially from that pursued by the early Laski, which Miss Stapleton rejects.

Whatever one's reservations as to detail, it must nevertheless be said that here are two defenses of democracy which are far more than uncritical expressions of affection. They are searching and illuminating works that contribute significantly to our understanding of democracy and the dangers that beset it.

DAVID SPITZ.

Ohio State University.

Authoritarianism and the Individual. By HAROLD METZ AND C. A. H. THOMPSON. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1950. Pp. xi, 371. $3.50.)

The Individual and Society. By EVAN L. LEWIS. (New York: Exposition Press. 1949. Pp. ii, 111. $3.00.)

Twentieth century expansion of state authority continues to attract the efforts of American writers of all stripes, from those who deplore the march of "statism" altogether, on the one hand, to those who fear, on the other, that comprehensive political integration in the right direction will not be achieved soon enough. These two books add their thoughts to the swelling literature of the subject, although they address quite distinct aspects; and neither can be said to fall within either extreme.

To the professional student of government, the first of these will undoubtedly prove more interesting. Metz and Thompson strive with considerable success to assay the costs in human freedom inflicted by authoritarian regimes upon their subjects. They posit as their perhaps inescapable criterion the sum of the personal, political, economic, social, and intellectual rights and liberties of individuals which constitutes the substance of orthodox western liberalism and, more precisely, of American constitutionalism; and they apply it with deliberate care to the theory and practice of selected authoritarian societies, medieval, early modern absolutist, Russian Communist, Fascist, Nazi, and finally American Utopian. Their examination produces excellent bills of particulars that cumulate into an impressive indictment of all absolutisms, however rationalized for the greater glory of God, country, race, social class, salvation of the soul, or other ideological ends. The conclusion seems to be inevitable that no significant freedom for the individual can survive in societies consciously dedicated to authoritarian pursuit of transcendent objectives.

Metz and Thompson find that modern absolute regimes, whether Fascist, Nazi, or Russian Communist, clearly attain the greatest efficiency in absolutism, because: (1) they have devised a marvelous instrument for power in the one-party state that not only tolerates no opposition, but also "atomizes"

the social organization to weld it anew to the monolithic structure; (2) they reach new heights of human skill in the systematic use of violence against dissent; (3) they exploit the increasing dependency of individuals exacted by modern industrialism; (4) they utilize modern advance in public administration, education, and communication fully to achieve wonders in the arts of "thought control"; (5) most portentous of all, they persistently risk war by design, offering foreign "devils" as the psychological solvent of domestic frustrations and as further justification of monolithic controls. Despite a certain repetitiveness and excessive organization in their treatment, the authors make a strong and persuasive case for their thesis. Exception might be taken to a few fugitive points, as, *e.g.*, the statement that feudalism recognized no theoretical limits upon its control over individuals, and another ascribing a fixed quantity theory of economic production to early modern mercantilism. But on the whole their performance renders a signal service.

This work may prove of great value in bringing doctrinaire thinking "down to earth." To those who in pursuit of distributive justice would fritter away traditional political and civil freedoms, the authors give warning that the price would not be trivial. The study might also expose the false idea that the substance of human freedom is the reputed economic democracy of socialism, no matter how achieved, for it appears clear that labor has lost its liberty under Communism just as surely as under Fascism or Nazism. In fact, despite Russian propaganda to the contrary, Communism and Nazism are shown to be, on all important points, essentially the same. Possibly the greatest service in this effort is espousing the understanding that political liberalism of the western constitutional type alone makes individual liberty its central principle; that its attainment to a substantial degree anywhere has been relatively very recent; and that it should be neither taken for granted nor discounted through familiarity, but appreciated, even celebrated, for the rare blessing it is.

The second book is obviously aimed at the general reader, for Lewis attempts within its brief compass to summarize the whole of human experience in "thought, feeling, and action" from prehistoric origins down to the present, admittedly relying upon the works of numerous other writers in economics, politics, religion, philosophy, the arts and sciences, and to point up in the process significant truths regarding human personality, society, and societal evolution. The cognoscenti may find little new save in panoramic perspective. The author reveals collectivist and internationalist predilections in examining the prospect for the future and certainly illustrates aptly several times the danger inherent in wide ranging of other fields by the specialist, as *e.g.*, when he asserts that the Constitution of the United States embraced the political philosophy of Rousseau.

Concerning the individual in relation to society, Lewis succeeds in doing little more than restating the problem. Further maturation of society will require increasing recognition of the worth and dignity of the individual and continuous development of broader opportunities for self-realization by steadily growing numbers of human beings, even though doing so will, paradoxically enough, involve the exercise of new authority by the state, at least where its grasp has

not already become total. In terms of human personality, the ultimate solution of our more serious difficulties depends upon progressively greater identification of self with the group, of smaller groups with the larger, and finally of the individual with all mankind—and with Deity in the hereafter. This is a task of moral and spiritual growth that involves all the functions of society. In fine, the state must provide the individual with greater freedom to grow into the kind of sympathetic, cooperative, and sharing being that the welfare of society requires him to be.

AUGUST O. SPAIN.

Texas Christian University.

American Democracy and Natural Law. By CORNELIA G. LE BOUTILLIER. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. vi, 204. $3.00.)

In 1943 Jacques Maritain's *The Rights of Man and Natural Law* sought to identify democracy and idealist ethics, as expressed in natural law. The foundation of Maritain's work was the apparent certainty found in the idealist ethics of Aquinas. To Cornelia G. Le Boutillier, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College, these attempts do violence to the American democratic tradition, to the modern scientific spirit, and to what she regards as the proper philosophic foundation for investigation in the social sciences. Starting with the idealist system of Plato, she shows that continuing on through the Stoics, Cicero, Aquinas, Grotius, Richard Hooker, and then through the idealist conception of the state in Germanic thought as presented by Hegel, Fichte, and the neo-Kantians, idealist ethics, whether Catholic or Protestant, is more compatible with absolute systems of government, especially fascism, than with democracy. Even Marx, she believes, although professing a materialist approach, actually endorses an idealist absolute and can be considered an illustration of the non-harmony between any system of philosophic absolutes and the democratic process. Modern writers of the natural law school, William E. Hocking, Stammler, Del Vecchio and Lord Wright are also condemned.

The philosophic schools compatible with the democratic process are based on either the modified conception of nature as in Aristotle, Spinoza, Jefferson and Hamilton; or more properly on the work of David Hume and then the Utilitarians, Bentham, Mill, Thomas Cooper (in his later period), and the pragmatists and empiricists, William James, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and others. The American conception of rights is thus based in part on natural law (and even then a modified type), but colonial charters and the common law are more important.

The endorsement of a system of utilitarianism, pragmatism, and empiricism does not mean rejection of ethical values. Nor does it mean a system of no political values. It does mean that such values are relative, and are settled by application of the principle: "The greatest good for the greatest number." This permits proper discussion of values in accord with the democratic process, whereas the system of absolutes is based on conclusions that can hardly be tested.

Professor Le Boutillier is best in the fields of philosophy, political thought,

and legal theory. Some of her discussion of United States Supreme Court cases is excellent. On the other hand, her treatment of purely political matters leaves something to be desired. The Articles of Confederation are confused with the American Constitution at one point. Walter Lippmann's *The Good Society* does not provide a final answer to all current political problems. The inclusion of the American system of judicial review in the model democratic system is startling in view of the practice of other democratic systems, past and present. But such points are minor in judging this work as a whole. If some of the suggestions are not worked out fully, such completeness is hardly to be expected of a work covering so large a scope. This book provides a provocative answer to such writers as Maritain and Hallowell. It is well written. The materials are presented incisively and clearly. An important issue is joined, one of great contemporary significance both to students of politics and to others who are concerned with the basis of our approach to the contemporary problems before us, and with the attempt to formulate an ideology.

MANNING J. DAUER.

University of Florida.

The Study of Comparative Government; An Appraisal of Contemporary Trends. EDITED BY JASPER SHANNON. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1949. Pp. viii, 338. $4.00.)

Frederick Austin Ogg has the satisfaction of knowing that he has probably taught American and comparative government to more students than anyone else in history. "Oggenray" is as accepted a *liaison* in political science as "damnyankee" is in Georgia—although the former bears happier connotations.

The Study of Comparative Government, edited by Jasper Shannon, is composed of a series of essays written in Ogg's honor. The sub-title, *An Appraisal of Contemporary Trends*, gives a more adequate indication of the book's scope and design than the title itself. For this is no systematic conventional treatment of comparative government. Rather it is a happy collection of insights into largely unexplored areas of our discipline, with examples and illustrations drawn from the diverse political laboratories of the entire world.

A hasty glance at the table of contents is disconcerting: "American Democracy—After War;" "World Federation;" "The British Labor Party;" "Prospects of Democracy in Germany;" "Japanese Government Under the 1946 Constitution;" "Latin America Comes of Age; An Interpretation;" "Dual Federalism in Canada, Australia, and the United States;" "Some New Forms of Democratic Participation in American Government;" "Regional Government and Administration;" "Trends in Rural Local Government;" "Trends in City Government;" "The Executive;" "Training for Public Service;" "Political Parties in Transition;" "News Communication and World Affairs;" and a concluding essay by the editor, "The Study of Political Leadership."

But an inner logic shines through these disparate titles. Again and again the same fundamental questions appear: How can we understand political structures unless we understand the basic sociology of political power? How can we understand the sociology of political power unless we understand the

anatomy of culture? How can we understand the anatomy of culture unless we understand the psychological unities and diversities of humankind? Or again, how can democracies make an ethical and practical reality of the nebulous but indispensable concept: the public interest? In a world of specialties, how can citizen non-specialists retain even a fiction of participation in and control over their own political destinies? In a world of dramatic political alternatives, how can the complex processes of democracy compete for the hearts of men with the siren call of charismatic leadership? And finally, what skills of method and insight can the political scientist bring to bear on these tremendous issues so that human destiny can be shaped rather than suffered?

Here is a political science agenda for the last half of the 20th century. We who correct exams, sign scholarship forms, attend curriculum committee meetings, teach classes, worry about tenure, and despair of keeping up with our field, must occasionally stop to ponder our deepest obligations to our society. We are in the business of human freedom—for ourselves, and for the world market. This volume of essays, written in honor of a distinguished colleague, is a reminder that unless the pace of analysis and social invention quickens, liberty may well become a term simply of historical description.

"For what avail the plow, or sail,
"Or land, or life—if freedom fail."

STEPHEN K. BAILEY.

Wesleyan University.

My Three Years in Moscow. BY LT. GEN. WALTER BEDELL SMITH. (Philadelphia: Lippincott Publishing Company. 1950. Pp. 376, $3.75.)

The announcement that a professional soldier was about to publish memoirs covering a tour of diplomatic duty in Moscow probably raised no high expectations in most of us who have not the good fortune to know General Smith. It is an understatement to say that the book betters its promise. From the first chapter the author displays a discriminating intelligence, a lucidity and cogency of argument, and a breadth of knowledge of Russian history and institutions, that give his work high rank among the best studies of Soviet policy.

General Smith is clearly blessed with a native talent for getting to the heart of complexities. Starting with this advantage, he had at his disposal the archives and the elaborate fact-finding machinery of the Embassy. Best of all, the Soviet scene was illuminated for him by a first-rate staff of experienced and devoted experts. The author has generous praise for his assistants; but the best tribute he pays them is the full use that he made of their exceptional abilities.

Clearly this Ambassador went to Moscow with the established conviction, unshaken by military life, that democracy is infinitely superior to totalitarianism—that the latter, indeed, is thoroughly bad business. But he did not go with a chip on his shoulder. His innate friendliness shines out from these pages. As Chief of Staff in occupied Germany, he had already witnessed at first hand the widening rifts in the wartime alliance. Yet he went on his new mission hopefully, believing that firm frankness, coupled with a constant effort to under-

stand the opposing position, might still evoke a spirit of cooperation on the Russian side. It was only the long-drawn-out and baffling obstruction of successive overtures that made him finally despair of checking by appeal to any consideration but power the fixed policy of Soviet expansion. From that moment on he would have been more than human if his tone had not sharpened into general condemnation of the Politburo's objectives and methods. How often we have seen this reaction in men who have gone to the USSR with a doctrinal sympathy for the régime which General Smith never had. But this book does not descend to mere denunciation. Its judgments continue to be reasoned and documented. It would be a heartening thing to be able to refute some of its negative conclusions. But nothing in my reading of Soviet history, ideology or politics provides the material for refutation.

In 1946, when the author first went to Moscow, many of us who have no use for police states, red, black or brown, were still fighting off the evidence of Soviet imperialism. We felt it still possible to argue that the motive of energetic interference in surrounding States was genuinely, if needlessly, defensive. We were not yet ready to concede that the only plausible interpretation of the line being taken by the Kremlin demonstrated a fixed determination to expand by every expedient means the boundaries of Soviet power. Unhappily the evidence has meanwhile grown to overwhelming volume and strength. The fantastic misrepresentation and obstruction of the Marshall Plan, the establishment of the Cominform, the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the struggle with Tito, the purges and trials in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, the Communist conquest of China and threat to Southeast Asia—such a chain of development makes it naive to assign quantitative or qualitative limits to the Stalinist appetite.

Much of this story is told in *My Three Years in Moscow*. The scope of the book is greater than its title suggests. It is a chronicle of the world-conflict from 1945 to 1949. The chapters on the Berlin blockade and on the battle to overthrow Tito are as much worth studying as those which portray life in Moscow and the personnel and machinery of Soviet government.

There are, inevitably, some slips and some passages where conclusions outrun the evidence presented. How, for example, did Malenkov come to be described as "native of Georgia?" He is, I believe, usually credited to Orenburg in the Urals. Having three Georgians in the upper level of the Politburo is overdoing it. Again, one may doubt whether it is really or mainly the unpaid labor of the concentration camps "which enables the Soviet system to concentrate on the expansion of its heavy industry without providing the consumers' goods incentive necessary to the use of free labor." And why, after persuading the reader that Stalin is a dictator, sharing his powers at most with the Politburo, assert that policy is completely controlled by the Bolshevik party? To make this small élite co-extensive with the party is at least misleading. Finally, one element in particular seems to me to be lacking in the picture of Soviet national life. Despite his frank confession of the impossibility of friendly contact with Soviet citizens, General Smith might have made a fuller attempt to diagnose the attitude of the Russian people. The subject is too briefly touched in the

chapter headed "Mechanics of a Police State." Many of the diplomatic staff had traveled far and wide in the USSR. Innumerable small incidents witnessed; talk heard on trains, in theatres, shops, streets; fleeting encounters with less inhibited individuals living far from capital cities—all these fragments pieced together must add up to some plausible estimates. Is there not, for example, some spontaneous enthusiasm for the material achievements of the régime, at least among the young? It is difficult to imagine that the great advances in industry and in education which the author fully acknowledges, to say nothing of a colossal victory in war, could have been gained by a people spiritually passive and politically indifferent. Here is one of the darkest enigmas of the Soviet society, on which General Smith might perhaps have lifted a corner for us.

What is the upshot of this painstaking survey? The chapter, "War or Peace?" is a fine piece of balanced analysis. General Smith is no counsellor of preventive war. He does not believe that the Soviet government will directly precipitate a war, at least not "before they are confident that the strength controlled by the Soviet Union has far surpassed that of the United States"—a contingency which he does not foresee in any nearby future. But the risk is always there, and we must be strong to avert it. Material and moral strength, firmly devoted to the free way of life, and organized in unity with our democratic allies under the Atlantic Treaty, may indefinitely check any temptation in the Soviet Union to invite a trial by battle. It is a hard and irritating road that the General charts—one that calls for vast quantities of patience, a virtue which with us is for most purposes in short supply. But can there be much doubt that it is the wise road?

P. E. Corbett.

Yale University.

Roosevelt and the Russians; the Yalta Conference. By Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. and edited by Walter Johnson. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1949. Pp. xvi, 367. $4.00.)

One of the most controversial and at the same time misunderstood questions which has been perplexing both politicians and publicists for the past five years on the subject of Soviet-American relations has been the agreements made at Yalta. It is most fortunate that Mr. Stettinius was able to finish his account of the Conference before his untimely death. The author was aided in presenting his fascinating and revealing story by the able editorship of Professor Walter Johnson. To those critics who have been shouting that President Roosevelt was "taken in" by Stalin and "sold us down the river," the former Secretary of State replies in a very cogent manner, "It is not Yalta that is the trouble with the world today, but subsequent failures to adhere to the policies Yalta stood for and to carry out agreements that were reached there. Difficulties have developed, not from the agreements reached at Yalta, but from the failure of the Soviet Union to honor those agreements." The book is divided into three parts: the first part consists of an effort to explain the background of the Conference, the second part deals with the Conference itself and the third

part gives an appraisal of the Conference in the light of what has happened subsequently. An appendix includes a "Summary of the Major Diplomatic Meetings at the Yalta Conference," the formal "Report of the Crimea Conference," the "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference" and the "Agreement on Terms for Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan."

There are many choice items for both the general reader as well as the serious student of American foreign policy. For the former, there is the hilarious incident of the NKVD losing Stalin when he went to the washroom and the furor in the corridors until he re-emerged, and the account of Stalin surreptitiously pouring water into his vodka glass at a very alcoholic banquet.

The real value of the book to those interested in our diplomacy lies in the very detailed reporting of the negotiations between the Big Three and their Foreign Ministers. This account is based on the notes made by the author at the Conference as well as on the official documents covering the period. One of the regrettable aspects of Yalta was the fact that, in the discussions of one of the most controversial matters considered in the Conference, the Foreign Ministers did not participate. This was the question of the Far East. The Foreign Ministers were only told what their Chief Executives cared to tell them during and after the Conference. The question of why President Roosevelt "gave in" to Marshal Stalin's demands for the Kurile Islands and former Russian possessions and rights in the Far East is not fully covered by Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Stettinius attempts to justify the wisdom of President Roosevelt's action. "What, too, with the possible exception of the Kuriles did the Soviet Union receive at Yalta which she might not have taken without any agreement?" Then he goes on to say, "If there had been no agreement, the Soviet Union could have swept into North China, and the United States and the Chinese would have been in no real position to prevent it."

It occurs to the reviewer that the evaluation of the Yalta Conference has to be made in the frame of reference of a military situation. In other words, Yalta was still primarily a war conference. Its purpose was to bring the war to as speedy an end as possible. Yalta was also a parley among the Big Three, who in matters of Far Eastern diplomacy consisted really of two—Stalin and Roosevelt, with Churchill deferring to the latter's position.

Roosevelt must have believed that it was necessary to make a "deal" with Stalin in order to have the support of the USSR against Japan. This course was the one he was advised by the American military to follow. To be sure, we know now that it was not necessary to have the USSR with us in the war against Japan because of the rapid deterioration of Japan through our air and submarine actions, to say nothing of the *coup de grace* of the atom bomb.

We also know now that the Soviets never really intended to continue the cooperative spirit of Yalta which Mr. Stettinius extols, because in the very same month as the Conference, the Soviet Union unilaterally took action in Rumania to make Groza prime minister. A few weeks later she started the war of nerves against Turkey, subsequently brought pressure on the Polish Government, and ultimately carried through the Sovietization of Bulgaria, Hungary

and Czechoslovakia. This is all a far cry from the spirit of the negotiations at Yalta, particularly the "Declaration on Liberated Europe," which came out of this Conference.

In spite of the sordid and unsavory record of the Soviets in the last five years, the fact still remains that what President Roosevelt tried to do at Yalta was done on the assumption that the Russians wanted to take the path of international cooperation rather than the road to world domination. To accuse President Roosevelt of being a party to what the Russians have been doing in the post-Yalta period is in the opinion of the reviewer reading more into the record than the record at the time manifests. The reviewer is inclined to agree with Mr. Stettinius who wrote, "President Roosevelt did not 'surrender' anything significant at Yalta which was in his power to withhold."

WILLIAM B. BALLIS.

University of Washington.

National Transportation Policy. By CHARLES L. DEARING AND WILFRED OWEN. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1949. Pp. xiv, 459. $4.00.)

Issues Involved in a Unified and Coordinated Federal Program for Transportation. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE. (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1949. Pp. 49. $.20.)

Within the 448 pages of their book Dearing and Owen have set down an immense amount of useful data on American transportation and its regulation by the national government. (In particular, see the twenty-one charts incorporated in the Appendix.) They have listed major problems being encountered by the federal government in its regulation of transportation by rail, highway, air, and water and have posed solutions to these problems. The authors have made no attempt to hide their basic assumptions or the special brand of economic conservatism that guided their conclusions. This is a volume of worth, a worth largely in exposition and description.

Specialists would have found the book of greater use had the authors not become special pleaders for railroads, which they view as a potential area of free enterprise that has been injured by inept federal bureaucratic interference with management on the one hand and by public openhandedness to the competitors of the railroads on the other. The authors' deep and often repeated annoyance with the extensive use of federal subsidies to certain forms of transportation has impaired the force of their judgments with regard to the wisdom of making such grants. Even their bias in favor of states' rights must be considered in appraising several of their conclusions.

These faults (if faults they are) are not hidden, nor, in fact, do they materially curtail the greater usefulness of the study. A more serious criticism, however, is found in the fact that much of the work falls outside the context of a developing economy and a changing nation. This criticism, incidentally, cannot be leveled with the same force at the report the Secretary of Commerce recently

published on a unified program for regulating and promoting transportation. Surely public interference with the operation of national transportation need not be justified on a short-run basis. It is probably late to regard the rights of shareholders in public carriers as of first importance. Too, with the authors of the Brookings study determined to preserve and improve a competitive economy, they might have been mindful of the effects of their proposed reforms on agriculture and industry as well as on transportation companies. Nevertheless, this work does highlight the difficulties such concerns have faced due directly to identifiable bureaucratic shortcomings and to inconsistencies in national transportation policy.

The Brookings volume is of particular interest to political scientists in its proposed reorganization of federal promotional and regulatory agencies that effectuate—and at times formulate—transportation policy. Their proposal is, first, for the "consolidation of government programming and operating functions into a single executive agency," and, second, for "the creation of a national Transport Regulatory Commission" that "would be required to administer a revised program of public regulation applicable to all forms of transportation." More briefly stated, the proposal calls for the creation of a department of transportation headed by a secretary of cabinet rank and for a single regulatory commission under some undefined congressional control.

Unfortunately, the strides taken here toward a solution of the old problem of adjusting federal regulatory activities with those of promotion, management, research, and planning are not great. The authors assume that the regulatory process should be left "free of functional and operating encumbrances." They insist that there is a fundamental difference between regulation and other forms of administration and that each—in all but exceptional situations—can function best apart from the other. They do not doubt but that regulatory power will be abused if it falls within the President's "line of command," and as "the need for retaining the independence of action of the regulatory body has never been seriously questioned," they do not propose to question it now. In this connection it needs to be indicated that the handling of this problem in the report of the Department of Commerce is hardly more satisfactory than that found in the Brookings study.

The brief Commerce Department pamphlet covers much the same ground traversed by Dearing and Owen. It does not pretend to be an exhaustive survey. Rather, it frankly spells out many problems that can be solved only after more extended research has been completed. This report suggests the "grouping of all major promotional activities under unified direction and control," but doubts the need of a similar unification of regulatory activities. In their suggested organizational changes, Secretary Sawyer's experts followed closely basic recommendations of the Hoover Commission.

Both studies here under consideration, and the reports of the Hoover Commission as well, agree that the non-regulatory governmental functions in the field of transportation should be organized into a single department—whether in a wholly new department or in the existing Department of Commerce. This unanimity of opinion raises a strong inference in support of the adminis-

trative soundness of this point. And the theoretical defense for such action is strong indeed. Nevertheless, the case for unification might have been made stronger if the experts had made an appraisal of the administrative obstacles to effective and meaningful unification that would remain after consolidation: the subtle deceptions hidden behind a redrawing of lines on an organizational chart. As the problems of unification are practical ones, the experts might well have considered the difficulties that must be faced in the accomplishment of such a consolidation.

The Brookings study wisely stressed the importance of fully equipping the office of the department head with adequate research and planning staffs. The importance of research was stressed in the report of the Department of Commerce as well. The authors of that report felt that even though a unified transportation agency was not established immediately, much could be gained by "the establishment of a permanent centralized research staff with a clear mandate to evaluate and appraise all of the government's various promotional activities." Even the Hoover Commission departed somewhat from its stubborn dislike of administrative planning. In its Department of Commerce report it agreed that the Commerce Department, reorganized to include transportation functions, should carry on wide research into transportation needs and into how best these needs could be met.

The tentative conclusions of the Brookings group were made available to the Hoover Commission late in 1948 and were considered by that body before it reported to Congress. Thus the fact that their study was not published until a later time gave Dearing and Owen an opportunity to comment on the judgments of the Commission. Secretary Sawyer's experts spoke last. Partly because of that fact their report may serve as the logical starting point for a review of these common problems. In the long run it may exercise as great an influence on the course of legislative and administrative development as will the suggestion of the Hoover group. Its other values are enhanced by the fact that it is concise, generally informative, and—unlike the long study—non-repetitive.

CHARLES AIKIN.

University of California, Berkeley.

Wartime Economic Planning in Agriculture; A Study in the Allocation of Resources. BY BELA GOLD. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 594. $6.75.)

Government direction of the economy during wartime is generally taken for granted. And planning of some sort would seem to be indispensable to the effective allocation of resources and selection of production objectives incident to such governmental intervention in the economic life of the nation.

This study by Mr. Bela Gold is a critical analysis of governmental planning in a major sector of the wartime economy. Reviewing the record of agricultural mobilization against the background of needs and potential, Mr. Gold finds that it was seriously deficient.

To those who have felt that national planning would be an antidote to some

of the illogical and non-rational tendencies in our society, this study should prove sobering, for it illustrates the fact that planners, even when servants of "big government," are also subject to pressures and interests which lead them to conclusions often in conflict with objective public interest. Far from discrediting planning, however, this analysis offers constructive recommendations on how planning, in the perspective of the entire governmental process, might be improved and strengthened.

The author stresses the point that most nationally planned undertakings "involve taking disproportionately from some regions, groups and individuals and giving disproportionately to others; or disadvantaging some . . . and advantaging others. . . . " Hence planning is necessarily intermingled with the political process and requires political choices which rest upon subjective judgments as well as upon objective facts. For this reason, he would insist upon "continuous democratic criticism from the major interest groups affected."

In this view, planning is not to be regarded as a "fourth branch of government" protected from executive and legislative interference and administered by experts who coldly determine public as against private objectives. The author suggests, rather, that planning is properly a tool of the Executive, essential to the effective discharge of his responsibilities. But the Executive, at the same time, must possess the knowledge of how to use this tool. He must be ready to fight for the policies and programs which planning studies indicate to be desirable and sound. "Our form of government," Mr. Gold states, "would never have been characterized as a system of checks and balances if failure to resolve disagreements between the Executive and the Congress through direct negotiation had automatically required the former to abandon its demands. . . . It is incumbent on the Executive to pursue the struggle on into the political arena, with each of the contenders having to seek effective popular support for its views."

It was largely the failure of the Executive to exercise "forthright and vigorous" leadership that crippled agricultural mobilization. Thus the author is forced to conclude that "behind the consistent array of shortcomings in results may be observed common tendencies to underestimate the scale of mobilization requirements, to establish unduly limited adjustment goals, to rely on policies barely edging beyond the limits of past practice, to tolerate patent ineffectiveness in the execution of newly adopted programs, and to exhibit a singular readiness to retreat from even urgent goals when these failed to elicit prompt adjustments of the magnitude recommended."

Mr. Gold's volume is divided into five parts. In the first part the strategic tasks of agricultural mobilization are examined and the food needs of the United Nations indicated. Against this background of need the author, in the second part, analyzes agricultural production in the United States, comparing the reasonable technical potential with administrative goals and with actual results. The comparison is not encouraging for it reveals an indefensible timidity in setting goals and a gross failure to realize potential in every area of agricultural

mobilization. Agricultural output and the utilization of land, livestock, manpower, farm machinery and fertilizer resources—all reveal the same disheartening failures.

The third section of the study reviews the distribution of United States food supplies, and the fourth appraises the consequences of the failures in mobilization in terms of the food crises of 1945 and 1946. Here the author shows how we fell grievously short of meeting our world commitments, while *per capita* food consumption in our own country increased. The record is shameful. In the last section, which will probably be of most direct interest to political scientists, the author seeks an explanation for these depressing failures, and develops his ideas with respect to government planning.

Because it is a thorough and convincing analysis of a concrete planning situation, Mr. Gold's treatise represents a significant contribution to a field that has largely been characterized by theoretical treatment. It is unfortunate, however, that the literary style is not more lucid and direct, for long and complex sentences frequently keep the reader from gaining the full force of the argument.

NORMAN WENGERT.

City College, New York.

Relations Between the Federal and State Courts. By MITCHELL WENDELL. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 298. $4.00.)

It is generally recognized that a federal government has numerous administrative and political problems not present in a unitary one. The difficulties which federalism produces in the administration of justice, however, have been given much less attention. The United States, with its dual system of courts (federal and state) furnishes an especially fruitful field for the study of these problems, particularly as they arise at the lower judicial echelons. The friction between the state and the federal courts may be either legal (*e.g.*, conflicts of jurisdiction) or administrative (*e.g.*, between jury commissioners). It is the first of these fields of friction that Dr. Wendell has chosen for his useful study.

Some areas of federal jurisdiction have caused but little difficulty as far as the state courts are concerned. There have been few conflicts with respect to the enforcement of the national criminal statutes in the federal courts. Nor has the trial of civil cases involving the federal government in its own courts been generally criticized. The chief frictions between the two judicial systems have arisen in the trial of suits between private parties under the diversity of citizenship clause—*i.e.*, between citizens of different states involving more than $3000—cases in which both the federal and the state courts may have jurisdiction. These cases make up a very large part of the work of the federal district courts, comprising some forty per cent of the cases filed and more than half of the civil cases. When two trial courts function side by side, conflicts are bound to arise, and when the parties are given a choice of the tribunal in which to bring their suits, the result will often depend more on the skill of an attorney

in getting his case into the more favorable court than on the merits of the controversy.

There are two principal reasons for permitting certain large litigants to bring their cases in the federal courts if they wish to do so. When the federal courts apply a national common law—a law more uniform than that of the various states—the growth of large enterprises engaged in interstate commerce is facilitated. At the same time the decisions of federal judges would tend to bind the states together, reducing separatism and promoting nationalism. These considerations furnished the economic and political justification of the rule expounded by Justice Story in *Swift v. Tyson*, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), that a decision of a state court is not binding on the federal courts, "if it differs from the principles established in the general commercial law." Attractive as such a rule was to a Massachusetts nationalist in the era before the Civil War, neither the frontier conditions which Story faced nor the need for promoting national unity which he felt are present today. Furthermore, as Dr. Wendell points out, the uniform national commercial law which Story sought failed to develop and this case served but to produce a melee by adding a different federal rule to the wide variety of state rules. The *Tyson* rule was given a thorough test, lasting nearly a century, before it was overruled in *Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As a result of this about-face, much of the economic and political basis for opening the federal courts to private litigants has ceased to exist.

The remaining reason for giving the federal courts private suit jurisdiction rests on the assumption that local tribunals are prejudiced against litigants from other states, particularly if they are corporations. Dr. Wendell has not attempted to measure either the extent of this fear or its validity. His study would have been strengthened at this point if he had made empirical use of statistical data like that gathered by the Administrative Office of United States Courts. But his review of the literature on the subject shows that the fear of local prejudice has been widespread throughout our history and that opposition to federal jurisdiction has been equally strong. To meet the growing criticism that the $3000 monetary minimum is at best an arbitrary device for screening the kind of cases which should be brought into the federal courts, Dr. Wendell suggests the possibility of "a broad statutory definition of local prejudice" which the litigant would have to demonstrate. The difficulties of drafting such a statute, as well as of applying it, may lead some to prefer the use of appellate review to correct injustices in local tribunals, a practice now followed in cases under the federal employers' liability acts.

Dr. Wendell's study is not limited to a summary of the problems raised by *Swift v. Tyson*. He has brought a wealth of legal, historical, political, and social data to bear on the wide range of problems arising from our dual judiciary. The description of the conflict between state and federal courts in the railroad bond cases (1850–1890) is particularly interesting and would provide effective case material for instructional purposes. The book is well written and its balanced discussion of controversial issues inspires confidence. Political scientists

should be grateful for such an intelligent and lucid introduction to a phase of our federal relationships which they have generally ignored.

RODNEY L. MOTT.

Colgate University.

On Understanding the Supreme Court. BY PAUL A. FREUND. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1949. Pp. 130. $3.00.)

This slender volume of less than thirty thousand words comprises three Rosenthal Foundation lectures, given at the Law School of Northwestern University in 1949. For so slight a work, the comprehensive title is quite misleading. The series has neither a unifying theme nor logical sequence.

In the first chapter, "Concord and Discord," Professor Freund undertakes to shed light on recent Supreme Court turmoil. There is nothing new in this, he tells us, playing down the significance of recent explorations in this field by Charles Curtis, Wesley McCune and Herman Pritchett. Professor Freund reminds us that discord marked the work of the Justices immediately preceding the Roosevelt Court, and the discussion it then stimulated provoked Chief Justice Hughes to say that he was at a loss to understand why we should expect "icy certainty" among judges while accepting without question the sharpest division of opinion among theologians, philosophers and scientists. The author runs the gamut of the usual bones of judicial contention—civil liberties, human rights versus property rights, etc.—but he does not add much, if anything, to more exhaustive studies by the writers previously mentioned.

In his second chapter, "Portrait of a Liberal Judge: Mr. Justice Brandeis," Professor Freund discovers that the Bostonian, though often denounced by critics as a radical, was in fact a liberal, and that his liberalism lay primarily in "an essential morality of mind." One wonders whether this is more than a glib phrase or whether, in any event, the author is justified in suggesting that this peculiar quality sets Brandeis apart from, say, Mr. Justice Sutherland. Certain prejudices, certain ingrained preferences, form a picture of an ideal society and predetermine the stands most humans take. Cardozo, while a member of the New York Court of Appeals, made no exceptions whatsoever when he observed: "Deep below consciousness are . . . the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge. . . . The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by." Under this head Mr. Freund claims for Brandeis a degree of intellectual chastity that the Justice himself disavowed. On one occasion he acknowledged that his reasons for supporting a particular measure were "partly legal, partly sentimental, and partly a recognition of economic rights and a sound social policy."

What really distinguishes Brandeis is not so much integrity of mind (he had no monopoly of that) as a profound sense of urgency, born of precise knowledge, and stirring him to constructive social endeavor. His uniqueness lay in the uncanny knowledge that failure of any generation to grapple promptly

and effectively with existing wrongs complicates the future, narrows the range within which men are and can be self-governing.

In his last chapter, Professor Freund, building on his experience as law-clerk to Mr. Justice Brandeis and as counsel in the Solicitor General's office, deals in a fresh and original way with the lawyer's strategy and tactics in arguing cases before the Supreme Court. One ventures the suggestion that if the lecturer had devoted the entire series to this subject, the effort might have been a greater contribution for lawyers and political scientists alike.

ALPHEUS T. MASON.

Princeton University.

Discontent at the Polls. By MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR., AND SUSAN W. STEDMAN. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. x, 190. $2.75.)

This reasonably thin volume represents an attempt to measure the farmer-labor protest vote in American national elections since 1827. The approach is not unique. Three chapters are given over to an historical account of third parties. In the less than fifty pages, nothing is added to our knowledge of that sector of American politics. Numerous errors of fact, apparently largely the result of downright carelessness, are present in the discussion. For instance, congressional elections are alleged to have been held in 1897 and 1937 (p. 42); and, on page 51, General James B. Weaver is twice declared to have been the Greenback candidate in 1884.

The discussion of third-party platforms (Ch. 2) is entirely too cursory to be of value. There is sufficient attention given neither to paternity of ideas nor to their continuity through the protest channel from the Grangers to the Henry Wallace Progressives. Here would have been an excellent opportunity to motivate the protesting farmers and workers, to give something of the persistent ideology of American progressivism, and to distinguish it especially from the splinters which have represented Marxist and neo-Marxist ideas of the proletarian revolution.

The meat of the study comes in the attempt to correlate political protest with economic malaise. Two very informative graphs are given in Chapter 5. Protest vote percentages are overlaid on a wholesale-price-index graph. The pattern is fairly noticeable; when prices are down, political protest is ascendant. Another graph shows successful protest congressional elections imposed on wholesale farm prices. The same general pattern prevails, though there are some areas of obscurity. We shall hardly be able to regard such correlations as definitive unless they are constructed on a more scientific basis. The persistent skepticism which prevails among the members of agricultural and of labor organizations is not mere ethereal fancy. Their economic interests are by no means identical. For instance, it would be useless to expect agricultural discontent to increase proportionately with an increase in unemployment, unless such latter phenomenon was accompanied by a proportionate decrease in prices. For the same reason, there would scarcely occur wholesale political

desertions in the ranks of a prosperous labor community merely because the price of food-stuffs declined.

For these reasons, farmer protest votes in North Dakota cannot be adequately explained by means of a national price index, as that state depends so substantially upon wheat and cattle. There will have to be a separate economic index for each state. And where states present widely diversified economic bases, indices properly representing those diversities will have to be scientifically constructed and applied.

The latter part of the study is given over to an attempt to analyze the components of economic and political protest. Some data from the *Fortune* and other polls are presented for consideration. They reveal the same old truisms which everyone, except Republican leaders, have been reading in Monday-morning newspapers since the thirties—the relations between economic status and support for increased governmental intervention. Similar figures for political affiliation from 1940 to 1946 are included, though they would certainly not have explained Mr. Dewey's loss of Iowa and Minnesota in 1948. The October drop in grain prices and the Republican lack of enthusiasm for high parity prices appear to have been more important to Iowans than was the fact of ownership or non-ownership of their farms.

Though it has solid and valuable features, the essential weakness of this study is the failure to understand the true character of American political parties. They are coalitions of group interests and where a party in control, by its official actions, creates in any group the "sense of thwarted justice," the leaders of the dissatisfied group are open for bargaining with the minority party. If both of the great parties turn deaf ears to the pleas, the situation is ripe for the establishment of a third party. Of course, there are political complications, such as fear of reprisal, unipartism, legal barriers, and traditional mores which enter into every group decision. To keep mutually antagonistic groups in full-throated support of a party is proof of immaculate leadership. The late Franklin Delano Roosevelt will remain for years to come the epitome of the successful political leader.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING.

University of Oklahoma.

This I Remember. By ELEANOR ROOSEVELT. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1949. Pp. x, 387. $4.50.)

In this frank and revealing book, Mrs. Roosevelt describes with modesty the role that she and her husband played in American public life from 1928 to 1945. She describes party conventions, election campaigns, legislative battles, tours of inspection, White House social affairs, the White House advisory staff, her own press conferences, and some of the administrative problems of the Chief Executive in time of depression and in time of war.

While she discounts the political influence that she had with her husband, one can infer that he did not ignore her reports regarding her trips of inspection in this country, her tours abroad, and her many contacts with individuals and

various groups. She relates how Harry Hopkins asked her to present to her husband the case for a National Youth Administration. The result belongs to history. The President regarded her first trip abroad during the war so successful that he asked her to make two more.

The book throws light upon how Mrs. Roosevelt acquired her interest in public life. Following her husband's illness, she served as his eyes and ears in places where it was hard for him to go. She took an active part in the affairs of the Democratic Party since she saw that this would keep alive his interest in politics. Once he re-entered public life and became so absorbed that he had little time for family affairs, she looked for recognition to the underprivileged whom he was trying to help by governmental action.

The importance of Louis Howe as a president maker and as a close adviser is clearly revealed in these pages. Mrs. Roosevelt indicates that if Mr. Howe had not come back to work for her husband when he was taken ill in 1921, it would have been much harder for FDR to have returned to politics. She admits that Mr. Howe played a large part in her own political education. She attributes to him the strategy of the preconvention campaign of 1932. She also points out what a great loss Mr. Howe's death was in 1936. President Roosevelt never found anyone to take his place as a loyal and frank critic who saw that all points of view were presented.

Mrs. Roosevelt attributes her husband's success in politics to his sense of timing, his infinite patience and never-ending persistence acquired during his illness, his sense of humor, his courage, his self-confidence, his acute powers of observation, his fondness for people, his optimism, his sense of the practical, and his desire to make life happier for people.

The book contains many shrewd observations regarding important figures in our times. She comments briefly, but discerningly, upon Alfred E. Smith, Herbert Hoover, Mayor LaGuardia, Winston Churchill, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, and many others. In writing about her husband's appointees, she occasionally makes statements that are revealing in their frankness. She refers to "Sumner Welles, Franklin's able Undersecretary of State." While it is true that the Undersecretary of State is a presidential appointee, the reference tends to confirm the position that Secretary Hull took in demanding Mr. Welles' resignation. The Undersecretary should not bypass the Secretary in reporting to the President.

Living in the White House brought many problems to Mrs. Roosevelt and her children. She discusses them with candor and good grace. The book is a very human account of what public life does to a man and his family.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL.

Washington, D. C.

The Relativity of War and Peace; A Study in Law, History, and Politics. By FRITZ GROB. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1949. Pp. xviii, 402. $5.00.)

It takes more than *Words and Phrases* to reach sound conclusions in a problem of legal interpretation. In one context a word may have quite a different

force and value from what it imports in some different setting. This caution is especially applicable to the words "war" and "peace." Congress has power to declare "war." But the *Prize Cases* held that there may be "war" without such a declaration. The members of the international community have entered into covenants not to resort to "war." The Hague conventions lay down various rules for the declaration and the conduct of "war." The Articles of War denounce certain "war offenses," and magnify various other transgressions when committed "in time of war." Contracts of insurance often make special provisions for the event of "war." It takes hard thinking to give to the word in each context its particular rational significance.

There are special reasons why "war" is an exceptionally bothersome word. A government bent upon foreign adventure may desire, for reasons of constitutional or of international law, to maintain that its warlike acts do not amount to "war." The victim, too, may hesitate to brand the action "war" lest treatment still worse be visited upon it. Third parties may be happy to join in the pretense, as a way of avoiding obligations to repress the aggressor. When responsible statesmen and jurists lend themselves to the make-believe, it becomes difficult to keep one's thinking straight.

Dr. Grob's book is devoted to "the thesis of the relativity in the realm of law of the legal concepts of war and peace" (p. 332). The first half of the work is historical—a detailed examination of many anomalous instances such as our naval operations against France in 1798-1800, the Boxer expedition, the Manchurian conflict of 1931–33, and the Sino-Japanese "incident" of '37–'41. Part II, theoretical, attacks the notion that one can discover "the" legal definition of war, and goes on to give pretty rough treatment to much that has been said on occasion about armed interventions, reprisals, pacific blockades, limited operations and undeclared hostilities. For each episode the facts are pegged down with care, and the case is explained for exactly what it is worth. The result, says Dean Pound in his Foreword, is "a real contribution to analytical jurisprudence."

Perhaps sturdy common sense would have enabled one to avoid these pitfalls of conceptualism that Dr. Grob has been at pains to expose. Even so, it is useful to have so elaborate a documentation of the proposition that "what has to be looked for is not one over-all legal definition of war, but a variety of legal definitions, each made in the light of and in relation to the particular intent and purpose of the rule which happens to be under consideration" (p. 189). The reason and purpose of the rule is surely the touchstone of legal interpretation.

Let it be added that the argument has been cast in excellent English, and that the typography is engaging.

CHARLES FAIRMAN.

Stanford University.

BOOK NOTES AND NOTICES

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

American Politics and the Party System. By Hugh A. Bone. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1949. Pp. viii, 777. $5.50.)

The author of this new text has sought not only to cover the familiar materials expected for a course in American political parties, but to widen the focus to include a serious discussion of communications, opinion formation, pressure politics and less usual materials such as the role of church, school and family in political life. The text is in the new tradition, not becoming lost in the rationalistic theology of democratic government, nor in a narrow concern for the formal institutions. There is a wealth of material descriptive of political behavior. Professor Bone, without in any sense committing himself to an uncritical acceptance of all the ingenious as well as the frustrating in American politics, wants to redress the balance as against the debunker, the muck-raker, the disillusioned realist. It is to this end that he pairs a chapter on bosses with a chapter on statesmen. On the well-worn questions of interpretation, the text leans to description and a summary of critical views rather than to the development of its own theme. Implicit in the presentation, however, and briefly summarized as well, is a negative evaluation of unrestrained pressure politics, a call for better defined and more stringently enforced laws, and for full disclosure by interest groups. On the major issues of party responsibility, the function of party in the machinery of government, and the development of parties of issue and principle, the text reveals the author's interest in substantial change in the rules of the game, tempered by his practical appreciation of the political obstacles to any revision of the American political system in the short run. The thumbnail sketches of party systems abroad are a most welcome addition to an American political text. To be really fruitful for analysis, however, the comparative approach requires the development of historical and cultural materials of considerable complexity. Chapters on the history of American parties will, on the other hand, help materially to enrich the student's grasp of his own political system.—Oliver Garceau, *Bennington College.*

Public Administration in A Democratic Society. By W. Brooke Graves. (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company. 1950. Pp. xvi, 759. $6.00.)

One of the nation's foremost political scientists presents us with another textbook in public administration. There is always room for another textbook, especially if it is as good as this one. In principal outline the book is orthodox. Its five parts are structure and organization, personnel management, fiscal management, internal management and control, and external relations. The book accepts the general "concept of administration as concerned with the transaction of all of the public business, whether legislative, executive or judicial; whether international, national, state, or local." Part IV, devoted to problems of internal management and control, emphasizes, more than has been done heretofore, the importance of coordinating organization, personnel, and

finance in the processes of management. The chapter on leadership in administration stands out as most effective and instructive. In the final section, an excellent presentation is given in the chapter on administrative procedure. The book is well and lucidly written. Upon first examination it appears too highly organized. There is hardly a page that does not have an outline heading, a table either of factual or of conceptual materials, or a change of type for a special presentation. These techniques, however, permit the inclusion of more material than appears in comparable texts. The student will find the book readable. The teacher may well receive a reeducation from it. The book is a worthy competitor for those previously in the field.—JOSEPH M. RAY, *University of Maryland.*

Introduction to Municipal Government and Administration. BY ARTHUR W. BROMAGE. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1950. Pp. vii, 693. $5.00.)

This new textbook does not vary markedly, in terms of chapter outline, from earlier texts in the field. The book is orthodox in all matters of construction save possibly a more restrained use of footnotes. It is in the substance of the treatment of subjects that Professor Bromage makes his real contribution. In his exhaustive catalog of all facets of municipal government, the standard of analysis and the degree of penetration to fundamental factors are exceptionally high. The book is up-to-the-minute in its acquaintance with developments in municipal government. All textbook writers would do well to analyze the style in which this book is written. Statements are clear, and involved sentences are rare. Professor Bromage has given us one of the best, if not the very best, of the textbooks in municipal government and administration.—JOSEPH M. RAY, *University of Maryland.*

American City Government. BY WILLIAM ANDERSON AND EDWARD W. WEIDNER. (New York: Henry Holt and Co. Rev. ed. 1950. Pp. xiii, 625. $4.25.)

Twenty-five years is a long time to wait for a revision of a textbook, but William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner have done a thorough rewriting of Anderson's 1925 edition of *American City Government.* In addition to a rearrangement of the chapter sequence, the authors have recognized the significance of Federal-municipal relations by elevating that subject from the status of a section to that of a chapter, added a new chapter on the strong mayor and city manager as executives, and combined two former chapters concerned with municipal revenues and indebtedness into one. Full advantage has been taken of the intervening censuses and numerous studies in the field to make the revised edition completely up-to-date. But if the book is current in terms of information and trends, it is still the same book in terms of the basic problems of municipal government, which is simply to state that municipal government in essence has remained unchanged. Those who were first introduced to municipal government through the medium of the 1925 edition will find that this general standard of excellence has been maintained in the revised edition.—WELDON COOPER, *University of Virginia.*

27 Masters of Politics. By Raymond Moley. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1949. Pp. xii, 276. $3.50.)

A student of politics and often a practitioner of it, Professor Moley presents twenty-seven biographical essays on men (and one woman) he has known, in a "personal perspective." His subjects include "party choices" (Smith, Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Willkie, Dewey), party politicians (Will Hays, Farley, Flynn, Louis Howe, Charles Michelson), congressional politicians (Garner, Hiram Johnson, Rayburn, Byrnes, Hatton Sumners), local leaders (Walker. Seabury, Moses), and a number of others, including Huey Long, Frankfurter, and Hugh Johnson. Political scientists will be interested in the sketch of Charles A. Beard. The essays are anecdotal, fragmentary, and somewhat discursive, but the author brings to his subjects a thoughtful and reflective mind. His portrait of Roosevelt, whom he served as "brain truster" during the early New Deal, is critical although not ill-humored. He believes that Roosevelt devoted his great political talents to his own career at the expense of building up the Democratic Party. In contrast, Mr. Moley takes a sympathetic attitude toward men of more conservative bent, such as Hoover, Garner, and Sumners. In general the author does not view his subjects from any sustained position; he lets them speak for themselves where possible. He makes many a shrewd observation on the political process. He includes some interesting observations by others, such as Byrnes on political tactics, and Rayburn on how to get along in Congress. But one misses a final chapter in which the author might have offered some generalizations based on his varied material. Perhaps that would be expecting too much, however, in view of the small progress we have made in systematic analysis of the art of leadership in a democracy.—James MacGregor Burns, *Williams College.*

Government, Politics and Administration in Missouri. By Carl A. McCandless. (Educational Publishers. 1949. Pp. 261, 49. $3.00.)

The purpose of Professor McCandless' study is "to provide in some detail a description of the governmental and administrative organization of the state" under the new Constitution of 1945 and existing statutes. With this purpose in mind, the author makes no attempt, as he states in his preface, "to evaluate the various features of Missouri government" or "to give special emphasis to features of Missouri government which distinguish it from the governmental organization in other states." In twenty-one compact chapters, Professor McCandless surveys the state's constitutional history and gives a factual account of legislative organization, powers and procedures, judicial organization and procedure, the position of the governor, political party organization, nominations and elections, local government, and state administrative organization and functions. In addition, the 1945 Constitution of Missouri is included in an appendix. Although brief, detailed descriptions of governmental machinery and procedures without evaluations, comparisons, and analyses of political forces tend to become wearisome to the reader, descriptive studies like this one are of value in providing a groundwork of facts to which ready reference may be made

by those interested in the architecture of state government in the United States.—J. ALTON BURDINE, *University of Texas.*

Metropolitan Los Angeles; One Community. By MEL SCOTT. (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation. 1949. Pp. 192. $5.00.)

Metropolitan Los Angeles; Its Governments. By HELEN L. JONES AND ROBERT F. WILCOX. (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation. 1949. Pp. 224. $5.00.)

These excellently designed books were intended primarily for use in the senior high schools of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. But there is no watering down of the style. College professors and students, as well as other citizens, will find Scott's study helpful in understanding the development of a metropolis, the effect on people of the many activities carried on in a metropolitan area, and the role and possibilities of planning to secure more satisfaction from these activities. The volume by Jones and Wilcox is a straightforward description of the many types of local government in the area and of the activities in which the state and local governments are engaged. Unfortunately, the organization of the book does not emphasize the extent, unapproached elsewhere, to which Los Angeles County functions as a municipality. There is little analysis or even discussion of the problems of establishing a metropolitan government, or of getting existing governments to work together. But this is not the primary purpose of the book. The Haynes Foundation and the authors are to be congratulated for preparing books on a high level of discourse for use in high schools. Both books are profusely illustrated with photographs, charts and maps.—VICTOR JONES, *Wesleyan University.*

Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration. By ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT. (New York: Law Center of New York University. 1949. Pp. xxxii, 752. $7.50.)

This study is a detailed survey of the extent to which recommendations of the American Bar Association in 1937 and 1938 on improvement of judicial administration have been adopted for the federal and state courts. Such matters, for example, as judicial selection and tenure, pretrial conferences, trial and appellate practice, the law of evidence, and jury selection and service are covered thoroughly. The author develops each chapter by stating one of the recommendations and then explaining what the practice is in each of the several states with respect to the recommendation. On judicial selection he names and discusses the states in which judges are chosen either by executive appointment, by the legislature, or by popular election. The variations in administrative practice from state to state are graphically illustrated by shaded maps of the United States, from which one can tell at a glance, for example, whether judges in any state are elected or appointed. An extensive appendix contains the texts of relevant committee reports to the American Bar Association. This excellent book will be an invaluable reference aid both to lawmakers and to students of state government and administration.—ALDEN L. POWELL, *Louisiana State University.*

Government Publications for the Citizen. By James L. McCamy. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 139. $2.50.)

The Public Library in the Political Process. By Oliver Garceau. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 254. $3.75.)

These are two of the seven reports of the Public Library Inquiry of the Social Science Research Council. Both maintain high standards of scholarship and present many constructive suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the public library as an agency of democratic government. McCamy's book is based on the assumption that public libraries have a special function of making easily available to all citizens the more serious, more reliable, and more permanent materials produced by various agencies of the government. He points out the defects in the present system of handling government publications by the public library. He finds that because of defective listing by issuing agencies, cumbersome systems of distribution, and faulty library organization, public libraries are not performing their function in making government publications available. He recommends the transfer of the Government Printing Office from Congress to the Executive Branch of the Government, the establishment of key distribution centers for government publications throughout the United States, and the establishment of a government publication reviewing service for libraries. Garceau in his book discusses the governing authorities of public libraries, the political potential of the public library in the community, the professional library associations, and the unit of government best adapted to provide adequate library services. He points out that there is a gap between the faith of librarians in the virtue of the printed word and the actualities as evidenced by the character and coverage of library service. He recommends that librarians relate their community activities more closely to political reality. —Harold F. Gosnell, *Washington, D. C.*

Wartime Experiences of the National Labor Relations Board, 1941–1945. By Fred Witney. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1949. Pp. 309. $2.50 [paper]. $3.50 [cloth].)

How the National Labor Relations Board successfully adapted its operations to wartime exigencies is ably reported in this volume. Dr. Witney has filled in a neglected phase of NLRB history. The author concludes that the NLRB made a substantial, though unsung, contribution to the nation's war effort. It did so by such measures as, (a) streamlining its administrative procedures in both representation and unfair labor practice cases, (b) developing effective liaison with emergency labor relations agencies, (c) giving priority treatment to cases directly affecting war production, and otherwise gearing its operations to the needs of the war period. The study is divided into three major sections: (1) appraisal of the impact of wartime legislation on the policies and procedures of the NLRB, (2) detailed accounting of the NLRB's relations with the National Defense Mediation Board, the National War Labor Board and the FEPC, and (3) analysis of troublesome policy decisions facing the NLRB during wartime, *e.g.*, the status of foremen's unions, appropriate bargaining unit prob-

lems, etc. In Dr. Witney's view, the NLRB was largely successful in maintaining Wagner Act principles during the War. In the main, its decisions and jurisdiction were respected by the National War Labor Board, although there was perhaps more friction between the two agencies than Dr. Witney indicates.—HAROLD W. DAVEY, *Iowa State College.*

Airline Competition. By FREDERICK W. GILL AND GILBERT L. BATES. (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. 1949. Pp. 691. $5.75.)

This study examines in detail, for the period 1939–1948, the effects of competition on the quality and price of airline service and the self-sufficiency of the sixteen "trunklines" operated as United States domestic carriers. It inquires particularly into the reasons why increased traffic and more favorable unit production costs did not result in better profitability and diminishing reliance upon government aid, especially in the post-war part of the period covered. It is concluded that competitive impacts were among the principal influential factors in the situation. The major findings of the study are that "although in general competition has been an important force in the maintenance of a high quality, low-price airline service, the type of additional competition which has been certified, especially during the postwar expansion of the domestic air transportation system, has not in a great many cases contributed significantly to either objective." The type of competition found to be most consistently ineffective "as regards all the aspects of public interest" is where route patterns have been established authorizing more than two carriers to serve major markets. The analysis merits the attention of scholars and officials concerned with governmental policies affecting the sound development of commercial airlines.—BURTON N. BEHLING, *Library of Congress.*

History of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. By EDWIN EMERY. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. 1950. Pp. 263. $3.50.)

The American Newspaper Publishers Association, founded in 1887, is an organization of United States and Canadian dailies for the promotion of their common business interests. From a small original membership it has grown until in 1948 it contained more than half of the American dailies, including all but 20 of the 367 with circulation above 25,000. Its purview has expanded from advertising practices to include labor-management relations, the newsprint tariff, the newsprint supply, postal rates, "free publicity," the competition of magazines and radio, mechanical research, real and assumed threats to the freedom of the press, and much else. Although wary of offering judgments where some writers could not resist—the ANPA's defense of a right to print questionable advertising, its unabashed fight for tariff and postal favors, its claim to exemption from certain labor and publicity laws, the closed shop, and the rathole practice of mat resetting—Emery does commend the ANPA for its long devotion to the principle of arbitration in labor disputes and he demurs at its

strained interpretation of freedom of the press in its resistance to New Deal legislation. This is a very good study. The author has examined the almost innumerable ANPA pamphlets and many government documents. Instead of getting bogged down in a mass of detail, much of it technical, he has produced a brief and clear exposition of the essential problems of the industry. His organization is topical but he permits no confusion in chronology. And here is a former newspaperman—now a professor!—who writes English to the King's taste. Except for some pamphlets issued by the ANPA itself, this is the first time that the ANPA story has been told.—HOWARD C. PERKINS, *University of Pennsylvania.*

The Strengthening of American Political Institutions. By A. S. MIKE MONRONEY ET AL. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1949. Pp. ix, 134. $2.00.)

Five lectures delivered during the spring of 1949 at the Cornell symposium on "America's Freedom and Responsibility in the Contemporary Crisis." Authors are Congressman Monroney, on the Legislative Reorganization Act; Thomas J. Hargrove, on industrial mobilization; Thurman Arnold, on the federal loyalty program (with additional comment by Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr.); Don K. Price, on the Presidency; and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, on the formulation of American foreign policy.

American Government under the Constitution. By PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW. (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown. 1949. Pp. viii, 369. $3.25.)

Revision by Notre Dame political scientist of text combining description of national and state government with clause by clause commentary on the Constitution. First published in 1947.

History of California State Correctional Administration from 1930 to 1948. By LLOYD L. VOIGT. (San Rafael, California: Published by author. 1949. Pp. 126. $2.00.)

Historical and descriptive approach, with no effort to judge the results of the correctional program.

California Government; Politics and Administration. By WINSTON W. CROUCH AND DEAN E. MCHENRY. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1949. Pp. ix, 407. $5.00.)

Two UCLA professors present a revision of one of the most adequate books on the government and politics of a given state.

Records of the Court of Chancery of South Carolina, 1671–1779. EDITED BY ANNE KING GREGORIE. (Washington, D.C.: The American Historical Association. 1950. Pp. 676. $10.00.)

The Committee on the Littleton-Griswold Fund of the American Historical Association announces this as "the most extensive and complete collection of the records and papers of a court of equity ever published for the American colonial period." There is an historical introduction by the editor and a legal introduction by J. Nelson Frierson, Dean Emeritus of the University of South Carolina Law School. Volume 6 in the American Legal Records series.

Virginia's State Government During the Second World War. By Francis Howard Heller. (Richmond: Virginia State Library. 1949. Pp. xvii, 203. $2.00.)

Analytical account by a political scientist of the constitutional, legal and administrative changes made in the state government by the impact of the War. Prepared under the supervision of the World War II History Division of the Virginia State Library.

American State Government and Administration. By Austin F. MacDonald. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1950. Pp. xiii, 722. $4.00.)

Fourth edition of one of the leading textbooks in its field.

State and Local Government. By Claudius O. Johnson. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1950. Pp. ix, 289. $2.50.)

An adaptation of state and local materials from the author's *Government in the United States*, with substantial additions of text and charts and with an appendix containing the Model State Constitution.

Readings in American State Government. By Lane W. Lancaster and A. C. Breckenridge. (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc. 1950. Pp. ix, 347. $1.50.)

A book of readings prepared as a companion volume to the standard textbooks on state government. Selections are up-to-date, interesting, and non-technical.

Our Sovereign State. Edited by Robert S. Allen. (New York: The Vanguard Press, Inc. 1949. Pp. xxxviii, 413. $5.00.)

The "explosive chapters" of this "devastating exposé" of corruption in "our sovereign states" were written, for the most part, by journalists. Twelve states—California, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin—are covered by individual chapters. The editor, also responsible for *Our Fair City*, prepared the introduction.

Digest of County Manager Charters and Laws. (New York: National Municipal League. $3.00.)

Looseleaf mimeographed volume summarizing provisions of state constitutions, laws and local charters relating to county manager government. Excellent guide for persons interested in manager government for their own counties.

Silas Wright. By John Arthur Garraty. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 426. $5.00.)

Biography by Michigan State College historian of New York Governor and United States Senator of the Jacksonian era.

The Corporation in New Jersey; Business and Politics, 1791–1875. By John William Cadman, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1949. Pp. xvi, 462. $6.00.)

Survey of development of public policy towards the business corporation in New Jersey through 1875, and analysis of charter provisions. Published in cooperation with the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Research in Economic History.

Government and Business. By Ford P. Hall. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1949. Pp. xi, 594. $5.00.)

Third edition of a well-known text, bringing in the many developments of the past decade in this field.

Readings on Agricultural Policy. Edited by O. B. Jesness. (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company. 1949. Pp. xi, 470. $4.75.)

A collection of articles published elsewhere between the years 1935 to 1948, mostly 1944 and after, by leading authorities in the field of agricultural policy.

State Government. By Oliver P. Field, Pressly S. Sikes and John E. Stoner. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1949. Pp. ix, 692. $4.50.)

Third edition of the well known "Bates and Field." Includes among its new materials in the administrative area chapters on "The Administrative System" and on "Personnel, Purchasing and Planning."

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The German Social Democratic Party, 1914–1921. By A. Joseph Berlau. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 374. $4.75.)

The rise of socialist parties to positions of mounting influence and power has been among the most notable trends in European politics for the past fifty years. Whether they are in opposition or responsible for the conduct of government, a close understanding of their various adaptations of Marxian theory to political practice and of their political tactics and strategy, as well as of their position on concrete issues of policy, has become essential for the student of comparative government and international relations. There is no scarcity of general works in this field, but hardly an abundance of careful studies of individual parties other than the British Labor Party. The present study, despite the author's primary concern with a limited period, is a welcome addition to the literature on socialist parties in general and the German Social Democratic Party in particular. Starting with a good thumbnail sketch of the Party's formative years, Berlau undertakes a close analysis of S.P.D. policies and internal tensions during the crucial years of World War I and the establishment of the Weimar Republic. The cleavage between majority Socialists and Independents, the attitudes toward Spartacists and Communists, the Party's position on war aims and peace settlement, and the approach to socialization after 1919 are brought to life through a painstaking scrutiny of the record of those years. There may be room here for differences of interpretation at some points, yet this is an essentially convincing story of accommodation and compromise, even of principle, during the Party's rise to power. Inevitably, perhaps, a dogmatic opposition, called upon to liquidate an empire, had gradually changed "into a nationalist party, ready to co-operate with any other political group on a democratic basis, opposed to proletarian dictatorship, and resisting all practical steps toward the socialization of the means of production" (p. 319). Similar pressures and circumstances are again at work in post-Hitler Germany. Whether the heirs of the Social Democrats of 1919 will prove to be stronger or more imaginative

than their forerunners is not merely a German domestic problem. Berlau's scholarly and discriminating book deserves the attention of all those concerned with the outcome.—WOLFGANG H. KRAUS, *George Washington University.*

Democratic Government in Canada. By R. MACGREGOR DAWSON. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1950. Pp. 188. $2.75.)

With Canada's obvious coming of age during and since World War II and her considerable strategic importance vis-a-vis the United States and Russia, there is already evidence of increasing American (and Canadian) interest in the processes and problems of government in Canada. This awakening interest fortunately coincides with the publication, by one of Canada's foremost political scientists, of an intelligent layman's guide to the structure and functioning of Canadian government, federal, provincial, and municipal. In *Democratic Government in Canada,* Dr. Dawson has done a workmanlike job of condensing his more detailed and exhaustive treatment of the same subject (*The Government of Canada*—University of Toronto Press, 1947) into the basic essentials of Canada's constitutional structure and its parliamentary system while adding a useful survey of the general features of provincial and local government in the Dominion. In a book which is directed, as the author implies in his preface, toward the interested citizen rather than the political science student, it is a real merit to find a readable style unencumbered by excessive footnotes combined with a definitive analysis of fundamentals, a type of treatment frequently difficult for the serious scholar to achieve. One possibility of improvement suggests itself—a somewhat more intensive survey of Canadian political parties and perhaps of current political problems might be more useful than a forty-eight-page appendix devoted to the text of the Canadian constitution.—GEORGE M. HOUGHAM, *University of Pennsylvania.*

The Elizabethan House of Commons. By J. E. NEALE. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1950. Pp. 455. $5.00.)

A masterly study of parliamentary elections, and of membership, organization and procedure in the House of Commons, written in fascinating narrative style by the Astor Professor of English History in the University of London.

Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century. By K. W. SWART. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1949. Pp. 165.)

This well-documented study attempts an appraisal of the extent and effect of a major administrative weakness of governments in France, Spain, England, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and China.

The Law and the Commonwealth. By R. T. E. LATHAM. (London: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. viii, 510–633. $1.75.)

This photographically-reproduced section of W. K. Hancock's *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* (1937) is a brilliant constitutional analysis by a young barrister killed in action with the Royal Air Force.

Germany Under Occupation; Illustrative Materials and Documents. By JAMES K. POLLOCK, JAMES H. MEISEL AND HENRY L. BRETTON. (Ann Arbor: George Wahr Publishing Co. 1949. Pp. 305.)

Discriminating lithoprinted collection of official documents dealing with German occupation and the evolution of the new German state. Extensive revision of 1947 edition.

Contrôle de l'Allemagne. Control of Germany. By LOUIS F. AUBERT, WILLIAM DIEBOLD, MICHAEL ZVEGINTZOV, ET AL. (Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie. Distributed in the U. S. by Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 144. $1.25.)

Education in Occupied Germany. L'Education de l'Allemagne Occupée. By HELEN LIDDELL, EDMUND VERMEIL, BOGDAN SUCHODOLSKI. (Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie. Distributed in the U. S. by Columbia University Press. 1948. Pp. 148. $1.25.)

Two cooperative studies on several basic aspects of the German occupation with substantial papers in French and English by representatives of the Council of Foreign Relations, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Centre d'Études de politique Étrangère and of the corresponding Dutch and Polish institutions. These papers were first delivered at conferences held in Holland in the fall of 1947 and the spring of 1948.

The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907. By WILLIAM ALEXANDER JENKS. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. 227. $3.25.)

Account by Washington and Lee University historian of "one of the last efforts made to reconcile nationalism and democracy with Hapsburg tradition. . . ."

Whirlwind; Tito's Rise to Power. By STEPHEN CLISSOLD. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 245. $3.75.)

A former liaison officer in Tito's headquarters writes an interesting and moving account of the progress of events in Jugoslavia from 1940 to 1945.

The Cardinal's Story; The Life and Work of Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty, Archbishop of Esztergom, Primate of Hungary. By STEPHEN K. SWIFT. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1949. Pp. x, 328. $3.75.)

Dramatic account of the life, imprisonment, and trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, based on eyewitness accounts and including stenographic minutes of his trial.

Leaves from a Russian Diary—and Thirty Years After. By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1950. Pp. ix, 346. $3.50.)

Harvard sociologist republishes, with new introduction, personal recollections of the progress of events in Russia in the years 1917–1922. First published in 1924.

India, Pakistan, and the West. By PERCIVAL SPEAR. (London: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 232. $2.00.)

A fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge, offers in this volume of the Home University Library a geographical, historical, economic, and political summary.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948. By George Lenczowski. (New York: Cornell University Press. 1949. Pp. xv, 393. $4.50.)

This is a very informative study within a narrow frame of reference. The book does not give a political, social, and economic analysis of Iran but aims to present the rivalries between the Big Powers in Iran over the last thirty years. Dr. Lenczowski, now of Hamilton College and formerly an officer of the Polish Foreign Service, stationed in Teheran from 1942 to 1945, discusses these conflicts with considerable supporting documentation, drawn from treaties, publications of the Comintern, materials from the Iranian press, as well as the writings of European and American students. All these form the basis of the author's treatment of the Soviet attempts to expand into Iran and of the methods used by the West to counteract the pressure of the USSR. This is done in a very scholarly manner. The author might have investigated more the internal factors in Iran which have allowed the Big Power rivalries to flourish so extensively. While this is perhaps going somewhat deeper than the author intended, the fact still remains that the enormous oil resources plus the political instability of the government, the economic plight of the people, and the social backwardness of the country are very important elements in precipitating Big Power rivalries in Iran.—William B. Ballis, *University of Washington.*

Making the Peace—1941–1945. By William L. Neuman. (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs. 1950. Pp. 101. $1.00.)

Critical analysis by member of the board of directors of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs of allied diplomacy in wartime conferences.

International Monetary and Financial Conferences in the Interwar Period. By Dean E. Traynor. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 1949. Pp. ix, 196. $2.25.)

A doctoral dissertation, appearing as volume 23 of the Catholic University Studies in Economics, analyzing the contribution of the conference method to the solution of international financial problems. Deals principally with conferences held at Brussels, Genoa, and London.

Contemporary International Relations; 1949–1950. Edited by Norman J. Padelford. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1949. Pp. xii, 397. $2.50.)

Collection of reading materials on major problems of present-day international relations, selected to provide up-to-date description and different points of view. Supplemented by brief editorial comment, selected references, and maps and charts. Eleanor Kearns and F. Pauline Tompkins are associate editors. Announced as the first of an annual series.

The European Press Today. By European Affairs Division, Library of Congress. (Washington, D.C.: 1949. Pp. 152. [Multilith.] $1.00. For sale by Card Division, Library of Congress.)

Analytically annotated survey of selected European newspapers and periodicals representing a useful guide to the political atmosphere, kind of reportage, and individual characteristics of the European press.

The United States and Europe; a Bibliographical Examination of Thought Expressed in American Publications during 1949. By European Affairs Division, Library of Congress. (Washington, D.C. 1949. Pp. 192. [Multilith.] $1.30. For sale by Card Division, Library of Congress.)

Annual issue of study of the year's output of books, pamphlets and periodical articles concerned with Europe and with United States foreign policy toward Europe, in form of a bibliographical survey, annotated with full descriptive and analytical comment.

1949 Annual Review of United Nations Affairs. Edited by Clyde Eagleton. (New York: New York University Press. 1950. Pp. ix, 322. $5.00.)

Proceedings of the first New York University Institute for Annual Review of the United Nations, held at New York University and at Lake Success in July, 1949. Most of the lectures are by United Nations officials. The Institute has been established as a regular part of the New York University Program of Graduate Studies in United Nations and World Affairs.

How Can We the People Achieve a Just Peace? Selected Speeches, Second Annual Session, Mount Holyoke College Institute on The United Nations, June 26-July 23, 1949. Edited by Ruth C. Lawson, director. (Holyoke, Mass.: Mount Holyoke College. 1949. Pp. viii, 254. $2.00.)

Compilation of thirty-five speeches dealing with human rights, European union, conflicts in Asia, and the outlook for world stability.

Non-Self-Governing Territories; Summaries and Analyses of Information Transmitted to the Secretary-General during 1948. By The United Nations. (Lake Success, New York: United Nations Publications. 1949. Pp. vii, 686.)

Third of a series of reports on the administration of trust territories. It deals with the year 1947, summarizing information received by the United Nations from trust territory administering states.

African Dependencies; A Challenge to Western Democracy. By Nwankwo Chukuwemeka. (New York: The William-Frederick Press. 1950. Pp. 210. $3.50.)

A study of colonial problems in general with special emphasis on Nigeria, a dependency of Great Britain. Analyzes the resources, and makes suggestions for the economic development of the colony.

Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction. Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General. (Lake Success, New York: United Nations Publication. 1949. Pp. vii, 147. $1.00.)

Report prepared on the request of the General Assembly to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with international crimes.

Documents on European Recovery and Defence; March 1947–April 1949. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1949. Pp. vii, 150. $2.50.)

Brief compilation of texts of fourteen selected documents, 1944–1949, such as the Benelux Customs Convention, Dunkirk Treaty, Marshall Plan Address, Brussels Treaty, North Atlantic Treaty, and Council of Europe Statute.

The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy; A Documentary Record. Edited by James W. Gantenbein. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. xxvii, 979. $12.50.)

Collection of some 300 official documents—selected from U. S. Government publications, speeches of leading statesmen, diplomatic notes, and international agreements—tracing the main lines of our foreign policy regarding Latin America.

Berlin Command. By Brigadier General Frank Howley. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1950. Pp. 276. $3.50.)

A member of General Clay's staff, deputy and later commandant of the American sector of Berlin, 1945–1949, gives an uninhibited account of his four years' dealings with the Russians.

The People Don't Know; The American Press and the Cold War. By George Seldes. (New York: Gaer Associates. 1949. Pp. 342. $3.00.)

Indictment of American press and other means of mass communication for allegedly misinforming the people as to what is happening in Europe.

POLITICAL THEORY AND MISCELLANEOUS

Respublica Helveticorum. By Ernst Reibstein. (Bern: Verlag Haupt. 1949. Pp. 101.)

In a brief but informative compass, Ernst Reibstein has given us a summary analysis of a forgotten study of Swiss government in the sixteenth century, Josias Simler's *Respublica Helveticorum.* His little book by the same title begins with an illuminating general discussion on "Simler und Althusius" which unfortunately is not instructed by any knowledge of the more recent literature on Althusius, such as the writings of Mesnard, C. J. Friedrich or Erik Wolf. As a result, this discussion lacks perspective and depth. Much more valuable and really helpful are the five chapters on Simler proper, in which Reibstein deals with (1) the author and his work; (2) state, law and morals as problems of method; (3) the legitimacy of the Swiss Confederation; (4) the commonwealth as prince (*civitas sibi princeps*); and (5) confederate government. Simler's book on the Swiss Commonwealth had a tremendous influence; it was for many years *the* authoritative interpretation. Published in Latin and German in 1576 for the first time, it ran through many editions, and was translated into French and Dutch and, I believe, into English. Reibstein first of all seeks to identify the philosophical outlook of his author, and places him—in contrast to a modern (in his view Kantian) theory of law as the product of the state—in the tradition of Stoic and medieval philosophy which considers law as a product of natural law and justice. Reibstein would maintain that *lex injusta non est lex* is a universally accepted *principium juris* and he goes so far as to allege that "it would be an inconceivable thought for the sixteenth century that the government (*Staatsgewalt*) could establish moral—and hence legal—duties which are not already given by natural justice." In light of the Tudor legislation regarding oaths of supremacy this is an astonishing statement, indeed. Reibstein's discussion of Simler's ideas on the legitimacy of the Swiss confederation is quite

suggestive. Unfortunately, he exaggerates the role of certain writers, such as Vasquez, but it is nevertheless very helpful that the author, on the basis of earlier studies, stresses the significance of the Spanish school. His statement, however, that these writers are the bridge from Bartolus to Althusius (p. 54) would be objected to by many, including D'Entrèves, whose work appears not to be known to Reibstein. Yet, I am inclined to agree with Reibstein that the references to Simler in Althusius and other systematic writers show that "democracy has on the continent a much older scientific tradition than is commonly assumed." Relating this aspect to the more general thought of monarchomachs and constitutionalists, Reibstein declares that Althusius recognizes that "the Swiss resisted with force of arms the tyrannies of the Austrians, and approves of it." In doing so Althusius went beyond the argument Simler himself is prepared to develop. Enough. What has been said should suffice to show that all students of the history of political thought and institutions will find much of interest in the study here presented.—CARL J. FRIEDRICH, *Harvard University.*

Our Eminent Friend Edmund Burke. By THOMAS W. COPELAND. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1949. Pp. ix, 251. $4.00.)

Burke's Politics: Selected Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke. EDITED BY ROSS J. S. HOFFMAN AND PAUL LEVACK. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1949. Pp. xxxvii, 536. $4.75.)

The first of these volumes is comprised of six well-considered biographical essays, the most interesting of which is concerned with Burke's relations with Paine prior to the publication of the *Reflections.* Professor Copeland suggests that Burke's apparent ability to predict the developments of the French Revolution can be explained in part by his connection with Paine, who was himself in intimate contact with the situation in France. The other essays, which are equally well done, deal with such questions as Burke's journalistic career, his relations with Boswell, and the identity of "Monsieur Dupont." The second of these books, *Burke's Politics,* is entirely different in character. It is designed to present in a single volume the substance of Burke's contribution to political philosophy with emphasis on revolution and reform, particularly the latter. The selections which appear are preceded by a rather long introduction, chiefly notable for the highly sympathetic tenor of its exposition.—LAWRENCE C. WANLASS, *Mount Holyoke College.*

Industrialisation et Technocratie. EDITED BY GEORGE GURVITCH, WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY LUCIEN FEBVRE. (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin. 1949. Pp. xii, 214.)

A significant symposium, the result of a conference held in 1948 under the auspices of the Centre d'Études Sociologiques and related in subject matter to an earlier one (Progrès Technique et Progrès Moral) organized in 1947 by the Rencontres Internationals de Genève. Among subjects of particular interest to the political scientist are such papers as M. Byé's "Toward a Fourth Power" and Harold Laski's "State, Worker, and Technician."

The Idea of Progress; A Collection of Readings. By Frederick J. Teggart and George H. Hildebrand. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1949. Pp. xi, 457. $6.00.)

Carefully selected readings on the idea of progress from Hesiod to Darwin. Original selections were made by the late Professor Teggart for a course syllabus and published in 1929. Professor Hildebrand has revised these selections, added new ones, and written a 30 page introductory essay on the history of the idea of progress.

On World Government or *De Monarchia.* By Dante Alighieri. Translated by Herbert W. Schneider with an introduction by Dino Bigongiari. (New York: The Little Library of Liberal Arts. The Liberal Arts Press. 1949. Pp. xiv, 61. $0.40.)

A new translation, slightly abridged, of one of the classical statements of medieval political thought, with an incisive analytical introduction by a veteran teacher of medieval intellectual history.

Human Rights; Comments and Interpretations. Edited by UNESCO. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. 288. $3.75.)

Printed here are thirty-one of the more significant replies, from thinkers of many nations, to a questionnaire on the theoretical bases of the rights of man.

Primer of Intellectual Freedom. Edited by Howard Mumford Jones. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1949. Pp. xv, 191. $2.75.)

Compilation by Harvard English professor of sixteen important statements supporting freedom of discussion. Selections range from Bacon in 1605 to Conant in 1949.

English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By Crane Brinton. 1949. Pp. vii, 312. $3.50.)

Studies of nineteen nineteenth century English political writers by Harvard historian. First published in 1933 and reprinted here in original form.

The Debate on the American Revolution, 1761–1783. Edited by Max Beloff. (London: Nicholas Kaye. 1949. Pp. xi. 304. 12s. 6d.)

Standard selections from British and American thinkers of the eighteenth century. Analytical introduction by the editor, reader in comparative institutions at Oxford.

St. Thomas and the World State. By Robert M. Hutchins. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 1949. Pp. 53. $1.50.)

Lecture by the Chancellor of the University of Chicago in the spring of 1949 at Marquette University. One of a series of annual Aquinas lectures sponsored by the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University.

The Driving Power of Western Civilization; The Christian Revolution of the Middle Ages. By Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1949. Pp. xiv, 126. $2.50.)

This book is the first of a series entitled *Seeds-Of-Thought,* edited by Karl W. Deutsch. This volume represents part of the author's earlier publication: *Out of Revolution; Autobiography of Western Man.*

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, RENE. *Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. 314. $4.25.

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